This article is an exploration of the interconnected legal ties between Christians and Zoroastrians in the early Islamic era. Drawing from the writings of the Christian authors Ishobokt, Simeon, and Henanisho, Payne describes how East Syrian bishops appropriated laws of marriage, inheritance, and property from Iranian jurisprudential traditions as a means of transferring wealth intergenerationally and extending their judicial authority. Payne thus explores the ways in which the Christians of Iran were influenced by the Iranian legal system and culture and in the seventh century CE.

Azerbaijani national history theory poses a challenge to the conventional history writing of Iran. Since 1937, Azerbaijani Soviet historians in Baku have constructed an Azerbaijani national history and identity based on the territorial definition of the nation. This approach was supported by Joseph Stalin. By the 1940s, this narrative incorporated various components hitherto exclusively known as “Iranian,” such as the Medes. Meanwhile, Soviet Iranologists and Orientalists, followers of the conventional Iranian narrative, tried to avoid controversy with the Azerbaijani claims, which secured political support at the highest level. When Stalin died in 1953, the Iranologists raised their voices, which caused controversy with political connotations. Using primary source materials, this article sheds light on the first round of discussions between Azerbaijani historians, constructors of their national history, and the Soviet Iranologists, the proponents of conventional Iranian history. The article also shows the limits of the Communist Party's control over history writing and the hardships of accommodating contradictory interpretations of history within a multinational communist state.

From December 1930, when the first Iranian feature film was made to the 1980s, the connections between Persian literature and the Iranian cinema have been intimate, varied, and significant. In fact, an examination of the Iranian cinema in terms of the roles literature plays in it demonstrates that the cinema constitutes an important aspect of the sociology of the Iranian writer, especially from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s.

This essay surveys the role of literature and Iranian writers in the Iranian cinema and then focuses on a prominent example of the relationship between literature and movies, the popular 1971 film called Dash Akol, for the purpose of indicating differences in the aims and effects of the two art forms.

Alongside the burgeoning secular ideas on people and state during the Constitutional Revolution, a movement seeking a modern Islamic state, governed according to the shari'a, also emerged. This article studies the evolution of that movement in Isfahan, first by contrasting the experience of two brothers of very different ages, Aqa Najafi Isfahani and Haj Aqa Nurullah Isfahani, and examining the way the younger became receptive to the Pan-Islamic ideas then current in the Middle East. Second, the article considers in particular the political theory of Aqa Nurullah, which was influenced by his practical experience of institutional innovation in Isfahan. He argued that constitutionalism was implicit to Islam and saw it as generating wealth for Muslims. He also advocated many of the features of later Islamism, including the desire for a strong army.

The specific sense that the word xratu- possesses in the Gāthās has not received the attention it deserves. As this article will show, this specific sense points to the eschatological foundation of Zoroastrianism. Eschatological concerns did not first develop in the frame of an established “monotheistic” religion; rather, Zoroastrianism arose from those concerns. The xratu- has a strictly eschatological function in the Gāthās. The noun retains this semantic capacity not only in the Young Avestan but also in the Middle Persian Zoroastrian texts. Iranian languages share the noun with Vedic and (archaic) Greek, where it has the basic meaning of the mental capacity to achieve proposed goals, hence practical intelligence, resourcefulness, or efficacy. If this is in fact the general sense that xratu- has in Iranian, as will be briefly pointed out, the specifically eschatological meaning that it acquires in the Gāthās must indicate the type of religious discourse to which these compositions belong. The noun may, further, have developed its eschatological meaning before the time of the Gāthās and already become a technical term. In this case, it would be legitimate to ask whether there are traces in the Gāthās that point to the institutional background of the term. There do indeed seem to be such traces. The term seems to have been used in the technical sense of the mental power to attain the divine sphere in the daēva cult.

This study investigates university coaches' knowledge about their legal duties toward their athletes, as well as the connection between the level of their legal knowledge and their educational, social and economic background. The results are presented according to three major dimensions: deficiencies in the coaches' training system, in their knowledge concerning their legal responsibility and the coaches' social recognition regarding their profession. The findings indicate that the coaches' training in Iran has a lot of weaknesses, including the neglect of legal issues, the consequence of which is that the Iranian university coaches do not have sufficient knowledge about the legal issues in general and they are not aware of their duty toward their athletes in particular. In Iran coaching is not considered as a prestigious occupation; in terms of social status coaches belong to the lower middle class.

The triumph of the Khomeini forces and of the Iranian revolution in February 1979, sweeping away the old imperial regime and the transitional Bakhtiyar government, marked the beginning of a highly critical period in American-Iranian relations. The conflict culminated in the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran and in the holding of U.S. diplomats as hostages for well over a year. The hostage issue was the most controversial question for U.S. foreign policy in 1980 and marked a historic low point in relations between the two countries.

From the viewpoint of most Iranian leaders, this battle was an inevitable one. Based on their perceptions of bilateral relations over the previous three decades, Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters expected a deterministically hostile United States. In their eyes, Washington had provided the main foreign support for the shah, a regime for which their passionate hatred can scarcely be overstated, and had tried to prevent the revolution's triumph.

The nomadic tribes of Iran have long attracted interest, yet despite many descriptive accounts there have been few critical studies of them. Major obstacles to analysis have been a romanticization of nomadism, a dichotomization that emphasizes the differences between nomadism and agriculture, and a disregard for the historical setting and change. Discussions have tended to obscure important economic and social relationships between nomadic and sedentary society, and within the tribal structure itself; moreover, it has often been assumed that an organic or deterministic, link between pastoralism and tribal political structures exists.

The Bakhtiyārī are commonly associated with the central Zagros mountains. It is assumed that this rugged area in turn necessitates transhumant movement of the Bakhtiyārī with their flocks of sheep and goats and a tribal organization to accomplish this end. Furthermore, this environment isolates and gives the tribe autonomy vis-a-vis the state.

The Royal Harem is Perhaps One of the Most Misunderstood Institutions of the Perso-Islamic social order. The myths surrounding the harem originated primarily in the West, fomented to a great extent by European travelers over a period of several centuries. As is well known, the Islamic empires, at their zenith (beginning around A.D. 1500), attracted numerous European merchants and traders, as well as assorted adventurers, emissaries, and missionaries. Many of them took up residence in these countries, some for a short time, some for many years. They toured cities, saw the countryside and became acquainted with the local people. In several instances, some made their way into the royal courts. Many of these travelers kept extensive notes about their journeys and left careful sketches of the various aspects of the society with which they came in contact. Often, upon their return home, many made their narratives available at court and sometimes to the public.

In less than twenty years, Nadir Shah built an empire across Iran, India, and Central Asia. When he took the throne on the Mughan steppe in 1148/1736, Nadir confronted the problem of how to legitimize his reign after two centuries of Shi'i Safavid rule. He attempted to solve this problem, in part, by challenging Iran's Twelver Shi'i identity.

Nadir proposed to the Ottomans that Twelver Shi'ism be considered a fifth school of Sunni Islam, to be called the Ja'fari madhhab after the sixth Imam, Ja'far al-Sadiq. In exchange for Shi'i renunciation of such practices as sabb (the ritual cursing of the first three caliphs), Nadir proposed that the Ottomans give this Ja'fari madhhab all the privileges enjoyed by the four Sunni schools, and that a fifth pillar be erected in the Ka'bah in Mecca to commemorate it. He asked that the Ottomans allow him to appoint the leader of the annual ḥajj caravan from Iran.

The Turkmen inhabit a portion of the Central Asian steppe extending cast from the Caspian Sea to the Amu Darya, a region divided among three countries--Iran, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union. The central part of this area is the Kara Kum, or “black sand,” a vast, largely uninhabited desert. The majority of the Turkmen are concentrated in two somewhat more fertile regions bordering the Kara Kum. One area consists of the banks of the Amu Darya; the other is a long strip of plains and low mountains, lying south of the Kara Kum and separating it from the Iranian Plateau (see Map below). The Turkmen number about a million and a half, with approximately a million living in the Soviet Union, and roughly a quarter of a million each in Iran and Afghanistan.

Research in Iranian social and economic history is still relatively unknown. This situation is puzzling in view of the social and economic research in Arab and Turkish history, particularly from 1955 onwards. in the past ten years, social and economic research in these two areas of Middle East history have produced some excellent results. But similar research in Iranian history has not developed. This state of affairs is disappointing when we recall the words of Vladimir Minorsky in his "Foreword" to the Tadhkirat al-mulūk in 1943:

This article presents a detailed criticism of Darioush Bayandor's book Iran and the CIA. Bayandor argues that certain Shi'a clerics, rather than the US Central Intelligence Agency, were the main actors responsible for overthrowing Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in August 1953. Bayandor presents no major new evidence to support this claim. He gives too much weight to certain statements, draws unwarranted inferences from others, and discounts or disregards a wealth of evidence that conflicts with his account. He overemphasizes the role of civilian crowds in the overthrow of Mosaddeq and underemphasizes the role of Iranian military units organized by the CIA. And he fails to acknowledge the importance of US and especially British efforts to foment opposition to Mosaddeq before the coup.

This paper discusses the attempted resumption of paramount Qashqa'i leadership upon the fall of the Pahlavi regime in 1979. Paramount Qashqa'i leaders had been exiled from Iran following their support of Prime Minister Mosaddeq in the early 1950s and had, since then, either remained in exile or returned to Iran to live under political restrictions. In early 1979, those in exile returned to Iran and joined the others in resuming positions of regional and national political power.

These questions are central to the discussion and analysis: What was the nature of Qashqa'i leadership both before and during Pahlavi rule, and how and why had it changed under the Islamic Republic of Iran? How had changes in Iran affecting the Qashqa'i people between 1953 and 1979 affected the attempted resumption of paramount leadership? How had the nature of the Iranian state changed during these periods? How are Qashqa'i leaders best characterized? Are they “tribal” or national-minority leaders, or are they better seen as regional and national powers? How is Qashqa'i leadership different from other kinds of political leadership in Iran, in particular that of other tribes and national minorities, and why?

This article discusses the use of food as a mode of differentiation and identification according to Zoroastrian Middle Persian and Persian texts of the late antique period. In these texts, the list of foods consumed by Arabs and Indians are juxtaposed with that of the Iranian diet, and each group is given anthropological treatment. The article contends that the Zoroastrian dietary law, based on the Middle Persian texts, provides a mode of purity and impurity vis-à-vis others. Finally, the article touches upon the idea of moderation and the consumption of wine as dealt with in some Middle Persian sources.

In the first surviving portrait of Fath ᶜAli Shah (r. 1797-1834) as the Qajar sovereign, painted in 1213/1797-98, just after his accession, the young shah appears with a turban-like cap decorated with a plumed jiqqa (aigrette, fig. 1). The so-called Kayanid crown, a creation of his uncle and predecessor, Aqa Muhammad Shah Qajar (1785-97), is missing. In contrast to most other royal portraits of the later years, here in this majestic work by the master painter, Mirza Baba Shirazi, the shah poses on what appears to be a platform throne covered with a carpet, though at the time there was no Qajar royal throne in existence. The absence of the crown and the throne, the most conspicuous symbols of kingly authority, made the young Fath ᶜAli Shah a crown-and-throne-less king (bī tāj va takht), a synonym for utter powerlessness in the Persian political culture.

The document translated below is a will written by cAbbās Mīrzā, the Heir Apparent, in July, 1830, three years before his death in Khurasan. This will is important because of its style and content. Written in a hasty manner, and originally in Persian, in some places it gives the impression of having been translated from Āzarī Turkish. The author has paid little attention to grammatical rules and literary embellishments. The force of the document derives from the author's deep feelings of hope (for future military success), sorrow (for past defeats), and uncertainty and worry (for the destiny of his children). References are made to the political events and personalities of the times, not directly, but in connection with the author's personal concerns. On the whole, cAbbās Mīrzā's major preoccupations in this document are to justify past errors, to be buried as a man of God, and to be remembered as a national hero.

This paper classifies Persian negative elements and analyzes the negative structures based on Minimalism and Distributed Morphology. Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) in Persian which have [−neg] check its feature against [+neg] of negative marker for convergence. Negative Concord Items (NCIs), which are inherently negative, have [+neg]. Thus, in the NC Sentences, we have two [+neg]—one in negative marker, and the other in NCI. It can be misread that a NC structure, like Double Negation, delivers an affirmative reading. To prevent the misreading, we assumed Neg-absorption and Neg-criterion. However, that is impossible in Double Negation with two negative markers placed in different NegP, so the [+neg] in the sentence remain till Logical Form (LF) and they cancel each other and, as a result, the sentence becomes affirmative. Based on Minimalism and Distributed Morphology, the unified account on the structure of negation is examined.

The splendour of Safavid Isfahan is no doubt proverbial. The landmarks that come to mind--the great Maydān-i Shāh with its stage perpetually set, the elegant Chahār Bāgh avenue, the graceful bridges slung across the Zayandah Rud--would make it appear as though the topography of Isfahan today, except for the old Jāmiᶜ, is a Safavid one. It is hard to believe, however, that the ages have not left a deeper mark, that the patterns of life generated in the pre-Safavid past did not affect profoundly the course of subsequent development.

Consider for example the curious orientation of Shāh ᶜAbbās’ imperial centerpiece, the Maydān-i Shāh. The two imperial mosques built to the south and east of the Maydān, the Masjid-i Shāh and the Luṭfallah Mosque, awkwardly twist on their axes in order to face the proper direction for prayer, the qiblah.