It is generally agreed that the rise of the Safavids in the sixteenth century marks a new period in the history of Persia. Hegemony of one dynasty over nearly all the Persian-speaking world, accompanied by the swift forced conversion of the overwhelming majority of the Persians into Twelver Shi'ism, resulted in the emergence of the first Persian state in the modern era. Such a signal event could not but invest the Persian state and society with major, fundamental institutions. The same institutions have continued to characterize and to influence Persia down to the Constitutionalist Revolution of 1905-1911. It is these institutions that constitute the “traditional” features of the society against which the forces of “modernization” have been operating since the adoption of the Constitution and the Supplementary Fundamental Law of 1907.

This article explores tales and tropes of conversion, especially conversion engendered by romantic attraction for the religious other, in the poetry of Farīd al-Dīn ‘Attār. The plot dynamics of class, gender and confessional adherence are complex, and hold important clues to the poet's theology. One particularly rich example of the encoding of religious and social boundaries can be found in a body of ghazals written about the beautiful Christian boy (tarsā-bachcha). The history of this homoerotic sub-genre is traced, and ‘Attār's treatment of the theme is explored in juxtaposition not only to earlier authors, but to other motifs of the religious other and of religious conversion, appearing in his own oeuvre, including the narrative of Shaykh San‘ān with its representation of the Christian girl beloved. The terminology of Christianity and the markers by which ‘Attār construes Christian-ness are discussed, and these symbolically amorous encounters with Christianity are analyzed as part of a larger discourse of emasculation which ‘Attār constructs around conversion, religious affiliation, and insufficient commitment to spiritual growth. Analysis of the dynamic interplay of markers of gender and class in the tales and topoi dealing with religious conversion or cross-confessional interaction will ultimately afford a perspective into ‘Attār's conception of the specific religious traditions juxtaposed to Islam, as well as his beliefs about inter-religious relations.

As a collectively acting subject, the Pahlavi regime constituted itself through a functional memory by construing a particular past. In this way, the official or political memory served as the regime's key legitimizing factor. Both Pahlavi shahs attempted to appropriate the Iranian past as well as its future; that is, they legitimized their rule in retrospect and sought to immortalize themselves prospectively. In contrast to the official historiography, ‘counter-memories’ are often established. The motive in producing such a ‘counter-memory,’ whose founders are usually the conquered and oppressed, is to delegitimize the perceived oppressive balance of power. An outspoken critic of the Pahlavi regime, the Iranian teacher and writer Jalal Al-e Ahmad ‘wrote back,’ trying his hand at a ‘counter memory’.

For the nationalist elite of early Pahlavi Iran, the regime's military successes over tribal opposition, whether real or imagined, were welcomed and celebrated. These successes were interpreted as confirmation of their views of tribal power as hostile to modernity, archaic and outmoded, and of Riza Shah as the deliverer of Iran's national salvation. This conceptualization of the “tribal problem” had appeared in tandem with and as a product of modernist ideology in the late nineteenth century, acquired the backing of state power with the rise of the Pahlavi dynasty, and endured until the revolution of 1979. It communicated itself, in diluted form, to Western scholarship, which has been largely content to depict Riza Shah's tribal policies as regrettably brutal, but an unavoidable stage in Iran's progress and “modernization.”

Yet this version of tribe–state relations is clearly an ideological construct rather than an historical analysis. The account which follows begins a re-evaluation of tribal politics in modern Iran, focusing especially on the Riza Shah decades when these politics were a site of intense conflict and where the nationalist template was most starkly delineated, and concludes by tracing and re-examining the evolution of the tribe–state dynamic in the decades of land reform and revolution.

Persian historical sources, especially those of the early Qajar period, devote more attention to the achievements of the Russian czar Peter I (r. 1682-1725) than to any other “modern” European monarch. The image of Peter the Great captured the attention of Iranian reformers, who articulated their own hopes by glorifying him as the regenerator of the Russian Empire. They drew an ambiguous image of the czar, portraying him, on the one hand, with admiration and esteem and, on the other, with fear and mistrust. Yet the Qajar ruling elite looked to Peter as a sort of mirror in which they could see their own reflection and as a symbol crucial to the construction of a discourse that in their minds would lead to change, a discourse that resonated naturally with the political requirements of their nation. By using Czar Peter as a point of reference, Iranian reformers expressed their dismay at the deteriorating international status of Iran and the urgency to arrive at solutions.

The first Iranian to study medicine abroad was sent to Britain by the Iranian government in 1811, during the early decades of the Qajar period (1796–1925). The second student was sent to France in 1815, along with four other students. Another group of five students, including the third student of medicine, was sent to France in 1845. Forty-two others, including five medical students, were dispatched to France in 1858. Most members of the latter group were among the first graduates of Tehran Dar al-Fonun (House of Techniques) School. Then, in 1928, during Reza Shah Pahlavi's reign (1925–41), a special act was passed by the Iranian parliament (Majlis) according to which the Ministry of Education would send 100 students abroad annually for higher education at the government's expense. The practice was suspended in 1935 with the advent of the Second World War. Between 1928 and 1935, a total of 640 students, including 125 medical students, were sent abroad. The majority of the medical students (84 percent) were sent to France. Most of these medical graduates returned to Iran and in subsequent years played a significant role in further propagation of modern medical knowledge in the country. The paper presents a brief historical account of the conditions of public health and medical education between 1811 and 1935 as well as biographical sketches of some of the best-known or most influential medical figures among these graduates.

Although it is generally accepted that the Soviet Union did not play a significant role in the events leading to the overthrow of Mohammed Mosaddeq in 1953, little has been written about how the Soviets perceived the Iranian leader and the movement he inspired. This article argues that Soviet leaders generally saw Mosaddeq as weak and ill-disposed towards the Soviet Union. The Soviet failure to secure an oil concession in Iran in 1946 and general conservatism about anti-colonial movements during the late Stalin period conditioned their assessment of Mosaddeq's premiership. After Soviet policy towards the Third World changed in the mid-1950s, Mosaddeq's movement was reinterpreted as a genuine “struggle of national liberation.”

In the 1990s, Russia and Iran successfully laid the foundations for interaction and expanded their spheres of cooperation. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, their relations developed unevenly. These fluctuations depended on the combination of global and regional factors, as well as on the internal circumstances in each country. Russia's participation in international sanctions has aroused discontent in Iran. Despite this, the political establishments of both countries continue to demonstrate an interest in developing bilateral relations and to reaffirm their shared geopolitical interests. This paper analyzes foreign policy documents and the latest research by Russian and Iranian scholars. It strives to shed light on the question: “To what extent and in what areas do the interests of Russia and Iran coincide, and what is the foundation for their potential future development?”

More than half the population of Iran is under the age of seventeen, but despite these more than 30 million children and adolescents, social scientists know little about their experiences, culture, or history.

This ignorance is a reflection of what social scientists deem important. The dismissive attitude toward research with children is similar to earlier attitudes toward research with women: at best women were quantified and described. Most social scientists were male, seeing women from a male point of view. Out of the innocent arrogance that a male-dominated science breeds in its practitioners, women's own culture was largely ignored; “culture” was male culture. This changed only when women social scientists started to look at women through their own eyes.

Iranian Society has Traditionally had a Deep Admiration for the Courageous hero or champion, often called jawānmard (lit., young man; jawānmardī—manliness). Such a person possessed the aggregate of all positive virtues of manhood—courage, honesty, hospitality and generosity. One model of the jawānmard is the heroic warrior, as reflected in Persian epic literature and classical popular romance. In Persian culture, Rustam, the legendary pre-Islamic hero of the epic Shah-nāmah embodied the characteristics of the heroic warrior.

A related term for jawānmard is the Arabic fatā (lit., young man; manliness—futuwwa; Persian futuwwat), which designated the ideal hero of pre-Islamic Arabia. In Perso-Islamic culture, a synthesis of ancient Persian and Arabo-Islamic ideals, the ethic of piety towards God, which was influenced by the increasing dominance of Sufism, shaped a second model of heroism.

In 1978 the publication of Edward Said's Orientalism changed forever the terms of the debate about the nature of western scholarship on the non-western world. Profoundly unsettling, Said's work had a transformational impact on many academic disciplines in western Europe, the Americas and across Asia. Although drawing on older ideas and research, including critiques of western scholarship formulated in the Soviet Union, Said's book, along with Said's own public persona, came to represent and symbolize a broader rejection of existing power-political relationships between the imperial metropoles and the colonial world. In Orientalism, Said was principally concerned with deconstructing a discourse, seeking to analyze the specific character of a particular ideological mission, the elaboration of Anglo-French Orientalism, through which European intellectuals made an essential contribution to the extension of western hegemonic power over the East. Taking case studies drawn from Iran and the wider Persophone region, the question is posed whether a similar intellectual construction may be discerned within nineteenth century Russian, or post-1917 Soviet, discourses on the Orient. Were tsarist Russian scholars and administrators concerned with the Persophone world Orientalists in the Saidian sense? What was the significance of the rupture of 1917 in Russian discourses on the Orient? Did Soviet Iranology continue or break with traditional imperial Orientology? What was the relationship between knowledge of the East and power over it for imperial Russia and in the Soviet Union? Most controversially, did imperial Russian or Soviet Iranology display the same predisposition as Anglo-French discourses to essentialize Orient and Occident, to impose profound ontological oppositions between them and to conclude with the inherent superiority of the latter?

I regard the arguments about nationalism or the lack of it, and about whether or not the Safavid state can be called a nation-state, as in many ways sterile. What I am much more interested in is the question whether or not the Safavids created a state at all, in any generally accepted sense of the word. I propose in a moment to look at some of the commonly accepted characteristics of the state, and see whether or not the Safavid system possessed these characteristics. It is because I do not want to place primary emphasis on the concept of the “nation-state” that I have entitled this paper “The Safavid state and polity”--the latter meaning, of course, an organized society of which they were a part, for to Plato and Aristotle the polis was more than just a natural organism such as a herd or a hive.

Anthropological participant observation during two different periods (1978–79 and 2003–08) documents dramatic change in gender identity and expectations in an Iranian village. While patriarchal definitions of females and their places and on-the-ground social conditions restricted female agency and kept women and girls under the authority of male supervisors 30 years ago, recent years have witnessed growing opportunities for females. Now most girls complete high school before marriage, and may even travel to other cities for higher education. In “Aliabad,” however, for the great majority, more education for females has not led to participation in the labor market. Ethnographic research focuses on how young females negotiate between the more traditional expectations and cultural constraints and the new opportunities to serve their own interests as best as possible. Although work outside of the home presents too many difficulties for the great majority of Aliabad females, who must marry in order to obtain financial support, females have used their education and the increased self-confidence, experience, status, and literacy to develop more influential positions within the marriage relationship, among kin and in-laws, and in the community. Young village women have been involved in constructing their evolving identities in an environment of social change and modernization.

According to S. N. Elsenstadt, Institutions are Those Processes and structures, together with the associated set of regulative principles, that arrange human activities in a community “into definite organizational patterns from the point of view of some of the perennial, basic problems of any society or ordered social life.” From this perspective, the social dimension of the concept of social institutions is seen in terms of its “institutional spheres,” which include family and kinship, education, economics, politics, culture, and stratification. To this list may be added those approaches in psychology in which the unit of analysis is the group, community, or society.

Because the subject of “Social Institutions” covers such a vast domain, it will be necessary to focus upon only certain entries of the EIr in this domain. However, before proceeding, it is worth noting that some 150 articles in the first seven volumes may be classified under “social institutions,” including the subsections of articles.

Ever Since The Appearance of the Notion of the “Intellectual,” Writers and theorists have been preoccupied with attempting to define just what an intellectual is, or ought to be. Is an intellectual a detached observer, one who is free from the immediate concerns of life, and interested primarily in the pursuit of timeless and universal truths, as Julien Benda argued in La Trahison des clercs, or is an intellectual one who very much engages with society, necessarily challenges power, one who, in Edward Said's words, “is a spirit in opposition” who raises “embarrassing questions … and cannot easily be co-opted by governments or corporations, and whose raison d'être is to represent all those people and issues that are routinely forgotten or swept under the rug”? Sociologists and historians have adopted a variety of approaches to this concept: in a sociological sense, they have applied the term to all those who produce and propagate thought and culture, thus designating a neutral although wide socio-professional category, or in an attempt to narrow down the grouping, they have qualified the word with distinct characteristics, pointing out a certain way of acting in public life.

Among the demands formulated by the ˓ulamā and the tujjār (merchants) who took bast in the shrine of Shah ˓Abd al Azim in December of 1905 was the establishment of an ‘Edālat Khāneh (House of Justice).

The significance of the House of Justice was that it proved to be the prototype for what later became the Majles-e Shūrā-ye Mellī (National Assembly). Paradoxically, this also proved to be obstructive to its becoming a focus for scholarly attention, in the sense that it was soon superseded by the Majles itself, which began to function in the summer of 1906. The role of addressing public grievances was in fact the basic function of the Edalat Khaneh. However, the basic engraving on the society that the Majles was a substitute for the Edalat Khaneh is well illustrated by the fact that during the early period of the Majles over 1000 petitions and complaints were addressed to it.

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about major upheavals in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Among the newly independent states, those that were endowed with energy resources set out on the path of economic growth. The energy resources in Central Asia also attracted outside powers to the region. Moreover, the status of these countries as landlocked, and Russia's monopoly over energy pipelines, led these countries to search for new partners in order to reduce their dependency. This added a new dimension to the political, economic and security equations of the region. In this article, Turkmenistan is studied as a former Soviet republic and Iran as a regional actor that has interests in the region's energy dynamics. The role of energy in the relations between Turkmenistan and Iran is examined. The article proposes that the energy factor has produced a favorable atmosphere for closer relations between the two countries. However, Tehran needs to overcome a number of challenges in expansion of its relations with Turkmenistan, the most important of which is the United States' effective opposition to any Iranian initiative in the field of energy in the region.

The Iranian crisis of 1946 occupies a significant place in the early history of the Cold War. While this fact has been increasingly acknowledged by scholars, there remain aspects of the crisis, in particular the motivations of the major actors involved, which demand further exploration. This article reconsiders the roles of early Cold War actors, including the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and Iran itself in the Azerbaijan crisis and offers a synthesis of different perspectives. In revisiting the crisis it draws upon Cold War and post-Cold War literature including recently available archival material. It aims to combine contributions from International Relations, the Cold War and Iranian history to offer a balanced and integrated narrative of events.

The history of Iran, in the years just before World War I is dominated by a general institutional crisis called the Persian Constitutional Revolution. Although the narrative line most often followed through those years is a sequence of political and military encounters, the revolution was in fact a systemic crisis which affected nearly all of the institutions that contained the Persian people. Like all revolutions, however, it had its own idea of what it was up to; in fact, it had several. In common with other modern revolutions, it held the principle to be self-evident that through the revolution a new freedom was being created and a corrupt tyranny destroyed. Such views were, of course,rationales not interpretations of history, but like the latter they extended backward in time to describe the period before the revolution. In short, they explained not only what the revolutionaries themselves were doing, but what much of the history of Qajar Persia amounted to.

Languages have their own distinctive styles of argumentation. It seems some languages like Arabic and Persian have a preference for using the “oral” features of parataxis, formulaicity and repetition as persuasive devices in argumentation. The purpose of this article is first to examine these “oral” characteristics in Persian argumentation, and then to tie together the two areas of research: the study of orality and the study of metadiscourse. The article claims that these oral characteristics in Persian are means of gaining rhetorical effectiveness. Therefore, they should be considered as metadiscourse devices used to create a bond between writer and reader.