The region between the lower course of the Tigris and its joint estuary with the Euphrates on the west, the head of the Persian Gulf on the south, and the Zagros Mountains on the east and north was known in classical Islamic sources as Khuzistan. The tenth-century geographer Ibn Ḥawqal described the province in a separate chapter of his Kitāb ṣūrat al-arḍ and included a map--“Ṣūrat Khūzistān.” In the thirteenth century, Yaqut reserved a detailed entry for “Khuzistan” in his compendium Muᶜjam al-buldān.

In Safavid times, however, the province began to be called Arabistan, and the older name became obsolete. The term Khuzistan reappeared in the 1920s, but Arabistan has continued to be used by some scholars and politicians. Both names were a matter of controversy in the early stage of the present war between Iraq and Iran. The purpose of this article is to examine the history of these two names and the reasons for their existence or disappearance.

This paper fills in the gap in the literature by providing an acoustic analysis of rhotics in Persian and considers the social variables gender and register. Through the acoustic analysis of 807 tokens, it demonstrates that that there are a number of rhotic variants in Persian in different positions in the word and finds evidence of degemination in coda position, against previous accounts. Furthermore, it suggests that on the one hand, Tehrani-Persian speaking men and women's rhotic production patterns with those of Arabic societies as men favor rhotics with more complex articulations. On the other hand it questions whether the behavior of Tehrani-Persian speaking men and women conforms to established sociolinguistic norms regarding prestige and gender.

With the emerging political stability in Afghanistan, Afghan refugees residing in Iran are scheduled to repatriate to Afghanistan. Many Afghan men have married Iranian women and their repatriation has caused a major dilemma for their Iranian wives. The dilemma stems from the Iranian citizenship laws which disadvantage Iranian women in transfer of their citizenship to their non-Iranian husbands and their children. Thousands of children born of these Iranian mothers and non-Iranian fathers are not recognized as Iranian citizens. They are considered Afghan nationals and are, thus, not entitled to benefit from state-funded education and health services. These children's uncertain futures have magnified the unequal status of Iranian women as mothers and served as an impetus to demand change in the Iranian citizenship laws. This paper seeks to explain gendered citizenship in Iran and explores the socio-legal challenges faced by these women.

This study examines the poetry of two women of nineteenth-century Iran—one royal, one non-royal—and the women patrons for whom they composed praise poetry. Through the reconstruction of female-centered patronage networks and associated female-only performance venues, and via an examination of the active roles played by female patrons both in affairs of state and in the management of the immense royal harem, this study highlights the various ways in which members of several generations of women in Qajar Iran were involved in the production, dissemination and appreciation of poetry. It is argued here that these patronage and poetry production networks should be read as evidence of a female-centered literary tradition, one that was in dialogue with (and often intersected) the dominant male tradition; one that empowered the women actors within it to create a sisterhood of poets through which their art could be passed on from mother to daughter, and from daughter to granddaughter (and occasionally from mother to son).

During the Qajar period the two shrine cities ('Atabādt-e ‘āliydāt, lit. Sublime Thresholds) of Najaf and Karbala, south of Baghdad, served as the leading centers of learning for the Shi'i world. As such they were also at the center of patronage networks that were essential for the consolidation of the religious leadership of all Shi'i communities. Yet, whereas various scholars have examined doctrinal and political developments in the religious establishment in Iran, none have dealt specifically with the ‘Atabat community of learning during the 19th century. The purpose of this study is to examine patterns of continuity and dynamics of change in the composition of the ulama community of the ‘Atabat, based on ethnic, professional, and geographical factors. Such research could shed light on the structure and characteristics of the entire ulama community in Iran and specifically in Ottoman Iraq.

The Russians with the British, some now cheer,
have made a solemn oath this very year,
that within the politics of Iran,
they will not interfere from this time on.
It's a shame that the appeased of this land,
are content with the matter now at hand,
for when cat and mouse together lie,
the grocer may's well kiss his store goodbye.
Iraj Mirza, 1907(On the Anglo-Russian Treaty)

This paper is a study of early U.S. policy towards Iran and its significance in the field of twentieth-century Iranian-American relations. The paper also has the broader objective of investigating the roots of Iran's hostility towards America during the 1979 Iranian revolution. The early history of Persian-American relations has rarely been examined but, as I will argue, it was during this time (i.e., 1856-1921) that Iranians conceived an image of America as a sympathetic power—an image which the United States government falsely promoted and which resulted in Persia's overly heightened expectations of America. When these expectations were not met in later periods (i.e., 1953-1979), Iranians reacted with a magnified sense of hatred for the United States. The hostility expressed during the revolution came as a great shock to the United States.

Iran’s rural mental health care system emerged in a context that included experiments in health care prior to the 1979 Revolution and the establishment of a primary health care (PHC) system after the Revolution. Beginning in the 1980s, Iran integrated mental health care into the existing PHC system by treating mental illness much like a communicable disease. Iran advanced treatment options compatible with the existing system, added new training for existing care providers, and incorporated specialists. The integration of mental health care led to the rapid improvement of health outcomes. The integration also created the unintended consequence of privileging pharmaceutical treatments and overlooking mental illnesses affected by somatization.

In 2005, Iran outlined its goals in economic, science and technology for the next twenty years, Sanad-e- Cheshm Andaz-e Bist Saleh (The Twenty-Year Vision Document), a working plan to raise the country's ranking to that of the first in the region. This article aims to map Iran's scientific and technological performance over five years since the ratification of the plan. Three main areas of science and technology—the percentage of GDP invested in knowledge, scientific performance and technological performance—were used to compare Iran's scientific output with a set of regional countries. The study revealed that Iran's investment in science to inspire technology (the linear model) has been able to nourish scientific performance in the form of rising publication, whereas the neighboring countries followed a more diversified pathway and inspired science from technological advances. Thus, the number of countries in the region capable of competing with and even outstripping Iran in terms of technological and hence scientific performance has increased.

The political history of the Ghaznavid and Seljuk dynasties, which ruled much of Iran throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries, is now fairly well known and recently has been drawn together in the excellent narrative of Professor Bosworth in the Cambridge History of Iran. It is still quite imperfectly understood, however, and will probably remain so for a good while yet to come. The old and serviceable schematization of the period based on the notion of a Sunni revival, keyed to the development of madrasa education and to the personality of Nizam al-Mulk, is still current despite increasing awkwardness in fitting the facts to it. It would be premature to attempt at this time an alternative schematization, and, indeed, such a schematization, when it eventually appears, may well be not so much an alternative to the old one as an expansion in which the main features of the old one have a prominent place.

A well-educated, wealthy, 35-year-old woman from Tehran reported the following: “Someone I know has a man working for him whose brother is a gravedigger. He dug graves for those murdered in Jaleh Square 40 days ago. He said they needed a bulldozer to dig the ground for all the dead. An entire tent was filled with chadors. Fifty thousand people were killed.”

The Jaleh Square incident of Tehran was a momentous event in the Iranian revolution, marking popular revolt against the shah's regime by the people, and retaliatory atrocities by the shah's army against the people. Although demonstrations and killings in other cities after Jaleh Square were no less dramatic, Jaleh Square remains in the minds of nearly everyone in Iran as the principal episode of innocent citizens slaughtered. Yet, details and facts pertaining to the event are undocumented. What is known is that thousands of people participated in a massive antishah demonstration on Thursday, September 7, 1978, to demand the resignation of the shah, defying a government ban on rallies.

Current literature on twentieth century Kurdish history overwhelmingly covers Kurdish populations and national movements within the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. This article, hoin Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan,ever, focuses on Soviet Kurdistan and Kurdish policy in Azerbaijan between 1920 and 1937 through the broader question of national minorities within the republic. It is claimed here that the Soviet policy on Azerbaijani Kurds was part of a multilayered issue. First of vnall, the Kurds of Azerbaijan were semi-nomadic mountain dwellers transformed by the modernization policies implemented in Soviet territories. Azerbaijani Kurds were a national identity within the Soviet Union and thus subject to ethnophilic All-Union policies in those years. Finally, Kurds were one of the numerous national minorities in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan who were exposed to the national minority policies executed within the republic by the administration in Baku. The national minority policy in Azerbaijan was often contested and limited by local conditions and obstacles. Therefore, the granting of cultural rights in the 1920s to national minorities, which included the Kurds of Azerbaijan, the promotion of these rights in the 1920s and 1930s, and opposition to these policies can only be examined with regard to these three layers.

Although it is generally accepted that the Soviet Union did not play a significant role in the events leading to the overthrow of Mohammed Mosaddeq in 1953, little has been written about how the Soviets perceived the Iranian leader and the movement he inspired. This article argues that Soviet leaders generally saw Mosaddeq as weak and ill-disposed towards the Soviet Union. The Soviet failure to secure an oil concession in Iran in 1946 and general conservatism about anti-colonial movements during the late Stalin period conditioned their assessment of Mosaddeq's premiership. After Soviet policy towards the Third World changed in the mid-1950s, Mosaddeq's movement was reinterpreted as a genuine “struggle of national liberation.”

Medieval Persian imperial correspondence (tarassul) remains relatively untapped as a source of historiographical information, due in no small part to its stylized and ornate character. This ornateness, far from being merely an obstructive husk to the useful pith of data within, constitutes a rich source of information in its own right; indeed, the formal aspects of a given letter may significantly alter the ostensible sense of the text. This study examines as a representative case a fathnama sent by Uzun Hasan to Qaytbay on the occasion of the former's victory over Sultan-Abu Sa‘id in 1469, here contextualized, translated and subjected to formal analysis with reference to contemporary insha’ manuals. For all its submissive rhetoric, the letter's aggressive intent is shown to be activated by its formal structure, which strategically deploys Uzun Hasanid messianic symbolism to challenge the ascendancy of the Mamluk state.

In the 1990s, Russia and Iran successfully laid the foundations for interaction and expanded their spheres of cooperation. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, their relations developed unevenly. These fluctuations depended on the combination of global and regional factors, as well as on the internal circumstances in each country. Russia's participation in international sanctions has aroused discontent in Iran. Despite this, the political establishments of both countries continue to demonstrate an interest in developing bilateral relations and to reaffirm their shared geopolitical interests. This paper analyzes foreign policy documents and the latest research by Russian and Iranian scholars. It strives to shed light on the question: “To what extent and in what areas do the interests of Russia and Iran coincide, and what is the foundation for their potential future development?”

As a collectively acting subject, the Pahlavi regime constituted itself through a functional memory by construing a particular past. In this way, the official or political memory served as the regime's key legitimizing factor. Both Pahlavi shahs attempted to appropriate the Iranian past as well as its future; that is, they legitimized their rule in retrospect and sought to immortalize themselves prospectively. In contrast to the official historiography, ‘counter-memories’ are often established. The motive in producing such a ‘counter-memory,’ whose founders are usually the conquered and oppressed, is to delegitimize the perceived oppressive balance of power. An outspoken critic of the Pahlavi regime, the Iranian teacher and writer Jalal Al-e Ahmad ‘wrote back,’ trying his hand at a ‘counter memory’.

Persian historical sources, especially those of the early Qajar period, devote more attention to the achievements of the Russian czar Peter I (r. 1682-1725) than to any other “modern” European monarch. The image of Peter the Great captured the attention of Iranian reformers, who articulated their own hopes by glorifying him as the regenerator of the Russian Empire. They drew an ambiguous image of the czar, portraying him, on the one hand, with admiration and esteem and, on the other, with fear and mistrust. Yet the Qajar ruling elite looked to Peter as a sort of mirror in which they could see their own reflection and as a symbol crucial to the construction of a discourse that in their minds would lead to change, a discourse that resonated naturally with the political requirements of their nation. By using Czar Peter as a point of reference, Iranian reformers expressed their dismay at the deteriorating international status of Iran and the urgency to arrive at solutions.

The first Iranian to study medicine abroad was sent to Britain by the Iranian government in 1811, during the early decades of the Qajar period (1796–1925). The second student was sent to France in 1815, along with four other students. Another group of five students, including the third student of medicine, was sent to France in 1845. Forty-two others, including five medical students, were dispatched to France in 1858. Most members of the latter group were among the first graduates of Tehran Dar al-Fonun (House of Techniques) School. Then, in 1928, during Reza Shah Pahlavi's reign (1925–41), a special act was passed by the Iranian parliament (Majlis) according to which the Ministry of Education would send 100 students abroad annually for higher education at the government's expense. The practice was suspended in 1935 with the advent of the Second World War. Between 1928 and 1935, a total of 640 students, including 125 medical students, were sent abroad. The majority of the medical students (84 percent) were sent to France. Most of these medical graduates returned to Iran and in subsequent years played a significant role in further propagation of modern medical knowledge in the country. The paper presents a brief historical account of the conditions of public health and medical education between 1811 and 1935 as well as biographical sketches of some of the best-known or most influential medical figures among these graduates.

It is generally agreed that the rise of the Safavids in the sixteenth century marks a new period in the history of Persia. Hegemony of one dynasty over nearly all the Persian-speaking world, accompanied by the swift forced conversion of the overwhelming majority of the Persians into Twelver Shi'ism, resulted in the emergence of the first Persian state in the modern era. Such a signal event could not but invest the Persian state and society with major, fundamental institutions. The same institutions have continued to characterize and to influence Persia down to the Constitutionalist Revolution of 1905-1911. It is these institutions that constitute the “traditional” features of the society against which the forces of “modernization” have been operating since the adoption of the Constitution and the Supplementary Fundamental Law of 1907.

According to S. N. Elsenstadt, Institutions are Those Processes and structures, together with the associated set of regulative principles, that arrange human activities in a community “into definite organizational patterns from the point of view of some of the perennial, basic problems of any society or ordered social life.” From this perspective, the social dimension of the concept of social institutions is seen in terms of its “institutional spheres,” which include family and kinship, education, economics, politics, culture, and stratification. To this list may be added those approaches in psychology in which the unit of analysis is the group, community, or society.

Because the subject of “Social Institutions” covers such a vast domain, it will be necessary to focus upon only certain entries of the EIr in this domain. However, before proceeding, it is worth noting that some 150 articles in the first seven volumes may be classified under “social institutions,” including the subsections of articles.