¹ See Enayat, Hamid, “Iran: Khumayni's Concept of the ‘Guardianship of the Jurisconsult,’” in Islam in the Political Process, ed. Piscatori, James P. (Cambridge and New York, 1983), 160–80Google Scholar, for an invaluable overview of Khomeini's doctrine.

² See in this regard Bakhash, Shaul, The Reign of the Ayatollahs (London, 1985), 74Google Scholar; Schirazi, Asghar, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic (London, 1997), 22–4Google Scholar; and Chehabi, Houchang, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran Under the Shah and Khomeini (Ithaca, NY, 1990), 264–5.Google Scholar This position is also adopted by Saffari, who states “surprisingly, Ayatollah Khomeini actually approved the government's draft constitution. He even suggested bypassing the Constituent Assembly and placing the draft before the people for an immediate vote.” Saffari, Said, “The Legitimation of the Clergy's Right to Rule in the Iranian Constitution of 1979,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20, no. 1 (1993): 66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ Interview with Minachi and Ahmad Sadr Hajj-Seyed-Javadi, justice minister of the PRG, in Bakhtiarnejad, Parvin, “Pish Nevis Qānun Asāsi Cheguneh Tahyeh Shod?,” Iran-e Fardā 51 (1998): 25.Google Scholar

⁴ Nehzat-e Āzādi-ye Iran, Showrā-ye Enqelāb va Dowlat-e Movaqqat (Tehran, 1982), 234.Google Scholar

⁵ Ibid., 235.

⁶ Khomeini, Ruhallah, Sahifeh-ye Imam (Tehran, 1999), 5: 426–8.Google Scholar

⁷ Bazargan notes that the RC underwent four significant membership turnovers during the course of its existence, but clerics were always a majority component of its membership. Iran, Showrā, 236.

⁸ Habibi interview, Keyhān, 11 Shahrivar 1358 [September 2, 1979]. This has been corroborated by other participants in these discussions, such as Sadegh Tabatabai, a close relative of Khomeini.

⁹ This was sarcastically noted later by Bani-Sadr, who believes that Habibi needlessly based himself on that model, since Iran “did not have a De Gaulle” at the outset of the fall of the shah's regime. Ahmadi, Hamid, ed., Khāterāt-e Abulhasan Bani-Sadr (Frankfurt, 2001), 62.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Katuziyan, Naser, “Gozari bar Tadvin-e Pish Nevis-e Qānun-e Asāsi,” Huquq-e Asāsi 1, no. 1 (2003): 124.Google Scholar Bani-Sadr goes further and calls it a “raw” translation. Ahmadi, Hamid, ed., Khāterāt-e Abulhasan Bani-Sadr (Frankfurt, 2001), 62.Google Scholar

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² None of Khomeini's clerical associates nor any member of the radical revolutionary groups, such as the Fadāiyān-e Khalq or the Mojāhedin-e Khalq, were involved at this stage.

¹³ Bakhtiarnejad, “Pish Nevis,” 25.

¹⁴ Katuziyan, “Gozari,” 124.

¹⁵ Bakhtiarnejad, “Pish Nevis,” 25. The first modifications brought to Habibi's text therefore diluted the powers of the presidency in favor of the prime ministerial institution.

¹⁶ Āyāndegān, 9 Esfand 1357 [February 28, 1979].

¹⁷ The text of this latter version appears in full, possibly for the first time, in Katuziyan, Naser, Zendegi-ye Man (Tehran, 2007), 193–220.Google Scholar It is entitled here “The First Complete Version of the pish nevis” and most likely refers to the 15 March text referred to Habibi.

¹⁸ Ibid., 195–6.

¹⁹ Ibid., 207.

²⁰ Ibid., 208. Due to the fact that the parliamentary elections were held through local constituencies, for the first time in Iranian political history, the population was therefore entrusted with the selection of an eminent state official through a nationwide election.

²¹ Ibid., 218–19.

²² Ibid., 219.

²³ These provisions would be included in article 99 of the final text and would include the Majles elections, which are not explicitly listed in the February text.

²⁴ The addendum to the 1906 text stated that a committee formed of five mojtaheds was vested with the power to “reject or repudiate any proposal that is at variance with the sacred laws of Islam … In such matters the decision of this committee of ʿolamāʾ shall be followed and obeyed, and this article shall continue unchanged until the appearance of the Hidden Imam.” Quoted from Said Amir Arjomand, “Constitutional Revolution——– iii. The Constitution,” Encyclopaedia Iranica Online, unpaginated, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-iii.

²⁵ Katuziyan, “Gozari,” 122.

²⁶ Khomeini's critiques to the February text are described in detail, possibly for the first time, in Vara'i, Seyyed Javad, Mabāni va Mostanadāt Qānun-e Asāsi beh Revāyat-e Qānungozār (Qom, 2006), 55–8Google Scholar, and reproduced in full in ibid., 1082–90. This is an extensive analysis on the constitution-writing process of 1979–89 which was published by the Majles-e Khobregān, the institution tasked with monitoring the performance of the Supreme Leader. The version of the draft text reproduced here is identical to the one published separately by Katuziyan, save for a minor numerical discrepancy in the composition of the Guardian Council.

²⁷ Ibid., 56. Khomeini was apprehensive that the article 55 in its original form would be tantamount to giving the impression that the constitution had a communist slant.

²⁸ Ibid., 57. Both of these critiques were not heeded and the articles were left untouched in the draft text published by the PRG in June 1979.

²⁹ Ibid., 58. The original text's pecking order assigned priority to the president, followed by the president of the Supreme Court. The marāje' were listed in last position.

³⁰ According to Ezatollah Sahabi, Ayatollah Hossein Beheshti, a prominent associate of Khomeini and a leading ideologue of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), was on the other hand in favor of women being allowed to compete for the presidency and stated that it was Shi'i culture, rather than the shari'a, which stood at the root of the opposition, within clerical circles, to an all-inclusive role for women within political life. Interview with Sahabi, Ahmadi-Amui, Bahman, Eqtesād-e Siyāsi-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslāmi (Tehran, 1999), 43.Google Scholar

³¹ This request was finally implemented by the PRG in June. Another version of the pish nevis published by Keyhān in April and detailed below still contained the original wording of article 21.

³² Habibi interview, Keyhān, 11 Shahrivar 1358 [September 2, 1979]. Crucially, Habibi laments that the present version of the pish nevis (i.e. the June one), bound the GC with the Majles, while the previous version (the February text) had created an “independent” Guardian Council which, as seen above, was crucially handed the power of vetoing any Majles bill deemed in contravention to the shari'a. This view is also reflected in Naser Katuziyan's commentary on the PRG's June text, which was published in August 1979.

³³ Āyandegān, 11 Farvardin 1358 [March 31, 1979].

³⁴ Vara'i, Mabāni, 59. This was due to Shari'atmadari's strong connections with the northern Azarbaijan region, most of the inhabitants of which were his followers and speakers of the Turkic Azeri language.

³⁵ Ezatollah Sahabi claims that the RC devolved “deep scrutiny” to the text it received from the PRG between the months of Ordibehesht and Khordād of 1358. Qalafi, Mohammad Vahid, Majles-e Khobregān va Hukumat-e Dini dar Iran (Tehran, 2005), 376.Google Scholar

³⁶ Keyhān, 8/9 Ordibehesht 1358 [April 28/29, 1979]. The text published here was the first publicly available version of the pish nevis. It has been described by Schirazi as being Habibi's original version which, as can be inferred from the material presented above, is likely not to be the case. The newspaper warned its readers that the version it published would probably be subject to further modification before being placed at the disposal of the Constituent Assembly.

³⁷ Khomeini had asked for these modifications in his previous critiques in order to ensure that the Parliament would not feature members closely aligned to either the eastern or western blocs.

³⁸ The article ordering was markedly different from previous texts examined here, thus ruling out the possibility that the aforementioned critiques of Khomeini could apply to the June text. Ayatollah Shari'atmadari raised the possibility that the text presented to him “three or four months before” could have been subject to significant alteration during a press conference on June 10. He also stated on this occasion that he had previously listed “seven or eight” items that needed corrections in that text, but refrained from describing their content in detail. Jomhuri-ye Eslāmi, 21 Khordād 1358 [June 11, 1979].

³⁹ The earlier draft stipulated that the president should be of Twelver Shi'i faith. This provision was resurrected and adopted by the Assembly of Experts in autumn 1979.

⁴⁰ These descriptions are from the text published in Ettela'āt, 26 Khordād 1358 [June 16, 1979], which was officially endorsed by the PRG.

⁴¹ Āyandegān, 26 Khordād 1358 [June 16, 1979].

⁴² Testimonies provided by leading political figures in the summer of 1979 are often conflicting on this point. Abolhasan Bani-Sadr stated for example on July 4 that Khomeini had raised objections to nine articles of the “present” constitution, and added that the grievances of Ayatollahs Khomeini and Shari'atmadari were addressed in the timeframe between the early version of the pish nevis——which he defined as lacking uniformity——and the final one. Similar points were raised by, amongst others, the interior minister Ahmad Sadr Hajj Seyyed Javadi. It is likely that Khomeini aired these concerns in private but did not feel the need to make them public, for reasons discussed subsequently.

⁴³ Āyandegān, 29 Khordād 1358 [June 19, 1979].

⁴⁴ Khomeini, Ruhallah, Sahifeh-ye Imam (Tehran, 1999), 8: 219–21.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Keyhān, 30 Khordād 1358 [June 20, 1979].

⁴⁶ Montazeri's critique was distributed at the time in the form of a booklet titled “Dow Payām” [Two messages] and has been reprinted in his memoirs. Hossein Ali Montazeri, Khāterāt (Qom, n.d.), 2: 895–6.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 896.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 898.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 902. It is pertinent to note that Montazeri does not refer here to the February text, which assigned a similar vetoing power to the clerical component of the Guardian Council, thereby giving the impression that he had not seen that text after its examination by Khomeini, Golpayegani and Shari'atmadari.

⁵⁰ Ettela'āt, 21 Tir 1358 [July 21, 1979].

⁵¹ Sāzmān-e Mojahedin-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmi, Matn-e Pishnahādi-ye Pish Nevis-e Qānun-e Asāsi (Tehran, 1979).Google Scholar

⁵² The more prominent organizers included Hasan Ayat and Ali Khamene'i of the IRP, Mohammad Taqi Shariati, the high-profile father of the late Islamic thinker Ali Shariati, and Ali Golzadeh-Ghaffuri, a popular maverick cleric.

⁵³ Jomhuri-ye Eslāmi, 5 Tir 1358 [June 27, 1979]. He added that only Khomeini could have presently fulfilled that role.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Āyāndegān, 14 Tir 1358 [July 5, 1979]. The preferred candidate of the IRP for the first presidential elections, Jalaleddin Farsi, would be excluded in the following months from the contest after a clerical ally of Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, Shaykh Ali Tehrani, successfully claimed that Farsi's ancestors were of Afghan origin.

⁵⁶ Jomhuri-ye Eslāmi, 16 Tir 1358 [July 7, 1979]. Ayat therefore confirms the essence of Yadollah Sahabi's remarks on the lack of a clear reaction by Khomeini to the PRG's text.

⁵⁷ Jomhuri-ye Eslāmi, 12 Tir 1358 [July 3, 1979]. Khamene'i would reverse his stance once he became president himself and would frequently complain about the lack of powers of the presidency during his re-election campaign in 1985.

⁵⁸ Jomhuri-ye Eslāmi, 25 Tir 1358 [July 16, 1979].

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Besides the aforementioned remarks at the Muslim Critics' Congress, other supporters of this proposal included, amongst other, the Mojāhedin-e Khalq organization, which first attempted to persuade Khomeini to stand for the presidency in late 1979 before launching the failed campaign in favor of its own leader, Masoud Rajavi. See in this regard the Mojāhedin-e Khalq communique announcing Khomeini as the organization's candidate, published on Ettela'āt, 1 Dey 1358 [December 22, 1979].

⁶¹ See for example Ettela'āt 26 Khordād 1358 [June 16, 1979]. Khomeini would confirm this impression in a long conversation with the scholar Hamid Algar in late December 1979, which is reproduced in Khomeini, Ruhallah, Sahifeh-ye Imam (Tehran, 1999), 11: 447–68Google Scholar, and would only relent only after the bombings of summer 1981, which decimated the early leadership of the Islamic Republic.

⁶² Jebheh-ye Melli Iran, Nāmeh-ye Sargoshādeh: Jebheh-ye Melli Iran be Mellat-e Iran (Tehran, 1979), 6.Google Scholar

⁶³ Nāmeh-ye Mardom, 2 Tir 1358 [June 23, 1979]. The Tudeh therefore effectively made a unique call for proportional representation, from which it ostensibly sought to benefit as the sole political party capable at the time of creating an extensive national campaign.

⁶⁴ Pro-Moscow communism, which was tacitly espoused by the Tudeh, was notably lacking from this list. The party also called for adding to the constitution the prohibition of membership in any “military alliance”—an implicit reference to the moribund CENTO organization, of which Iran was a prominent member prior to 1979.

⁶⁵ Ibid. Such a request was grounded in the long tradition of torture and coerced confessions to which a considerable amount of Tudeh members and sympathizers were subject during the Pahlavi era. Ironically, the top leadership of the party would succumb to such a treatment less than four years after the production of this open letter.

⁶⁶ Āzādi, 6 Tir 1358 [June 27, 1979]. The NDF had previously lamented the reduction of the role of women in society to a “solely motherly” one in the June text.

⁶⁷ The National Front's proposal was published in full on Āyāndegān, 11 Mordād 1358 [August 2, 1979].

⁶⁸ Only the entire cabinet could be summoned according to the original text. The proposal of the National Front made it through to the final text and has been frequently used in the past decade, especially during the presidential administrations of Mohammad Khatami and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

⁶⁹ See the statements to this effect of Reza Shayegan, a leader of the National Front, on Āyāndegān, 18 Tir 1358 [July 9, 1979]. This balance of power within the executive branch was confirmed by the Assembly of Experts, and held sway until the abolition of the prime ministerial institution in 1989.

⁷⁰ Āyāndegān, 18 Tir 1358 [July 9, 1979].

⁷¹ Interview with the Fadāiyān candidates for the Assembly of Experts, Āyāndegān, 6 Mordād 1358 [July 28, 1979].

⁷² Mojāhed, 5 Mordād 1358 [July 27, 1979].

⁷³ Vara'i, Mabāni, 87, 1175–1178. The PRG's text did not include any provision for the impeachment of the president. The Toilers' Party's request was accommodated in the final text and provided the basis for the dismissal of Bani-Sadr in 1981.

⁷⁴ Interview with Sahabi, in Ahmadi-Amui, Eqtesād, 51.

⁷⁵ The Majles-e Mo'assesān was convened to approve the change of dynasty from Qajar to Pahlavi in 1925, to attribute to the shah the power to dissolve the two houses of parliament in 1948 and finally to appoint the Empress Farah as vice-regent while Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi was reaching adulthood in 1970.

⁷⁶ Jebheh-ye Melli Iran, Nāmeh, 2. The Front also stated here that these decisions were handed over to the RC for final deliberations around the same time.

⁷⁷ Keyhān, 2 Khordād 1358 [May 23, 1979].

⁷⁸ Nehzat-e Āzādi-ye Iran, Barkhord bā Nehzat-e Āzādi va Pāsokh-e Mā (Tehran, 1983), 22Google Scholar; Amir-Entezam, Abbas, Ān Suye Ettehām (Tehran, 2002), 2: 24–25.Google Scholar This source states that the constitution had been submitted by that time to the attention of Khomeini and other senior marāje', who had all expressed their opinions on it.

⁷⁹ Ibid. Khomeini would frequently focus on this point in his public speeches following the publication of the June text.

⁸⁰ Taleqani was also confident that the Assembly of Experts would have a diverse composition, a small segment of it being formed by the clergy. Schirazi, Constitution, 29.

⁸¹ Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Imam, 7: 482–3.

⁸² Front pages of Āyandegān and Keyhān, 20 Khordād 1358 [10 June 1979].

⁸³ The Interior minister Hajj-Seyyed-Javadi explained that the decision was eventually made to allocate one Assembly member for every 500,000 citizens, a ratio which was five times lower than the one initially envisaged.

⁸⁴ Kār, 1 Mordād 1358 [23 July 1979].

⁸⁵ Ayatollah Montazeri issued a declaration to this effect on the day prior to the polling. Keyhān, 11 Mordād 1358 [August 2, 1979].

⁸⁶ The capital's constituency was also the only electoral ward where all the political organizations that had stated their intention to take part in the contest, except the pro-Shari'atmadari Hezb-e Khalq-e Mosalmān, had fielded candidates.

⁸⁷ These electoral statistics were published on Keyhān, 20 Mordād 1358 [August 11, 1979].

⁸⁸ A coalition of five radical groups including the Mojāhedin and Jāmā sent an open letter to Khomeini citing widespread fraud, published in Keyhān, 18 Mordād 1358 [August 9, 1979].