¹ See Kellens, Jean, “Avesta,” in Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. Yarshater, E. (Costa Mesa, CA, 1987), 3: 35–44.Google Scholar

² For the text of Y 19 and useful commentary, see Kellens, Jean, Études avestiques et mazdéennes, vol. 3, Le long préambule du sacrifice (Paris, 2010), 27–51.Google Scholar On the exegete's syntactic understanding of the Ahuna Vairiia, see especially 39–40.

³ Kellens lists the relevant publications in Kellens, Études avestiques et mazdéennes, 34 n. 15.

⁴ See Ahmadi, Amir, “The Syntax and Sense of the Ahuna Vairiia,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 22, no. 3-4 (2012): 519–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ Lommel, Herman, “Awestische Einzelstudien,” Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik 1 (1922): 24–32Google Scholar; see Kellens, Études avestiques et mazdéennes, 41 n. 23. The exception I am aware of is Humbach (Humbach, Helmut, The Gāthās of Zarathushtra and the Other Old Avestan Texts, vol. 2, Commentary [Heidelberg, 1991], 2)Google Scholar, who interprets the compound adjective as a tatpuruṣa: “the creatures which are the prime ones of (good) thought.” The problem with this interpretation is the sense in which the possessive relation between the creatures and the god vohu- manah- must be understood, if “good thought” in fact refers to the divine entity. On the other hand, if it simply means good thought (e.g. a ritual qualification), what is the further qualification, the “prime ones” (of good thought), supposed to signify?

⁶ Lommel, “Awestische Einzelstudien,” 25.

⁷ Ibid., 25, 26.

⁸ Narten, Johanna, Die Aməa Spəṇtas im Avesta (Wiesbaden, 1982), 100, 99 n. 14.Google Scholar

⁹ Narten (ibid., 98) translates Y 19.12: “[a] (Das Wort) ‘wie’ sprach er (= Zarathustra) hier aus, als sie ihn als Herrn und Richter einsetzten. [b] In gleicher Weise (= mit dem Wort ‘wie’) bestimmt er (= der Sprecher des Gebets) ihn, den Weisen Herrn, für die Schöpfungen, deren erste das (Gute) Denken ist, [c] so wie er ihn als größten von allen bestimmt. [d] (Mit dem Wort) ‘so’ bestimmt er die Schöpfungen für ihn (= den Weisen Herrn).” Narten's paraphrase of the text (Die Aməa Spəṇtas im Avesta, 98–9 n. 11) leaves almost no doubt that she includes in “die Schöpfungen, deren erste das (Gute) Denken ist” all the creations: “wie er Ahura Mazdā für die Schöpfungen bestimmt (b), und zwar als größten von allen (c), so bestimmt er auch die Schöpfungen für Ahura Mazdā (d).”

¹⁰ Kellens, Études avestiques et mazdéennes, 40.

¹¹ Ibid., 40–41.

¹² Lommel, “Awestische Einzelstudien,” 25; and Narten, Die Aməa Spəṇtas im Avesta, 96–7.

¹³ Narten, Die Aməa Spəṇtas im Avesta, 99.

¹⁴ See Narten, Die Aməa Spəṇtas im Avesta , 101; compare Narten, Johanna, “Avestiche ci,” Monumentum H.S. Nyberg (Leiden, 1975), II: 88ff.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Narten, Die Aməa Spəṇtas im Avesta, 101–2.

¹⁶ See Narten, Die Aməa Spəṇtas im Avesta, 99: the prior rankings of aa- and of vohu- manah- belong, respectively, to the Older Avestan and the Later Avestan “theological schools.” For Kellens (Études avestiques et mazdéennes, 49), they belong to different “stages” of ritual: “le stade de la pensée posant d'emblée l'antériorité absolue de Vohu Manah, le stade du geste prend en considération les entités restantes, dont la première dans l'ordre énumératif est effectivement Aa.” As for the “stages” of the ritual, see Ahmadi, Amir, “The Twins Stanza, Y 30.3,” Iranian Studies 46, no. 2 (2013): 227–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Matching the “stages” with particular Aməa Spəṇtas (as tutelary deities?) seems to me an ad hoc construction.

¹⁷ de Vaan, Michiel, The Avestan Vowels, Leiden Studies in Indo-European 12 (New York, 2003), 179.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸ On the eschatological valence of the word aauuan, see Kellens, Jean, “L'âme entre le cadavre et le paradis,” Journal Asiatique 283, no. 1 (1995): 19–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar; 32–8. See Wackernagel, Jakob and Debrunner, Albert, Altindische Grammatik. Vol II.2 Die Nominalsuffixe (Göttingen, 1954), 900–902Google Scholar on the use of the suffix -van- in denominative adjectives used of persons or personalized things, with meanings “mit dem Begriff des Grundworts versehen” or “etwas bringend, ausübend.” The word aa- is regularly used in the Gāthās metonymically for the divine realm, e.g. Y 32.13 darəsā aahiiā “(hold back) from seeing aa.” Scholars generally interpret aā hacā as an adverbial, meaning something like “in accordance with truth” or “with the right order”; exceptions, as far as I know, are Kellens and Pirart, who read it as an adnominal (“harmonieux”), “vraisemblablement comme substitut de aauuan- avec certaines entités ou certains concepts” (Kellens, Jean and Pirart, Eric, Les textes vieil-avestiques, vol. 2, Répertoires grammaticaux et lexique [Wiesbaden, 1990], 38Google Scholar). The adverbial reading is rather awkward, to say the least, in Y 51.5 yaθā aā hacā gąm vīda vāstriiō, where aā hacā does not bear on the verb but on “the cow.” The phrase can hardly mean, e.g. “wie dem Wahrsein gemäß der Kuh teilhaftig wird der Viehzüchter” (Lommel, Herman, Die Gathas des Zarathustra (Basel, 1971), 173Google Scholar). Is the poet indirectly preaching about the proper way of acquiring cattle (e.g. not stealing)? The comparison with the parallel phrase in Y 50.2 definitely rules out the adverbial reading: kaθā mazdā rāniiō.skərəitīm gąm išasōi y hīm ahmāi vāstrauuaitīm stōi usiiā ərəžjīš aā “how could the man living rightly ask for the joy-giving cow, (the man) who would want her, possessed of pasturage, to be for him because of aa?” Just like rāniiō.skərəiti-, aā hacā in Y 51.5 qualifies the cow and not the manner of acquiring it. One could translate the adnominal aā hacā as “being oriented to (the domain of) aa,” just as Y 53.6 drūjō hacā seems to mean “being oriented to (the house of) druj.” I refer the reader to my “The Syntax and Sense of the Ahuna Vairiia” for further argument regarding aā hacā.

¹⁹ Narten, Die Aməa Spəṇtas im Avesta, 101.

²⁰ Kellens, Études avestiques et mazdéennes, 49. His actual translation of the phrase (ibid., 50) is hard to decipher. See my discussion in the text.

²¹ Ibid., 50.

²² The adjective astuuaṇt- does not, strictly speaking, mean corporeal or material but “possessed of bone.” In the Gāthās and Yasna Haptaŋhāiti ahu- is an abstract noun, “existence” or “state,” and does not designate a concrete entity, e.g. “world.” “Mind” as the concrete bearer of “bone” may be implied in the “existence possessed of bone.” Compare Vīdēvdād 19.29–31 and Vištāsp Yašt 32 aheca aŋhuš … manahiieheca aŋhuš “of this life and of the mental life.” The Greek empsychon means “soul-endowed” and designates living creatures. Narten (Narten, Johanna, Der Yasna Haptaŋhāiti [Wiesbaden, 1986], 291Google Scholar) acknowledges that in a number of LAv. passages the opposition between “this existence” or “corporeal state” and the “mental state” is the one between the earthly life and the afterlife.

²³ Narten, Die Aməa Spəṇtas im Avesta, 101.

²⁴ In fact it is not clear what “die Schöpfungen, deren erste die Wahrheit ist” as the agents of huuaršta- designates. It can hardly be the Aməa Spəṇtas. Nor can it be creation in general as she has for Vr 19.2: “Schöpfungen (= erschaffenen Dinge und Wesen), deren erste die Wahrheit ist” (Narten, Die Aməa Spəṇtas im Avesta, 99). The most plausible candidate would be “human beings.”

²⁵ It is quite possible that (the older?) Yt 13.117 aō.paoiriia- is theophoric, and (the later?) Y 19.19 aa.paoiriia- an evaluative adjective.

²⁶ Narten, Die Aməa Spəṇtas im Avesta, 100–101.

²⁷ Kellens, Études avestiques et mazdéennes, 49. I am not sure what the participial formation of the adjectives has to do with the time of the event in question.

²⁸ Ibid., 50,

²⁹ “Attesté par Y 30.1, 35.10 (2 x), 45.8 et 49.12, trois fois sous la forme staotāiš” (Kellens, Études avestiques et mazdéennes, 50 n. 32).

³⁰ Ibid., 49.

³¹ Ibid., 50.

³² Ibid., 49.

³³ Ibid., 41–2.

³⁴ Ibid., 49.

³⁵ Ibid., 51.

³⁶ “Le première vers-pensée suscite chez Ahura Mazdā la prise de conscience qu'il existe quelqu'un pourvu de la qualité d'aauuan … Ahura Mazdā donne une expression orale à sa pensée initiale: il existe quelqu'un qui est aauuan et cet aauuan est de nature à la fois spirituelle et matérielle” (ibid., 49; emphasis added).

³⁷ Narten, “Avestiche ci,” 83–4.

³⁸ Ibid., 88–92.

³⁹ Kellens (Études avestiques et mazdéennes, 37–8) writes: “kaēša, comme yasna, établit la correspondance entre une situation liturgique donnée et le genre rhétorique qui l'exprime. C'est à ce conglomérat liturgique / rhétorique que se rapportent les emplois faits de ciš dans le Yasna Haptaŋhāiti, tandis que les deux textes mentionnés ci-dessus [i.e. Vr 1.9 and Y 12.1] témoignent du fait que qu'il était encore bien vivant à l'époque moyen-avestique. Je propose de traduire, dans Y 19 à 21, kaēša par ‘doctrine’ et ciš par ‘exposer une doctrine, poser en doctrine’.” Whatever one may think of the derivation, one thing is clear: the specific meaning ascribed to the verb in Baγān Yašt pieces by Kellens must be ruled out for the present, first person, plural form cīšmahī in the Yasna Haptaŋhāiti (Y 35.5, 39.4, 41.1), whose usage strictly adheres to the pattern underlined by Narten, namely the dative of person, the accusative of object, and the instrumental of means of spiritual powers (in the YH: the rite underway), e.g. “we hereby allocate” (cīšmahī) the “power” (xšaθrəm) to the “most salutary power-wielder that Mazdā and the holy Aa are” (huxšaθrō.təmāi … hiia mazdāi ahurāi aāicā vahištāi). If in fact the derivation is correct and thus Y 19 cinasti and YH cīšmahī are from the same root ciš, a connection like the one suggested by Narten (“Avestiche ci,” 84–5) is much more plausible than the persistence of a “conglomérat liturgique / rhétorique” postulated by Kellens. The constant collocation in the YH of ciš and dā and the use of the latter (in the middle voice) with two direct objects (e.g. Y 41.3) meaning something like “consider A as B” could have given rise to a similar usage of the former. Compare Y 41.3 humāīm θβā … dadəmaidē “we regard you as the good-powered…” (Almut Hintze, A Zoroastrian Liturgy. The Worship in Seven Chapters [Yasna 35–41], Iranica 12 [Wiesbaden, 2007], 312) and Vr 12.4 humaiia aēta dāmąn dadəmaide humaiia cišmaide humaiia mainiiāmaide yą daθa ahurō mazdå aauua “Nous considérons qu'elles sont magiques, croyons qu'elles sont magiques, pensons qu'elles sont magiques les institutions qu'Ahura Mazdā qui soutient l'Agencement a fondées” (Kellens, Études avestiques et mazdéennes, 114).

⁴⁰ The verb cit means “recognize,” e.g. the complement in the accusative. Its Vedic cognate cet “recognize, note” has both cognitive (“observe”) and intersubjective (“acknowledge”) senses (see Mayrhofer, Manfred, Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindoarischen, 3 vols. (Heidelberg, 1992-2001), I, 547–8Google Scholar). In the Gāthās cit has the former sense only in Y 51.5, where it is qualified by the adverb ərəš “rightly”: y dāθaēibiiō ərəš ratūm xšaiiąs aiuuå cistā “(the resourceful pastor), having disposition over (life), who correctly recognizes the measure of the two retributions for those who abide by the law.” In all its other occurrences in the Gāthās the verb means “acknowledge.” In the middle voice and without a direct object, it has a reflexive sense, i.e. “get oneself acknowledged as the nom. or for the dat.”: Y 51.11cc' k vā vaŋhuš manaŋhō acistā magāi ərəšuuō “which upright man has got himself recognized for the gift of good thought?” and 32.11a'b yōi drəguuaṇtō mazbīš cikōitərəš aŋ^vhīšcā aŋhauuascā “the masters and mistresses who have got themselves recognized as followers of druj by their great (wrongs),” i.e. are known for being the followers of druj, etc. When the verb has an accusative complement, it means “acknowledge the acc. (e.g. for a purpose)”: Y 46.9 k huuō y mā arədrō cōiθa pouruiiō “who is that achiever (of the divine sphere?) who would acknowledge me as the first?” and 33.2b' vaŋhāu vā cōiθaitē astīm “or (who) would acknowledge his guest at (the time of?) the good (distribution of rewards).”

⁴¹ Compare Narten's translation: “(mit dem Worten) dazda manaŋhō bestimmt man ihn (Ahura Mazdā) für das Denken, (so) wie einen Lehrer für das Denken” (“Avestiche ci,” 87). Should this not have made her revise her interpretation of manas.paoiriia- dāman-, at least in Y 19.12? As for Y 19.6–11 (see Kellens, Études avestiques et mazdéennes, 30–33, for the Avestan text): “(6) whoever in this existence that is possessed of bone, O Zarathuštra Spitāma, rehearses the baγā version of the Ahuna Vairiia—while rehearsing, memorizes it; having memorized it, recites it; while reciting it, offers it (in) sacrifice—in three ways I, Ahura Mazdā, make his soul pass through the Bridge to paradise (vahištəm ahūm): to paradise (ā vahištā aŋhao), to the holy (domain) of aa (ā vahištā aā), to the holy (endless) lights (ā vahištaēibiiō raocbiiō) … (10) … for through it (there) is so much utterance-power (uxδata) that if the entire corporeal being learns it, learning and holding it fast, it safeguards (itself) against mortality (nī pairi iriθiiąstāta haraite).”

⁴² The reference is to the Gāthic fradaxštar- mentioned in Y 31.17 and 51.3, especially to the latter, despite Kellens, Études avestiques et mazdéennes, 42 n. 26. Y 51.3: “Let the lord carry to you (in his chariot) those who are about to join aa thanks to (their true) actions (dedicated) to you (and their) utterances (⁺hizuuā uxδāiš) of the good mind (vaŋhuš manaŋhō), whose primordial guide (fradaxštar-) you are, O Mazdā!” I basically follow Kellens' and Pirart's translation in 1988, 181. Humbach (The Gāthās of Zarathushtra and the Other Old Avestan Texts, 2: 191–2) is probably right in emending Geldner's hizuuå to hizuuā, which in any case is found in the oldest manuscript of Pahlavi Yasna tradition, K5. Tremblay's translation of the stanza (2009, 338) is hard to accept because he makes aa- the means rather than the object of the “union,” against the evidence of other passages where the two occur together (Y 35.8, 49.8, 53.3). Y 31.17cc': “O Ahura Mazdā, be for us the guide (fradaxštar-) of the good mind (vaŋhuš manaŋhō)!”

⁴³ Narten, Die Aməa Spəṇtas im Avesta, 95.

⁴⁴ Kellens, Études avestiques et mazdéennes, 34–5.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 37.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 42.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 38.

⁴⁸ Compare Hintze, Almut, “‘Do ut des’: Patterns on Exchange in Zoroastrianism,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 14, no. 1 (2004): 27–45Google Scholar; 39, who makes mīžda- the object of gam “come,” which is formally quite possible. The direct object of gam is either in the accusative or locative, not in the dative. When the verb has no complement, it has the sense of “arise” (e.g. Y 30.8, 31.14, 48.11), and its possible dative complement expresses the reason for “arising.” Y 51.10cc' maibiiō zbaiiā aəm vaŋhuiiā aī ga.tē means “I invoke aa with the holy ai to come for me,” i.e. for my sake, and not “de venir à moi” (Kellens, Jean and Pirart, Eric, Les textes vieil-avestiques, vol. 1, Introduction, texte et traduction [Wiesbaden, 1988], 183Google Scholar), “to come to me” (Humbach, Helmut, The Gāthās of Zarathushtra and the Other Old Avestan Texts, vol. 1, Introduction—Text and Translation [Heidelberg, 1991], 188Google Scholar). The senses of the accusative and dative complements of gam are clear in Y 36.2 uruuāzištō huuō nå yātāiiā paitī.jamiiå ātar mazdå ahurahiiā “You there, the most joyful one, may you come close to us for the sake of the request, O fire of the Wise Lord!” (Hintze, A Zoroastrian Liturgy, 119). See Hintze's analysis of the dative yātāiiā in ibid., 124–7. Compare Kellens, Jean and Pirart, Eric, Les textes vieil-avestiques, vol. 3, Commentaire (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1991), 35.Google Scholar Y 28.3c' ā mōi rafəδrāi zauuṇg jasatā means “come to my appeals for help” where the direct object (“my appeals”) is in the accusative and the reason for coming (“helping”) is in the dative. In Y 29.3c' yahmāi zauuṇg jimā kərədušā the dative relative pronoun does not refer to 29.3c hātąm huuō aojištō but to 29.3a ahmāi (the “Soul of the Cow”): for the sake of the Soul of the Cow I come to (his) appeals, humble (that I am). The expression zauuṇg ā gam may be idiomatic. Compare Kellens and Pirart 1988, 108.

⁴⁹ See Mayrhofer, Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindoarischen, II, 147.

⁵⁰ Incidentally, it is not quite clear in Kellens' text what the sense of yaθa “comme” is: what elements are being compared and in respect of what? That the two texts posit the same relation between Mazdā and vohu- manah-? But why would Y 19.13 use only one component of the god's name? Kellens' translation of fradaxštar- as “moteur” is also troublesome in the absence of an elucidation of the prima facie strange conception of Mazdā being the “moteur” of vohu- manah- (the god?).

⁵¹ Kellens, Études avestiques et mazdéennes, 42.

⁵² “L'autorité du créateur sur ses créations résulte du fait que le créateur est nécessairement antérieur à ses créations” (Kellens, Études avestiques et mazdéennes, 40). Incidentally, persistent justification of authority (e.g. by an appeal to anteriority in Y 19.12 and 13, according to Kellens) implies that the authority is questioned. Otherwise, what do these statements of anteriority serve, stating the obvious point that the creator god is anterior to what he creates?

⁵³ On yaθəna, “an adverb connecting a nominal complement,” see Hintze, A Zoroastrian Liturgy, 66–8.