Obtaining and maintaining humanitarian access to populations in need by humanitarian actors is a challenge. A wide range of constraints on humanitarian access exist, including ongoing hostilities or an otherwise insecure environment, destruction of infrastructure, often onerous bureaucratic requirements, and attempts by parties to armed conflict to block access intentionally. The difficulties that these constraints present to humanitarians are frequently compounded by a lack of familiarity – on the part of states, non-state armed groups, and humanitarian relief organizations – with the legal framework. The main purpose of this article is to lay out the existing international legal framework regulating humanitarian access in situations of armed conflict.

The Islamic law on rebellion offers a comprehensive code for regulating the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed conflicts and thus it can be used as a model for improving the contemporary international legal regime. It not only provides an objective criterion for ascertaining existence of armed conflict but also recognizes the combatant status for rebels and the necessary corollaries of their de facto authority in the territory under their control. Thus it helps reduce the sufferings of civilians and ordinary citizens during rebellion and civil wars. At the same time, Islamic law asserts that the territory under the de facto control of the rebels is de jure part of the parent state. It therefore answers the worries of those who fear that the grant of combatant status to rebels might give legitimacy to their struggle.

Armed non-state actors are involved in most armed conflicts today, yet international law provides few mechanisms to ensure that they comply with humanitarian norms applicable to them. In particular, monitoring and verification mechanisms that address the conduct of armed non-state actors rarely appear in multilateral treaties, and, even when they do, are weak and not applied in practice. Over the past few years, a number of alternative mechanisms have been developed to better monitor respect of humanitarian norms during internal armed conflicts and verify allegations of violations. This article examines the strength of these various mechanisms and then focuses on the Deed of Commitment, an innovative instrument developed by the Swiss-based non-governmental organization Geneva Call, to hold armed non-state actors accountable. Experience with the Deed of Commitment on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines shows that these alternative mechanisms can be effective in ensuring better compliance with at least some humanitarian norms.

This article introduces the various economic dimensions of armed groups and explores the implications of their engagement through mediation and dialogue. It looks specifically at the financing, operational costs, and economic agendas of armed groups and brings together examples from Angola, Kosovo, Sudan, Colombia, and other places. It emphasizes that information about available financing and operational costs is critical for assessing the financial and operational strength of an armed group. It also highlights the need to understand armed groups in the broader context of their evolution and the changes that organizational and territorial expansions require with regards to financing strategies. Overall, the economic dimensions of armed groups should be approached with an open mind so that issues such as financing, costs, and economic agendas can be perceived as opportunities, and not necessarily as a problem for peace.

The French government and an armed insurrectionary movement – the National Liberation Front (FLN) – confronted each other for over seven years in the Algerian War, which would become the archetype of wars of national liberation. It brought the new conditions of struggle in revolutionary warfare to a convulsive climax characterized by terrorist attacks, underground warfare, and repression. On the humanitarian front, the challenge of ensuring respect for humanitarian rules in asymmetric warfare was posed more bluntly than in any previous conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) faced the triple challenge of offering its services to a government facing an armed insurgency that it claimed to be able to bring under control through police action alone, of entering into contact with a liberation movement, and of conducting a humanitarian action in the context of an insurrectionary war.

This article looks at the tension between principles and politics in the response to the Afghan crisis, and more specifically at the extent to which humanitarian agencies have been able to protect themselves and their activities from overt instrumentalization by those pursuing partisan political agendas. After a short historical introduction, it focuses on the tensions around the issue of ‘coherence’ – the code word for the integration of humanitarian action into the wider political designs of the United Nations itself and of the UN-mandated military coalition that has been operating in Afghanistan since late 2001. The article ends with some more general conclusions on the humanitarian–political relationship and what Afghanistan ‘means’ for the future of humanitarian action.

The decision to respect the law – or not – is far from automatic, regardless of whether it is taken by an armed group or a state. Respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) can only be encouraged, and hence improved, if the reasons used by armed groups to justify respect or lack of it are understood and if the arguments in favour of respect take those reasons into account. Among the reasons for respecting the law, two considerations weigh particularly heavily for armed groups: their self-image and the military advantage. Among the reasons for non-respect, three are uppermost: the group's objective, the military advantage, and what IHL represents according to the group.

The United States' foreign policy in the first decade of the twenty-first century and its involvement in armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have given rise to a reinvigorated interest in international humanitarian law (IHL), commonly referred to in the United States as the law of armed conflict. Conversations about whether to classify detainees as prisoners of war, debates about what constitutes torture, and numerous surveys attempting to measure the public's knowledge about and views on the rules of war are offering an opportunity to examine Americans' views on IHL. This article will reflect on those views, providing numerous examples to illustrate the complexities encountered when near universally accepted legal standards of conduct are layered upon the fluid and unpredictable realities of modern warfare. The article will also highlight the impact that battlefield activities can have on domestic debates over policy choices and national conscience.

The Review asked Alberto Cairo, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) orthopaedic programme in Afghanistan since 1992, to make his own selection of pictures from the ICRC's photo library collection, which covers its activities in conflicts throughout the world from the 1860s to the present day.1 There are now more than 115,000 photos available in digital format.

While detention by armed opposition groups in non-international armed conflict is a reality that is foreseen and not prohibited by international humanitarian law, the grounds upon which it may take place are not defined. This article looks more closely at the customary international humanitarian law prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and how it can apply to armed opposition groups in a manner that makes compliance realistic. It focuses on the legal bases upon which armed opposition groups may detain persons who are taken into custody in order to remove them from hostilities or for security purposes. An approach to detention by armed opposition groups based on the principles of international humanitarian law applicable to international armed conflicts is explored and its limitations defined.

This article contends that the integration of humanitarian assistance in efforts to ‘win hearts and minds’ in counter-insurgencies has not been successful, and that the costs, both operational and legal, clearly outweigh any benefits. It demonstrates how such manipulation of humanitarian assistance runs counter to fundamental principles of international humanitarian law. In addition, a growing body of research suggests that the use of short-term aid and relief programmes as part of counter-insurgency has been ineffectual, and that, in places such as Afghanistan, it may even have undermined the overall military goal of defeating insurgents. With the United States and NATO military operations winding down in Afghanistan, it is time for the military and policy-makers reviewing ‘winning hearts and minds’ as a counter-insurgency strategy to draw the lessons and recognize the importance of a neutral and independent space for humanitarian aid.

Armed conflict and deprivation of liberty are inexorably linked. Deprivation of liberty by non-state armed groups is a consequence of the predominantly non-international character of contemporary armed conflicts. Regardless of the nature of the detaining authority or the overarching legality of its detention operations, deprivation of liberty may nonetheless have serious humanitarian implications for the individuals detained. Despite a need for humanitarian action, effective engagement is hampered by certain threshold obstacles, such as the perceived risk of the group's legitimization. Since the formative work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)'s founder, Henry Dunant, the ICRC has sought to overcome these obstacles. In doing so it draws upon its experience of humanitarian action in state detention, adapting it to the exigencies of armed groups and the peculiarities of their detention practice. Although not without setbacks, the ICRC retains a unique role in this regard and strives to ameliorate the treatment and conditions of detention of persons deprived of liberty by armed groups.

What is the position of non-state armed groups in public international law, a system conceived for and by states? This article considers the question, mainly in the light of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It shows that, while armed groups essentially trigger the application of jus ad bellum, they are not themselves endowed with a right to peace. Jus in bello confers rights and obligations on armed groups, but in the context of an unequal relationship with the state. This inequality before the law is strikingly illustrated by the regulation of detention practised by armed groups in non-international armed conflicts. Despite the significant role that they play in modern-day conflicts, armed groups constitute an ‘anomaly’ in a legal system that continues to be state-centric.

The Libyan crisis of 2011 has again raised the crucial problem of the choice of means in protecting civilians. Authorized by the international community as part of military operations in Libya, the use of force in protecting civilians has revived the concept of ‘humanitarian war’ and has raised a number of issues for humanitarian organizations, in particular concerning the notion of neutral, impartial, and independent humanitarian action.1 The article focuses on these humanitarian issues and, inter alia, on the possible impact on humanitarian action of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which was at the basis of the intervention in Libya.

The question of whether non-state armed groups could and should provide reparations to their victims has been largely overlooked. This article explores this gap, with a particular focus on symbolic reparations, such as acknowledgement of the truth and apologies. It argues that, while the question is fraught with legal, conceptual, and practical difficulties, there are some circumstances in which armed groups are capable of providing measures of reparations to their victims. The article identifies the issue of attacks on informers as one potential area for armed groups to provide such measures, and demonstrates that in a few cases armed groups have already engaged in actions that could be seen as analogous to symbolic reparations. The article's main case study is provided by recent actions by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in relation to its past attacks against suspected informers.

In 2010, Pakistan was struck by devastating floods, the latest in a series of disasters to strike the country in recent years. As it had during the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, the Pakistan military played a significant operational and co-ordination role in the humanitarian response that followed. Its role raised important questions about civil–military relations between humanitarian actors and national (as opposed to international) militaries. This article looks at the interaction between the humanitarian community and the Pakistan military in responding to the 2010 floods in order to identify key successes and challenges. It also highlights a number of issues that emerged in the context of Pakistan but that may also be relevant to civil–military relations – particularly between the humanitarian community and the national military of an affected state – in other natural disaster and complex emergency settings.

By introducing a new ‘debate’ section, the Review hopes to contribute to the reflection on current ethical, legal, or practical controversies around humanitarian issues. This section will expose readers to the key arguments concerning a particular contemporary question of humanitarian law or humanitarian action.

For this first debate, the Review asked two members of its Editorial Board, Professor Marco Sassòli and Professor Yuval Shany, to debate on the topic of equality of states and armed groups under international humanitarian law. Professor René Provost comments on this debate, adding a third dimension to the discussion.

The crucial question is whether it is realistic to apply the current legal regime to non-state armed groups. How can armed groups, with sometimes very limited means and low levels of organization, meet the same obligations as states? What are the incentives for armed groups to respect rules that their opponents have enacted? Why should they respect any rules when the very fact of taking arms against the state already makes them ‘outlaws’?

All participants in this discussion share an aspiration to ensure better legal protection for all those affected by armed conflicts. Professors Sassòli and Shany have agreed to present two ‘radically’ opposed stances, Professor Sassòli maintaining that equality should be reconsidered and replaced by a sliding scale of obligations, and Professor Shany rebutting this assertion. Professor Provost then reflects on the stances put forward by the two debaters and invites us to revisit the very notion of equality of belligerents.

The debaters have simplified their complex legal reasoning for the sake of clarity and brevity. Readers of the Review should bear in mind that the debaters actual legal positions are more nuanced than they may appear in this debate.

Neutrality as a guiding principle of humanitarian action was roundly rejected by most actors in Afghanistan's latest conflict. One party to the conflict commandeered assistance and aid organizations into a counter-insurgency campaign, and the other rejected Western aid organizations as agents of an imperialist West. The murder in 2003 of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) water engineer Ricardo Munguia, because of what he symbolized, cast doubt on whether the ICRC could be perceived as neutral in this highly polarized context. Rather than abandon a neutral stance, however, as so many aid organizations did, the ICRC persevered and, through some innovative and sometimes risky initiatives, managed to show both sides the benefits of having a neutral intermediary in conflict. Today, the ICRC continues to expand its reach to Afghans in dire need of humanitarian assistance.