^{page 430 note 1} Examples are the Stalinist implications – Schorske, C., German Social Democracy (Cambridge, 1955), p. 124Google Scholar – or the Lincolnian equations – Heuss, T., “Friedrich Ebert zum Gedächtnis”, in: M. Peters, Friedrich Ebert (Berlin, 1954).Google Scholar

^{page 430 note 2} Besson, Neither W., Friedrich Ebert (Berlin, 1963)Google Scholar, which remains the most insightful biography to date, nor Kotowski, G., Ebert, Friedrich, I: Aufstieg eines deutschen Arbeiterführers (Berlin, 1963)Google Scholar go much beyond the general presentations of the 1920s: Felden, E., Eines Menschen Weg (Bremen, 1927)Google Scholar and Ebert, Friedrich und Zeit, seine, ein Gedenkwerk (Charlottenburg, 1928).Google Scholar Kotowski's first part of a full-scale biography is particularly disappointing in that though some novel information is presented about the Bremen period, Ebert as man and party politician does not emerge from the background. The idea that Ebert “only in 1917 began to exert decisive influence on the whole politic of his party” (p. xii) is placed in doubt by much evidence Kotowski himself presents from the memoirs of Scheidemann or the minutes of the Parteiausschuss; it is contradicted by the diary published below and by Matthias, E. and Miller, S., eds, Das Kriegstagebuch des Reichstagesabgeordneten Eduard David (Düsseldorf, 1966), pp. 50, 53, 57, 62, 70Google Scholar, which shows, by the difficulties the rightists had in gaining Ebert and Scheidemann for their plans and policies, that the latter not only had their own aims and methods but that power in the party central lay with them or it would not have been necessary to gain their support. Kotowski's assertion that Ebert was known neither to the public nor to the leading men of the Wilhelmian state (p. xi) is an acceptance of a myth Scheidemann created but contradicted by the diary below and David, Kriegstagebuch, pp. 6 note 12, 141, 127, passim. Ebert's shortcomings only are emphasized by Hunt, R. N., “Friedrich Ebert and the German Revolution of 1918”, in: L. Krieger and F. Stern, eds, The Responsibility of Power (1967), chapter 17.Google Scholar

^{page 431 note 1} Ebert, F. Jr, ed., Friedrich Ebert: Schriften, Aulzeichnungen, Reden (Dresden, 1926)Google Scholar and idem, Kämpfe und Ziele (Dresden, 1927).

^{page 431 note 2} Schulz, U., ed., Die Bremer Anfänge Friedrich Eberts: Eine Dokumentation (Bremen, 1968)Google Scholar; idem, Friedrich Ebert in Bremen: Aus seinem parlamentarischen Wirken 1900 bis 1905 (Bremen, 1963); Moring, E., Die Sozialdemokratie in Bremen 1890–1914 (Hannover, 1968).Google Scholar

^{page 431 note 3} For example, the minutes of the Parteiausschuss which Ebert chaired exist only as published manuscript printed for internal party use and hence survive in only 3 or 4 copies for each meeting. The most complete collection is at the SPD Archiv, Bonn.

^{page 431 note 4} Pertinent details about Ebert's headship of this organization from 1908 to 1918 are in the laudatory account of one of its secretaries, Peters, M., Friedrich Ebert (Berlin, 1954)Google Scholar, and more should be available in the proposed 3-volume documentary Geschichte der Sozialistischen Jugend Bewegung Deutschlands und sozialistische Erziehungsbewegung edited by the Sozialistische Jugend Deutschlands under guidance of B. Brücher.

^{page 431 note 5} See Matthias, E. and Pikart, E., eds, Die Reichstagsfraktion der deutschen Sozialdemokratie (Düsseldorf, 1966)Google Scholar; the author is preparing an article “Ebert and Wuppertal” to illustrate the relations of a socialist Reichstag member and his constituency.

^{page 431 note 6} An article with very significant documents, “Friedrich Ebert und die Internationale”, is to be published by A. Wurmbach in Archiv für Sozialgeschichte.

^{page 431 note 7} The minutes of the Rat der Volksbeauftragten and of the Zentralrat were to have been published by 1969 in addition to an analysis of the Ebert-Groener “Pact”.

^{page 431 note 8} Dissertations on cabinet-building and the use of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution are being prepared in Tübingen and Berlin.

^{page 431 note 9} Their disappearance has not been fully clarified.

^{page 431 note 10} Fritz Ebert (Berlin [1919]), p. 5.Google Scholar

^{page 432 note 1} Müller, Hermann, “Friedrich Ebert”, in: Die Gesellschaft, II (1925), Pt 1, p. 301.Google Scholar

^{page 432 note 2} Memoiren eines Sozialdemokraten (Dresden, 1928), I, p. 360.Google Scholar

^{page 432 note 3} David, , Kriegstagebuch, p. 285Google Scholar; Nadolny, R., Mein Beitrag (Wiesbaden, 1955), p. 76Google Scholar, give examples.

^{page 432 note 4} Examples: Geheimes Preussisches Staatsarchiv Berlin, Nachlass Eugen Schif+er, Dossier 2, 274 and 292. Also Kämpfe und Ziele, p. 209.

^{page 432 note 5} Scheidemann, , Memoiren, I, p. 360Google Scholar; Nadolny, , Beitrag, p. 70Google Scholar; David, , Kriegstagebuch, p. 251.Google Scholar

^{page 432 note 6} Kotowski, , Ebert, I, pp. 156–157Google Scholar attempts to revise the staid image which emerged as leaders of the Weimar Republic tried to prove they were not frivolous in public affairs as Wilhelm II had been. However, Kotowski at the same time attempts to make Ebert the man who smoothed the way for cooperation and comradeship in the partly central (p. 152). This contradicts the personality traits, especially the petty jealousy and concern to have his own way, that Kotowski has found in Ebert's character (pp. 153, 157). Where Ebert did play the moderator was in party-union relations; see Protokolle der Konferenzen der Vertreter der Zentralvorstände (Berlin, 1903ff.)Google Scholar especially minutes of meetings 16–17 December, 1907 and 22–23 March, 1909.

^{page 432 note 7} Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amt Bonn, Europa Generalia 82, No 1, Vol. 26.

^{page 432 note 8} Scheidemann, , Memoiren, I, p. 100.Google Scholar

^{page 432 note 9} Ebert, , Schriften I, pp. 129–130.Google Scholar

^{page 433 note 1} David, , Kriegstagebuch, pp. 50, 55Google Scholar; also Kuczynski, J., Der Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges und die deutsche Sozialdemokratie (Berlin, 1957), pp. 209–211.Google Scholar

^{page 433 note 2} David, , Kriegstagebuch, p. 83.Google Scholar

^{page 433 note 3} See the diary entry August 13 and diary entries in Ebert, , Schriften, II, p. 111.Google Scholar

^{page 433 note 4} This throws even more doubt upon the thesis of Schorske, German Social Democracy, that a split among German socialists was the inevitable result of ideological, organizational and tactical differences. See also the criticisms of Maehl, W., “Recent Literature on the German Socialists”, in: Journal of Modern History, XXXIII, 3 (09, 1961), pp. 292ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Epstein, K., “Three American Studies of German Socialism”, in: World Politics, XI, 4 (07, 1959), pp. 629–651CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and the especially perceptive remarks by Miller, S., “Zum dritten August 1914”, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, IV (1964), pp. 515–523.Google Scholar

^{page 434 note 1} Ebert, , Schriften, I, p. 309Google Scholar; reprinted in Kotowski, , Ebert, I, p. 225.Google Scholar

^{page 434 note 2} David, , Kriegstagebuch, pp. 189–190Google Scholar. David naturally thought of himself.

^{page 434 note 3} See Schorske, , German Social Democracy, p. 120Google Scholar, passim; Besson, , Ebert, pp. 38ff.Google Scholar; Kotowski, , Ebert, I, ch. 5 and 6.Google Scholar

^{page 434 note 4} Berlau, A. J., The German Social Democratic Party (New York, 1949)Google Scholar has relied extensively upon newspapers; Kotowski, Ebert, I, has employed the minutes of the Parteiausschuss.

^{page 434 note 5} See Besson, , Ebert, pp. 40ff.Google Scholar; Kotowski, , Ebert, I, ch. 5.Google Scholar

^{page 434 note 6} Protokoll des Parteitages (Berlin, 1911), p. 371.Google Scholar

^{page 434 note 7} Protokolle der Konferenzen der Vertreter der Zentralvorstände (Berlin, 903ff.)Google Scholar, in particular sessions of April 24, 1910 and May 4–6, 1914.

^{page 434 note 8} Results were published in Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission (1914), pp. 274–275.Google Scholar

^{page 435 note 1} An annual report for this insurance system with 3617 members in 1914 is in ibid., pp. 294–296.

^{page 435 note 2} Beside examples in the diary entries August 7–12, see Ebert's part in the Württemberg party and press strife best revealed in the printed manuscript Der Parteivorstand zum Redaktionswechsel der Schwäb. Tagwacht. Protokoll der Presskommission über die gemeinsame Sitzung am 15. November 1914 (Stuttgart, 1914).Google Scholar

^{page 435 note 3} For a complimentary view as to why Haase did not make his weight felt in the party central see Calkins, K. R., “The Election of Hugo Haase to the Co-chairmanship of the SPD and the Crisis of Pre-war German Social Democracy”, in: IRSH, XIII (1968), pp. 174–188, esp. 187.Google Scholar

^{page 435 note 4} Haase, E., ed., Hugo Haase (Berlin, 1929), p. 101Google Scholar, presents a letter from Haase to Vaillant dated May 1914 in which Haase informs that the party central in Germany unanimously rejected the idea of a general strike.

^{page 436 note 1} This was the theoretically “correct” line of Karl Kautsky who had written the Austrian as well as the German party program. The best anaylsis remains Matthias, E., “Kautsky und der Kautskyanismus”, in: Marxismusstudien, II (1957), pp. 151–197.Google Scholar

^{page 436 note 2} Elberfeld Freie Presse 22. Januar 1915. For Ebert's views on war see Protokoll des Parteitages (Berlin, 1912), pp. 6ff., 215ff.Google Scholar

^{page 437 note 1} Kotowski, , Ebert, I, p. 226 note 20.Google Scholar

^{page 437 note 2} Müller's explanation went to the party press in March, 1915.

^{page 437 note 3} Kuczynski, J., Der Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges, p. 78.Google Scholar

^{page 437 note 4} Haupt, , Der Kongress fand nicht statt, pp. 117ff.Google Scholar

^{page 437 note 5} See the provocative thesis: Steinberg, H. J., Sozialismus und deutsche Sozialdemokratie (Hannover, 1967).Google Scholar

^{page 437 note 6} Stern, F., “Bethmann Hollweg und der Krieg”, in: Recht und Staat, Heft 351–352 (Tübingen, 1968), p. 21.Google Scholar

^{page 437 note 7} Zechlin, E., “Bethmann Hollweg, Kriegsrisiko und SPD 1914”, in: Der Monat (01, 1966), pp. 22–25.Google Scholar

^{page 437 note 8} Even more than the Zabern Affair, the discovery made in 1910 that the whole party system would be subject to destruction and the arrest of leaders regardless of parliamentary immunity must have been cause for unease. Protokoll des Parteitages (Berlin, 1910), p. 430.Google Scholar

^{page 437 note 9} Stern, , “Bethmann Hollweg und der Krieg”, p. 38.Google Scholar

^{page 437 note 10} Rosenberg, Arthur, Entstehung und Geschichte der Republik (Frankfurt, 1955), p. 73.Google Scholar

^{page 438 note 1} Zechlin, , “Bethmann Hollweg, Kriegsrisiko und SPD”, pp. 22ff.Google Scholar; Stern, , “Bethmann Hollweg und der Krieg”, p. 38.Google Scholar See also Pikart, E., “Der deutsche Reichstag und der Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges”, in: Der Staat, V (1966), pp. 47–70.Google Scholar

^{page 438 note 2} David, , Kriegstagebuch, p. 113.Google Scholar

^{page 438 note 3} Protokoll des Parteitages (Berlin, 1917), p. 230.Google Scholar

^{page 438 note 4} Kuczynski, , Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges, p. 53.Google Scholar

^{page 438 note 5} Haupt, , Der Kongress fand nicht statt, p. 189.Google Scholar Rosa Luxemburg who also attended this meeting of the ISB did not contradict Haase.

^{page 438 note 6} Diary entry of 22.12.1914, reprinted in David, , Kriegstagebuch, p. 4 note 2.Google Scholar

^{page 439 note 1} The editor is grateful for the assistance of Dr Susanne Miller.

^{page 439 note 2} Scheidemann, , Memoiren, I, p. 243Google Scholar speaks of some weeks before the outbreak of war, and Kotowski, , Ebert, I, p. 224Google Scholar claims Ebert left Berlin immediately after June 29, 1914.

^{page 439 note 8} Accompanying the parents to the Baltic were probably the youngest son Karl and the daughter Amalie.

^{page 439 note 4} Kuczynski, , Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges, pp. 49–61Google Scholar shows how unaware all German socialists were of the danger; Haupt, , Der Kongress fand nicht statt, pp. 149ff.Google Scholar shows all European socialists thought similarly.

^{page 440 note 1} Ebert's lack of information, and consequent unrest, is fully related in the letter of 27 July to the party central printed in Ebert, , Schriften, I, p. 309Google Scholar, and reprinted in Kotowski, , Ebert, I, p. 225.Google Scholar

^{page 440 note 2} According to Haase, E., ed., Hugo Haase, 24Google Scholar, this declaration stemmed mainly from Haase. Its main contention was that Austria was provoking war. The declaration called for anti-war-demonstrations and demanded Germany control, not support, its ally.

^{page 440 note 3} Compare Scheidemann, , Memoiren I, pp. 243 and 247Google Scholar, who claims Ebert returned to Berlin only July 30; also Kotowski, , Ebert, I, p. 226.Google Scholar

^{page 440 note 4} Biographical information about socialists mentioned in the diary will be noted only if not readily available as in Osterroth, F., Biographisches Lexikon des Sozialismus (Hannover, 1960).Google Scholar First and last names will be supplied on first mention.

^{page 440 note 5} Besides planning the trip to Switzerland, hiding party papers and warning the regional parties, these security measures probably focused upon putting party funds into moveable form. The trade unions while still fearing repression, for example, transferred many of their funds to private accounts; see Scheugenpflug, O., Johann Sassenbach (Hannover and Frankfurt, 1959), p. 73.Google Scholar

^{page 440 note 6} The Belgian socialist, C. Huysmans, had on his own initiative as secretary of the ISB called a meeting which convened July 29 and 30. See Haupt, , Der Kongress fand nicht statt, pp. 150–151.Google Scholar Ebert. had assumed a meeting would be necessary before he knew this one had been called; Ebert, , Schriften, I, p. 309.Google Scholar

^{page 440 note 7} According to the minutes of the meeting, published in Haupt, , Der Kongress fand nicht statt, p. 179Google Scholar (and footnotes) on the morning of July 29 “Haase read a telegram signed Braun which stated that on the previous day in Berlin thousands of workers in 27 overfilled meetings and on the street demonstrated against war and for peace.” “Groups of 10,000 on Unter den Linden. Clash with police … On Unter den Linden chauvinists attempted counter demonstration. Hilferding being deported from Berlin.” No mention is made about proroguing the congress, indeed it was Haase who proposed moving the date ahead to August 9 (p. 181).

^{page 441 note 1} According to Haase's report at the 1916 party conference, he had been called to the Prussian Ministry of the Interior; see Protokoll der Reichskonferenz (Berlin, 1916), p. 60Google Scholar, and Haase, E., ed., Hugo Haase, p. 25.Google Scholar Otto Braun also participated because Ebert, Scheidemann and Molkenbuhr were not in Berlin. The government revealed its intention to stand by Austria if Russia supported Serbia. Haase criticized this interpretation of German duties. Also discussed were the mass demonstrations planned for July 28. Pikart, , “Der Reichstag”, pp. 62 and 64Google Scholar, asserts Haase did not inform his colleagues in the party central about the meeting. Actually, the diary shows candidness and cohesion among the leaders.

^{page 441 note 2} See note 7, p. 440 above, and Vorwärts, July 29, 1914.

^{page 441 note 3} Wilhelm Pfannkuch, Scheidemann and Ebert were holidaying and Haase preoccupied by a law case as the July Crisis gathered momentum. Scheidemann, , Memoiren I, p. 245Google Scholar reports an exceptionally smooth meeting with the control commission.

^{page 441 note 4} The report of the control commission is reprinted in the Protokoll des Parteitages (Berlin, 1917), pp. 49–53.Google Scholar

^{page 441 note 5} Ibid., The control commission had decided to present a full report to the party congress instead of just listing complaints. Ebert's harsh judgement was probably due to the recurring statement that trust must exist between leaders and membership in a democratic organization. Also, the control commission had questioned the right of the party central to terminate the literary section of a party journal because in it Franz Mehring was deploying a different viewpoint than the general editor, Karl Kautsky. The other complaint of the control commission against the the party central, that too much money in one sum was being lent to foreign organizations, may refer to the 300,000 Mark loan which party and unions extended to a co-operative bread factory in Vienna on the pleadings of the Austrian party; see Protokoll der Konferenz von Vertretern der Zentralverbandesvorstände (Berlin, 1914)Google Scholar, session of June 27, 1914.

^{page 442 note 1} According to Haase, , Protokoll der Reichskonferenz (Berlin, 1916), p. 60Google Scholar, Südekum was called because other leaders were not available. An exchange of letters revealing the visit's purpose is reprinted in Kuczynski, , Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges, pp. 78–80.Google ScholarHaupt, , Der Kongress fand nicht statt, p. 169Google Scholar, correctly raises the question whether two visits took place.

^{page 442 note 2} The most recent addition to the long list of publications appearing since the new debate about war origins and war aims began, claims there is no evidence in the diary of Bethmann Hollweg's secretary “of any attempt by Bethmann to stop the crisis, to save the peace”. Stern, F., “Bethmann Hollweg und der Krieg”, in: Recht und Staat (Tübingen, 1968)Google Scholar, Heft 351–352, p. 21. This agrees with Zechlin, E., “Bethmann Hollweg, Kriegsrisiko und SPD”, in: Der Monat (01, 1966), pp. 17–32Google Scholar, who has shown that after July 26 the government was concerned only to prove the war was defensive against Russia.

^{page 442 note 3} The military leaders and the Kaiser were for harsh measures against the socialists; von Delbruck, Clemens, Die wirtschaftliche Mobilmachung in Deutschland (München, 1924), p. 156.Google Scholar

^{page 442 note 4} Scheidemann, gives a slightly different account in Der Zusammenbruch (Berlin, 1921), p. 4.Google Scholar

^{page 443 note 1} July 31 the German government demanded an end to mobilization or else it would follow suit which it did at 5 p.m.

^{page 443 note 2} French socialist leader, assassinated in Parisan café July 31.

^{page 443 note 3} Berlin-born furniture maker who moved to Zürich around 1900, was active in the cooperative movement, the city council and the executive of the canton Zürich.

^{page 443 note 4} Reprinted in Kuczynski, , Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges, pp. 81–82.Google Scholar It is a declaration of resignation: “Were our serious protests, our constantly repeated efforts unsuccessful, are the relationships under which we live once again stronger than our worker-brother will, so we must squarely face that which is coming.”

^{page 444 note 1} All authors have followed Scheidemann's claim that Ebert, by not returning until August 6, did not participate in any party decisions; Memoiren, I, p. 247Google Scholar; Kautsky, , Sozialisten und Krieg, p. 441Google Scholar; Kotowski, , Ebert I, p. 226Google Scholar. Besson, , Ebert, p. 48Google Scholar, without giving a source states August 2. David Kriegstagebuch, p. 12 confirms Ebert's presence in Berlin August 4.

^{page 444 note 2} See Matthias, E. and Pikart, E., eds, Die Reichstagsfraktion der deutschen Sozialdemokratie (Düsseldorf, 1966), II, pp. 3–4 with notes.Google Scholar

^{page 444 note 3} Ibid., I, pp. clxxxviii-cxci.

^{page 445 note 1} The entry here is a resumé of Bethmann Hollweg's speech. Verhandlungen des Reichstags. Stenographische Berichte, Vol. 306, pp. 3ff.

^{page 445 note 2} Scheidemann, , Memoiren, I, p. 250Google Scholar reports the meeting between chancellor and party leaders on August 3. Late during the same day the Social Democrats' Reichstag declaration was handed to the government.

^{page 445 note 3} Reference is to the statement: “Our army stands in the field, our fleet is ready to fight, – behind them the whole German nation!“

^{page 445 note 4} Matthias, and Pikart, , eds, Reichstagsfraktion, II, p. 4.Google Scholar

^{page 445 note 5} Ibid., note 6, which explains that the Foreign Office objected to the phrase that all-out resistance would be offered against any annexationist war. David, , Kriegstagebuch, p. 11Google Scholar attributes the change to Haase.

^{page 445 note 6} Compare ibid., p. 12, and Prager, E., Geschichte der USPD (Berlin, 1921), p. 35.Google Scholar

^{page 445 note 7} The international congress had already been prorogued August 1; the party congress was planned for Würzburg September 13–19.

^{page 446 note 1} Ebert's report in the Parteiausschuss September 27, 1914, stated that the party school was closed, educational work had stopped, the family-aimed press and the journal Neue Welt were not published. Protokoll des Parteiausschuss (Berlin, 1917), p. 5.Google Scholar

^{page 446 note 2} Same as circular referred to in note 4 below.

^{page 446 note 3} Results are recorded in Protokolle der Konferenzen der Vertreter der Zentralverbandsvorstände (Berlin, 1915), p. 30,Google Scholar session of 5 August, 1914. Legien reported the party central's propsed income reduction from between 15 to 30% for party functionaries. Ebert argued the scale be accepted unchanged.

^{page 446 note 4} Text is in Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission, 1914, pp. 486–487Google Scholar and carries the signature of both the party central and the trade union central. In addition to the issues mentioned by Ebert it asks duty be done especially in bringing in the harvest and integrating women into the economy.

^{page 446 note 5} Main theoretical organ, edited by Karl Kautsky.

^{page 447 note 1} The journal continued to appear regularly though the number of pages dwindled as the war progressed.

^{page 447 note 2} Printed in Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission, 1914, pp. 516–517.Google Scholar

^{page 447 note 3} See p. 434 above; results of the negotiations with the trade unions in ibid., p. 520.

^{page 447 note 4} According to Scheidemann, , Memoiren, I, p. 260Google Scholar and Kautsky, , Sozialisten und Krieg, p. 441Google Scholar, Braun returned August 10.

^{page 447 note 5} The yearly report of the organization printed in Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission, 1914, pp. 294–296Google Scholar reveals 16,000 Mark on hand and in the bank out of a capital totaling over a million.

^{page 447 note 6} The fate of these exiles and emigrés could not be discovered. For background, in particular the identification of Russian and Jew see Brachmann, B., Russische Sozialdemokraten in Berlin 1895–1914 (Berlin, 1962).Google Scholar

^{page 447 note 7} Document reads “K. Schatzes”, which may be assumed to refer to the funds that Kautsky and Zetkin held in trust for the Russian Social Democrats. The money was in Kautsky's possession, ibid., p. 94. See also Losche, P., Der Bolschewismus im Urteil der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1903–1920 (Berlin, 1967), p. 59–66.Google Scholar

^{page 448 note 1} Could not be identified.

^{page 448 note 2} Blatantly false.

^{page 448 note 3} An answer to an inquiry at the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amt did not further clarify the matter.

^{page 448 note 4} Südekum travelled to Italy August 25 to September 4, 1914 but was unsuccessful for the Italians had taken an anti-German position. Südekum Nachlass, 66 in Bundesarchiv Koblenz. See also David, Kriegstagebuch, p. 35.Google Scholar

^{page 448 note 5} Must refer to trying to get a press friendly toward Germany. In the session of September 15, 1914, Ebert informed the unions: “As the war broke out Germany was cut off from any contact with the outside. Therefore, the foreign press depended completely on English and French reports. The party central did its best, to inform the press and membership, partly through personal contact. The GermanSwiss press in general took a German-friendly stance … The Italian press took a definitely anti-German position; an attempt was made to explain the position of the German party.” Protokoll der Konferenzen von Vertretern der Zentralverbandsvorstände (Berlin, 1915).Google Scholar Further on September 27, 1914, Ebert, stated: “With Adler in Vienna we have discussed the whole situation; we are in complete agreement.” Protokoll des Parteiausschuss (Berlin, 1914), p. 4.Google Scholar

^{page 448 note 6} Das Recht während des Krieges (Berlin, 1914).Google Scholar

^{page 448 note 7} On July 31 the idea of acting against war measures was given up; later socialists joined the government as well as voting for the war credits.