A giant in the postwar study of international relations. Helped invent regional integration studies. Introduced systematic social science concepts and methods into the study of international organization, emphasizing how structures, interests, and actor learning interact to produce institutional transformation. Was instrumental in International Organization becoming the leading journal in the field.

Do the macroeconomic priorities of citizens differ across countries? If so, what accounts for this variation and what are its consequences for explanations of the choice of monetary institutions, macroeconomic policy, and international monetary cooperation? This article uses survey data from twenty advanced economies to examine individual preferences about macroeconomic priorities. The analysis establishes three key findings. First, the results suggest that economic context, defined by inflation and unemployment performance, has a substantial impact on the public's economic objectives in a way that is broadly consistent with the specification of utility/loss functions in the theoretical political economy literature. Second, the results suggest that there is significant cross-country variation in inflation aversion, controlling for economic context. Third, some of this variation is accounted for by national-level factors affecting the aggregate costs of inflation and unemployment. These results have significant implications for optimal monetary policymaking, the explanation of variation in economic outcomes, and for accounts of the choice of institutional frameworks for policymaking.I thank the Bank of England, the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, and the Institution for Social and Policy Studies for research support, and Jim Alt, Andrew Bailey, Bill Bernhard, Lawrence Broz, John Freeman, Jeff Frieden, Jim Granato, Shigeo Hirano, David Lake, Jeff Lax, Simon Price, Rose Razaghian, Ron Rogowski, David Stasavage, Gabriel Sterne, Mike Tomz, Jim Vreeland, the editor, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. All views expressed are those of the author and do not represent those of the Bank of England.

Recent studies have found that natural resources and civil war are highly correlated. Yet the causal mechanisms behind the correlation are not well understood, in part because data on civil wars is scarce and of poor quality. In this article I examine thirteen recent civil wars to explore the mechanisms behind the resource-conflict correlation. I describe seven hypotheses about how resources may influence a conflict, specify the observable implications of each, and report which mechanisms can be observed in a sample of thirteen civil wars in which natural resources were “most likely” to have played a role. I find that two of the most widely cited causal mechanisms do not appear to be valid; that oil, nonfuel minerals, and drugs are causally linked to conflict, but legal agricultural commodities are not; and that resource wealth and civil war are linked by a variety of mechanisms, including several that others had not identified.For their comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Paul Collier, J. R. Deshazo, Pierre Englebert, Barbara Geddes, Anke Hoeffler, Macartan Humphreys, Philippe Le Billon, Roy Licklider, Dan Posner, Ken Shultz, and Libby Wood.

This article examines the key ethical questions in the design of labor immigration programs. We propose a two-dimensional matrix of ethical space that isolates a number of different ethical frameworks on the basis of the degree of consequentialism they allow and the moral standing they accord to noncitizens. We argue for the rejection of extreme ethical frameworks and propose criteria that should guide national policymakers in their choice and application of a framework within the ethical subspace of moderate consequentialism and moderate moral standing for noncitizens. To translate these “ethical guidelines” for the design of labor immigration programs into policy practice, we advocate new types of temporary foreign worker programs. In contrast to many existing and past guest worker policies, the programs that we propose would more actively promote the interests of migrant workers and sending countries by more clearly defining, and more effectively enforcing, certain core rights of migrant workers.For their helpful comments, we would like to thank Manolo Abella, Rainer Bauböck, Thomas Bräuninger, Wayne Cornelius, Clare Fox, David Heer, Jessica Heynis, Robert Holton, Eddie Hyland, Miles Kahler, Alan Kessler, Christian Klamler, Christoph Kuzmics, Phil Martin, Gail McElroy, Robert McLaughlin, Onora O'Neill, Nalini Persram, Thomas Pogge, Carlos Rodriguez, Robert Rowthorn, John Sender, Patrick Taran, Takeyuki Tsuda, Patrick Weil, two anonymous referees, and especially the editors of this journal. Martin Ruhs gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Cambridge European Trust, the Cambridge Political Economy Society Trust, the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University of California-San Diego, and the Policy Institute at Trinity College Dublin. Most of this article was written while Martin Ruhs was a Ph.D. candidate at the Faculty of Economics and Politics, University of Cambridge, and a Visiting Research Fellow at both the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University of California-San Diego, and the Policy Institute at Trinity College Dublin. Ha-Joon Chang wishes to thank the Korea Research Foundation for its research support through the BK21 program at the Department of Economics, Korea University, where he was a Visiting Research Professor when the manuscript was completed.

A substantial body of research suggests that the United States has a distinctive legal style characterized by detailed rules, extensive transparency requirements, adversarial procedures for dispute resolution, costly legal contestation involving many lawyers, and frequent judicial intervention in administrative affairs. Recently, scholars of comparative law and public policy have asked whether this American legal style is spreading around the world. Some scholars have argued that legal styles are converging on an American model, while others have argued that distinctive national legal styles will persist. This article addresses this emerging debate. We argue that American legal style is spreading to other jurisdictions. However, we depart from predominant explanations, which attribute convergence to international regulatory competition or emulation. Instead, we argue that economic liberalization and political fragmentation have undermined traditional approaches to regulation and have generated functional pressures and political incentives to shift toward American legal style.The authors thank Kenneth Abbott, Ward Bower, Kent Calder, Robert G. DeLaMater, Tom Ginsburg, Jack Goldsmith, Milton Heumann, Mark D. Hunsaker, Nicolas Jabko, Robert Kagan, Susan Lawrence, Kathleen McNamara, Michael Paris, Mark Ramseyer, Amy Searight, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Tatsushi Terada, David Vogel, Albert Yoon, and participants in presentations at the 2001 International Studies Association Convention, the 2001 American Political Science Association Convention, Northwestern University's Center for International and Comparative Studies, the University of Chicago Law School, and Princeton University's Center of International Studies for their comments on earlier versions of the article. The authors thank Rachael Snyder, Fatima Khan, Hisako Yamamoto, Masako Ishiwata, and Kei Yamaguchi for their research assistance and Akiko Tsuda, Akemi Ideuchi, and Mio Kato for secretarial assistance. Kelemen thanks the Frank Kneller Fund at Rutgers University and the Center of International Studies at Princeton University for financial support. Views expressed herein are those of the authors alone and are not necessarily those of any institutions with which they are affiliated.

Some member-states of the European Union (EU) want a supranational foreign and security policy, while other member-states oppose any significant limitation of national sovereignty in this domain. What explains this variation? Answering this question could help us to better understand not only the trajectory of European unification, but also the conditions and prospects of consensual political integration in other regional contexts and territorial scales. The main research traditions in international relations theory suggest different explanations. I examine the roles of relative power capabilities, foreign policy interests, Europeanized identities, and domestic multilevel governance in determining the preferences of the fifteen EU member governments concerning the institutional depth of their foreign and security policy cooperation. I find that power capabilities and collective identities have a significant influence, but the effect of ideas about the nature and locus of sovereignty, as reflected in the domestic constitution of each country, is particularly remarkable.A previous version of this article was presented at the 4th ECPR Pan-European International Relations Conference, Canterbury, 8–10 September 2001. For their valuable comments, I would like to thank Filippo Andreatta, Daniele Archibugi, Simone Borra, Nicola Dunbar, Fabio Franchino, Alkuin Kölliker, Leonardo Morlino, Angelo Panebianco, Eiko Thielemann, Ben Tonra, the editors of IO, and three anonymous reviewers. I am responsible for any mistakes.

This article examines why international relations theories presume checks and balances but universal domination triumphed in ancient China. I argue that one should not presume the European experience as the norm and treat ancient China as a deviant case. I propose a dynamic theory of international politics that views international competition as processes of strategic interaction and that allows for alternative trajectories and endogenous transformation. Realist theories of international politics tend to focus on structural mechanisms and overlook agential strategies. At the same time, these theories focus on causal mechanisms that check attempts at domination and overlook mechanisms that facilitate domination. It is true that attempts at domination are checked by the mechanisms of balance of power and rising costs of expansion. But domination-seekers may overcome such obstacles by pursuing divide-and-conquer strategies, ruthless tactics, and self-strengthening reforms. From this strategic-interactive perspective, universal domination is no less possible than the balance of power.I would like to express my gratitude to Jack Snyder, Ira Katznelson, Charles Tilly, Thomas Bernstein, Michael Davis, and David Kang for their extensive comments on multiple drafts. I also want to thank Fiona Adamson, Bear Braumoeller, E. Bruce Brooks, Lars-Erik Cederman, Thomas Christensen, Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Charles Cogan, Timothy Crawford, Julian Franklin, Taylor Fravel, Robert Goodin, Yoav Gortzak, A. Iain Johnston, Edward Kolodziej, Andrew Kydd, Mark Lewis, Daniel Nexon, Richard Rosecrance, Stephen Rosen, Peter Rutland, Mark Sheetz, Erik Voeten, R. Harrison Wagner, R. Bin Wong, and the editor-in-chief and two anonymous reviewers of International Organization for their thoughtful and critical comments. In addition, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, the Institute for the Study of World Politics, the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University sponsored various phases of this project.