Recent writings on problems of the international economy have focused attention primarily on changes in the international system. This paper attempts to show that foreign economic policy can be understood only if domestic factors are systematically included in the analysis. The paper's first part groups the recent literature into three paradigms which distinguish between three international effects. The second part offers a comparison of the differences between a state-centered policy network in France and a society-centered network in the United States. The third part of the paper combines the arguments of the first two and analyzes French and American commercial, financial, and energy policies as the outcome of both international effects and domestic structures. These case studies show that domestic factors must be included in an analysis of foreign economic policies. The paper's main results are analyzed further in its fourth part.

Increasing attention is being paid to the development of international codes of behavior and rules of law to regulate the behavior of transnational enterprise. Notable steps in this direction have been taken by the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Community, the Andean Common Market and various other organizations. The approaches represented by these efforts can be categorized by the use of four models: the Free Market model; the European Community model; the Multinational Consortium approach; and the Development Community approach. These approaches to the problem of regulation differ in the degree to which they impose prior regulation on multinational firms and in whether they permit the firms to operate as integrated systems or impose arms-length standards on parent-subsidiary relations. Each approach has merits, depending on context and the values of the governments involved.

The article is an empirical study of the political processes leading to the agreement on the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) that was reached in October 1970 at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Section I of the article sets out the triangular interests that had to reach agreement among developed countries, among developing countries, and between developed and developing countries. Section II poses the problem of the article: How did the UNCTAD secretariat contribute to the political process that resolved the three-dimensional disagreements, if only on a partial basis? The argument of the article is that sustained institutionalized pressure exerted through the UNCTAD secretariat did make a difference in influencing the policy outcomes on GSP. Certain results were achieved through UNCTAD organizational processes–secretariat ideology, Prebisch's leadership, and pragmatic group bargaining–that could not have been achieved through other means.

The research reported in this article seeks to understand how and why individuals are appointed to serve as executive heads of international organizations. A simple statement of the behavioral rule used in selection of executive heads is developed in the form of an executive head appointment function. The type of data available for the analysis of the appointment of executive heads in international organizations is identified, and an empirical examination of changes in emphasis in the selection of executive heads is reported. The executive head appointment function utilized in the study views appointment as an executive head as a function of six factors (three organizational, one national, and two personal). Discriminant function analysis is used to determine if the function would distinguish between individuals appointed during the period 1945–57 and those appointed from 1958–70 as executive heads in UN treaty-based organizations. It is possible to distinguish, on the basis of the specified executive head appointment function, between executive heads appointed during the two halves of the time period under study. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the emphasis involved in the selection of executive heads has changed over time in UN treaty-based organizations.

This article examines the voting behavior of the exceptionally small states (population less than one million) in the UN General Assembly. It uses modified Rice-Beyle techniques (Index of Cohesion and Index of Agreement) to measure the cohesiveness of 23 ministates in four issue-areas: political, colonial, economic, and social, humanitarian and cultural. Ministate voting patterns are compared with those of the US, the USSR, the former colonial powers, and the African-Asian caucusing group. The study's major findings are that: 1) there is greatest ministate cohesion on colonial and economic issues and less cohesion on social, humanitarian, and cultural questions. Political issues divide the ministates; 2) the ministates and the USSR vote similarly on colonial and economic questions, whereas the ministates' voting is more similar to that of the US and the colonial powers on social, humanitarian, and cultural issues. On political issues the ministates are neither a bloc nor the subservient clients of the superpowers; 3) with few exceptions ministate voting patterns are similar to those of the African-Asian group in the UN. These findings extend the generalizations of Kay, et al., with reference to the concerns of the newer nations. In addition, the findings indicate that size alone does not appear to be a significant differentiating variable. The existence of shifting alignments and majorities in different issue-areas underscores the political sophistication and relative independence from large power pressure of ministate voting in the UN.

Despite the approaching universality of the United Nations, Switzerland continues to be a non-member. Her traditional policy of permanent neutrality, which is theoretically incompatible with the United Nations collective security system, and an unsatisfactory experience as a member of the League of Nations largely explain this absence. Ironically enough, however, Switzerland has played in effect as active a role in the United Nations as have many actual members. Switzerland belongs to most of the specialized agencies and many of the Organization's ancillary organs. She has even involved herself in numerous peacekeeping activities. Geneva serves as the Organization's European headquarters. Thus, the Swiss freely participate in what they refer to as the “technical,” as distinguished from the “political” United Nations. The increased prestige of neutrality and neutral Austria's successful membership, approaching universality, the waning of collective security, and a desire to participate fully in international relations are encouraging a gradual reorientation towards the United Nations which may some day lead to formal Swiss membership.