Research for this article was supported by the Peter B. Lewis Fund and by the Center of International Studies at Princeton University. For their helpful comments and suggestions, I thank David Cameron, Peter Cowhey, Daniel Deudney, William Diebold, Jeff Frieden, Lloyd Gardner, Peter Haas, Robert Jervis, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, David Lake, Craig Murphy, John Odell, M. J. Peterson, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and the participants of seminars held at Columbia University, the University of California at Los Angeles, Yale University, and the University of Southern California. I am also grateful to Geoffrey Herrera for his valuable research assistance.

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6. In this article, the specific outcome I am seeking to explain is the agreement signed at Bretton Woods in 1944. There was, of course, an entire sequence of “outcomes” that could be the object of explanation: the Anglo-American “Joint Statement of Principles,” the agreement signed at Bretton Woods, the actual accord ratified by Congress and Parliament, the eventual monetary regime itself, and the larger set of political compromises. I focus on the Bretton Woods agreement because it provided the critical blueprint for the larger postwar economic order.

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80. Ibid., p. 20.

81. Ibid., p. 14.

82. For a discussion of the relationship between British domestic economic problems (particularly those concerning employment) and an open international economic order, see Fisher, Allan G. B., International Implications of Full Employment in Great Britain (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946)Google Scholar. Fisher also surveys various positions on multilateralism and its alternatives.

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102. See, for example, Sterling, Mark, “Peace by Economists,” The Spectator, 24 07 1941, pp. 79–80.Google Scholar

103. See, for example, “Currency and Trade,” The Spectator, 9 04 1943, pp. 331–32.Google Scholar

104. The Economist clearly favored multilateralism to blocs and bilateral trade. By the end of the war, its editors argued that the world needed to move toward “managed free trade.” See “The Multilateral Approach,” The Economist, 22 01 1944, pp. 94–96.Google Scholar

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108. This is stressed by Odell in “From Bretton Woods to London.”

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