Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-tf8b9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-24T21:25:01.689Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 October 2010

Daniela Donno
Daniela Donno
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh. E-mail: [email protected]
Get access

Abstract

Scholars have found an association between membership in regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and democracy, and IGO enforcement is often credited as an important factor explaining this link. But empirical evidence reveals great variation in whether these organizations actually respond to violations of democratic norms, even in democratic regions. Why do IGOs punish some norm-violating countries but not others? What does this variation imply for theories about how IGO membership helps states make credible commitments? This article presents a theoretical framework for understanding variation in multilateral norm enforcement. It identifies two obstacles to enforcement—the presence of competing geopolitical interests and uncertainty about the nature and scope of norm violations—and it argues that international monitoring can help mitigate these obstacles by revealing and publicizing information that pressures reluctant member states to support enforcement. An original data set of democracy enforcement in Latin America and postcommunist countries is used to examine regional IGO enforcement in response to one prevalent type of democratic norm violation: electoral misconduct. I find that enforcement is less likely in countries of high geopolitical importance, but the presence of election observers increases the probability of enforcement, and the content of observers' reports influences the type of enforcement that is imposed. These findings suggest that the link between IGO membership, credible commitments, and democracy should be theorized and tested as a conditional relationship, depending on country- and incident-specific factors that influence the likelihood of enforcement.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 64 , Issue 4 , October 2010 , pp. 593 - 625
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Bjornlund, Eric C. 2004. Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boehmer, Charles, Gartzke, Erik, and Nordstrom, Timothy. 2004. Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace? World Politics 57 (1):1–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brambor, Thomas, Clark, William Roberts, and Golder, Matt. 2006. Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analysis. Political Analysis 14 (1):63–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brett, Rachel. 1996. Human Rights and the OSCE. Human Rights Quarterly 18 (3):668–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carothers, Thomas. 1997. The Observers Observed. Journal of Democracy 8 (3):17–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chayes, Abram, and Chayes, Antonia Handler. 1993. On Compliance. International Organization 47 (2):175–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, Andrew F., and Legler, Thomas. 2001. The OAS Democratic Solidarity Paradigm: Questions of Collective and National Leadership. Latin American Politics and Society 43 (1):103–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, Andrew F., and Legler, Thomas. 2006. Intervention Without Intervening? The OAS Defense and Promotion of Democracy in the Americas. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism. International Organization 59 (2):363–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dannreuther, Roland. 2004. European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighborhood Strategy. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Diamond, Larry Jay. 2002. Thinking About Hybrid Regimes. Journal of Democracy 13 (2):21–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Donno, Daniela. 2009. Defending Democratic Norms: Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and Democratic Change After Flawed Elections. Paper presented at the 105th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, Toronto, Canada.Google Scholar
Doyle, Michael W. 1986. Liberalism and World Politics. American Political Science Review 80 (4):1151–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eeckhout, Piet. 2004. External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Elklit, Jorgen, and Svensson, Palle. 1997. What Makes Elections Free and Fair? Journal of Democracy 8 (3):32–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Emerson, Michael, Aydin, Senem, Noutcheva, Gergana, Tocci, Nathalie, Vahl, Marius, and Youngs, Richard. 2005. The Reluctant Debutante: The European Union as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood. In Democratisation in the European Neighborhood, edited by Emerson, Michael and Aydin, Senem, 169–230. Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies.Google Scholar
Ghebali, Victor-Yves. 2002. The Bucharest Meeting of the Ministerial Council: Towards a New Consensus at the OSCE? Helsinki Monitor 13 (2):157–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, Marshall I. 2008. Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Greene, William H. 2003. Econometric Analysis. 5th ed.Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression. International Organization 59 (3):593–629.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haftel, Yoram Z., and Thompson, Alexander. 2006. The Independence of International Organizations: Concept and Applications. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (2):253–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Halperin, Morton H., and Lomasney, Kristen. 1998. Guaranteeing Democracy: A Review of the Record. Journal of Democracy 9 (2):134–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hartlyn, Jonathan, and McCoy, Jennifer. 2006. Observer Paradoxes: How to Assess Electoral Manipulation. In Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, edited by Schedler, Andreas, 41–54. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hathaway, Oona A. 2003. The Cost of Commitment. Stanford Law Review 55 (5):1821–62.Google Scholar
Hawkins, Darren. 2008. Protecting Democracy in Europe and the Americas. International Organization 62 (3):373–403.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ho, Daniel E., Imai, Kosuke, King, Gary, and Stuart, Elizabeth A.. 2007. Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference. Political Analysis 15 (3):199–236.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huth, Paul K., and Allee, Todd L.. 2003. The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hyde, Susan D. 2007. The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. World Politics 60 (1):37–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hyde, Susan D. 2009. The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why International Election Observation Became an International Norm. Book manuscript.Google Scholar
Hyde, Susan D., and Marinov, Nikolay. 2008. Does Information Facilitate Self-Enforcing Democracy? The Role of International Election Monitoring. Paper presented at the 49th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, March, San Francisco, Calif.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelley, Judith. 2008a. Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring. International Organization 62 (2):221–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelley, Judith. 2008b. The Supply and Demand for International Election Monitoring. Manuscript, Duke University, Durham, N.C. Available at ⟨http://www.duke.edu/web/diem/docs/Supply%20and%20Demand.pdf⟩. Accessed 22 June 2010.Google Scholar
Kelley, Judith. 2009. D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation. International Organization 63 (4):765–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kimball, Anessa L. 2006. Alliance Formation and Conflict Initiation: The Missing Link. Journal of Peace Research 43 (4):371–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
King, Gary, Tomz, Michael, and Wittenberg, Jason. 2000. Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation. American Journal of Political Science 44 (2):347–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Konig, Thomas, and Slapin, Jonathan. 2006. From Unanimity to Consensus: An Analysis of the Negotiations at the EU's Constitutional Convention. World Politics 58 (3):413–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lebovic, James H., and Voeten, Erik. 2006. The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR. International Studies Quarterly 50 (4):861–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levitsky, Steven, and Way, Lucan A.. 2002. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy 13 (2):51–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levitt, Barry S. 2006. A Desultory Defense of Democracy: OAS Resolution 1080 and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Latin American Politics and Society 48 (3):93–123.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lindberg, Staffan I. 2006. Tragic Protest: Why Do Opposition Parties Boycott Elections? In Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, edited by Schedler, Andreas, 149–66. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
MacFarlane, S. Neil. 2004. The Caucasus and Central Asia: Towards a Non-Strategy. In European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighborhood Strategy, edited by Dannreuther, Ronald, 118–34. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Mansfield, Edward D., and Pevehouse, Jon C.. 2006. Democratization and International Organizations. International Organization 60 (1):137–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marshall, Monty G., and Jaggers, Keith. 2004. Polity IV Project. Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), College Park, University of Maryland.Google Scholar
McCoy, Jennifer. 1998. Monitoring and Mediating Elections During Latin American Democratization. In Electoral Observation and Democratic Transitions in Latin America, edited by Middlebrook, Kevin, 53–90. La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.Google Scholar
Middlebrook, Kevin J. 1998. Electoral Observation and Democratic Transitions in Latin America. La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.Google Scholar
Mitchell, Ronald B. 1994. Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance. International Organization 48 (3):425–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe. International Organization 54 (2):217–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). 2004. Preliminary Statement on the Second Round of the Presidential Election in Ukraine. 21 November 2004. Warsaw, Poland.Google Scholar
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 2005. A Decade of Monitoring Elections: The People and the Practice. Warsaw, Poland: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.Google Scholar
Pastor, Robert A. 1999. The Third Dimension of Accountability: The International Community in National Elections. In The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, edited by Diamond, Larry, Schedler, Andreas, and Plattner, Mark F., 123–44. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002a. Democracy from the Outside in? International Organizations and Democratization. International Organization 56 (3):515–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002b. With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy. American Journal of Political Science 46 (3):611–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pevehouse, Jon C. 2003. Democratization, Credible Commitments, and Joining International Organizations. In Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions, edited by Drezner, Daniel W., 25–48. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Pevehouse, Jon C., Nordstrom, Timothy, and Warnke, Kevin. 2004. The COW-2 International Organizations Dataset Version 2.0. Conflict Management and Peace Science 21 (2):101–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2009. Public Goods or Political Pandering: Evidence from IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe. International Studies Quarterly 53 (3):787–816.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Russett, Bruce M., and Oneal, John R.. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
Sanchez, Thania. 2009. Enforcers Within: Domestic Sanctions and Compliance with International Agreements. Paper presented at the 105th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, Toronto, Canada.Google Scholar
Santa-Cruz, Arturo. 2005. International Election Monitoring, Sovereignty, and the Western Hemisphere Idea: The Emergence of an International Norm. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Santiso, Carlos. 2003. Responding to Democratic Decay and Crises of Governance: The European Union and the Convention of Cotonou. Democratization 10 (3):148–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schedler, Andreas. 2002. The Menu of Manipulation. Journal of Democracy 13 (2):36–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Signorino, Curtis S., and Ritter, Jeffery M.. 1999. Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions. International Studies Quarterly 43 (1):115–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simmons, Beth A. 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simpser, Alberto, and Donno, Daniela. 2008. Unintended Consequences of Monitoring Regimes: The Case of International Election Monitoring. Paper presented at the 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August, Boston, Mass.Google Scholar
Smith, Alistair. 1999. Testing Theories of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation. American Journal of Political Science 43 (4):1254–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Karen E. 2001a. Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy. In Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe. 2, International and Transnational Factors, edited by Zielonka, Jan and Pravda, Alex, 31–57. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Smith, Michael E. 2001b. Diplomacy by Decree: The Legalization of EU Foreign Policy. Journal of Common Market Studies 39 (1):79–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stone, Randall W. 2002. Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stone, Randall W. 2004. The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa. American Political Science Review 98 (4):577–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stone, Randall W. 2008. The Scope of IMF Conditionality. International Organization 62 (4):589–620.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tsebelis, George. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vogel, David, and Kessler, Timothy. 1998. How Compliance Happens and Doesn't Happen Domestically. In Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords, edited by Weiss, Edith B. and Jacobson, Harold K., 19–38. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Vreeland, James R. 2003. The IMF and Economic Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar