Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-dsjbd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T06:30:13.879Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The United Nations and Decolonization: the Case of Southern Yemen

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

King-yuh Chang
King-yuh Chang
Affiliation:
King-yuh Chang is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, Western Illinois University, Macomb, Illinois.
Get access

Extract

Since 1962 the United Nations, mainly through the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Special Committee of 24), has attempted to effect political change in dependent territories in accordance with the principle of self-determination of peoples. While the organization usually demands that the inhabitants be given a chance to determine their political future and to choose their government, its primary objective has been somewhat more specific. Spurred on by the influx of new members that occurred around the start of the decade, most of them former colonies, the UN has pressured for the complete displacement of alien rule in dependent territories and has tended to accept whatever type of government emerges as long as it is indigenous, that is, not controlled by a colonial power or European settlers.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 26 , Issue 1 , Winter 1972 , pp. 37 - 61
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1972

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 The committee was established by the UN General Assembly in 1961 to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), December 14, 1960. It originally had seventeen members, including eight Afro-Asian states (Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Madagascar, Mali, Syria, Tanganyika, Tunisia), four Western states (Australia, Italy, United Kingdom, United States), two Eastern bloc states (Polish People's Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), two Latin American states (Uruguay, Venezuela), and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1962 seven members (People's Republic of Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone) were added to the committee. There have since been minor changes of membership. The three administering powers on the committee, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, withdrew in 1970–1971.

2 Little, Tom, South Arabia: Arena of Conflict (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), pp. 22–30.Google Scholar

3 For instance, in May 1956 John Selwyn Brook Lloyd, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, stated at the Aden airport after he met a demonstration calling for independence: “;The importance of Aden both strategically and economically within the Commonwealth is such that the United Kingdom cannot foresee the possibility of any fundamental relaxation of their responsibilities for the Colony.” Cited in Little, p. 35.

4 Ibid., pp. 59–60.

5 Cross, Colin,The Fall of the British Empire 1918–1968 (New York: Coward-McCann, 1969), PP. 354–355.Google Scholar

6 Aden Colony had its first legislative election in 1955: Four members of the Legislative Council were elected, the remainder being nominated by the governor. In 1959 the Legislative Council was reorganized to include twelve elected members and eleven nominated or ex officio members. The governor was assisted by a ten-member Executive Council, consisting of five elected or nominated members of the Legislative Council and five ex officio members. The 1963 constitution provided for a Legislative Council composed of a speaker, sixteen elected members, six nominated members, and the attorney-general; the Executive Council was replaced by a Council of Ministers. The governor's title was changed to that of high commissioner for Aden and the protectorate of South Arabia. See UN Document A/5446/Rev. 1, chapter 5, paragraphs 7 and 13–17.

7 Dating from 1963 Aden always had four times as many representatives in the Federal Council (the legislative) as any other state. The Federal Council had 103 representatives in 1966 from seventeen states, Aden provided 24. The Supreme Council (the executive body) consisted of twelve ministers elected by and from the representatives in the Federal Council, each state being allowed one min-istrial post for every six representatives. Therefore, Aden was entitled to four ministerial posts out of a total of twelve. See UN Document A/6700/Add. 4, paragraph 9.

8 Trevaskis, Kennedy, Shades of Amber: A South Arabia Episode (London: Hutchinson, 1968), pp. 214–216, 188–190.Google Scholar

9 See UN Document A/AC.109/SR.149-SR.152.

10 UN Document A/AC.109/SR.154, pp. 3–18.

11 For an eyewitness account unsympathetic to the Special Committee of 24 see Trevaskis, pp. 192–193.

12 UN Document A/AC.109/L.52.

13 Ibid.14Ibid.

14 Ibid.14Ibid.

15 Paget, Julian, Last Post: Aden 1964–1967 (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), pp. 34–35.Google Scholar

16 The Times (London), 03 8, 1963, p. 10.Google Scholar

17 The Times (London), 05 31, 1963, p. 13.Google Scholar

18 UN Document A/AC.109/SR.193.

19 UN Document A/5446/Rev.l, chapter 5, appendix, paragraph 50.

20 Ibid., paragraph 159.

21 Ibid., paragraphs 59–131.

22 Little writes that outside interest and support (i.e., from the UN) encouraged the opposition to increase political agitation; in turn the colonial authorities acted decisively to avoid giving an appearance of weakness. In 1963 the National Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (NLF) was formed in Sanaa to direct resistance. Before long, Aden was full of weapons smuggled in from Yemen. The Aden government replied by imprisoning PSP and union leaders on the most suitable available charge, with the result that terrorism was so confronted by repression that the UN protest about political prisoners was justified by the facts. Little, p. 103.

23 The Times (London), 05 12, 1964, p. 12.Google Scholar

24 UN Document A/AC.109/L.159, paragraph 84.

25 Ibid., paragraph 20.

26 Ibid., paragraph 30.

27 Trevaskis, p. 224.

28 UN Document A/6000/Rev.l, chapter 6, paragraphs 7–11.

29 Trevaskis, p. 231.

30 UN Document A/6300, chapter 6, paragraph 31.

31 UN Document A/6000/Rev.l, chapter 6, appendix 2, paragraph 42.

32 For details of the security problem see Paget, pp. 113–223.

33 Little, p. 146.

34 See the New York Times, 05 8, 1964, p. 1; and 05 13, 1964, p. 5;Google Scholar see also, the New York Times (International Edition), supplement, 10 10, 1965 pp. 6–7.Google Scholar

35 Statement on Defense 1962: The Next Five Years (Command Paper, No. 1639) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 02 1962), pp. 7–8.Google Scholar

36 The Times (London), 10 12, 1965, p. 11.Google Scholar

37 Statement on the Defence Estimate 1966 (Command Paper, No. 2901) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 02 1966), pp. 6–8.Google Scholar

38 The Times (London), 03 9, 1966, p. 13.Google Scholar

39 The Times (London), 05 17, 1966, p. 17.Google Scholar

40 Trevaskis, p. 238.

41 Little, p. 149.

42 Ibid., pp. 152–153.

43 UN Document A/6300/Add.4/annexes 1, 3, 4.

44 UN Document A/AC.109/179/Rev.l, adopted by a vote of 18 to 2 (Australia, United States), with 2 abstentions (Denmark, Italy). The United Kingdom and Uruguay were not present.

45 Paragraph 12 was the most important, but paragraph 5 was the most controversial. Iran, Italy, the Ivory Coast, and Madagascar, in addition to the three administering powers on the Special Committee of 24, expressed strong doubts that paragraph 5 would help secure agreement by all sections of the population.

46 See The Times (London), 05 2, 1966, p. 8;Google Scholar June 21, 1966, p. 9; June 28, 1966, p. 10; and February 22, 1967, p. 5.

47 UN Document A/AC.109/161/Add. 2 and Corr. 1, paragraph 6.

48 UN Document A/6300/Add. 4, paragraphs 385–389, 392, 425–426.

49 Ibid., paragraphs 390, 405, 415–416, 420–422.

50 General Assembly Official Record … Fourth Committee (21st session), 1622nd meeting, 11 2, 1966, pp. 147–156;Google Scholar General Assembly Official Records … Fourth Committee (21st session), 1628th meeting, 11 8, 1966, pp. 189–190.Google Scholar

51 General Assembly Official Records … Fourth Committee (21st session), 1623rd-1627th meetings, 11 3–7, 1966, pp. 157–188.Google Scholar

52 General Assembly Resolution 2183 (XXI), December 12, 1966.

53 Little, p. 162.

54 See ibid., pp. 162–163; Survey of British and Commonwealth Affairs, 01 20, 1967 (Vol. 1, No. 2), p. 71; and 04 28, 1967 (Vol. 1, No. 9), p. 422.Google Scholar

55 A three-day general strike called by FLOSY and the NLF began with the arrival of the mission on April 2. On the following day attempts at violent demonstrations, with several incidents involving grenade-throwing and shooting, resulted in the deaths of three Arabs and the wounding of 23 persons, both military and civilian. Survey of British and Commonwealth Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 9, p. 423.Google Scholar

56 UN Document A/6700/Add.4/annex 3, paragraph 133.

57 Ibid., paragraphs 146–147; Survey of British and Commonwealth Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 9, p. 424.Google Scholar

58 UN Document A/6700 Add. 4, annex 3, paragraph 156.

59 Ibid., paragraph 160.

60 Ibid., paragraph 162.

61 Ibid., paragraph 187.

62 UN Document A/6700/Add. 4, annex 3, appendix 8.

63 UN Document A/6700/Add. 4, paragraph 188, especially points 5 and 8; also paragraphs 278–280, 283.

64 Ibid., paragraphs 281, 288.

65 Ibid., paragraph 310.

66 Ibid., paragraph 315.

67 Survey of British and Commonwealth Affairs, 01 5, 1968 (Vol. 2, No. 1), p. 16.Google Scholar

68 The Economist commented before the mission proceeded to carry out its task: “How can three outsiders from the UN, however well intentioned, flatten the past and persuade rivals, against a background of terror, confusion and ignorance, to work together? Their presence may, with great luck, act as some sort of catalyst; it is not they who should be blamed if no advantage is taken of this.” “South Arabia: No Passing of the Buck,” 03 11, 1967 (Vol. 222, No. 6446), p. 921.Google Scholar

69 It was reported that during the London conference in June and July 1964 the British secretary of state for the colonies, Duncan Sandys, told an opposition member of the Aden legislature, Omar Shihab, that “if President Nasser can keep 40,000 troops in Yemen, I will move an equal number of troops to the area.” He also reportedly told Shihab, “Let us see what the United Nations can do for you.” The Times (London), 07 8, 1964, p. 11.Google Scholar

70 Trevaskis, pp. 203–204.