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Some reflections on the “dove's dilemma”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Lewis A. Dunn
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Extract

A new generation of advanced conventional arms developed during the late 1960s and 1970s, ranging from antitank guided missiles to scatterable land mines, promises to buttress the defensive capabilities of their possessors. Selective transfer of such new weapons in certain cases may be a useful nonproliferation tactic. However, the fungibility of selective arms transfers with other security related nonproliferation measures, and particularly with security guarantees, appears limited. Moreover, not only would that tactic have little impact on other compelling proliferation incentives, but it would incur important risks. Nonetheless, those risks may be less than the risks and costs of nuclear proliferation in conflict-prone regions. And they may be minimized by suitable policies. The dilemma of having to choose between so using arms transfers for nonproliferation purposes and continued pursuit of global conventional arms sales restraint has been overdrawn. In contrast with recent efforts to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons, efforts to foster multilateral conventional arms restraint have proved unavailing. Various factors explain that pattern of success and failure, not least of all the different international norms in the respective areas.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , Winter 1981 , pp. 181 - 192
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1981

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References

Parts of this paper draw on a recently completed study of life in a world of more widespread nuclear weapon proliferation undertaken for the Twentieth Century Fund.

This paper represents the views of its author and in no way should be attributed to the Hudson Institute.

1 One of the first and most helpful discussions remains Richard Burt, “Nuclear Proliferation and Conventional Arms Transfers: The Missing Link,” presented at the California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, September 1977.

2 See, for example, Burt, Richard, “New Weapons Technologies: Debate and Direction,” Adeiphi Paper No. 126 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976)Google Scholar; Digby, James, “Precision Guided Weapons,” Adeiphi Paper No. 118 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975)Google Scholar; Mearsheimer, John J., “Precision-guided Munitions and Conventional Deterrence,” Survival 21, 2 (03/04 1979): 68–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 See Mearsheimer, op. cit., passim.Google Scholar

4 On Pakistani activities and incentives, see Khalilzad, Zalmay, “Pakistan and the Bomb,” Survival 21, 6 (11/12 1979): 244–50, esp. 245–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 See, for example, Khalilzad, op. cit., p. 246.Google Scholar

6 On those incentives, see, for example, Young-sun, Ha, “Nuclearization of Small States and World Order: The Case of Korea,” Asian Survey 28, 11 (11 1978): 1134–51.Google Scholar

7 “China Steps Up Protest of U.S. Arms for Taiwan,” Washington Post, 22 06 1980.Google Scholar

8 See Harkavy, Robert, Spectre of a Middle Eastern Holocaust: The Strategic and Diplomatic Implications of the Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program, Monograph Series in World Affairs (Denver, Colo.: University of Denver, 1977), pp. 59–64.Google Scholar

9 Barnds, William J., India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 197–208, esp. p. 200.Google Scholar

10 Luttwak, Edward and Horowitz, Dan, The Israeli Army (London: Allen Lane, 1975), pp. 136–37.Google Scholar

11 Barker, A. J., The Yom Kippur War (New York: Random House, 1974), pp. 62–66.Google Scholar

12 See Snepp, Frank, Decent Interval (New York: Random House, 1977), pp. 137–39.Google Scholar

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14 “Broad Carter Policy Will Restrict Sales of Weapons Abroad,” New York Times, 20 05 1977.Google Scholar

15 “Libya Pressures India to Supply Nuclear Technology,” Financial Times (London), 1 09 1979.Google Scholar