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Resolve, Time, and Risk

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 April 2017

Joshua D. Kertzer
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Abstract

Why do some actors in international politics display remarkable persistence in wartime, while others “cut and run” at the first sign of trouble? I offer a behavioral theory of resolve, suggesting that variation in time and risk preferences can help explain why some actors display more resolve than others. I test the theory experimentally in the context of public opinion about military interventions. The results not only help explain why certain types of costs of war loom larger for certain types of actors but also shed light on some of the behavioral revolution's contributions more broadly.

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Research Article
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International Organization , Volume 71 , Supplement S1 , April 2017 , pp. S109 - S136
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Copyright © The IO Foundation 2017 

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