Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-dsjbd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T17:15:50.774Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Leon N. Lindberg
Get access

Extract

I view international political integration as a distinctive aspect of the more inclusive process (international integration, generally) whereby larger groupings emerge or are created among nations without the use of violence. Such groupings can be said to exist at a variety of different analytical levels. At each level we can conceive of a number of nations linked to each other in certain salient ways. For example, their populations may be linked by feelings of mutual amity, confidence, and identification. Or their leaders may hold more or less reliable expectations, which may or may not be shared by the populations, that common problems will be resolved without recourse to large-scale violence. Or a grouping might be defined as an area which is characterized by intense concentrations of economic exchange or the free circulation of productive factors (labor, capital, services). In describing these phenomena we speak of social community, security community, and of economic union. Political integration can be said to occur when the linkage consists of joint participation in regularized, ongoing decisionmaking. The perspective taken here is that international political integration involves a group of nations coming to regularly make and implement binding public decisions by means of collective institutions and/or processes rather than by formally autonomous national means. Political integration implies that a number of governments begin to create and to use common resources to be committed in the pursuit of certain common objectives and that they do so by foregoing some of the factual attributes of sovereignty and decisionmaking autonomy, in contrast to more classical modes of cooperation such as alliances or international organizations.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 24 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1970 , pp. 648 - 731
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1970

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

1

A member of the Board of Editors, is professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.

The author began working on the subject of this article several years ago when he was a research associate at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. A major reworking and rethinking was accomplished during the summer 1969 when he was a participant in a workshop on the formal analysis of international systems at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto, California. In between he benefited greatly from the constructive criticisms of his students; most particularly he wants to thank Peter Beckman, Brian Silver, Peter Cocks, William Fisher, Robert Weisberg, Jefferey Obler, and Keith Billingsley. Among the numerous colleagues in this country and in Europe who have commented on the previous versions of this article the author expresses a special debt of gratitude to Hayward Alker, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Richard Brody, and Jack Dennis.

References

1 Nye, Joseph S. Jr, “Comparative Regional Integration,” International Organization, Autumn 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 4), pp. 855–880CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Ernst B. Haas in this volume.

3 Alker, Hayward, “Computer Simulations of Integration Processes,” research memorandum prepared for the Conference on Regional Integration, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 04 24–26, 1969Google Scholar.

4 Blalock, Hubert M. Jr, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 9Google Scholar. The notion of reliability is thus built into this conception of the operational definition. The definition should be sufficiently precise that all persons using the procedure will achieve die same results.

5 For a discussion of these problems and of the advantages of continuous variables as compared with attributes see Blalock, Hubert M. Jr, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), pp. 30–38Google Scholar.

6 Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965)Google Scholar.

7 Ibid., p. 177.

8 Ibid.

9 Deutsch, Karl W., “Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Environment,” American Political Science Review, 06 1966 (Vol. 60, No. 2), pp. 354–363CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Deutsch, Karl W., and others, France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), part 3Google Scholar.

10 Fisher, William E., “An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration,” International Organization, Spring 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 2), pp. 254–290CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 The lawyers and the economists have done somewhat better insofar as the legal and economic policy implications are concerned. For legal analyses of European community “legislation” see Bebr, Gerard, Judicial Control of the European Communities (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962)Google Scholar; and Hay, Peter, Federalism and Supranational Organizations: Patterns for New Legal Structures (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966)Google Scholar. For a very useful analysis of economic policy implications of European integration see Jensen, Finn B. and Walter, Ingo, The Common Market: Economic Integration in Europe (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1965)Google Scholar.

12 Lasswell, Harold D., The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis (College Park, Md: Bureau of Government Research, College of Business and Public Administration, University of Maryland, 1956)Google Scholar.

13 Easton, p. 193.

14 Harsanyi, John, “Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games,” in Shubik, Martin (ed.), Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior: Selections (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), p. 195Google Scholar.

15 Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A., Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 178–180, 283Google Scholar.

16 See, for example, Almond, Gabriel, “A Developmental Approach to Political Systems,” World Politics, 01 1965 (Vol. 17, No. 2), 183–214CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Levy, M. J. Jr, The Structure of Society (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1952)Google Scholar.

17 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12 (n.p: Macmillan Co. and Free Press, 1968), p. 408Google Scholar.

18 Lasswell, Harold D. and Kaplan, Abraham, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 55–56 and 72Google Scholar. For some research applications of this taxonomy see Namenwirth, J. Zwi, “The Lasswell Value Dictionary,” Yale University, 01 1968Google Scholar. (Mimeographed.) J. Zwi Namenwirth and Harold Lasswell, Cyclical Value Changes in American History: Essays in Social Dynamics (forthcoming) and Namenwirth, J. Zwi, “Wheels of Time and the Interdependence of Value Change,” Yale University. (Mimeographed.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19 This list is a composite of the efforts of a number of scholars and has been refined and tested for cross-national validity in seminars at the University of Wisconsin. The list is derived from the results of Riker, William H., Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964)Google Scholar; Kirschen, E. S., and others, Economic Policy in Our Time (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1964)Google Scholar; and Jensen and Walter. For an earlier version of this effort to measure scope see Lindberg, Leon N., “The European Community as a Political System: Notes Toward the Construction of a Model,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 06 1967 (Vol. 5, No. 4), pp. 356–360CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20 Lindberg and Scheingold, p. 74.

21 Harsanyi, in Shubik, p. 186.

22 Nye, , International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 869Google Scholar.

23 Nye suggests combining expenditure indicators with reputational rankings of ministries by experts.

24 The method chosen would depend on such things as the relative power of the nations vis-à-vis each other and on whether or not decisions require unanimity or majority assent. One convention could be to base aggregate issue-area scores on the highest salience found, on the assumption that most integration systems are structured in a way to make any issue as salient as the most concerned actors are prepared to make it.

25 Lowi, Theodore, “The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism,” American Political Science Review, 03 1967 (Vol. 61, No. 1), pp. 5–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

26 It would, of course, be preferable if we could find objective quantitative indicators for each of these salience dimensions.

27 A simpler approach would be to have a number of judges rank order issue areas for increasing salience, or classify them into sublists which could be ranked high, moderate, and low saliency, or to each of which we could assign a numerical measure. Alternatively, an arbitrary total score of perhaps ioo points might be assigned to each state (or group of states) and expert judges asked to divide up the ioo points among issue areas in terms of their relative saliency, using a variety of criteria, including some of the above. For a similar approach to a different weighting problem see Barrera, Mario and Haas, Ernst B., “The Operationalization of Some Variables Related to Regional Integration: A Research Note,” International Organization, Winter 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 1), pp. 152–154Google Scholar.

28 On the uses of vectors see Campbell, Hugh G., Matrices with Applications (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968)Google Scholar.

29 Lasswell, Harold D., “Current Studies of the Decision Process: Automation versus Creativity,” Western Political Quarterly, 09 1955 (Vol. 8, No. 3), pp. 381–399CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 Harold D. Lasswell, The Decision Process.

31 On the Nordic area see Andrén, Nils, “Nordic Cooperation,” Cooperation and Conflict, 1967 (No. 2)Google Scholar; Haskell, Barbara, “Is There an Unseen Spider?” Cooperation and Conflict, 1967 (No. 2)Google Scholar, and Haskell, Barbara G., “External Events and Internal Appraisals: A Note on the Proposed Nordic Common Market,” International Organization, Autumn 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 4), pp. 960–968CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Anderson, Stanley V., The Nordic Council: A Study of Scandinavian Regionalism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967)Google Scholar. On Australia-New Zealand see Robinson, Alan, “Trends in Australian-New Zealand Relations,” Australian Quarterly, 03 1969 (Vol. 41, No. 1), pp. 43–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Robinson, Alan, Towards a Tasman Community? (Discussion Paper No. 5) (Wellington, New Zealand: Institute of Economic Research, 1965)Google Scholar.

32 The successes and failure of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and Council of Europe illustrated the limitations of the approach to the six countries that eventually went ahead to more far-reaching efforts; see Lindberg and Scheingold, pp. 11–21.

33 Ibid., pp. 75–80.

34 Lindberg, Leon N., “Europe as a Political System: Measuring Political Integration,” Center for International Studies, Harvard University, 04 1967Google Scholar. (Mimeographed.)

35 Kendall's W, the “coefficient of concordance,” a nonparametric measure of rank association, was calculated. This statistic is a form of analysis of variance and it expresses the average agreement between ranks on a scale from .00 to 1.00. The overall W for the expert judges was .899. For the formula and details on computation see Kerlinger, Fred N., Foundations of Behavioral Research: Educational and Psychological Inquiry (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 267Google Scholar.

36 Some indication of the nature of these results and how they compare to my own 1966 ranking of the EEC is given by the following summary scores obtained by adding ranks across issue areas:

37 For procedures and details for a similar way of scaling see Moses, Lincoln E., and others, “Scaling Data on Inter-nation Action,” in Science, 05 26, 1967 (Vol. 156, No. 3778), pp. 1054–1059CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

38 This resembles Dahl's concept of “the amount of power”; see Dahl, Robert A., “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science, 07 1957 (Vol. 2, No. 3), pp. 203–205Google Scholar.

39 Easton, p. 38.

40 Lindberg and Scheingold, pp. 121–128.

41 Ibid., pp. 283–284.

42 See Fitzsimmons, Barbara, and others, “World/Event/Interaction Survey, Handbook and Codebook,” Department of International Relations, University of Southern California, 01 1969Google Scholar; and McClelland, Charles A., “International Interaction Analysis: Basic Research and Some Practical Applications,” Department of International Relations, University of Southern California, 11 1968Google Scholar. (M imeographed.)

43 Etzioni, Amitai, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 38–39Google Scholar.

44 Ibid., pp. 94–96.

45 United Arab Republic, Federation of the West Indies, Nordic Associational Web, and the European Economic Community.

46 Lindberg and Scheingold, p. 116.

47 Harsanyi, in Shubik.

48 Haas, Ernst B. and Schmitter, Philippe C., “Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America,” International Political Communities: An Anthology (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday & Co., 1966), pp. 259–300Google Scholar.

49 Easton, p. 191.

50 For an effort to delineate the content of such a procedural code or set of decision rules see Lindberg and Scheingold, pp. 95–97.

51 For example, see Huntington, Samuel, “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics, 04 1965 (Vol. 18, No. 3), pp. 386–430CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52 With regard to supranational institutional growth and resources we do not here seek to measure the extent to which they are actually used in the integrative process.

53 There are, of course, many who consider the two patterns basically incompatible. For example, some see the integration of Europe as depending upon the rapid centralization of authority and decision in supranational institutions while others are partisans of a “Europe des patries” where integration is more a process of consultation between national authorities.

54 Nye, , International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 867Google Scholar.

55 Rulemaking competence measures extent to which an international organization can control or regulate states through binding rules. Rule-enforcement authority measures the existence of sanctioning authority and coercive resources to ensure compliance. Puchala, Donald J., “Integration and Disintegration in Franco-German Relations, 1954–1965,” International Organization, Spring 1970 (Vol. 24, No. 2), pp. 203–208CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nye, ibid., pp. 867–868.

56 See, for example, Haas, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1967 (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 486–527Google Scholar; and Lindberg, Leon N., The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1963). pp. 49–93Google Scholar.

57 Lindberg and Scheingold, chapter 4. See also chapter 5 for a classic case of maximum utilization of these resources.

58 Some data could be gleaned from surveys such as the following investigations in Western Europe: Haas; Kapteyn, Paul, L'assemblé de la Communauté européenne du Charbon et de L'Acier (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1962)Google Scholar; Meynaud, Jean and Sidjanski, Dusan, Europe des affaires: Róle et structure des groupes (Paris: Payot, 1967)Google Scholar: Feld, Werner, “Political Aspects of Transnational Business Collaboration in the Common Market,” International Organization, Spring 1970 (Vol. 24, No. 2), pp. 209–238CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ronald Inglehart in this volume.

59 Fisher, , International Organization, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 285–286Google Scholar.

60 Ibid., p. 288.

61 Puchala, , International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 183–208CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

62 Ibid., p. 199.

63 Lindberg and Scheingold, p. 121.

64 See Inglehart in this volume. See also Lindberg and Scheingold, pp. 252–257.

65 For an illustration from the history of the European community see Lindberg and Scheingold, pp. 172–176.

66 Ronald Inglehart, Stuart A. Scheingold, Jack Dennis, and I, working in collaboration with European Community Information Service, have been generating data on dimensions such as these for samples of youth and adults in seven Western European countries. For some early findings see Inglehart in this volume.

67 Lindberg and Scheingold, pp. 55–61.

68 Easton, p. 278.

69 For European data on these dimensions see Lindberg and Scheingold, chapters 2 and 8.

70 Easton, pp. 240–242. See also Lindberg, Leon N., Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 378Google Scholar.

71 Lindberg and Scheingold, chapters 2 and 6.

72 Krause, Lawrence B., European Economic Integration and the United States (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968), especially pp. 20–25, 32–74, 94–109, 120–139Google Scholar, and appendices B and C.

73 Puchala, , International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 186–188Google Scholar.

74 Deutsch, Karl W., and others. “Political Community and the North Atlantic Area,” in International Political Communities, pp. 1–92Google Scholar.

75 See Lindberg and Scheingold, chapter 2, and Deutsch, and others.

76 Lindberg and Scheingold, pp. 128–133.

77 Haas, Ernst B., Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 87–125Google Scholar. See also Cox, Robert W., “The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization,” International Organization, Spring 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 2), pp. 205–230CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

78 See Cox, ibid., pp. 215–218; and Kay, David, “Secondment in the United Nations Secretariat: An Alternative View,” International Organization, Winter 1966 (Vol. 20, No. 1), pp. 69–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

79 See Lindberg, pp. 286–287.

80 Cox, , International Organization, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 222–226Google Scholar.

81 For extensive discussion of this leadership function in the European community see Lindberg and Scheingold, passim.

82 Cox, , International Organization, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 225–230Google Scholar.

83 Ibid., p. 225.

84 For an example of a study of differences in the availability of leadership from one issue area to another and of the consequence of that difference for success or failure, see Lindberg and Scheingold, chapter 5.

85 On mediation of support see Easton, pp. 225–229.

86 Ibid., pp. 228–229.

87 See, for example, Apter, David E., The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965)Google Scholar, chapter 1.

88 Haas, Ernst B., “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process,” International Organization, Autumn 1961 (Vol. 15, No. 4), pp. 366–392CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

89 Lindberg, pp. 285–286.

90 For example, Buchanan, James M. and Tullock, Gordon, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962)Google Scholar; Riker, William H., The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1962)Google Scholar; Rapoport, Anatol, Fights, Games, and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960)Google Scholar; Luce, R. D. and Raiffa, H., Games and Decisions (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957)Google Scholar; and Martin Shubik.

91 Rapoport, pp. 8–12.

92 Nash, John, “Two-Person Cooperative Games,” Econometrica, 01 1953 (Vol. 21, No. 1), pp. 128–140CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

93 Buchanan and Tullock, chapters 10 and 11.

94 Ibid., pp. 297–306.

95 Cleavages may be noncumulative (which increases the incentives for conciliation) because the distribution of most opinions is unimodal or because they are of low coincidence. See Dahl, Robert A. (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 367–371. See also the literature on “the end of ideology” and on “technocracy” and “plannism,” e.g.,Google ScholarHaas, Ernst B., in Graubard, Stephen R. (ed.), A New Europe? (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), pp. 62–87Google Scholar.

96 See Alker, Hayward Jr, Mathematics and Politics (New York: Macmillan Company, 1965)Google Scholar, chapter 7.

97 Puchala, , International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 2Google Scholar.

98 Cooperative are: concurrences, formal treaty signings, assurances, goodwill gestures, support, praise, deference, cooperative initiatives, policy convergences, joint cooperative initiatives. Competitive are: simple disagreement, slight, rebuttal, rebuff, criticism, concern, displeasure, unilateral disruptive initiative, threat, warning, protest, impasse.

99 See, for example, Lindberg, pp. 280–281, note 20 on p. 349.

100 Stuart A. Scheingold in this volume.

101 See Krause; Walter, Ingo, The European Common Market: Growth and Patterns of Trade and Production (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967)Google Scholar; Scitovsky, Tibor, Economic Theory and Western European Integration (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1958)Google Scholar; Lamfalussy, A., The United Kingdom and the Six: An Essay on Economic Growth in Western Europe (London: Macmillan and Company, 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

102 Lindberg and Scheingold, p. 119.

103 Fisher, , International Organization, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 262–263Google Scholar.

104 For a fuller discussion see ibid., p. 263.

105 Harsanyi, in Shubik, p. 184.

106 Deutsch, Karl W., “Communication Theory and Political Integration,” in Jacob, Philip E. and Toscano, James V. (ed.), The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964). p. 54Google Scholar.

107 Harsanyi, in Shubik, pp. 189–192.

108 The problem of whether and how these distributive consequences are actually perceived will be taken up in die next section. The concern here is to establish methods of determining objective consequences.

109 See Olson, Mancur Jr, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965)Google Scholar.

110 Krause, p. 73 and p. 237.

111 Savage, I. Richard and Deutsch, Karl W., “A Statistical Model of the Gross Analysis of Transaction Flows,” Econometrica, 07 1960 (Vol. 28, No. 2), pp. 551–572CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Donald J. Puchala in this volume.

112 Deutsch, in Jacob and Toscano, p. 53.

113 Heidelberger, Bernard, “La ventilation des dépenses communautaires: Le juste retour” (unpublished manuscript), 09 1968Google Scholar, as cited in Lindberg and Scheingold, p. 300.

114 See Shubik, pp. 30–70.

115 Bell, Daniel, “Notes on the Post-Industrial Society (II),” The Public Interest, Spring 1967 (No. 7), p. 105Google Scholar.

116 See Hirs??man, Albert O., The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1958)Google Scholar.

117 Krause, pp. 70–72.

118 Myrdal, Gunnar, Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions (London: Duckworth, 1957)Google Scholar, chapter 3.

119 See Giersch, Herbert, “Economic Union between Nations and the Location of Industries,” Review of Economic Studies, 1949–1950 (Vol. 17, No. 2), pp. 87–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Byé, Maurice, “Customs Unions and National Interests,” International Economic Papers (No. 3), pp. 208–234Google Scholar; Perroux, Francois, “Note sur la notion de ‘pole de croissance’,” Economic appliquée, 01–06 1955 (Vol. 8, Nos. 1–2), pp. 307–320Google Scholar; Gorz, André, Strategy for Labor (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), pp. 154–160Google Scholar.

120 Balassa, Bela, The Theory of Economic Integration (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961) pp. 203–205Google Scholar.

121 Hansen, Roger, “Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Effort,” World Politics, 01 1969 (Vol. 21, No. 2), pp. 242–271CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

122 Gorz, pp. 140–154.

123 For a discussion see Grosser, Alfred, “The Evolution of European Parliaments,” Daedalus, Winter 1964 (Vol. 93, No. 1), pp. 173–176Google Scholar.

124 Schmitt, Hans, “Capital Markets and the Unification of Europe,” World Politics, 01 1968 (Vol. 20, No. 2), pp. 228–244CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

125 Nye, , International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 4Google Scholar, passim.

126 Haas in this volume, p. 633.

127 Ibid., p. 634.

128 Ibid., p. 632.

129 Ibid.

130 Harsanyi, in Shubik, p. 184.

131 Hayward Alker in this volume.

132 The broadened paradigm should also facilitate the work of those who would focus directly on the ways in which exogenous and endogenous variables (and processes) interact. For example, Puchala's interests in delineating the several dimensions of the “community formation process,” seeing how they interact with each other and with what he terms “political amalgamation,” would, it seems to me, benefit from a more complex delineation of the political integration process seen in the context of environmental and constituent system processes of greater or lesser independence. To the extent that community formation processes and political integration processes are related, it should be possible to specify the links with the aid of a model like the following:

133 Harsanyi, in Shubik, pp. 194–195.

134 Alker in this volume.

135 See Oran Young, “The Actors in World Politics,” in James N. Roseman, Vincent Davis, and Maurice A. East (ed.), The Analysis of International Politics (forthcoming). See also Oran Young, “Interdependencies in World Politics,” (forthcoming).