Hostname: page-component-6bf8c574d5-gr6zb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-20T12:08:22.271Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The “Peer-Effect” in Counterterrorist Policies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2014

Eric Neumayer ,
Thomas Plümper  and
Mariaelisa Epifanio
Eric Neumayer
Affiliation:
London School of Economicsand the Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). E-mail: [email protected]
Thomas Plümper
Affiliation:
University of Essex, UK, and Associate of theInternational Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). E-mail: [email protected]
Mariaelisa Epifanio
Affiliation:
Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy, University of Warwick, UK. E-mail: [email protected]
Get access

Abstract

Existing accounts posit that defensively oriented counterterrorist policies create negative externalities and result in regulatory competition that induces governments to increasingly tighten their policies. We argue that rather than causing an unconditional global “race to the top,” spatial dependence in counterterrorist policies is limited to within groups of countries exposed to a similar level of threat from international terrorism. Countries strongly differ in their propensity to become the target of an international terror attack. Governments can safely ignore counterterrorist policies enacted by countries outside their “peer group,” but they must pay attention to measures undertaken by their peers. We test several predictions derived from our theory in an empirical analysis of counterterrorist regulations in twenty Western developed-country democracies over the period 2001 to 2008.

Type
Research Note
Information
International Organization , Volume 68 , Issue 1 , January 2014 , pp. 211 - 234
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2014 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Arce, Daniel G., and Sandler, Todd. 2005. Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2):183–200.Google Scholar
Armingeon, Klaus, Careja, Romana, Weisstanner, David, Engler, Sarah, Potolidis, Panajotis, and Gerber, Marlène. 2010. Comparative Political Data Set III, 1990–2008. Bern, Switzerland: Institute of Political Science, University of Berne. Available at ⟨http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html⟩. Accessed 22 February 2012.Google Scholar
Azam, Jean-Paul, and Thelen, Véronique. 2010. Foreign Aid Versus Military Intervention in the War on Terror. Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (2):237–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu, and Sandler, Todd. 2011. The Interplay Between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures: A Two-Stage Game. Economica 78 (311):546–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bianchi, Andrea. 2006. Security Council's Anti-Terror Resolutions and Their Implementation by Member States: An Overview. Journal of International Criminal Justice 4 (5):1044–73.Google Scholar
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2007. Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror. International Organization 61 (1):9–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cameron, A. Colin, and Trivedi, Pravin K.. 2009. Microeconometrics Using Stata. College Station, TX: Stata Press.Google Scholar
Crenshaw, Martha. 1981. The Causes of Terrorism. Comparative Politics 13 (4):379–99.Google Scholar
Crenshaw, Martha. 2001. Why America? The Globalization of Civil War. Current History 100 (650):425–32.Google Scholar
Enders, Walter, and Sandler, Todd. 2006. The Political Economy of Terrorism. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Epifanio, Mariaelisa. 2011. Legislative Response to International Terrorism. Journal of Peace Research 48 (3):399–411.Google Scholar
Genschel, Philipp, and Plümper, Thomas. 1997. Regulatory Competition and International Cooperation. Journal of European Public Policy 4 (4):626–42.Google Scholar
Hays, Jude C., and Franzese, Robert J. Jr. 2009. A Comparison of the Small-Sample Properties of Several Estimators for Spatial-Lag Count Models. Working paper. Ann Arbor: Department of Political Science, University of Michigan. Google Scholar
Katzenstein, Peter J. 2003. Same War—Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Counterterrorism. International Organization 57 (4):731–60.Google Scholar
Kydd, Andrew H., and Walter, Barbara F.. 2006. The Strategies of Terrorism. International Security 31 (1):49–80.Google Scholar
Laborde, Jean-Paul, and DeFeo, Michael. 2006. Problems and Prospects of Implementing UN Action Against Terrorism. Journal of International Criminal Justice 4 (5):1087–103.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mickolus, Edward F., Sandler, Todd, Murdock, Jean M., and Flemming, Peter A.. 2011. International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), 1968–2010. Dunn Loring, VA: Vinyard Software. Available at ⟨http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/17278⟩. Accessed 22 February 2012.Google Scholar
Moeckli, Daniel. 2008. Human Rights and Non-Discrimination in the ‘War on Terror.’ New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Neumayer, Eric, and Plümper, Thomas. 2009. International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations. British Journal of Political Science 39 (4):711–34.Google Scholar
Neumayer, Eric, and Plümper, Thomas. 2011. Foreign Terror on Americans. Journal of Peace Research 48 (1):3–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neumayer, Eric, and Plümper, Thomas. 2012. Conditional Spatial Policy Dependence: Theory and Model Specification. Comparative Political Studies 45 (7):819–49.Google Scholar
Nohrstedt, Daniel, and Hansén, Dan. 2010. Converging Under Pressure? Counterterrorism Policy Developments in the European Union Member States. Public Administration 88 (1):190–210.Google Scholar
Nuotio, Kimmo. 2006. Terrorism as a Catalyst for the Emergence, Harmonization and Reform of Criminal Law. Journal of International Criminal Justice 4 (5):998–1016.Google Scholar
Pape, Robert A. 2003. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. American Political Science Review 97 (3):343–61.Google Scholar
Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Plümper, Thomas, and Neumayer, Eric. 2010a. The Friend of My Enemy Is My Enemy: International Alliances and International Terrorism. European Journal of Political Research 49 (1):75–96.Google Scholar
Plümper, Thomas, and Neumayer, Eric. 2010b. Model Specification in the Analysis of Spatial Dependence. European Journal of Political Research 49 (3):418–42.Google Scholar
Plümper, Thomas, and Troeger, Vera E.. 2007. Efficient Estimation of Time-Invariant and Rarely Changing Variables in Finite Sample Panel Analyses with Unit Fixed Effects. Political Analysis 15 (2):124–39.Google Scholar
Plümper, Thomas, and Troeger, Vera E.. 2011. Fixed-Effects Vector Decomposition: Properties, Reliability, and Instruments. Political Analysis 19 (2):147–64.Google Scholar
Plümper, Thomas, Troeger, Vera E., and Manow, Philip. 2005. Panel Data Analysis in Comparative Politics: Linking Method to Theory. European Journal of Political Research 44 (2):327–54.Google Scholar
Plümper, Thomas, Troeger, Vera E., and Winner, Hannes. 2009. Why Is There No Race to the Bottom in Capital Taxation? International Studies Quarterly 53 (3):761–86.Google Scholar
Powell, Robert. 2007. Defending Against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources. American Political Science Review 101 (3):527–41.Google Scholar
Rohner, Dominic, and Frey, Bruno S.. 2007. Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-Game Between Terrorists and the Media. Public Choice 133 (1-2):129–45.Google Scholar
Sandler, Todd. 2003. Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism. World Economy 26 (6):779–802.Google Scholar
Sandler, Todd. 2005. Collective Versus Unilateral Responses to Terrorism. Public Choice 124 (1-2):75–93.Google Scholar
Sandler, Todd, and Lapan, Harvey E.. 1988. The Calculus of Dissent: An Analysis of Terrorists' Choice of Targets. Synthese 76 (2):245–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sandler, Todd, and Siqueira, Kevin. 2006. Global Terrorism: Deterrence Versus Pre-Emption. Canadian Journal of Economics 39 (4):1370–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sandler, Todd, Arce, Daniel G., and Enders, Walter. 2011. An Evaluation of Interpol's Cooperative-Based Counterterrorism Linkage. Journal of Law and Economics 54 (1):79–110.Google Scholar
Vogel, David. 1995. Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Welch, Michael, and Schuster, Liza. 2005. Detention of Asylum Seekers in the US, UK, France, Germany, and Italy: A Critical View of the Globalizing Culture of Control. Criminal Justice 5 (4):331–55.Google Scholar
Wilson, John Douglas, and Wildasin, David E.. 2004. Capital Tax Competition: Bane or Boon. Journal of Public Economics 88 (6):1065–91.Google Scholar
World Bank. 2011. World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at ⟨http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/wdi-2011⟩. Accessed 22 February 2012.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: File

Neumayer et al. supplementary material

Data files

Download Neumayer et al. supplementary material(File)
File 14.3 KB