¹ Following the recommendation of the Algiers Summit, the General Assembly decided to hold a special session devoted to development and international economic cooperation just before its regular 30th session, in the Autumn of 1975. See GA resolution 3172 (XXVIII). It stated that the purpose of the session would be to examine “political and other implications of the state of world development and international economic cooperation, expanding the dimensions and concepts of economic and developmental cooperation, and giving the goal of development its rightful place in the UN system and on the international stage.” It also called on the special session to initiate “the necessary and appropriate structural changes to make the UN system a more effective instrument of world economic cooperation.” See also GA resolution 3343 (XXIX), which further elaborated the goals of the Seventh Special Session and defined the scope of the preparatory process. Among other things, it called for the appointment of a small group of high-level governmental experts to prepare a study on structural changes within the UN system “so as to make it fully capable of dealing with problems of international economic cooperation in a comprehensive manner.”

² This became the Conference of Developing Countries on Raw Materials, held in Dakar, from 4–8 February 1975. The Algiers Summit also called for an FAO-UNCTAD ministerial conference to deal with shortages of foodstuffs and maintain stable prices. It thus antedated the call for the world food conference.

³ Hansen, Roger D., “The political economy of North-South relations: How much change?” International Organization, 29 (Autumn 1975): 921–47Google Scholar. Hansen is referring primarily to foregoing short-term national interests for the sake of group unity; he himself uses the term in quotation marks, and does imply that calculation is lacking. For an elaboration on the politics of the Group of 77, see Gosovic, Branislav, UNCTAD: Conflict and Compromise (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1972), pp. 271–93Google Scholar, and Cordovez, Diego, “UNCTAD and Development Diplomacy,” Journal of World Trade Law, 1972Google Scholar.

⁴ Note the close linkage between actions of the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned. The latter have increasingly assumed a more active role and came to lead the Group of 77 in the 1970s. They introduced a sharper tone to the development debate. The fact that they were primarily concerned with political issues, and had an institutionalised process of consultation and preparation of positions, added influence to the Group of 77 stance.

⁵ In preparing this draft declaration, the Group of 77 relied extensively on the economic declaration of the 1973 Algiers Summit of Non-Aligned and in particular the section which dealt with permanent sovereignty over natural resources; on General Assembly resolution 3171 (XXVIII) which also dealt with permanent sovereignty over natural resources; on the 15 principles adopted in 1964 at UNCTAD I; and on the principles agreed upon at the ministerial meetings of the Group of 77 in Algiers in 1967 and in Lima in 1971, which were held in preparation of UNCTAD II and UNCTAD III, respectively.

⁶ See General Assembly resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI).

⁷ It should be pointed out that participants at the Seventh Special Session generally agreed that had the Sixth not been held, the Seventh would have taken up the issues addressed by the Sixth-and might have ended very much like the Sixth did.

⁸ For statements and reservations following the adoption of the resolutions, see UN documents A/PV. 2229, 2230, and 2231. The text of the Programme of Action contains the qualifying phrase—“ efforts should be made”— at the opening of each substantive section. This was an important element in gaining the assent of some developed countries to this document as a whole. Note also that the Session adopted a special program to deal with the problems of developing countries most seriously affected by rising oil, fertilizer, and food prices. This matter was of secondary importance despite the immediate impact of the oil crisis and the attempt by some major developed countries to make it the central concern of the session.

⁹ For the text of the Charter, see General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX). For reservations voiced regarding different provisions of the Charter, see UN documents A/AC.2/1649, 1650, and 1651. All told, 79 different votes were taken before the Charter was adopted by 120 votes for, 6 against, and 10 absentions. Voting against were: Belgium, Denmark, F. R. Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States. Abstaining were: Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain. Voting for were: Australia, Finland, New Zealand and Sweden. During the long negotiations on the Charter, differences between positions of developed and developing countries were being narrowed down and it was generally expected that the text would eventually be agreed to by consensus. However, the Sixth Special Session intervened, following which the developing countries took a more rigid position consistent with the New International Economic Order principles. This made compromise with the major developed countries impossible, especially on such issues as sovereignty over natural resources and treatment of foreign private investment.

¹⁰ For the Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Cooperation, and the report of the UNIDO Conference, see UN document ID/CONF. 3/31. For votes, reservations, and explanations of votes, see UN document ID/CONF. 3/SR. 18 and ID/ C0NF.3/ SR. 18/ Add. l/Rev. l. The Declaration and the Plan of Action were based on drafts adopted at the ministerial meeting of the Group of 77, held in Algiers in February 1975. See UN document E/AC. 62/4. During the negotiations, the greatest difficulty was again caused by the issues of indexation, natural resources, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, and producers' associations. On this last point, the final document states that “it is urgently necessary that the developing countries change their traditional method of negotiation with the developed countries.” The developed countries were annoyed that such issues, which they felt were extraneous to the concerns of the Conference and transcending its competence, were raised. In the end, and partly due to shortage of time, no effort took place to bridge the differences. The developed countries at one point proposed to give in on the issue of converting UNIDO into a specialized agency if the Group of 77 was prepared to make concessions on some key substantive issues in the Programme of Action. The trade-off, however, was not accepted by the 77, who were not prepared to compromise on what they considered to be the key principles of the New International Economic Order.

¹¹ For the results of this Conference, see UN document E/AC. 62/6. In addition to providing an input into the Paris preparatory conference between oil producing, oil consuming, and developing countries (see below page 318), Dakar also set the basis for coordinating developing countries' positions on primary commodities at the Seventh Special Session, at UNCTAD IV, and at the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in GATT.

¹² For the program adopted in Lima see UN document A/10217. The Solidarity Fund is to be located in Kuwait, and is to be financed principally through voluntary contributions. It is understood that Kuwait's initial contribution is to be about $1 billion. Regarding the buffer stock fund, a plenipotentiary conference is supposed to negotiate and conclude an agreement in June 1976. The size of the fund is estimated at about $3 billion initially, if copper, rubber, coffee, cotton, tea, sugar, cocoa, jute, hard fibers, and tin are included. On the Council of Producers' Associations, see Lima document NAC/FM/CONF. 5/3. Among the objectives of the Council are the organization of a regular exchange of experience between producers' associations, harmonization of their actions, mobilization of support for any given association, and the identification of common measures to control activities of transnational corporations. The Conference also had before it a draft statute for the treatment of foreign investment, transnational corporations, and the transfer of technology. See Lima document NAC/FM/ CONF. 5/5. The statute was passed on to governments so that they “may be possibly inspired” by it in their national policies. The Lima Conference also established a Committee of Experts to promote cooperation among developing countries in the field of science and technology.

¹³ The first of these steps led to the Washington Conference, held in February 1974; the second never materialized; the third resulted in the creation of the International Energy Agency and related financial measures; and the fourth became the Paris meeting of April 1975.

¹⁴ It should also be recalled that the boom in commodity prices in 1973 was widely interpreted as signifying general commodity shortages. Some of the symptoms of shortages turned out to be purely cyclical while others, such as energy and food, represented long-term problems. Chenery, Hollis B., “Restructuring the World Economy”, Foreign Affairs, 53 (January 1975): 242–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ The purpose of the Conference, the letter stated, would be to assess the current situation concerning world energy problems, and to arrive at general principles and practical modalities of cooperation on energy matters. However, the French avoided using language that would have required the Secretary-General of the UN or the President of ECOSOC to act under the rules of procedure on their request. It is, therefore, difficult to say how serious France was about such a conference. Informal consultations were held, exploring various procedures that were possible, but no formal action was taken in response to the letter.

¹⁶ The United States agreed only on the condition that such a meeting be preceded by an “intensive” preparatory process. A compromise was worked out with France at the Martinique summit, and the Paris meeting became the “preparatory meeting for the international conference proposed by the President of France”.

¹⁷ Interview with the Secretary-General of OPEC, as reported in the New York Times, April 7, 1975. An OPEC summit immediately preceded the Paris meeting; in a declaration issued at its close it was stated that, in return for guarantees and commitments OPEC was prepared to make on matter of oil, the developed countries would have to make major commitments to developing countries. In this connection, they emphasized the need for full implementation of the Programme of Action adopted by the Sixth Special Session (see UN document E/AC. 62/5).

¹⁸ Le Monde, April 9–10, 1975.

¹⁹ The policy of the European Community toward the developing countries has been under review for some time as exemplified by the Lome Convention, which accepts in principle and practice several objectives long puisued by the Third World (see the article by Isebill Gruhn in this issue). But apparently the Paris meeting was not initially viewed in the context of this policy review and reformulation. For a highly critical account of EEC preparations for the Paris meeting, see Die Zeil, April 18, 1975.

²⁰ Statement by Charles W. Robinson, head of the American delegation, as cited in the New York Times, April 8, 1975. Privately, American delegates were reported as saying that the Lome Convention was being scrutinized for new ideas in formulating American approaches to the effects of commodity price instability.

²¹ April 21, 1975.

²² New York Times May 29, 1975. The reasons for the US shift are undoubtedly diverse, but a critical factor seems to have been the Paris meeting. As put by Thomas Enders, Assistant Secretary of State and the American envoy to the last-minute negotiations at the Seventh Special Session, “The turning point for US policy came early this year, when it became clear that the conservative members of OPEC were going to join the radical ones in bidding for the political leadership of the Third World.” Cited in Richard S. Frank, “Economic Report: U.S. Takes Steps to Meet Demands of Third World Nations,” National Journal Reports (Oct. 25, 1975): 1480– 89Google Scholar; the citation is on p. 1481. Although it contains several inaccuracies, this is a useful first cut at the domestic bureaucratic politics involved in the US shift. It should also be pointed out that the United States had been conducting a review of its commodities policy since earlier in the year-this in the context of other negotiations, including those in UNCTAD, and in view of the volatility of commodities markets in the year or two preceding. The Lome Convention was a contributing factor to this review as well; in addition, it may also have influenced the shift in US policy evidenced at Paris. The importance of Lome in the context of the US policy review lies in the long-standing differences between the US and the EEC over the previous association agreements which Lomé replaced and went far beyond.

²³ Based on reports of a meeting of the Development Assistance Committee, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 30 June and 1 July 1975. Similar discussions had taken place at and subsequent to a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, held in Kingston, in May 1975.

²⁴ A broader range of issues was included in the UN Secretary-General's report, prepared in response to General Assembly resolution 3343 (XXIX), and submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Seventh Special Session (UN document E/AC. 62/8). A comprehensive set of recommendations of what the Seventh Special Session might have done had it concerned itself with a wider spectrum of issues is contained in “What Now-Another Development”, Development Dialogue, September 1975, published by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, partially funded by the UN Environment Programme as its contribution to the Seventh Special Session. This exercise was directly linked to the Cocoyoc Declaration, adopted by the UNEP/UNCTAD symposium on “Patterns of Resource Use, Environment and Development Strategies,” reproduced in Ruggie, J. G. and Haas, E. B. (eds.), International Responses to Technology, published as a special issue of International Organization, 29–3 (Summer 1975):893‐901Google Scholar.

²⁵ The original position paper of the 77 appeared on 18 July. It is contained in UN document E/5749. It was later somewhat modified to take into account the results of consultations. The version discussed at the Session is a conference room paper, which is not a public document.

²⁶ This was an important gesture by the 77. The US sought the inclusion of the item for its own domestic reasons, in the context of the preparations for the Special Session. The 77 felt that there was no need to put the item on the agenda, because the Rome Food Conference had done all that was possible at the present time. They also feared that the item might detract attention from other issues. Lastly, because of the generally favorable and forthcoming attitude of the US on food and agriculture, the 77 feared that giving an opening to the US to be positive in this area would correspondingly reduce the need and pressure for it to come forth with commitments and concessions in other issue-areas.

²⁷ We are aware of the meaning that has been usually attached in UN development diplomacy to the term “negotiations”: to denote processes that result in binding agreements among states. Deliberations, debate, dialogue, and other terms have been often used for processes that result in resolutions and recommendations of a non-binding nature, such as those arrived at by the Seventh Special Session. (For the long-standing controversy in UNCTAD over the meaning of “negotiations”, see Gosovic; pp. 225–34; also Cordovez.) We prefer to use the term “negotiations” in its everyday meaning. Furthermore, due to the emergence of the degree of countervailing power on the part of developing countries, as discussed above, one is probably justified in using the term even in its narrow sense, because the outcomes are beginning to carry an implicit commitment to act.

²⁸ The plenary statements are found in A/PV. 2326–2349. The Ad Hoc Committee of the plenary immediately dissolved into private negotiations, which took place in three small contact groups: one on trade, the second on finance and monetary issues, and the third on science and technology, industrialization, food and agriculture, and restructuring of the UN.

²⁹ For the original EEC working paper, see UN document A/AC. 176sol; 2. It was later expanded. (Note that in one of the contact groups a representative of the Commission negotiated on behalf of the EEC. )

³⁰ Following the Kissinger speech (see UN document A/PV. 2327), a large team of specialists labored through the weekend on preparation of the US position paper. It is not a public document. The paper was a fusion of points made in the Kissinger speech and also included amended or accepted parts of the 77 proposals. The US paper contained such wording as:“Arrangements should be agreed upon to improve the economic condition of commodityproducing countries, especially developing countries, to insulate them from the adverse effects of inflation. …” This wording, possibly drawn up in haste, and unaware of the meaning it had acquired in UNCTAD circles, was later withdrawn, having raised the hopes of some that the US had made a major departure in its policy towards accepting the concept of “indexation”. In its preambular parts, the US paper also recalled the Declaration and Programme of Action for the New International Economic Order, and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, and reaffirmed the “large objectives” contained therein.

³¹ The chief spokesman for the 77 on trade was the Venezuelan Minister of International Economic Affairs, Manuel Peréz Guerrero, who had formerly been Secretary-General of UNCTAD; on finance the 77 were led by an Iranian member of the Board of Governors of the IMF and World Bank.

³² The words in the closing speech by Moynihan that “the system works” are reflective of a more positive attitude by the US. This speech stands in contrast to the speeches by George Ball at the close of UNCTAD I in 1964 and John Scali at the close of the Sixth Special Session in 1974. The mechanisms of the system were more or less the same then as at the Seventh Special Session.

³³ The Committee is to take into account in its work, among other things, the report of the group of experts on restructuring, entitled “A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Co-operation”, E/AC. 62/9 (UN publications Sales No. E. 75II. A. 7).

³⁴ On industrialization, the 77 attempted to elicit greater acceptance by the developed countries of the UNIDO Lima Declaration and Programme of Action. This issue, and the question of redeployment of industries, took most of the time in the debate. In connection with the latter question, the US maintained that redeployment of industries is “a matter of the evolution of economies rather than a question of international policy or negotiation” (UN document A/10232). The Session did establish an intergovernmental committee to draw up a constitution for UNIDO as a specialized agency; the draft constitution is to be submitted to a conference of plenipotentiaries in late 1976. On the question of food and agriculture, the negotiations went smoothly and the agreed-upon text was arrived at in a matter of hours. The main operational outcome was a decision to enable the International Fund for Agricultural Development to come into being by the end of 1975, through an initial contribution by developed countries and oil-exporting developing countries in the amount of 1 billion SDRs. The main issue of contention in this particular set of negotiations were between the US and the 77 on one side, and the EEC and Japan on the other. It related to the estimated required size of world food grain reserves, in the context of the International Undertaking on World Food Security. The EEC and Japan objected to explicitly mentioning the figures the US advanced.

³⁵ For the results of the Seventh Special Session, see UN document A/10232; it contains the resolution adopted (3362[S-VII]) and the closing statements in the Ad Hoc Committee at which time the developed countries voiced several reservations regarding the agreed-upon text.

³⁶ UNCTAD document TD/B/C. 1/193 summarizes work done on the elaboration of an integrated program for commodities. Details are contained in documents TD/B/C. 1/ 94–197. package. Yet the integrated program aims at the maintenance and improvement of real prices, and therefore implies at least indirect indexation.

³¹ This was the main and the most publicized proposal of the US at the Session. The facility is intended to replace the existing Compensatory Financing Facility of the IMF. For details, see the speech by Kissinger in UN document A/PV. 2327. Note that Sweden also presented a proposal for a global system of export earnings stabilization. It goes considerably beyond the US proposal. The Swedish proposal is essentially based on the STABEX model of the Lome Convention and on the features of the UNCTAD supplementary financing scheme. Sweden proposed that its scheme, characterized by a high degree of automaticity, should be administered in the UN system, “where all member countries have equal possibility of participating in the decision-making process”. See UN document A/AC. 176/4. Finally, note that improvements in compensatory financing arrangements are being discussed in UNCTAD as a part of the integrated program for commodities. The UNCTAD proposals and the US-proposed scheme bear comparison. A fundamental point of difference is that in the UNCTAD proposals, the real, not nominal, value of exports is advanced for calculating export shortfalls. It is also proposed that a country's drawings not be limited by the size of its IMF quota, or by balance of payments criteria. See UNCTAD document TD/B/C. 1/195. The material in these tables is illustrative, selective, and summary, and cannot convey the complexities, subtleties, and nuances of the various positions and decisions. It is based on the working papers and amendments submitted for negotiating purposes by the Group of 77, the EEC, the United States, and by some of the other developed countries; on the resolution adopted by the 7th Special Session; and on the negotiations which took place at the Session. If there are forms of expression in the tables (especially in the columns “Group of 77” and “Resolution”) that appear awkward, it is because they were used, intentionally or otherwise, by the actors concerned.

³⁸ See General Assembly resolution 3506 (XXX), on the implementation of decisions adopted by the Seventh Special Session.

³⁹ At the end of the Session, the United States reiterated its position on the outcome of the Sixth Special Session, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, and the UNIDO Lima Declaration. The US representative stated that the United States “cannot and does not accept any implication that the world is now embarked on the establishment of something called the ‘new international economic order’. ”UN document A/10232.

⁴⁰ In this connection we should also mention moves within the IMF and the IBRD such as the establishment of the Third Window, of the Joint Fund/World Bank Development Committee, and of the IMF Interim Committee on the International Monetary System, which were at least partly in response t o some of the immediate concerns of the Group of 77. These moves were also inspired by the wish to divert issues from the UN and to diminish the importance of the Seventh Special Session. Note however that the 77 are trying to keep various ongoing processes linked to the UN; the Paris Conference, for example, is t o report back to the General Assembly: see GA resolution 3515 (XXX).