¹ Economic Community of West African States combines 16 Arab, English-, French-, and Portuguese-speaking states of West Africa in a scheme aimed at producing a customs union and a common market over a 15-year period. For a discussion of the Treaty establishing it, see West Africa (16 June 1975).

² See the editorial “Renaissance de l'frique de l'Ouest” in the Daily Times, 29 May 1975.

³ For a general discussion of problems that impeded earlier efforts at integration, see Green, Reginald A. & Krishna, K. G. V., Economic Cooperation in Africa: Retrospect and Prospects (London: Oxford University Press, 1967)Google Scholar.

⁴ This is the common assumption. See Haas, Ernst B. “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing” in Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A., Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 18Google Scholar.

⁵ Mazrui, Ali, Africa's International Relations (London: Heinemann, 1977), p. 2Google Scholar.

⁶ Hence Ghana-Guinea Union, Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union and Ghana-Congo Union each envisaged as a nucleus of a continental union. For a brilliant advocacy of continental union, see Nkrumah, Kwame, Africa Must Unite (London: Mercury Books, 1965), pp. 150–72Google Scholar.

⁷ On Nigeria's diplomacy with respect to this issue, see Ojo, Olatunde J. B., “Nigeria's Foreign Policy, 1960–66: Politics, Economics and the Struggle for African Leadership.” Doctoral Dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1974, pp. 203–58Google Scholar.

⁸ Haas, Ernst B., “Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration,” International Organization 30, 2 (Spring 1976): 186CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ It is true that the colonial government commissioned Studies in 1953 and 1957 on the prospects for a Nigerian Central Bank but no such bank was created until 1958, a year after Ghana had pulled out of the West African Currency Board.

¹⁰ On the Nigeria-Ghana rivalry and struggle for leadership, see Ojo, op. cit. For a more recent analysis, see Aluko, Olajide, Ghana and Nigeria, 1957–70: A Study in Inter-African Discord (London: Rex Collins, 1976), especially pp. 72–121Google Scholar.

¹¹ Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Development Plan: Progress Report 1964 (Lagos: Ministry of Economic Development, 1965), pp. 24–6Google Scholar.

¹² See Thompson, Willard Scott, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957–66 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 196–269, 305–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ The Monrovia Powers, also referred to as the Lagos Group, comprises all the West African Francophone states except Guinea and Mali, plus Nigeria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zaire, Zambia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Libya, Liberia, Gabon, Gambia, Ethiopia, Congo (Brazzaville), and the Central African Republic. It was opposed to the Casablanca group (Ghana, Algeria, UAR, Guinea, Mali, and Morocco) on a whole number of issues but principally the “maximalist” approach to continental unity favored by the Casablanca Group. See Andemicael, Berhanykun, The OAU and the UN (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1976), p. 255Google Scholar, note 7 for the essential differences.

¹⁴ Africa Diary (21–27 April 1962), p. 513.

¹⁵ Ojo, , op. cit., p. 175Google Scholar.

¹⁶ See notes 26 and 27.

¹⁷ Reginald H. Green and K. G. V. Krishna, op. cit.

¹⁸ House of Representatives Debates, Nigeria (21 08, 1962), pp. 139–54Google Scholar.

¹⁹ For the view that MPs' opinions and questions often revealed complete ignorance of foreign policy issues, see Akindele, R. A., “Nigerian Parliament and Foreign Policy, 1960–66,” Quarterly Journal of Administration, University of Ife (9 04 1975), pp. 279–91Google Scholar.

²⁰ House of Representatives Debates, Nigeria (21 08 1962)Google Scholar.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ofoegbu, Mazi Ray, “Functional Cooperation in West Africa: An Introduction,” Ikenga: Journal of African Studies, University of Nigeria, 1, 2 (07 1972), pp. 56–65Google Scholar.

²³ Ojo, , op. cit., pp. 333–63Google Scholar.

²⁴ On the dilemma of policies that at one and the same time encourage foreign investment and ensure economic independence, see Mummery, David R., The Protection of International Private Investment: Nigeria and the World Community (New York: Praeger, 1968), esp. pp. 3–38Google Scholar.

²⁵ See Willard Scott Thompson, op. cit.

²⁶ United Nations Document E/CN. 14/L153 (27 February 1963). The discouraging response led to another (and stronger) resolution cosponsored by Nigeria E/CN.14/L204 (28 February 1964).

²⁷ Ibid. Also important were the cumulative effect of the Nigerian-sponsored draft resolution A/C2/L622 on African economic independence and development and the ensuing debate, Nigeria's memoranda to ECA meetings in March and July 1962 and to the committee of nine set up to harmonize the various views on African economic problems and calling for “a special West African trade meeting” E/CN.14/L64 and E/CN.14/L101/Rev 1 of 1962, and the Nigeria-Tunisia draft resolution A/C2/L566/Add 1/Rev 1 all of which partly resulted in UNCTAD I, in the establishment of the African Development Bank and ECA's moves to forge economic groupings in Africa. For a more detailed discussion see Ojo, , op. cit., pp. 333–63Google Scholar and Tukur, Mahmud, “Nigeria's External Relations: The Conduct of Nigeria's Foreign Policy in the United Nations, October 1960–December 1965.” Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Pittsburgh (1966), pp. 33–48Google Scholar.

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²⁹ Africa Diary (22–28 July 1972), pp. 60–4. The Conseil de l'Entente comprising Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta was an institution for economic cooperation.

³⁰ Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Development Plan Progress Report 1964 (Lagos: Ministry of Economic Planning, 1965), pp. 31–2Google Scholar.

³¹ The Treaty was never ratified in view of French-Nigerian relations during the latter's civil war.

³² On the attempts to dissuade Britain see Ojo, , op. cit., pp. 178–80Google Scholar.

³³ Hilton, Andrew C., “The Changing Role of Private Foreign Investment in Nigeria,” Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, 1, 4 (05 1972): 3Google Scholar.

³⁴ Asiodu, P. C., “Planning for Further Development in Nigeria” in Reconstruction in Nigeria, Ayida, A. A. and Onitiri, H. M. A., eds. (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 186Google Scholar.

³⁵ In addition to David Mummery, op. cit., see Phillips, Adedotun “The Administration of Nigeria's Pioneer Companies Relief” Quarterly Journal of Administration, University of Ife, 4, 1 (09 1969): 11–29Google Scholar and idem “Reforming Nigeria's Tax Incentives System,” Ibid. 5, 4 (July 1971): 421–37; Industrial Development in Nigeria: Patterns, Problems and Prospects, Teriba, O. and Kayode, M. O., eds. (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1977)Google Scholar.

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³⁷ For details and data on the shift see Osagie, E. and Awosika, K., “Foreign Capital Aid Flows in Nigeria,” Quarterly Journal of Administration, 9, 1 (10 1974): 61–76Google Scholar; Boston Research Group, Other Side of the Nigerian Civil War (Boston: 1970), p. 10Google Scholar. World Bank, Nigeria: Options for Long-term Development (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 220Google Scholar.

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³⁹ Osagie and Awosika, op. cit. See also Fajemirokun, Henry, “The Role of Private Enterprise in Africa” in Europe and Africa: Trends and Relations (London: 1978), p. 31Google Scholar.

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⁴⁵ Baker, Ross, “The Role of the Ivory Coast in the Nigeria-Biafra War,” The African Scholar, 1, 4 (1970), pp. 5–8Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ See e.g., Joseph, Richard, “The Gaullist Legacy: Patterns of French Neo-Colonialism,” Review ofAfrican Political Economy 6 (05–08 1976): 4–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁴⁹ Yansane, A. Y., “West African Integration: is ECOWAS the Answer?” Africa Today 24, 3 (07–09 1977): 49Google Scholar; and Afolabi, Ambassador F., “ECOWAS: Building of an Economic Community,” paper presented at the International Conference on ECOWAS, Institute of International Affairs (Lagos: 22–27 08 1976: 8–10Google Scholar; Africa Research Bulletin (15 May–14 June 1974), p. 1696.

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⁵¹ Africa Confidencial, op. cit., p. 1.

⁵² Pinkley, Robert, “The Theory and Practice of Military Government,” Political Studies 21 (06 1973), p. 158Google Scholar. Phillip Asiodu, formerly Permanent Secretary in the Nigerian Federal Civil Service also characterized the position of the Higher Civil Servant under the Military. See “The Future of the Federal and State Civil Services in the Context of the Twelve States Structure” in Administrative and Political Development: Prospects for Nigeria, Tukur, Mahmud, ed. (Zaria: 1970), p. 126Google Scholar.

⁵³ Allison, Graham T., “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” American Political Science Review 58 (09 1969)Google Scholar; and idem., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971).

⁵⁴ E. Osagie and K. Awosika, op. cit.

⁵⁵ The Conference, organized by the Federal Ministry of Economic Development and the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research took place at the University of Ibadan from 24–29 March 1969.

⁵⁶ This point is confirmed by the World Bank study, op. cit., p. 243, showing the following percentage of domestic production (by volume) of total supply in 1970: Beer 99.1; Soft drinks 98.8; Textiles 68.4; Cement 55.6; Paints 84.6; Roofing sheets 76.6; Footwear 96.0; Soap and detergents 91.4; Refined sugar 23.7; and Biscuits 98.8.

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⁵⁸ I am indebted to Dr. Tunde Adeniran of the University of Ibadan for this point.

⁵⁹ Lentner, Howard H., “Foreign Policy Decision-Making: The Case of Canada and Nuclear Weapons,” World Politics 29, 1 (10 1976), pp. 29–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁶⁴ Adedeji, Adebayo, “Collective Self-reliance in Developing Africa: Scope, Prospects and Problems,” keynote address at the International Conference on ECOWAS, Lagos, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 23–27 08 1976, p. 19Google Scholar.

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⁶⁶ Of the 2565 Lagos-based Firms registered in Nigeria between 1952 and 1968, 29 percent were fully Nigerian, 27 percent Joint Nigerian/Expatriate and only 32 percent were fully expatriate. Ibid.

⁶⁷ For further details see Nzimiro, Ikenna, “The Political and Social Implications of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria,” in Classes and Class Struggles in Nigeria (New York: Monthly Review Press, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

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⁷³ The West African conditions seemed to conform to those under which, Vaitsos argues, multinational corporations might be expected to support regional integration. See section on “The role of transnational enterprises in economic integration” in Vaitsos, , op. cit., pp. 729–36Google Scholar; and idem., “The Attitudes and Role of Transnational Enterprises in Economic Integration Processes Among the LDCs,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 6, 3 (Winter, 1977/78), pp. 251–69.

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⁸² Ibid., 1, 3, January 1972, pp. 31–3.

⁸³ Adedipe, Adesina, Nigeria-Benin Relations, unpublished Postgraduate Diploma in International Affairs thesis, University of Ife (1976), pp. 36 and 46Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, 2, 1 and 2, 04–12 1972, pp. 51–3Google Scholar.

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⁹² Africa Diary, 1–7 April 1972, p. 5906.

⁹³ Ibid., 1–7 January 1973, p. 6284.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 12–18 February 1972, p. 5842 and text of agreement in Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs 1, 3 (01 1972), 42–5Google Scholar.

⁹⁵ Africa Confidential, 14, 40, 05 1973, p. 1Google Scholar.

⁹⁶ Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs 3 (1973): 133–4Google Scholar.

⁹⁷ Africa Diary, 3–9 December 1974, p. 7221.

⁹⁸ Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, 3 (1973): 42–50Google Scholar.

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¹⁰⁰ Africa Confidential, 14, 10, 11 05 1973, p. 3Google Scholar.

¹⁰¹ Nigeria. Bulletin on Foreign Affairs 3 (1973): 172–4Google Scholar.

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¹⁰³ Ibid., 1, 1 (1971), p. 30.

¹⁰⁴ Africa Confidential 14, 10, 11 05 1973, p. 3Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁵ Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs 2, 1 and 2 (04–12 1972): 70–4Google Scholar.

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¹⁰⁷ Cf. Philip, Kjeld et al. , Intra-African Economic Cooperation and Africa's Relations with the European Economic Community (Economic Commission for Africa, United Nations, 1972)Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁸ Africa Confidential, 6 July, 1973, pp. 3–6.

¹⁰⁹ On Nigeria's role see Briggs, Wenike, “Negotiations between the Enlarged European Economic Community and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Countries,” in Nigerian Journal of International Affairs (Lagos) 1, 1 (1975), pp. 12–32Google Scholar.

¹¹⁰ Gruhn, Isebill V., “The Lome Convention: Inching towards Interdependence,” International Organization 30, 2 (Spring 1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹¹² Haas, Ernst, “The Study of Regional Integration,” in Lindberg & Scheingold, op. cit., p. 16Google Scholar.

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¹¹⁴ “Articles 30(a) and 32(2) and (3). For text of the Treaty, See International Legal Materials 14, 5 (09, 1975)Google Scholar.

¹¹⁵ Adedeji, Adebayo, “Collective Self-Reliance …” op. cit.: 10Google Scholar.

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¹¹⁷ UNCTAD, Current Problems of Economic Integration (New York: 1971): 82–3 and 89–90Google Scholar; Axline, W. Andrew, “Integration and Development in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The Politics of Regional Negotiations” International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978): 953–73Google Scholar; and the withdrawal of Chile from the Andean Common Market in 1976 over disputes on the common treatment of foreign investments.

¹¹⁸ Adedeji, Adebayo, “Collective Self-Reliance,” op. cit., pp. 3–6Google Scholar; 10–12. The treaty provisions already cited, note do not preclude these developments, and Nigerian political leaders, General Obasanjo in particular, never ceased to implore brother heads of state not to “deviate from the goal of economic emancipation of our peoples.” See, e.g. the Nigerian Chronicle (17 November 1976), p. 7.

¹¹⁹ Olatunde Ojo, “Oil, Politics and Core State Integration Policy: Nigeria and ECOWAS” (forthcoming).

¹²⁰ Haas, Ernst, “Turbulent Fields,” op. cit., p. 176Google Scholar.

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¹²² Nigerian Tide (3 May 1979): 7.