No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Nato and the Shape Technical Center
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
Extract
Functional theory in international organization, as James Patrick Sewell has observed, asserts that “the most desirable route to international community-building proceeds gradually from initial transnational cooperation in the solution of common problems.” In restating the theory in a series of operational propositions Sewell formulates three “conditions” of functional “international activities”: 1) They are “specific in their focus,” i.e., organized to attack some concrete problem or set of problems; 2) they are “non-controversial,” i.e., concerned with problems which can in some way be set apart as nonpolitical; and 3) they are organized “separately from each other and from international political organs.”
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The IO Foundation 1967
References
1 Sewell, James Patrick, Functionalism and World Politics: A Study Based on United Nations Programs Financing Economic Development (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Ibid., p. 53.
3 Claude, Inis L. Jr, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (3rd ed. rev.; New York: Random House, 1964), p. 344Google Scholar.
4 Mitrany, David, A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization (London: Oxford University Press [for the Royal Institute of International Affairs], 1943)Google Scholar.
5 See especially Haas, Ernst B., Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1964)Google Scholar.
6 The official form is Air Defense Technical Centre. We have used the American form for consistency. NATO, of course, is the acronym for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and SHAPE for the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers, Europe.
7 A classic statement of the case is by the late Dr. von Neumann, John, “Can We Survive Technology?” Fortune, 06 1955 (Vol. 51, No. 6), pp. 106 ffGoogle Scholar.
8 On the pioneering development of military operations research see United Kingdom Air Ministry, The Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal Air Force (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964)Google Scholar. Among the most useful studies of the impact of scientific change on the United States military are Quade, E. S. (ed.), Analysis for Military Decisions (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964)Google Scholar; the essays by Brodie, Bernard and Schilling, Warner in Gilpin, Robert and Wright, Christopher (ed.), Scientists and National Policy-Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964)Google Scholar; and the basic study by Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, III: The Free Press, 1960)Google Scholar.
9 Gardner, Charles, “European Air Defense,” Military Review, 09 1953 (Vol. 33, No. 6), pp. 97–99Google Scholar.
10 See the report on NATO's air defense problems during its early years, prepared by an Interavia study group: “A Provisional NATO Plan for Western Europe's Air Defense,” Interavia, 02 1956 (Vol. 2, No. 2), pp. 103–109Google Scholar.
11 See Quester, George H., Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The Airpower background of Modern Strategy (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), Chapters 5 and 6Google Scholar.
12 Collier, Basil, The Defence of the United Kingdom (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), pp. 109–111Google Scholar.
13 From the beginning, of course, there was tension between two conceptions of NATO: as a treaty of guarantee or as an integrated military system which could defend Western Europe. Clearly, however, the funding of the Marshall Plan had priority over the Mutual Defense Aid Program (MDAP). See Osgood, Robert Endicott, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 37–45Google Scholar.
14 Quoted in Ismay, Lord Hastings, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954 (Paris, 1954), p. 185Google Scholar.
15 The best summary of NATO strategic planning through the 1950's is Hilsman, Roger, “NATO: The Developing Strategic Context,” in Knorr, Klaus (ed.), NATO and American Security (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 11–36Google Scholar.
16 See the article by General van Gussen, J. J., “L'OTAN: Integration ou Cooperation?” Révue Militaire Générale, 03 1960 (No. 3), pp. 287–292Google Scholar. There was also a European air traffic coordination group for commercial aviation which cooperated in these matters and subsequently gave assistance to SHAPE.
17 See the report in the NATO Letter, 04 1, 1956 (Vol. 4, No. 4), pp. 12–13Google Scholar, of a briefing given by General Gruenther on air defense to correspondents accredited to SHAPE; and the analysis and comment in The Times (London), 03 5, 1956Google Scholar.
18 See NATO: Facts About the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Paris: NATO Information Service, 1962), pp. 131–133Google Scholar; “Air Defence Technical Centre,” NATO Letter, 03 1958 (Vol. 6, No. 3), p. 15Google Scholar; and Sizoo, G. H., “The SHAPE Air Defence Technical Centre,” NATO Letter, 07 1960 (Vol. 8, No. 7), pp. 12–16Google Scholar, for some of the events leading up to the creation of SADTO and its early operations.
19 On the initiation of the Mutual Weapons Development Program see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The Mutual Security Act of 1953, 83rd Congress, 1st session, 1953, pp. 121, 140, 176–178Google Scholar. See also Lt. Col. McIntyre, G. W., “The Mutual Weapons Development Program,” Military Review, 11 1960 (Vol. 40, No. 11), pp. 48–54Google Scholar.
20 See Brady, Thomas F., The New York Times, 04 23, 1955Google Scholar.
21 Ibid.; see also the discussion in The Times (London), 12 16, 1955Google ScholarPubMed.
22 Ibid.
23 The “offshore” procurement purchases included ammunition, aircraft, ships, and various kinds of supporting equipment. This was in addition to the special military support for France. See Ismay, pp. 136–139. For more extensive data on United States military assistance to Europe during this period see Hovey, Harold A., United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 76 ffGoogle Scholar.
24 The mood of the time is very well stated in Glenn Snyder's study “The ‘New Look’ of 1953,” in Warner Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Snyder, Glenn H., Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 383 ffGoogle Scholar.
25 The production consortia included such American weapons as Hawk, Sidewinder, Bullpup, and the gigantic F-104G program. Under the NBMR procedure some NATO nations adopted the “winners” in the competion (the G-91 and the Brequet Atlantic), but the Western European Assembly's Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments noted in 1960 that only 3 percent of arms procurement expenditures in the alliance involved items joindy produced. See Western European Union (WEU) Assembly Document 250 (Paris, October 10, 1962), pp. 4–5. The best study of the NATO weapons programs is Brig. Gen. Vandevanter, E. Jr, Coordinated Weapons Production in NATO: A Study of Alliance Processes (Santa Monica, Calif: The RAND Corporation, 11 1964)Google Scholar.
26 United States Information Service Press Release (London), April 14, 1956.
27 Horelick, Arnold L. and Rush, Myron, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), Chapter 2Google Scholar.
28 The Times (London), 03 15, 1956Google ScholarPubMed.
29 NATO: Facts, p. 132.
80 Sizoo, , NATO Letter, Vol. 8, No. 7, p. 14Google Scholar.
31 It should be made clear in this respect that the Center very rarely entered into development or procurement contracts for operational requirements. As a result it was not subject to pressures from firms or from governments for the use of particular products.
32 NATO: Facts, Chapter 12.
33 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 12 21, 1960 (Vol. 632, Series 5), cols. 163–164Google Scholar.
34 See the report by Beaton, Leonard, The Guardian, 05 2, 1960Google Scholar.
35 Beaton, Leonard, The Guardian, 09 28, 1960Google Scholar; and Le Monde, September 30, 1960.
36 See the comments of Brett-Smith, Richard, The Daily Telegraph (London), 02 8, 1960Google Scholar.
37 Ellis, Harry B., Christian Science Monitor, 05 31, 1963Google Scholar.
38 The most comprehensive analysis of the arms competition within NATO is in the series Defense, Technology and the Western Alliance currently being published by The Institute for Strategic Studies in London. See especially John Calmann, European Cooperation in Defence Technology; C. J. E. Harlow, The European Armaments Base: A Survey (Parts 1 and 2); and James, Robert Rhodes, Standardization and Common Production of Weapons in NATO (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967)Google Scholar. Valuable data is also in the reports of the Western European Assembly's Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments, particularly WEU Documents 76 (1957), 106 (1958), 164 (1960), 250 (1962), and 304 (1964). The related conflict over United States investments in Europe is discussed in Christopher Layton, Trans-Atlantic Investments (Boulogne-sur-Seine, France: The Atlantic Institute, 1966)Google Scholar.
39 For varying viewpoints on the NADGE affair see De Vos, Pierre, Le Monde, 04 13, 1963Google Scholar; Brownlow, Cecil, “NATO Intercept Control Decision Nears,” Aviation Week, and Space Technology, 04 29, 1963 (Vol. 78, No. 17), p. 32Google Scholar; Rousseau, Robert, Le Figaro, 05 2, 1963Google Scholar; Beller, William, ”NATO Plans SAGE-Type System,” Missiles and Rockets, 10 12, 1964 (Vol. 15, No. 15), pp. 14–15Google Scholar; and Urquhart, John, The New York Herald Tribune, 02 5, 1965Google Scholar.
40 The New York Herald Tribune, April 17, 1963.
41 This figure does not fully cover the actual cost of United States personnel at the Center. Each American staff member is assigned a NATO grade and position, but the NATO salary is then paid not to the American staff member but as a reimbursement to the United States government. The United States, in effect, subsidizes the use of American personnel by paying the differential between NATO and United States salary levels.