Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T15:26:34.692Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Micro-Foundations of International Relations Theory: Psychology and Behavioral Economics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 April 2017

Janice Gross Stein
Get access

Abstract

Almost forty years ago, a small group of scholars drew on cognitive psychology to explain anomalous patterns of behavior by leaders on issues of international security. Although it made significant contributions to theory and research, that scholarship did not diffuse broadly into the field. Drawing on concepts in psychology and behavioral economics, research that uses new methods is now producing a wave of scholarship in international relations exemplified by the work in this special issue. Analysis of the use of prospect theory over the last three decades identifies the scope conditions that enable the predictions of rational choice and psychological theories. These scope conditions motivate the focus on the heterogeneity of decision makers that is at the core of current contributions. Future research will move beyond the now-sterile debate between rational choice and psychology.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 71 , Supplement S1 , April 2017 , pp. S249 - S263
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2017 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Abdellaoui, Mohammed, 2000. Parameter-free Elicitation of Utility and Probability Weighting Functions. Management Science 46 (11):1497–1513.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barberis, Nicholas C. 2012. Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review and Assessment. NBER Working Paper 18621.Google Scholar
Bayram, A. Burcu. 2017. Due Deference: Cosmopolitan Social Identity and the Psychology of Legal Obligation in International Politics. In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S137–S163.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berejikian, Jeffrey. 2004. International Relations Under Risk: Framing State Choice. Albany: State University of New York Press.Google Scholar
Berejikian, Jeffrey, and Early, Bryan R.. 2013. Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve. Political Psychology 34 (5):649–71.Google Scholar
Boettcher, William. 2004. The Prospects for Prospect Theory: An Empirical Evaluation of International Relations’ Applications of Framing and Loss Aversion. Political Psychology 25 (3):331–62.Google Scholar
Bruhin, Adrian, Fehr-Duda, Helga, and Epper, Thomas. 2010. Risk and Rationality: Uncovering Heterogeneity in Probability Distortion. Econometrica 78 (4):1375–1412.Google Scholar
Camerer, Colin, and Ho, T.G.. 1994. Violations of the Betweenness Axiom and Nonlinearity in Probability. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 8 (2):167–96.Google Scholar
Camerer, Colin, and Kunreuther, Howard. 1989. Decision Processes for Low Probability Events: Policy Implications. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 8 (4):565–92.Google Scholar
Carnevale, Peter J. 2008. Positive Affect and Decision Frame in Negotiation. Group Decision and Negotiation 17 (1):51–63.Google Scholar
Davis, James W. 2000. Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
De Dreu, Carsten K.W., and McCusker, Christopher. 1997. Gain-loss Frames on Cooperation in Two-Person Social Dilemmas: A Transformational Analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72 (5):1093–106.Google Scholar
Elms, Deborah Kay. 2008. New Directions for IPE: Drawing from Behavioral Economics. International Studies Review 10 (2):239–65.Google Scholar
Farnham, Barbara. 1992. Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: Insights from Prospect Theory. Political Psychology 13 (2):205–35.Google Scholar
Farnham, Barbara. 1997. Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldgeier, James, and Tetlock, Philip E., 2001. Psychology and International Relations Theory. Annual Review of Political Science 4 (1):67–92.Google Scholar
Gonzalez, Richard, and Wu, George. 1999. On the Shape of the Probability Weighting Function. Cognitive Psychology 38 (1):129–66.Google Scholar
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Alex Hughes, D., and Victor, David G.. 2013. The Cognitive Revolution and the Political Psychology of Elite Decision Making. Perspectives on Politics 11 (2):368–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, Todd H., and Ross, Andrew A.G.. 2015. Affective Politics after 9/11. International Organization 69 (4):847–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Herrmann, Richard K. 1985. American Perceptions of Soviet Foreign Policy: Reconsidering Three Competing Perspectives. Political Psychology 6 (3):375–411.Google Scholar
Herrmann, Richard K. 2017. How Attachments to the Nation Shape Belief About the World: A Theory of Motivated Reasoning. In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S61–S84.Google Scholar
Holmes, Marcus. 2013. The Force of Face-to-Face Diplomacy: Mirror Neurons and the Problem of Intentions. International Organization 67 (4):829–61.Google Scholar
Isenberg, Daniel J. 1986. Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 50 (6):1141–51.Google Scholar
Janis, Irving L. 1972. Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1992. Political Implications of Loss Aversion. Political Psychology 13 (2):187–204.Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1998. System Effects: Complexity in Social and Political Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jervis, Robert, Ned Lebow, Richard, and Stein, Janice Gross. 1985. Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.Google Scholar
Kahneman, Daniel, and Tversky, Amos. 1979. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk. Econometrica 47 (2):263–92.Google Scholar
Kahneman, Daniel, and Tversky, Amos. 1984. Choices, Values, and Frames. American Psychologist 39 (4):341–50.Google Scholar
Kanner, Michael. 2004. Framing and the Role of the Second Actor: An Application of Prospect Theory to Bargaining. Political Psychology 25 (2):213–39.Google Scholar
Kertzer, Joshua D. 2017. Resolve, Time, and Risk. In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S109–S136.Google Scholar
Kertzer, Joshua D., and Rathbun, Brian C.. 2015. Fair Is Fair: Social Preferences and Reciprocity in International Politics. World Politics 67 (4):613–55.Google Scholar
Knetsch, Jack L., and Sinden, John A.. 1984. Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value. Quarterly Journal of Economics 99 (3):507–21.Google Scholar
Koszegi, Botond, and Rabin, Matthew. 2006. A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121 (4):1133–65.Google Scholar
Koszegi, Botond, and Rabin, Matthew. 2007. Reference-Dependent Risk Attitudes. American Economic Review 97 (4):1047–73.Google Scholar
Koszegi, Botond, and Rabin, Matthew. 2009. Reference-Dependent Consumption Plans. American Economic Review 99 (3):909–36.Google Scholar
Kuhberger, Anton. 1995. The Framing of Decisions: A New Look at Old Problems. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 62 (2):230–245.Google Scholar
Kuhberger, Anton. 1998. The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-Analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 75 (1):23–55.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Lake, David A., and Powell, Robert. 1999. International Relations: A Strategic Choice Approach. In Strategic Choice and International Relations, edited by Lake, David A. and Powell, Robert, 3–38. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Lamm, Helmut. 1988. A Review of Our Research on Group Polarization: Eleven Experiments on the Effects of Group Discussion on Risk Acceptance, Probability Estimation, and Negotiation Positions. Psychological Reports 62 (3):807–13.Google Scholar
Lebow, Richard Ned. 1981. Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Levin, Irwin P., Schneider, Sandra L., and Gaeth, Gary J.. 1998. All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 76 (2):149–88.Google Scholar
Levy, Jack. 1992a. An Introduction to Prospect Theory. Political Psychology 13 (2):171–86.Google Scholar
Levy, Jack. 1992b. Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems. Political Psychology 13 (2):283–310.Google Scholar
Loewenstein, George F., Weber, Elke U., Hsee, Christopher K., and Welch, Ned. 2001. Risk As Feelings. Psychological Bulletin 127 (2):267–86.Google Scholar
Mandel, David R. 2001. Gain-Loss Framing and Choice: Separating Outcome Formulations From Descriptor Formulations. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 85 (1):56–76.Google Scholar
McDermott, Rose. 1998. Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
McDermott, Rose. 2004a. Prospect Theory in Political Science: Gains and Losses from the First Decade. Political Psychology 25 (2):289–312.Google Scholar
McDermott, Rose. 2004b. The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science. Perspectives on Politics 2 (4):691–706.Google Scholar
McDermott, Rose. 2009. Prospect Theory and Negotiation. In Negotiated Risks, edited by Avenhaus, Rudolf and Sjöstedt, Gunnar, 87–109. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar
McDermott, Rose, Fowler, James H., and Smirnov, Oleg. 2008. On the Evolutionary Origin of Prospect Theory Preferences. The Journal of Politics 70 (2):335–50.Google Scholar
Mercer, Jonathan. 2005a. Rationality and Psychology in International Relations. International Organization 59 (1):77–106.Google Scholar
Mercer, Jonathan. 2005b. Prospect Theory and Political Science. Annual Review of Political Science 8:1–21.Google Scholar
Mercer, Jonathan. 2010. Emotional Beliefs. International Organization 64 (1):1–31.Google Scholar
Odell, John. 2002. Bounded Rationality and the World Political Economy. In Governing the World's Money, edited by Andrews, David, Randall Henning, C., and Pauly, Louis W., 163–93. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Poulsen, Lauge N. Skovgard, and Aisbett, Emma. 2013. When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning. World Politics 65 (2):273–313.Google Scholar
Powell, Robert. 2017. Research Bets and Behavioral IR. In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S265–S277.Google Scholar
Rabin, Matthew. 2002. A Perspective on Psychology and Economics. European Economic Review 46 (4):657–85.Google Scholar
Rathbun, Brian C., Kertzer, Joshua D., and Paradis, Mark. 2017. Homo Diplomaticus: Mixed-Method Evidence of Variation in Strategic Rationality. In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S33–S59.Google Scholar
Renshon, Jonathan. 2015. Losing Face and Sinking Costs: Experimental Evidence on the Judgment of Political and Military Leaders. International Organization 69 (3):1–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Renshon, Jonathan, J. Lee, Julia and Dustin, Tingley. 2017. Emotions and the Micro-Foundations of Commitment Problems. In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S189–S217.Google Scholar
Rho, Sungmin, and Tomz, Michael. 2017. Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest? In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S85–S108.Google Scholar
Saunders, Elizabeth N. 2017. No Substitute for Experience: Presidents, Advisers, and Information in Group Decision Making. In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S219–S247.Google Scholar
Schaub, Gary Jr. 2004. Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect Theory. Political Psychology 25 (3):389–411.Google Scholar
Sell, Susan, and Prakash, Aseem. 2004. Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest Between Business and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights. International Studies Quarterly 48 (1):143–75.Google Scholar
Shiller, Robert. 2003. From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (1):28–38.Google Scholar
Slovic, Paul, Finucane, Melissa L., Peters, Ellen, and MacGregor, Donald G.. 2004. Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality. Risk Analysis 24 (2):311–22.Google Scholar
Stein, Janice Gross. 1985. Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View from Cairo. In Psychology and Deterrence, edited by Jervis, Robert, Ned Lebow, Richard, and Gross Stein, Janice, 34–59. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Stein, Janice Gross, Loewen, Peter, and Sheffer, Lior. In progress. Experimental Evidence on the Sensitivity of Rational Choice Models to Behavioral Anomalies across Populations.Google Scholar
Tajfel, Henri. 1982. Social Identity and Intergroup Relations. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Tajfel, Henri, and Turner, John C.. 1986. The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by Worchel, Stephen and Austin, William G., 2nd ed., 7–24. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.Google Scholar
Taliafero, Jeffrey W. 1998. Quagmires in the Periphery: Foreign Wars and Escalating Commitment in International Conflict. Security Studies 7 (3):94–144.Google Scholar
Tetlock, Philip E., and Gardner, Dan. 2015. Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction. London: Random House.Google Scholar
Tetlock, Philip E., and Ned Lebow, Richard. 2001. Poking Counterfactual Holes in Covering Laws: Cognitive Styles and Historical Reasoning. American Political Science Review 95 (4):829–43.Google Scholar
Tetlock, Philip E., Ned Lebow, Richard, and Geoffrey Parker, Neil, eds. 2006. Unmaking the West: “What-If” Scenarios that Rewrite World History. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Thaler, Richard. 1985. Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice. Marketing Science 4 (3):199–214.Google Scholar
t'Hart, Paul, Stern, Erik K., and Sundelius, Bengt. 1997. Foreign Policy Making at the Top: Political Group Dynamics. In Beyond Group Think: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy Making, edited by Hart, Paul t’, Stern, Erik K., and Sundelius, Bengt, 3–34. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Tversky, Amos, and Kahneman, Daniel. 1981. The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. Science 211 (4481):453–58.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tversky, Amos, and Kahneman, Daniel. 1992. Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5 (4):297–323.Google Scholar
US Department of Defense. 2006. Deterrence Operations, Joint Operating Concept. Version 2.0. Available at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/joc_deterrence.pdf>. Accessed 27 January 2017..+Accessed+27+January+2017.>Google Scholar
Weyland, Kurt. 1996. Risk Taking in Latin American Economic Restructuring: Lessons from Prospect Theory. International Studies Quarterly 40 (2):185–208.Google Scholar
Weyland, Kurt. 2002. Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Wu, George, and Gonzalez, Richard. 1996. Curvature of the Probability Weighting Function. Management Science 42 (12):1676–90.Google Scholar