1. Katzenstein, Peter J., ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).Google Scholar

2. Zimmerman, William, “Issue Area and Foreign-Policy Process: A Research Note in Search of a General Theory,” American Political Science Review 67 (December 1973), p. 1212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. Rosenau, James N., “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Farrell, R. Barry, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, I11.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27–92.Google Scholar

4. Potter, William C., “Issue Area and Foreign Policy Analysis,” International Organization 34 (Summer 1980), pp. 411–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For discussions and examples of this method, see George, Alexander L. and McKeown, Timothy J., “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985), pp. 21–58Google Scholar; George, Alexander L., “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Lauren, P. G., ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43–68Google Scholar; and George, A. L. and Smoke, R., Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).Google Scholar

5. Potter, William C., “The Study of Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security: What Is to Be Done?” in Valenta, Jiri and Potter, William, eds., Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 298–307.Google Scholar

6. The case studies come from Evangelista, Matthew, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988).Google Scholar although they are used in the book to address the debate over internal versus external determinants of security policy rather than the debate over issue-areas.

7. Zimmerman, , “Issue Area and Foreign-Policy Process.” p. 1209.Google Scholar

8. For a discussion, see Norton E. Long, “Open and Closed Systems,” in Farrell, , Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, pp. 155–66.Google Scholar

9. Zimmerman, . “Issue Area and Foreign-Policy Process,” p. 1212.Google Scholar

10. Ibid., p. 1204.

11. Moore, Barrington Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966)Google Scholar; Gerschenkron, Alexander, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962), chap. 1.Google Scholar

12. Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty. For a related discussion, see Kurth, James R., “The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle: Industrial History and Political Outcomes,” International Organization 33 (Winter 1979), pp. 1–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13. Stephen Krasner, for example, describes U.S. commercial and monetary policies as distinct issue-areas in “United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness,” in Katzenstein, , Between Power and Plenty, pp. 51–87.Google Scholar

14. In fact, a recent study stressed the need to distinguish not only between issue-areas but across historical periods as well. See the special issue of International Organization 42 (Winter 1988)Google Scholar, “The State and American Foreign Economic Policy,” G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, eds., especially Ikenberry's conclusion.

15. Katzenstein, Peter J., “International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States,” International Organization 30 (Winter 1976), p. 2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

16. Krasner, Stephen D., Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 70.Google Scholar

17. Ibid., p. 329.

18. Skocpol, Theda, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 12–13.Google Scholar Skocpol also quotes Nettl, J. P., “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” World Politics 20 (07 1968), pp. 559–92, to the same effect.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19. See Potter's discussion in “Issue Area and Foreign Policy Analysis.”

20. Dahl, Robert A., Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961)Google Scholar; and Lowi, Theodore J., “American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory,” World Politics 16 (07 1964), pp. 677–715.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21. Lowi, Theodore J., “Making Democracy Safe for the World: National Politics and Foreign Policy,” in Rosenau, James N., ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 314.Google Scholar

22. Kurth, James, “A Widening Gyre: The Logic of American Weapons Procurement,” Public Policy 19 (Summer 1971), pp. 373–404.Google Scholar Kurth related four modes of change—quantitative, innovative, renovative, and redistributive—to four modes of causation—bureaucratic politics, bureaucratic process, bureaucratic-corporate alliances, and the economic system.

23. Zimmerman, , “Issue Area and Foreign-Policy Process,” p. 1211.Google Scholar

24. This is especially so, considering the extent to which domestic, particularly bureaucratic, politics have been emphasized in the literature on security policy. See, for example, Allison, Graham and Halperin, Morton H., “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” in Ullman, Richard H. and Tanter, Raymond, eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972)Google Scholar; and Allison, Graham and Morris, Frederic A., “Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons,” Daedalus 104 (Summer 1975), pp. 99–129.Google Scholar

25. For a review of the recent literature on the state, see Krasner, Stephen D., “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” Comparative Politics 16 (01 1984), pp. 223–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Also relevant is the article by March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P., “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (09 1984), pp. 734–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26. On the origins of the Strategic Defense Initiative, see Greb, G. Allen, “Science Advice to Presidents: From Test Bans to the Strategic Defense Initiative,” Research Paper no. 3, Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, San Diego, 1987Google Scholar; and Broad, William, Star Warriors (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985).Google Scholar

27. See especially the conclusion in Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty.

28. Skowronek, Stephen, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 20; and the discussion in Krasner, “Approaches to the State.”CrossRefGoogle Scholar

29. Comisso, Ellen, “Introduction: State Structures, Political Processes, and Collective Choice in CMEA States,” International Organization 40 (Spring 1986), p. 195,CrossRefGoogle Scholar in the special issue on “Power, Purpose, and Collective Choice: Economic Strategy in Socialist States,” Ellen Comisso and Laura D'Andrea Tyson, eds. The concepts Comisso employs to distinguish between socialist states—“patrimonialism” and “collegiality”—are not applied to any of the non-CMEA states that are also covered in the volume. The terms appear in any case to be mainly a restatement of the standard distinction in Soviet politics between the totalitarian and oligarchic models. For a discussion, see Hough, Jerry, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 19–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

30. The relative strength of state and society, for example, seems to account for differences in responses to external economic conditions of such ostensibly similar countries as Poland and Romania. In the 1970s, Poland's state and party apparatus was crumbling while societal forces, particularly workers, were growing in strength. The result was an inability to respond to economic shocks with the type of austerity measures adopted by Romania. By contrast, Romania, like some authoritarian regimes in the Third World, was able to squeeze a weak society because Nicolae Ceaucescu controlled the instruments of a strong, centralized state. I draw these conclusions from the relevant articles in the special issue of International Organization edited by Comisso and Tyson, although the editors might disagree. See Ronald H. Linden, “Socialist Patrimonialism and the Global Economy: The Case of Romania”; and Poznanski, Kazimierz, “Economic Adjustment and Political Forces: Poland since 1970,” both in International Organization 40 (Spring 1986), pp. 347–80 and 455–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

31. This summary draws on Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness; and Moore, Social Origins. Other important discussions of these ideas are found in Skocpol, Theda, “A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,” Politics and Society 4 (Fall 1973), pp. 1–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gourevitch, Peter, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,“ International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978), pp. 881–912CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Kurth, ”Political Consequences of the Product Cycle.”

32. Moore, Social Origins. For discussion of a related pattern, see Trimberger, Ellen Kay, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978).Google Scholar

33. Pintner, Walter McKenzie and Rowney, Don Karl, eds., Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

34. See, for example, Klyuchevsky, Vasili, Peter the Great, trans. Archibald, Liliana (New York: Vintage, 1958).Google Scholar

35. Seton-Watson, Hugh, The Russian Empire, 1801–1917 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 522.Google Scholar See also Gerschenkron, Alexander, Continuity in History and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 140–248.Google Scholar

36. See the discussion in Holloway, David, “War, Militarism, and the Soviet State,” Alternatives 6 (03 1980), pp. 59–92, from which the quote is taken.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37. The contributors to the special issue of International Organization entitled “The State and American Foreign Policy” argue that the U.S. state cannot be characterized as equally weak in all policy areas. This argument would not appear to hamper the utility of the “weak state” label for comparative purposes, especially in the U.S.–Soviet context.

38. The “top-down” versus “bottom-up” analysis draws on Brzezinski, Zbigniew and Huntington, Samuel, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: Viking Press, 1963), especially pp. 202–30,Google Scholar and is developed in Evangelista, Matthew, “Why the Soviets Buy the Weapons They Do,” World Politics 36 (07 1984), pp. 597–618CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also the discussion by Potter. “Study of Soviet Decisionmaking.”

39. Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race.

40. Kurth, , “A Widening Gyre,” pp. 396–97.Google Scholar

41. The full documentation for the American case is found in Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race, chap. 4.

42. See, in particular, discussion of the Committee on Atomic Energy's Panel on Long-Range Objectives, which met under the auspices of the Department of Defense Research and Development Board and was chaired by Oppenheimer: In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security Board and Texts of Principal Documents and Letters, United States Atomic Energy Commission, originally published by the Government Printing Office in 1954, reprinted with an index and foreword by Philip M. Stern (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 46–48 and 64 (hereafter cited as Oppenheimer Hearings); and Gilpin, Robert, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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44. Lapp, Ralph. The New Force: The Story of Atoms and People (New York: Harper & Bros., 1953), p. 119.Google Scholar

45. Evangelista, Matthew, “Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised,” International Security 7 (Winter 1982–1983), pp. 110–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

46. See, for example, the remarks by a member of the first U.S. Joint Staff and NATO Standing Group. Brig. Gen. (USAF, ret.) Richardson, Robert C., “NATO Nuclear Strategy: A Look Back,” Strategic Review 8 (Spring 1981), p. 38.Google Scholar

47. Rosenberg, David Alan, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” International Security 7 (Spring 1983), pp. 3–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

48. This view was put forward by, among many others, the first director of the Defense Department's Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Morse, Philip M., in In at the Beginnings: A Physicist's Life (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), p. 239.Google Scholar

49. Kolodziej, Edward A., The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945–1963 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), especially pp. 93–94Google Scholar; Eden, Lynn, “Capitalist Conflict and the State: The Making of United States Military Policy in 1948,” in Bright, Charles and Harding, Susan, eds., Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), pp. 233–61.Google Scholar

50. For example, during the academic year 1947–48, the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth offered a course called “Trends in Warfare” that discussed the implications of atomic weapons. The course syllabus gives no indication, however, that battlefield nuclear support for ground forces figured at all in the program. “Trends in Warfare I,” Advance Sheet, in bound volume, Regular Course, School of Personnel, 1947–1948, Set 6, Part I, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Combined Arms Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

51. Oppenheimer Hearings, pp. 497–98 and 505.

52. See, for example, Oppenheimer, J. Robert, “Comments on the Military Value of the Atom,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 7 (02 1951), pp. 43–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gavin, Maj. Gen. James, “Tactical Uses of the Atomic Bomb,” Combat Forces Journal 1 (11 1950), pp. 9–11Google Scholar; and Cohen, Samuel, The Truth About the Neutron Bomb (New York: William Morrow, 1983), pp. 30–33.Google Scholar

53. To a certain extent, this practice had already begun during the previous period. See, for example, Voorhees, Tracy S., “To Prevent a ‘Korea’ in Western Europe,” The New York Times Magazine, 23 07 1950, pp. 10ff.Google Scholar

54. The use of “windows” by policy entrepreneurs in American domestic politics is developed by Kingdon, John W. in Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), chaps. 8 and 9.Google Scholar

55. See, for example, the partially declassified report of PROJECT VISTA, A Study of Ground and Air Tactical Warfare with Especial Reference to the Defense of Western Europe, 2 vols., 2 02 1952,Google Scholar Modern Military Branch, National Archives (MMB NA).

56. Not all of Lowi's programs were as prominent as the Marshall Plan. He also discusses the campaign for the United Nations, military aid to Greece and Turkey, the formation of NATO, and—in the context of the Eisenhower “New Look” policy—the production of tactical nuclear weapons. See Lowi, , “Making Democracy Safe for the World,” especially pp. 315–23.Google Scholar

57. speech, McMahon's quoted in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 7 (October 1951), pp. 297–99.Google Scholar

58. Gordon Dean, testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Second Supplementary Appropriations Bill for 1952, 27 09 1951,Google Scholar 82d Congress, 2d Sess., p. 3.

59. Memorandum for the President, 17 January 1952, President's Secretary's File, Folder: Atomic Energy—Expansion of the Atomic Energy Program, pp. 1–2, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

60. These deployments are discussed in Memorandum for the U.S. Representative to the Standing Group, North Atlantic Military Committee, “Aircraft Attrition Rates for SHAPE,” 28 March 1952, RG 218, JCS, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48), Section 132; and Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, “Military Requirements for Atomic Weapons,” 26 May 1952, RG 218, JCS, CCS 381 (2–8–43), Section 21, MMB NA.

61. For a related discussion of “consensus-building” and innovation, see Huntington, Samuel P., The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), chap. 5.Google Scholar

62. Dean, Gordon, Report on the Atom, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf. 1957), pp. 68–69.Google Scholar

63. This argument is developed in Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race, chap. 2.

64. Ibid.

65. The full documentation for the Soviet case is found in Evangelista. Innovation and the Arms Race, chap. 5.

66. Lavrinenkov, Vladimir, Bez voiny (Without war) (Kiev: Politizdat Ukrainy, 1982), pp. 66–71 and 141–42.Google Scholar

67. Ivanov, V., “Development of Soviet Operational Art,” Voennaia Mysl' (Military thought) 3 (03 1967), p. 11Google Scholar; and Kozlov, S., “The Development of Soviet Military Science after World War II,” Voennaia Mysl' 2 (02 1964), p. 33.Google Scholar Both articles are translations by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).

68. Gubarev, V., “Fizika—eto moia zhizn” (Physics is my life), interview with Iu. Khariton in Pravda, 20 02 1984Google Scholar; and Astashenkov, P. T., Podvig Akademika Kurchatova: Tvortsy nauki i tekhniki (The accomplishment of Academician Kurchatov: Creators of science and technology) (Moscow: Znanie, 1979), p. 104.Google Scholar

69. Karpov, Vladimir, Polkovodets (Commander) (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel, 1985), p. 522–24.Google Scholar The author was one of six officers from the General Staff who participated in the exercise.

70. Some systems had already been secretly deployed in Britain and with naval forces in the Mediterranean in the spring of 1952, but public attention was not drawn to these developments until the following year. See the discussion in Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race, chap. 4.

71. The statement was approved as national policy on 30 October 1953. JCS 2101/113, 9 December 1953, with decision, 10 December 1953, CCS 381 U.S. (1–31–50) Section 31, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Archives, quoted in Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill,” p. 31.

72. See the notes prepared by Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, 16 December 1953, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, vol. 5, Western European Security, Part I, pp. 476–79.Google Scholar

73. Evangelista, Matthew, “The Evolution of the Soviet Tactical Air Forces,” Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual 7 (1982–1983), pp. 451–79Google Scholar; Gareev, M. A., Takticheskie ucheniia i manevry (Tactical exercises and maneuvers) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977), pp. 171–72 and 189–90Google Scholar; and Lavrinenkov, , Bez voiny, p. 203.Google Scholar

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76. Transcript of Khrushchev's tape-recorded reminiscences, Harriman Institute Library, Columbia University, p. 403.

77. See, for example, Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet, printed in Pravda, 15 January 1960.

78. See Lowi's discussion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department in “Making Democracy Safe for the World.”

79. Holloway, David, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 148–49.Google Scholar

80. Pressure for strategic defenses had been building up “from the bottom” for many years before Ronald Reagan's speech of 23 March 1983. By March 1982, potential investors in military industries were being informed that “the ballistic missile defense (BMD) program is a major national priority,” whose funding had increased by 57 percent over the previous year and was scheduled to double in the next. See Investing in the Defense Industry: The Defense Budget, Research Report Defense Series no. 17, First Albany Corporation, Albany, N.Y., 03 1982, p. 10.Google Scholar For press accounts, see Halloran, Richard, “U.S. to Increase Military Funds for Space Uses,” The New York Times, 29 09 1982Google Scholar; and Boffey, Philip M., “Pressures Are Increasing for Arms Race in Space,” The New York Times, 18 October 1982,Google Scholar one of a three-part series of articles. The initiative for “Star Wars” came mainly from physicists and weapons designers associated with government laboratories—in this case, the Lawrence Livermore nuclear weapons laboratory in California. See Greb. “Science Advice to Presidents”; and Broad, Star Warriors.

81. For other studies that contrast U.S. and Soviet innovation in a similar fashion, see Holloway, David, “Innovation in the Defense Sector,” in Amann, Ronald and Cooper, Julian, eds., Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), chap. 7Google Scholar; Kaldor, Mary, “Military R?” International Social Science Journal 35 (02 1983), pp. 25–46Google Scholar; and Kaldor, Mary, The Baroque Arsenal (New York: Hill & Wang, 1981).Google Scholar

82. Evangelista, “Evolution of the Soviet Tactical Air Forces.”

83. Holloway, Soviet Union and the Arms Race, chap. 2.

84. Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race, chap. 6.

85. For a discussion of some of these cases, see Evangelista, , Innovation and the Arms Race, pp. 240–45.Google Scholar

86. Khrushchev's remarks were made in an interview with Arthur Sulzberger, originally published in The New York Times, 8 September 1961, and reprinted in Izvestiia, 9 September 1961, from which he is quoted here. See the discussion in Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race.

87. Tolubko, V., Nedelin: Pervyi glavkom strategicheskikh (Nedelin: First commander-in-chief of the strategic [rocket forces]) (Moscow: Molodaia Gvardiia, 1979), especially pp. 174–88.Google Scholar For an extensive discussion, see Holloway, David, “Military Technology,” in Amann, Ronald, Cooper, Julian, and Davies, R. W., eds., The Technological Level of Soviet Industry (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 407–89Google Scholar; and Holloway, “Innovation in the Defense Sector.”

88. Armacost, Michael H., The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969)Google Scholar; and Beard, Edmund, Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).Google Scholar

89. Zimmerman, , “Issue Area and Foreign-Policy Process,” p. 1212.Google Scholar

90. Most notably, the findings are consistent with those of Brzezinski and Huntington in Political Power: USA/USSR.

91. Zimmerman, , “Issue Area and Foreign-Policy Process,” p. 1211Google Scholar; and Potter, , “The Study of Soviet Decisionmaking,” pp. 298–305.Google Scholar

92. Krasner, , Defending the National Interest, p. 329.Google Scholar

93. Zimmerman, , “Issue Area and Foreign-Policy Process,” p. 1211.Google Scholar

94. For some evidence on this score, see Platias, Athanassios, “High Politics in Small Countries,” Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1986.Google Scholar

95. The conclusions of a number of comparative studies would seem compatible with such an analysis. See, for example, the contributions to Amann, Cooper, and Davies, The Technological Level of Soviet Industry; contributions to Amann and Cooper, Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union; Bentley, Raymond, Technological Change in the German Democratic Republic (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984),Google Scholar especially his concluding comparisons between East and West Germany on the one hand and the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union on the other, chap. 8; and Jonathan D. Pollack, The R D Process and Technological Innovation in the Chinese Industrial System, Rand Corporation Report R-3284, Santa Monica, Calif., May 1985.

96. These remarks are found in Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, p. 43, fn. 50.

97. Rosenau, “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy”.