1. This view of politics reflects the classical use of the term. See The Politics of Aristotle, ed. and trans, by Barker, Emest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), bk. 1, pp. 1–8Google Scholar; Arendt, Hannah, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969), pp. 40–56Google Scholar; Wolin, Sheldon, Politics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), pp. 1–28Google Scholar; Weber, Max, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Gerth, H. and Mills, C. W., eds., From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 77–129Google Scholar. It differs from the behaviorist view, which sees politics as being concerned purely with questions of power. See Dahl, Robert, Modern Political Analysis, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984), pp. 8–19Google Scholar.

2. See Komai, János, Economics of Shortage, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1980)Google Scholar.

3. The description of CMEA adjustment strategies is drawn from many sources, including Csaba, Lászlo, “Adjustment to the World Economy in Eastern Europe,” Acta Oeconomica 30, no. 1 (1983), pp. 53–75Google Scholar; Csaba, , “Some Problems of the International Socialist Monetary System,” Acta Oeconomica 23, nos. 1–2 (1979), pp. 17–37Google Scholar; Lavigne, Marie, “The Soviet Union inside Comecon,” Soviet Studies 35 (04 1983), pp. 135–53Google Scholar; Hanson, Philip, “Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe,” in Dawisha, Karen and Hanson, , eds., Soviet-East European Dilemmas (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981), pp. 90–108Google Scholar; Tyson, Laura D'Andrea and Neuberger, Egon, eds., The Impact of International Economic Disturbances on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon, 1980)Google Scholar; and Marrese, Michael and Vanous, Jan, Soviet Subsidization of Trade with Eastern Europe (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1983)Google Scholar.

4. See Csaba, , “Adjustment to the World Economy,” p. 61Google Scholar.

5. On Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, , see Csaba, Lászlo, Economic Mechanism in the GDR and in Czechoslovakia (Budapest: Hungarian Scientific Council for World Economy, 1983)Google Scholar; Zwass, Adam, “The Economies of Eastern Europe,” International Journal of Politics 13 (Winter 1983–1984), pp. 23–81Google Scholar; Hohmann, H., Kaser, Michael, and Thalheim, Karl, eds., The New Economic Systems of Eastern Europe (London: C. Hurst, 1983)Google Scholar.

6. See Djilas, Milovan, The New Class (New York: Praeger, 1958)Google Scholar; Castonadis, C., La Société bureaucratique (Paris, 1973)Google Scholar; Mallet, Serge, Bureaucracy and Technocracy in the Socialist Countries (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1974)Google Scholar; Bettelheim, Charles, The Transition to Socialist Economy (Sussex: Harvester, 1975)Google Scholar; Bahro, Rudolf, The Alternative in Eastern Europe (London: NLB, 1977)Google Scholar; Konrad, György and Szelényi, Iván, La marché au pouvoir des intellectuels (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979)Google Scholar. Critiques of these theories appear in Giddens, Anthony, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 238–54Google Scholar; Nove, Alec, “Is There a Ruling Class in the USSR?” Soviet Studies 27, no. 4 (1975), pp. 615–35Google Scholar; and Staniszkis, Jadwiga, “Martial Law in Poland,” Telos 16 (Winter 1982–1983), pp. 87–89Google Scholar.

7. See Clemens, Walker Jr, “The European Alliance Systems: Exploitation or Mutual Aid?” in Gati, Charles, ed., The International Politics of Eastern Europe(New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 217–37Google Scholar; Korbonski, Andrzej, “The Warsaw Treaty after Twenty-Five Years: An Entangling Alliance or an Empty Shell?” in Clawson, Robert and Kaplan, Lawrence, eds., The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1982), pp. 3–27Google Scholar; Farrell, R. Barry, “Top Political Leadership in Eastern Europe,” in Farrell, , ed., Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), pp. 88–108Google Scholar; Zimmerman, William, “The Energy Crisis, Western ‘Stagflation,’ and the Evolution of Soviet-East European Relations: An Initial Assessment,” in Neuberger, and Tyson, , eds., International Economic Disturbances, pp. 409–44Google Scholar. Zimmerman's earlier work gives far more play to the complementarity of interests and interpenetration of decision making in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in contrast. See his “Hierarchical Regional Systems and the Politics of System Boundaries,” International Organization 24 (Spring 1972), pp. 18–36Google Scholar.

8. The pathbreaking essay here is Skilling's, H. Gordon “Interest Groups and Communist Politics,” World Politics 18 (1966), pp. 435–61Google Scholar. See also Schwartz, Joel and Keech, William, “Group Influence on the Policy Process in the Soviet Union,” American Political Science Review 62 (09 1968), pp. 840–85Google Scholar; Kanet, Roger, “Political Groupings and Their Role in the Process of Change in Eastern Europe,” in Gyorgy, Andrew and Kuhlmann, James, eds., Innovation in Communist Societies (Boulder: Westview, 1978), pp. 41–58Google Scholar. This type of theorizing has been revived in theories positing a “social compact” between state and society in Eastern Europe. See Pravda, Alex, “East-West Interdependence and the Social Compact in Eastern Europe,” in Bornstein, M., Gitelman, Z., and Zimmerman, W., eds., East- West Relations and the Future of Eastern Europe (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 162–91Google Scholar. The best critique of this view is by Janos, Andrew, “Group Politics in Communist Society: A Second Look at the Pluralist Model,” in Huntington, S. and Moore, C., eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of One-Party Systems (New York: Basic, 1970)Google Scholar.

9. See Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970)Google ScholarPubMed.

10. See Valenta, Jiri, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968: Anatomy of a Decision (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; Rigby, T. H., “Politics in the Mono-organizational Society,” in Janos, Andrew, ed., Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1976), pp. 31–81Google Scholar; Laky, Teréz, “Enterprises in Bargaining Position,” Ada Oeconomica 22, nos. 3–4 (1979), pp. 227–46Google Scholar; Laky, , “The Hidden Mechanisms of Recentralization in Hungary,” Acta Oeconomica 24, nos. 1–2 (1980), pp. 95–109Google Scholar. Dawisha, Karen provides strong criticism of the approach in “The Limits of the Bureaucratic Politics Model: Observations on the Soviet Case,” Studies in Comparative Communism 13 (Winter 1980), pp. 300–327Google Scholar.

11. James March and Herbert Simon make this distinction: “Politics is a process in which the situation is the same as in bargaining—there is intergroup conflict of interest—but the arena of bargaining is not taken as fixed by participants.” See March, and Simon, , Organizations (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1958), p. 130Google Scholar.

12. See Katzenstein, Peter, “Introduction: Domestic and International Forces and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy,” and Katzenstein, , “Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Policy,” International Organization 31 (Autumn 1977), pp. 587–607; 879–920CrossRefGoogle Scholar. What Katzenstein referred to as “society” in those essays on the OECD states I call “economy” here, partly because it simplifies the language of the analysis and partly because even in his essays, “society” is more or less a stand-in term for the economy.

13. See Kornai, , Shortages, vol. 1Google Scholar.

14. See Rice, Condolezza, “Defense Burden Sharing,” in Holloway, David and Sharp, Jane, eds., The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition? (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 59–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15. See Comisso, Ellen, “Soviet-East European Relations: Unconventional Gains from Trade or a Positive-Sum Power Game?” (Paper presented to the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 6 12 1984)Google Scholar.

16. For example, the former Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow reports a 1957 meeting: “After the Polish ambassador arrived… Khrushchev became much more reserved. He no longer mentioned political problems. He didn't criticize the Poles, even once, a sure sign of coldness and distance in their relation.” Mićunović, Veljko, Journées de moscou, 1956–1958 (Paris: Laffont, 1977), p. 234Google Scholar (my translation). More recently, neither Czechoslovakia nor Hungary has responded to Soviet requests to increase defense expenditures. See Rice, , “Defense,” pp. 61–64Google Scholar.

17. See Brown, Kent, “Coalition Politics and Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe,” in Triska, Jan and Cocks, Paul, eds., Political Development in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 241–56Google Scholar; Weit, Erwin, At the Red Summit (New York: Macmillan, 1970)Google Scholar.

18. Certainly, a Leninist party is not an element of “structure” the way the state and economy are. Whereas any individual residing in a territory is “necessarily” a part of the state insofar as she or he is a citizen, and anyone residing in the territory “necessarily” participates in the economy (even if only to consume goods), the party is a voluntary association and has no direct authority over anyone who is not a party member. Nevertheless, insofar as neither the state nor the economy could operate without the party, it should stand as an element of structure in its own right.

19. The best work on the role of the party as a “check” on the implementation of policy by the state administration remains Hough's, Jerry F.The Soviet Prefects (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966)Google Scholar.

20. March, and Simon, , Organizations, p. 130Google Scholar.

21. My notion of “political process” and its relationship to “state structure” is closely akin to Pierre Bourdieu's concept of “habitus” and its relationship to the “structure” of social life. See his Outline of a Theory of Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 78Google Scholar.

22. Aristotle, , Politics, bk. 3, p. 144Google Scholar.

23. Ibid., bk. 5, p. 244.

24. The rather short lives slogans enjoy is but one indicator. A good picture of the varied tasks Czech leaders faced after 1948 appears in Mnacko, Ladislav, A Taste of Power (New York: Praeger, 1966)Google Scholar.

25. For the distinction between “teleological” and “genetic” planning, see Nove, Alec, An Economic History of the USSR (New York: Penguin, 1980)Google Scholar.

26. Aristotle, , Politics, bk. 3, p. 138Google Scholar.

27. Aristotle lists them as “the ‘lopping off of outstanding men…, the adoption of every means for making every subject as much of a stranger as is possible to every other…, [requiring] every resident… to be constantly appearing in public…, endeavoring to get regular information about every man's saying and doings…, impoverishing [the] subjects…,” and so forth. Politics, bk. 5, p. 244.

28. Ibid., p. 247.

29. See Linden's essay in this volume. In addition, see Jowitt, Kenneth, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971)Google Scholar; Jowitt, , “Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes,” in Triska, and Cocks, , Political Development, pp. 119–47Google Scholar; Gilbert, Trond, “The Communist Party of Romania,” in Fischer-Galati, Stephen, ed., The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 281–327Google Scholar.

30. Aristotle, , Politics, bk. 5, pp. 235, 245Google Scholar.

31. Ibid. p. 249.

32. Ibid.

33. For example, Kádár's first moves in Hungary in 1956 were designed not to build up a personal following but to rebuild the party organization, a process that entailed including many cadres who were less than enthusiastic about his leadership. For them, however, accepting Radar's leadership represented their only hope of reentering political life, while for Kádár, the reestablishment of party rule was the only condition under which he himself could affect the course of development in Hungary. See the essay by Ellen Comisso and Paul Marer in this volume.

34. “Powercorresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power… belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together… Authoritycan be vested in persons… or… in offices… Its hallmark is unquestioning recognition by those asked to obey; neither coercion nor persuasion is needed. To remain in authority requires respect for the person in office.” Arendt, , On Violence, pp. 44–45Google Scholar. To use Rosabeth Kantor's formulation, “Power is the ability to get things done… to get and use whatever it is that a person needs for the goals he or she is attempting to meet… and thus it means having access to what is needed for the doing.” Kantor, , Men and Women in the Corporation (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 166Google Scholar. Authority, in contrast, is “the established right… to determine policies, to pronounce judgments on relative issues, and to settle controversies.” Maclver, Robert, The Web of Government (New York: Macmillan, 1963)Google Scholar. Authority thus needs to be backed by power to be effective, whereas power must be exercised through authorized agents to command automatic obedience. Hence the possibility for checks and balances if the agents exercising each are separate and distinct.

35. “Performance” and “merit” thus reflect political considerations. Hence an enterprise director whose firm produces goods at a loss may be far more “meritous” than one whose firm runs a profit, if, say, the former is satisfying a supply constraint for items to which political leaders accord national economic importance.

Readers unfamiliar with Eastern Europe should bear in mind that a position allowing one to be a member of a party committee need not be a party position itself. The mayor of a town, for example, will normally be a member of the town party committee, but he or she is a fulltime state office-holder.

36. Csikos-Nagy was head of the Materials and Price Commission.

37. Burke's views on representation are scattered through his writings and parliamentary speeches. See Stanlis, Peter J., ed., Selected Writings and Speeches (Chicago: Gateway, 1964)Google Scholar; Burke, Edmund, Reflection on the Revolution in France (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955)Google Scholar; Hoffman, Ross and Levack, Paul, eds., Burke's Politics (New York: Knopf, 1949)Google Scholar. See also Pitkin, Hanna, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967)Google Scholar.

38. As Burke told the electors of Bristol, “Your representative owes you, not his industry but his judgment; and he betrays you, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.” Cited by Stanlis, , Writings, p. 187Google Scholar.

39. Ibid., p. 22.

40. See below, p. 230. Burke presents a highly idealized picture of 18-century British politics. In fact, according to Sir Lewis Namier, even in secure pocket boroughs or where the Crown covered a candidate's campaign expenses, “power was used… to satisfy local or even personal needs.” See Namier's, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1929), p. 163Google Scholar The same is true in the real world of collegial socialism and for the same reasons: “At all times a system of spoils and benefits necessarily obtains in governing representative bodies where sharp contrasts of ideas and interests or strong party organizations do not pre-determine the vote of the individual Member, and do not reduce him to a mere pawn in the Parliamentary game. If personal disinterestedness is expected from independent members, they have at least to secure benefits and advantages for their constituents; and where the constituents are too numerous to be benefitted individually, it becomes a question of a commercial treaty, a tariff or a bounty favouring some local industry or public works in the district, etc.” Ibid., p. 22. As we shall see below for the socialist analogue to the politics of notables, Burke and Namier do not present mutually exclusive descriptions of a single reality but rather two sides of the same coin.

41. “I reverentially look up to the opinion of the people, and with an awe that is almost superstitious. I should be ashamed to show my face before them, if I changed my ground as they cried up or cried down men or things or opinion.” In Stanlis, , Writings, p. 322Google Scholar.

42. Hence power to control the agenda is a strategic political resource of considerable value, as is access to information. Interestingly, Namier also draws attention to the “remarkable level” on which naval debates were conducted in the House of Commons thanks to the heavy population of admirals among its members. See Structure of Politics, p. 41.

43. Ibid., p. 11.

44. See Baylis's essay in this volume.

45. Montesquieu, , The Spirit of the Laws, trans, by Nugent, Thomas (New York: Hafner, 1966), p. 49Google Scholar.

46. On the techniques of legislative leaders in assemblies with weak party discipline, see Shepsle, Kenneth and Humes, Brian, “Legislative Leadership: Organizational Entrepreneurs as Agents” (Paper presented at the Conference on Adaptive Institutions, Stanford University, 8–9 11 1984)Google Scholar; and Fiorina, Morris, Representatives, Roll Calls and Constituencies (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974)Google Scholar.

47. See Kazimierz Poznański's article in this volume. See also Dziewanowski, M. K., The Communist Party of Poland, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976)Google Scholar; Staniszkis, Jadwiga, Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983)Google Scholar; Woodall, Jean, ed., Policy and Politics in Contemporary Poland (London: Frances Pinter, 1982)Google Scholar ; Korbonski, Andrzej, “Leadership Succession and Political Change in Eastern Europe,” Studies in Comparative Communism 9 (Spring 1976), pp. 3–23Google Scholar; and Ascherson, Neal, The Polish August (New York: Penguin, 1981)Google Scholar.

48. “The absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group action” led to a situation in which “each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities. The wealthy bribe; the students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup.” Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 196Google Scholar. The parallels between the Polish crisis and the economic background to military takeovers in Latin America are striking. See O'Donnell, Guillermo, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979)Google Scholar.

49. As Katzenstein found in the OECD cases. See Katzenstein, , “Conclusion,” p. 920Google Scholar .