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Introduction: Legalization and World Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 July 2003

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Extract

In many issue-areas, the world is witnessing a move to law. As the century turned, governments and individuals faced the following international legal actions. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that Britain's ban on homosexuals in the armed forces violates the right to privacy, contravening Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia indicted Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic during a NATO bombing campaign to force Yugoslav forces out of Kosovo. Milosevic remains in place in Belgrade, but Austrian police, bearing a secret indictment from the International Criminal Tribunal, arrested a Bosnian Serb general who was attending a conference in Vienna. In economic affairs the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body found in favor of the United States and against the European Union (EU) regarding European discrimination against certain Latin American banana exporters. A U.S. district court upheld the constitutionality of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) against claims that its dispute-resolution provisions violated U. S. sovereignty. In a notable environmental judgment, the new Law of the Sea Tribunal ordered the Japanese to cease all fishing for southern bluefin tuna for the rest of the year.

Type
Legalization and World Politics: An Introduction
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2000

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References

1. See Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. The United Kingdom, App. Nos. 31417/96 and 32377/96 (27 Sept. 1999); Smith and Grady v. The United Kingdom, App. Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (27 Sept. 1999) (available at <http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Judgments.htm>).

2. See Cohen, Roger, Warrants Served for Serbs' Leader and 4 Assistants, New York Times, 28 May 1999, A1Google Scholar; and Bonner, Raymond, Despite Indictment, Politicians and Diplomats Control Milosevic's Future, New York Times, 28 May 1999, A13Google Scholar.

3. See Simons, Marlise, Top Bosnian Officer Arrested for U.N. Tribunal, New York Times, 26 August 1999, A10Google Scholar.

4. See European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, Decision by the Arbitrators, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/ARB (9 Apr. 1999) (available at <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>).

5. See Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (n.d. Ala. 1999)Google Scholar.

6. See Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan) (order of 27 August 1999)Google Scholar (Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea) (available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/Ordertuna34.htm>).

7. Victor 1998.

8. See Henkin 1979; Schacter 1991; and Claude 1966.

9. See Stein 1981; Weiler 1991; and Burley and Mattli 1993.

10. See Garrett and Weingast 1993; Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz 1998; Slaughter, Stone Sweet, and Weiler 1998; and Alter 1998a, b.

11. See Weiler 1999; and Stone Sweet 1998.

12. See Jackson 1998; and Petersmann 1991.

13. See Hudec 1992; and Stone Sweet 1999 and 2000.

14. See Trimble 1985; Jackson, Louis, and Matsushita 1984; and Jackson and Davey 1986.

15. Hudec 1992 and 1999.

16. See Lillich and Brower 1994; and Stone Sweet 1999.

17. Romano 1999.

18. Ibid.

19. See Bassiouni 1999; Morris and Scharf 1995 and 1998; and Ratner and Abrams 1997.

20. See Romano 1999; and Charney 1999.

21. See Helfer and Slaughter 1997; Romano 1999; Pan 1999; Noyes 1998; Knox 1999; and Helfer 1998.

22. Mekouar 1998.

23. Teubner 1987.

24. Janow 1996/1997.

25. Morales 1997.

26. Goldstein 1996.

27. Winham 1998.

28. Fix-Fierro and Lopes-Ayllon 1997.

29. Raustiala 1996.

30. Carr 1939.

31. Kennan 1984.

32. Charles Lipson's research on informal agreements is a partial exception, emphasizing that informal agreements can promote cooperation and seeking to explain how decentralized systems of incentives can help to make agreements effective without a formal legal system. Lipson 1991.

33. See Slaughter 1995a; and Mattli and Slaughter 1998b.

34. Finnemore 1996, 139–43.

35. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998.

36. Franck 1990.

37. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998.

38. Simmons 1998, 78.

39. Bilder 1981.

40. Fearon 1998.

41. Keohane and Martin 1999.

42. Koh 1998.