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International Organizations as Policy Advisors

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2012

Songying Fang  and
Randall W. Stone
Songying Fang
Affiliation:
Rice University, Houston, Texas. E-mail: [email protected]
Randall W. Stone
Affiliation:
University of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

How can international organizations persuade governments to adopt policy recommendations that are based on private information when their interests conflict? We develop a game-theoretic model of persuasion that applies regardless of regime type and does not rely on the existence of domestic constituency constraints. In the model, an international organization (IO) and a domestic expert have private information about a crisis, but their preferences diverge from those of the government, which must choose whether to delegate decision making to the expert. Persuasion can take place if the international institution is able to send a credible signal. We find that this can take place only if the preferences of the IO and the domestic expert diverge and the institution holds the more moderate policy position. This result contrasts with conventional wisdom, which holds that the necessary condition for IOs to exert influence is support from a domestic constituency with aligned preferences. Our model suggests that, far from being an obstacle to international cooperation, polarized domestic politics may be a necessary condition for IOs to exert effective influence.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 66 , Issue 4 , October 2012 , pp. 537 - 569
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2012

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