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International Negotiations and Domestic Politics: The Case of IMF Labor Market Conditionality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2012

Teri L. Caraway ,
Stephanie J. Rickard  and
Mark S. Anner
Teri L. Caraway
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. E-mail: [email protected]
Stephanie J. Rickard
Affiliation:
Government Department, London School of Economics. E-mail: [email protected]
Mark S. Anner
Affiliation:
Pennsylvania State University, University Park. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

What is the role of international organizations (IOs) in the formulation of domestic policy, and how much influence do citizens have in countries' negotiations with IOs? We examine these questions through a study of labor-related conditionality in International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans. Using new data from IMF loan documents for programs from 1980 to 2000, we test to see if citizens' economic interests influence IMF conditionality. We examine the substance of loan conditions and identify those that require liberalization in the country's domestic labor market or that have direct effects on employment, wages, and social benefits. We find evidence that democratic countries with stronger domestic labor receive less intrusive labor-related conditions in their IMF loan programs. We argue that governments concerned about workers' opposition to labor-related loan conditions negotiate with the IMF to minimize labor conditionality. We find that the IMF is responsive to domestic politics and citizens' interests.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 66 , Issue 1 , January 2012 , pp. 27 - 61
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2012

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