¹ Europe's Would–Be Polity, p. v.

² First published in a special issue of International Organization, Autumn 1970 (Vol. XXIV, No. 4), under the same title.Google Scholar

³ Nye, J. S., “Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo–Functionalist Model,” in Regional Integration, pp. 192–231.Google Scholar

⁴ Donald J. Puchala, “International Transactions and Regional Integration,” in ibid., pp. 128–159.

⁵ Philippe C. Schmitter, “A Revised Theory of Regional Integration,” in ibid., pp. 232–264.

⁶ Schmitter, , “A Revised Theory,” pp. 232–33.Google Scholar

⁷ Puchala, , “International Transactions,” p. 129.Google Scholar

⁸ ibid., p. 149.

⁹ ibid., p. 150.

¹⁰ Hayward R. Alker, Jr., “Integration Logics: A Review, Extension, and Critique,” in ibid., pp. 272–73.

¹¹ Fisher, William E., “An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration,” International Organization, Spring 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 2), pp. 259–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² Puchala, , “International Transactions,” pp. 150–58.Google Scholar

¹³ Inglehart, Ronald, “Public Opinion and Regional Integration,” Regional Integration, pp. 160–91.Google Scholar

¹⁴ ibid., p. 160.

¹⁵ ibid., p. 191.

¹⁶ As Fisher noted in his article cited above, “Recent research …illustrates the problems involved in providing explanations of even the most simple of linkage situations: the case in which mass opinion is related to elite behavior through the two intervening variables of elite perceptions of mass opinion and elite attitudes. In order to fully describe this type of linkage situation we must specify the variables involved—the substantive issue or problem, the relevant elite, the specific elite behavior, the distribution of mass opinion, and the elites’ attitudes; we must state the logically distinct model of opinion transmission; and finally we must test the separate models by various statistical techniques to determine which model best fits the observed system of variable relationships.” Fisher, , “An Analysis of the Deutsch Paradigm,” p. 288.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Haas, Ernst and Schmitter, Philippe, “Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America,” International Organization, Autumn 1964 (Vol. 18, No. 4),CrossRefGoogle Scholar revised and reprinted in International Political Communities, pp. 259–99. The nine variables consisted of background variables (size of member–units, rates of interunit transactions, extent of social pluralism within the units, and elite complementarity); variables at the moment of economic union (degree of shared government purposes, and powers delegated to the union); and process variables (decision–making style, post–integration rates of transactions, and the adaptability of governments in situations of disappointment and crisis).

¹⁸ ibid., p. 274.

¹⁹ See for example Haas, , “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing,” Regional Integration, p. 11,Google Scholar and Nye, ibid., p. 200.

²⁰ Krause, Lawrence B., European Economic Integration and the United States, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 24.Google Scholar

²¹ As Krause wrote of the European Community, “Governments do not need to be told, for instance, that excessive inflation in an open economy quickly leads to difficulties for themselves and their trading partners. They can see for themselves the rapidly deteriorating balance of payments, and pressures immediately arise for corrective actions. A ‘hidden hand’ toward policy coordination is directed by the market mechanism and it has proven to be very effective with the EEC.” ibid., p. 24.

²¹ For a more detailed examination of some issues raised in this paragraph see Hansen, Roger D., “Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts,” World Politics, 01 1969 (Vol. 21, No. 2), pp. 253 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Europe's Would–Be Polity, pp. 282–83.

²⁴ ibid., p. 243.

²⁵ ibid., p. 243.

²⁶ Haas, , “The Study of Regional Integration,” p. 4.Google Scholar

²⁷ Nye, , “Comparing Common Markets,” p. 198.Google Scholar

²⁸ Kaiser, Karl, “The U.S. and the EEC in the Atlantic System: The Problem of Theory,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 06 1967 (Vol. 5), p. 401–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁹ Europe's Would–Be Polity, p. 81.

³⁰ ibid., p. 81.

³¹ Nye, , “Comparing Common Markets,” p. 197.Google Scholar

³² The two refinements in theory are closely related. If spillover were more compelling, there would be less room for divergent actor–strategies. Conversely, if all actors were economic–incrementalists, then much more might have been made of what Nye has called “cultivated spillover.” See Nye, ibid., p. 200.

³³ On actor strategies the following remarks by Schmitter are of interest: “Typologizing crudely, the following seem to be the strategic options open to a given actor in a given context: 1) spillover, i.e., to increase both the scope and level of his commitment concomitantly; 2) spill–around, i.e., to increase only the scope while holding the level of authority constant or within the zone of indifference; 3) buildup, i.e., to agree to increase the decisional autonomy or capacity of joint institutions but deny them entrance into new issue areas; 4) retrench, i.e., to increase the level of joint deliberation but withdraw the institutions from certain areas; 5) muddle–about, i.e., to let the regional bureaucrats debate, suggest, and expostulate on a wider variety of issues but decrease their actual capacity to allocate values; 6) spill–back, i.e., to retreat on both dimensions, possibly returning to the status quo ante initiation; 7) encapsulate, i.e., to respond to crisis by marginal modifications within the zone of indifference.” Schmitter, ibid., p. 242.

³⁴ Nye, ibid., p. 198. Nye's expanded list of “process forces” now includes functional linkage of tasks, rising transactions, deliberate linkage and coalition formation, elite socialization, regional group formation, ideological–identitive appeal, and involvement of external actors.

³⁵ Nye, ibid., p. 225, emphasis added.

³⁶ ibid., p. 225.

³⁷ Schmitter, ibid., especially pages 242–43.

³⁸ Europe's Would–Be polity, pp. 305–6.

³⁹ ibid., p. 280.

⁴⁰ See ibid., chapter 4, passim.

⁴¹ ibid., p. 132.

⁴² ibid., p. 285.

⁴³ ibid., p. 98. See also Nye, , “Comparing Common Markets,” p. 222.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Hoffmann, Stanley, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus, Summer 1966 (VC, No. 3), p. 865.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See Haas, , “The Study of Regional Integration,” pp. 17, 25.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See particularly chapters 6 and 9 of Europe's Would–Be Polity. The point is also made in Schmitter's essay in Regional Integration.

⁴⁷ Europe's Would–Be Polity, p. 191.

⁴⁸ ibid., p. 197.

⁴⁹ “As the artichoke's heart gets more and more denuded, the governments’ vigilance gets more and more alerted.” Hoffmann, , “Fate of the Nation State,” p. 880.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Europe's Would–Be Polity, chapter 2.

⁵¹ ibid., p. 257.

⁵² Inglehart, , “Public Opinion and Regional Integration,” pp. 169–179.Google Scholar The quoted material appears on p. 179.

⁵³ Bulletin of the European Communities, 11 1970 (Vol. 3, No. 11), p. 10.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Europe's Would–Be Polity, p. 105.

⁵⁵ See, for example, Europe's Would–Be Polity, pp. 284, 303; and Nye, , “Comparing Common Markets,” p. 225.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Schmitter, , “Three Neo–Functional Hypotheses About International Integration,” International Organization, Winter, 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 1) p. 165.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁷ “Overture for Europe: A Survey,” p. 10. A supplement to The Economist, Jan. 1–7, 1972.

⁵⁸ Schmitter, , “Three Hypotheses,” p. 165.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ For a summary review of several of these trends see U.S. Foreign Economic Policy for the 1970's: A New Approach to New Realities (Washington: National Planning Association, 1971),Google Scholar and Bergsten, C. Fred, “Crisis in U.S. Trade Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 07 1971 (Vol. 49, No. 4).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁰ Cooper, Richard, “Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies,” World Politics, 01 1972 (Vol. 24, No. 2), pp. 159–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶¹ Tucker, Robert W.. A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise’? (New York: Universe Books, 1972).Google Scholar A Reuters dispatch of August 31, 1972, quoted a “senior government source” as saying that the Republican administration had carried out a survey which showed that “we can withstand a trade war better than any country in the world."

⁶² For the most thoughtful analysis of the growth of interdependence see Young, Oran R., “Interdependencies in World Politics,” International Journal, Autumn, 1969 (Vol. 24, No. 4), pp. 726–750.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Cooper, “Economic Interdependence,” and Morse, Edward L., “The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence, and Externalization.” World Politics, 04 1970 (Vol. 22, No. 3), pp. 371–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶³ Young, , “Interdependence in World Politics,” p. 747.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ For a discussion of some of the asymmetries involved see Tucker, , A New Isolationism, and The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), particularly chapter 3.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ A mixed example of domestic political developments and presidential priorities affecting present levels of involvement might emerge as a budgetary constraint on military spending, i.e. the Sprouts’ “dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources.” US defense spending measured as a percentage of GNP has fallen significantly over the past several years. However, when a United States Secretary of Defense can score election year points by criticizing an opponent for his plan to cut a defense budget by 330 billion, the dilemma does not appear to be immediately at hand.