Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-m6dg7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-20T04:28:37.720Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 April 2011

Dustin H. Tingley  and
Barbara F. Walter
Dustin H. Tingley
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Boston. E-mail: [email protected]
Barbara F. Walter
Affiliation:
Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego. E-mail: [email protected]
Get access

Abstract

What effect does repeated play have on reputation building? The literature on international relations remains divided on whether, when, and how reputation matters in both interstate and intrastate conflict. We examine reputation building through a series of incentivized laboratory experiments. Using comparative statics from a repeated entry-deterrence game, we isolate how incentives for reputation building should change as the number of entrants changes. We find that subjects in our experiments generally build reputations and that those investments pay off, but we also find that some subjects did not react to incentives to build reputation in ways our model had predicted. In order to explain this, we focus on the heterogeneity of preferences and cognitive abilities that may exist in any population. Our research suggests that rational-choice scholars of international relations and those using more psychologically based explanations have more common ground than previously articulated.

Type
Research Note
Information
International Organization , Volume 65 , Issue 2 , April 2011 , pp. 343 - 365
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Andreoni, James, and Miller, John H.. 1993. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence. Economic Journal 103 (418):570–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bolton, Gary E., and Ockenfels, Axel. 2007. Information Externalities, Matching and Reputation Building—A Comment on Theory and an Experiment. Working Paper Series in Economics, 17. Cologne, Germany: University of Cologne. Available at ⟨http://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/download/papers/bolton_ockenfels_information_externalities.pdf⟩. Accessed 4 January 2011.Google Scholar
Brandts, Jordi, and Charness, Gary. 2000. Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games. Experimental Economics 2 (3):227–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brandts, Jordi, and Figueras, Neus. 2003. An Exploration of Reputation Formation in Experimental Games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 50 (1):89–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brosig, Jeannette, Weimann, Joachim, and Yang, Chun-Lei. 2003. The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment. Experimental Economics 6 (1):75–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and McDermott, Rose. 2004. Crossing No Man's Land: Cooperation from the Trenches. Political Psychology 25 (2):271–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, Colin, Ho, Teck-Hua, and Chong, Juin-Kuan. 2004. A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (3):861–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, Colin, and Weigelt, Keith. 1988. Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model. Econometrica 56 (1):1–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, Russell, DeJong, Douglas V., Forsythe, Robert, and Ross, Thomas W.. 1996. Cooperation Without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games. Games and Economic Behavior 12 (2):187–218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, James C., and Oaxaca, Ronald L.. 1995. Inducing Risk-Neutral Preferences: Further Analysis of the Data. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 11 (1):65–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davis, Douglas D., and Holt, Charles A.. 1993. Experimental Economics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, Ernst, and Schmidt, Klaus M.. 1999. A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (3):817–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grosskopf, Brit, and Sarin, Rajiv. Forthcoming. Is Reputation Good or Bad? An Experiment. American Economic Review.Google Scholar
Jung, Yun Joo, Kagel, John H., and Levin, Dan. 1994. On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain-Store Game. RAND Journal of Economics 25 (1):72–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kinder, Donald R., and Palfrey, Thomas R.. 1993. Experimental Foundations of Political Science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kreps, David M., Milgrom, Paul, Roberts, John, and Wilson, Robert. 1982. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 27 (2):245–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDermott, Rose. 2002. Experimental Methodology in Political Science. Political Analysis 10 (4):325–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKelvey, Richard D., McLennan, Andrew M., and Turocy, Theodore L.. 2007. Gambit: Software Tools for Game Theory, Version 0.2007.01.30. Available at ⟨http://www.gambit-project.org⟩. Accessed 4 January 2011.Google Scholar
McKelvey, Richard D., and Palfrey, Thomas R.. 1995. Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games. Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1):6–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mercer, Jonathan. 1996. Reputation and International Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Mercer, Jonathan. 2005. Rationality and Psychology in International Politics. International Organization 59 (1):77–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Milgrom, Paul, and Roberts, John. 1982. Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence. Journal of Economic Theory 27 (2):280–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neral, John, and Ochs, Jack. 1992. The Sequential Equilibrium Theory of Reputation Building: A Further Test. Econometrica 60 (5):151–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oxoby, Robert J., and McLeish, Kendra N.. 2004. Sequential Decision and Strategy Vector Methods in Ultimatum Bargaining: Evidence on the Strength of Other-Regarding Behavior. Economics Letters 84 (3):399–405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Press, Daryl G. 2005. Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Rabin, Matthew. 2000. Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem. Econometrica 68 (5):1281–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reny, Philip J. 1992. Rationality in Extensive-Form Games. Journal of Economic Perspectives 6 (4):103–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sartori, Anne E. 2005. Deterrence by Diplomacy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Schotter, Andrew. 2006. Strong and Wrong: The Use of Rational Choice Theory in Experimental Economics. Journal of Theoretical Politics 18 (4):498–511.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Snyder, Glenn. H., and Diesing, Paul. 1977. Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Tingley, Dustin. Forthcoming. The Dark Side of the Future: An Experimental Test of Commitment Problems in Bargaining. International Studies Quarterly.Google Scholar
Tomz, Michael. 2007. Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Walter, Barbara F. 2009. Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar