Greatly indebted to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for research support that enabled him to spend several months in black Southern Africa in 1982.

1. Botha, P. W., Towards a Constellation of States in Southern Africa, speech of 22 11 1979 (Pretoria: South Africa Information Services, 1980)Google Scholar; Geldenhuys, Deon and Venter, Denis, “Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: A Constellation of States,” International Affairs Bulletin 3 (12 1979), pp. 36–72Google Scholar; Thomas, Wolfgang H., “A South African ‘Constellation of States’: Challenge or Myth?” South Africa International 10 (01 1980), pp. 113–28Google Scholar; Breytenbach, Willie, ed., The Constellation of States: A Consideration (Johannesburg: Southern African Forum, 1980)Google Scholar; “[Briefing:] The Constellation of Southern African States: A New Strategic Offensive by South Africa,” Review of African Political Economy no. 18 (05–08 1980), pp. 102–5Google Scholar.

2. Libby, Ronald T., “The Frontline States of Africa: A Small Power Entente,” mimeo (University of Zambia, 18 05 1977)Google Scholar; The Front-Line States: The Burden of the Liberation Struggle (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1978)Google Scholar; Anglin, Douglas G., “The Frontline States and the Future of Southern Africa,” in Dowdy, Lee and Trood, Russell, eds., The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Area (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

3. Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation. A Declaration by the Governments of Independent States of Southern Africa Made at Lusaka on the 1st April 1980 (London: SADCC, 1980)Google Scholar. See also Tostensen, Arne, Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), Scandinavian Institute of African Studies Research Report no. 62 (Uppsala, 1982)Google Scholar.

4. Treaty for the Establishment of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (UN Economic Commission for Africa, 1982)Google Scholar, hereafter cited as PTA Treaty.

5. Geldenhuys, Deon, The Constellation of Southern African States and the Southern African Development Coordination Council [sic]: Towards a New Regional Stalemate? (Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1981)Google Scholar.

6. ECA Subregional Meeting on Economic Cooperation in East Africa, Lusaka, 26 October–6 November 1965, UN doc. E/CN.14/LU/ECOP/RES/l and Annex. Ten states ratified the terms of association: 3 in Central Africa (Malawi, Zambia, Zaire), 6 in East Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania–but not Uganda), and Madagascar. Two subsequent meetings were held: First Interim Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa, 2–5 May 1966; Meeting of Interim Committee, Addis Ababa, 30 October–7 November 1967 (Africa Research Bulletin: EFT, 1967, p. 853).

7. Ballance, Frank C., Zambia and the East African Community, Eastern African Studies I (Syracuse, N.Y.: Program of Eastern African Studies, Syracuse University, 1971), p. 1Google Scholar.

8. In 1974, in anticipation of this, the newly-established Lusaka-based UN Development Advisory Team (UNDAT)–later renamed MULPOC– prepared a study for submission to its ministerial meeting in Mbabane (February 1975). That meeting commissioned a more substantial study. The UNDAT initiative also responded to the UN General Assembly's adoption in May 1974 of a Declaration and a Programme of Action for a New International Economic Order.

9. On the tortuous course of negotiations, see Adedeji, Adebayo, “Foreword,” Second Revised Proposed Treaty for the Establishment of a Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States, UN doc. ECA/MULPOC/Lusaka/PTA/X, pp. 1–22Google Scholar.

10. SADCC Blantyre 1981 (Blantyre: SADCC, 1982), p. 15Google Scholar.

11. David Anderson, EEC delegate in Maseru, was first to propose the idea (in 1977). Among those he contacted were Dominic Mulaisho (Zambia), Amon J. Nsekela (Tanzania), Iddi Simba (Tanzania), and John Scott and Maurice Foley (EEC).

12. Green, Reginald Herbold, “Southern African Development Coordination: Toward a Functioning Dynamic?” Bulletin (Institute of Development Studies, Sussex) 11 (1980) p. 54Google Scholar.

13. FLS foreign ministers met in Gaborone (May 1979), economic ministers in Arusha (in July), and heads of state in Dar es Salaam (in November). For the background papers submitted to the Arusha Conference, see Nsekela, Amon J., ed., Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation (London: Rex Collings, 1981)Google Scholar.

14. SADCC, Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, 1 04 1980Google Scholar. This was a slightly revised version of the Arusha Declaration, 4 July 1979 (Africa Contemporary Record, 1979–80, pp. C117–20).

15. “[Briefing:] Malawi and SADCC,” Review of African Political Economy no. 22 (10–12 1981), pp. 82–85Google Scholar. Banda did not attend the inaugural summit in Lusaka in April 1980 but turned up in Harare in July 1981. Although host at SADCC 3 in Blantyre in November 1981, he failed to attend because of “prior engagements” (SADCC Blantyre 1981, p. 32). He was, however, present to greet the South African minister of agriculture and fisheries, who visited Malawi less than a month later.

16. Zairean membership was considered at Maputo (November 1980), Harare (July 1981), Blantyre (November 1981), Luanda (June 1982), Gaborone (July 1982), and Maseru (January 1983). A Zairean ministerial delegation attended SADCC 2 in Maputo in November 1980 as observers (Kgarebe, Aloyssius, ed., SADCC 2–Maputo [London: SADCC Liaison Committee, 1981], p. 264)Google Scholar. There has been speculation that Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda might also be interested in membership but this seems premature and, in any case, would encounter resistance; see African Business (London) 41 (01 1982), pp. 14–15Google Scholar; Africa Contemporary Record, 1979–80, p. A41; Nsekela, , Southern Africa, p. 20Google Scholar.

17. Record of the Southern African Development Coordination Summit Conference, Held in the Republic of Zimbabwe on the 20th July 1981, p. 41.

18. Africa Research Bulletin: PSC, 1980, p. 5768; Times of Zambia, 16 August 1980, p. 1; New African (London) 158 (11 1980), p. 32Google Scholar; Africa Now (London) 14 (06 1982), p. 38Google Scholar. Reports that on the eve of the SADCC Summit in Gaborone, where its application for membership was up for consideration, Zaire quietly hauled down its flag over the disputed territory proved premature (Herald [Harare, ], 15 07 1982, p. 2Google Scholar; Zambia Daily Mail, 13 October 1982, p. 1). Malawi and Swaziland were not disqualified on account of their territorial claims against Zambia and South Africa respectively because they were pursuing them “peacefully”; in any case, South Africa is not a SADCC member. Consistent with their principles, all SADCC states condemned the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands.

19. PTA Treaty, Articles 30, 31, and 37, and Annexes III and XII. The exemptions concern the percentage equity holding by nationals required for goods to qualify under the “rules of origin” provisions, the obligations of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland within the Southern African Customs Union, and exemption from financial contributions. PTA members, for their part, were anxious to ensure that they received most-favored-nation treatment from the three countries, which should not become conduits for the export of South African goods to the PTA (Articles 18, 19).

20. Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, and Tanzania (but not Madagascar or the Seychelles) attended the PTA Council of Ministers in Lusaka in June 1982, though none attended the December 1982 Summit. That meeting appealed to the absentees to join by December 1983 (Africa Research Bulletin: PSC, 1983, p. 6681). See also Green, Reginald, “Southern African Development Cooperation,” Africa Contemporary Record, 1981–82, p. A105Google Scholar.

21. Articles 2 and 46 of the Treaty provide for “immediately neighboring African States” becoming members. Angola, which had asked to be included in the Eastern and Southern African subregion, now hopes to join the Central African subregion as well. Zaire, which was once considered a possible candidate and sent observers to the inaugural ceremonies in Lusaka in December 1981, is no longer interested.

22. “Foreword,” Second Revised Proposed Treaty, p. 18; Africa Contemporary Record, 1981–82, pp. A105, 112. The Nairobi Weekly Review claimed that Kenya's alleged involvement in the abortive coup attempt in the Seychelles on 25 November 1981 was the main reason for Tanzania's last-minute volte-face (African Business 44 [April 1982], pp. 9–10). This would further support the thesis that the rivalry between PTA and SADCC is merely the continuation of Kenyan-Tanzanian rivalry on another plane.

23. Financial Times (London), 21 12 1981, p. 2Google Scholar.

24. PTA Treaty, Article 22 and Annex VI; Second Revised Proposed Treaty, pp. 18, 20.

25. Mozambique (in 1977) and Angola (in 1976) signed formal Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union and subsequently with other East European states.

26. On South Africa's destabilization campaign in Zimbabwe (and other Frontline States), see Anglin, “The Frontline States.”

27. Riddell, R. C., “Zimbabwe's Manufactured Exports and the Ending of the Trade Agreement with South Africa” (Harare: Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, 12 1981)Google Scholar.

28. Financial Times, 19 March 1982, p. 6; Economist, 16 January 1982, p. 43. In 1983, South Africa again agreed to renew the agreement for a further year.

29. “The Preferential Trade Area,” Comrade Richard Hove, minister of trade and commerce, declared in May 1982, “will assist positively the increase in trade between the countries in the region. It will also be complementary to the SADCC association of countries” (ZimbabwePress Statement 460/82, 27 05 1982, p. 4Google Scholar); see also Record of the SADCC Summit, Harare, 20 07 1981, p. 9Google Scholar.

30. ZimbabwePress Statement 547/82, 21 06 1982Google Scholar. The signing ceremony in Livingstone on 19 June occasioned front-page headlines in the Zambian press (Sunday Times of Zambia, 20 06 1982, p. 1) but barely a mention in the Zimbabwean pressGoogle Scholar.

31. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Botswana, the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland Terminating the Customs Agreement of 1910 and Concluding a New Agreement, Together with a Memorandum of Understanding Relating Thereto, 12 December 1969, Article 19; PTA Treaty, Article 30, Annex XII; “South Africa or SADCC, Not Both,” Economist (London), 22 01 1983, p. 60Google Scholar.

32. Botswana Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Press Release, 16 12 1981Google Scholar.

33. Although both SADCC and PTA were inaugurated in Lusaka, Zambia appears to have shown a distinct preference for the latter. There have been suggestions that Kaunda was reluctant to host the April 1980 founding conference in Lusaka, and that Zambia was disappointed that Livingstone was not chosen as the headquarters of SADCC.

34. “Southern African Development Coordination: From Dependence and Poverty toward Economic Liberation,” SADCC Blantyre 1981, p. 17. This memorandum was drafted by an expatriate member of the SADCC Liaison (formerly Steering) Committee.

35. PTA Treaty, pp. 7–12; “Memorandum of Understanding on the Institutions of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference,” Record of the SADCC Summit, Harare, 20 07 1981, pp. 32–36Google Scholar. The Authority is the PTA counterpart of the SADCC Summit, the Intergovernmental Commission of Experts the rough equivalent to the Standing Committee of Officials, and the Technical Committees comparable to the Sectoral Sub-Committees. Each body has a Council of Ministers and a Secretariat.

36. SADCC Blantyre 1981, p. 28; for the Simba-Goundrey “tests for viability,” see Africa Contemporary Record, 1978–79, pp. A44–45Google Scholar.

37. At Nyerere's insistence, PTA was termed an “Area” rather than a “Community” as originally proposed. Nevertheless, PTA is committed to the goal of a “Common Market” and eventually an “Economic Community” (PTA Treaty, Article 2).

38. New African 170 (November 1981), p. 74, emphasis added. The PTA Treaty (p. viii) acknowledges the “principles of sovereignty, equality and independence of all States and non-interference in the domestic affairs of States,” though only in the Preamble.

39. At the same time, SADCC ministers have agreed that, “while decisions should be taken by consensus in SADCC institutions, this does not imply a necessity for unanimity in decision making. It indicates a commitment to seek the greatest possible measure of agreement in the formulation and execution of policies” (Record of the Ministerial Meeting, Harare, 19 07 1981, p. 59)Google Scholar.

40. “SADCC: Roadshow without Cast,” Africa Confidential (London) 24 (19 01 1983), p. 11Google Scholar; Record of the SADCC Summit, Harare, 20 07 1981, p. 26Google Scholar; SADCC Summit, Gaborone, 22 07 1982, Progress Report on the Lusaka Programme of Action, 1981–82, p. 6Google Scholar. In connection with Zimbabwe's food security plan, there are meetings of ministers and of officials, and also biannual meetings of each of the three Consultative Technical Committees (ibid., p. 5).

41. “Convention for the Establishment of the Southern Africa Transport and Communications Commission,” Maputo, 2–3 03 1982Google Scholar, revised. The only specific reference to SADCC in the SATCC Convention concerns the deposit of instruments of accession and ratification. Mozambique holds the permanent chairmanship of SATCC, while in SADCC the chairmanship rotates every three years.

42. A year later, President Masire of Botswana asserted that “specialized coordinating bodies … should be created only when there is a proven need for them” (Record of the SADCC Summit, Harare, 20 07 1981, p. 19)Google Scholar. SADCC has not yet acted on a Mozambican-Tanzanian proposal for an Information Commission to counter South Africa's “massive racist propaganda and misinformation campaign” (AIM Information Bulletin [Maputo] 72 [06 1982], p. 29)Google Scholar.

43. SADCC, Record of the Council of Ministers, Luanda, 25–26 06 1982, p. 10Google Scholar. As with Mozambique, Angola hoped to compensate for its limited administrative resources by staffing the Energy Commission's secretariat largely from overseas, under technical assistance agreements. Some SADCC members feared that the Commission pattern might enable Angola, as the only oil-exporting country in SADCC, to exert undue influence over regional oil policy.

44. Zimbabwe employs the term “administrative support unit,” and Zambia “working group” (SADCC, Record of the Council of Ministers, Luanda, 25–26 06 1982, pp. 8, 11)Google Scholar. Earlier, it was reported that “coordinating states have found the combined pressures of national and regional work difficult to meet. In several cases, they now plan to secure external assistance to establish small technical units to service their sectoral coordination work” (Record of the SADCC Summit, Harare, 20 07 1981, p. 30)Google Scholar.

45. SADCC, Record of the Ministerial Meeting, Maputo, 26 and 28 11 1980, p. 13Google Scholar, and Mbabane, 11–12 June 1981, p. 7.

46. An interim PTA secretariat, consisting of officials seconded from the Lusaka-based MULPOC, became operational in late June 1982, but the Secretary-General, Moses Simyano Kiingi of Uganda, did not assume office until January 1983. Arthur Blumeris, the Zimbabwean executive secretary of SADCC, appointed in June 1982, did not take up his duties and begin the task of recruiting staff until October.

47. PTA Treaty, p. 10; UN doc. ECA/MULPOC/Lusaka/PTA/CM.1/1. To the base salary of $40,000 is added a post adjustment of $11,000 as well as a housing allowance of about $20,000.

48. SADCC, Record of the Council of Ministers, Blantyre, 18 11 1981, p. 10Google Scholar. “The secretariat's telecommunications budget is $12,000 and its duty travel allowance $24,000. The implication is that SADCC governments want the executive secretary to be office-bound. Blumeris has an impossible job” (“SADCC: Roadshow without Cast,” p. 2).

49. Even so, there are already complaints that members are in arrears in their contributions (SADCC, Record of the Council of Ministers, Luanda, 25–26 06 1982, pp. 7, 12Google Scholar; “SADCC: Roadshow without Cast,” p. 2). PTA has also suffered from the same endemic disease (Africa Research Bulletin: EFT, 1983, pp. 6680–81).

50. Masire, in SADCC, Record of the SADCC Summit, Harare, 20 07 1981, pp. 19–20Google Scholar.

51. SADCC, Record of the Ministerial Meeting, Maputo, 26 and 28 11 1980, Annex VII, p. 2Google Scholar. David A. Anderson (managing director, Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation), Reginald H. Green (Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex), Iddi Simba (African Development Bank, London), and Tim J. Sheehy (Catholic Institute for International Relations, London and Harare).

52. “Future of the Steering Committee,” SADCC, Record of the Ministerial Meeting, Maputo, 26 and 28 11 1980, Annex VIIGoogle Scholar.

53. SADCC, Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, 1 04 1980, pp. 3, 8Google Scholar; Record of the SADCC Summit, Harare, 20 07 1981, p. 44Google Scholar. The phrase “any single state or group of states” was an addition to the Arusha Declaration inserted in Lusaka, 04 1980Google Scholar.

54. Tostensen, , Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance, pp. 131–39Google Scholar.

55. Times (London), 5 06 1982, p. 20Google Scholar. Of the various Arab governments and funds invited, only BADEA attended SADCC 3 in Blantyre (where there is an Israeli embassy) and only Algeria, Egypt, and BADEA participated in SADCC 4 in Lesotho (which has an accredited Israeli ambassador, resident in Swaziland).

56. Maseru was the first SADCC meeting China has attended. Taiwan has an embassy in Blantyre and had one in Maseru at the time of SADCC 4.

57. SADCC Blantyre 1981, p. 29; SADCC, Record of the Council of Ministers, Luanda, 25–26 06 1982, p. 12Google Scholar. By comparison, Zimbabwe at its ZIMCORD conference in March 1981 garnered pledges totaling $1.4 billion.

58. A certain amount of gentle jurisdictional rivalry appears to have developed between the EEC and ECA over the Southern African sphere of influence. In early 1979, an EEC official suggested to ECA that it should sponsor SADCC, then only a vague proposal, but ECA declined as it was promoting PTA. Since then, EEC representatives have reportedly urged (unsuccessfully) ECA's exclusion from governmental meetings, notably the 1980 Lusaka Summit.

59. SADCC, Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, 1 04 1980, p. 8Google Scholar. “What SADCC is trying to do,” Mugabe has explained, “is to weave a fabric of regional cooperation which is truly Southern African, authored and implemented by the peoples of the region. … It is we … who have the right and the duty to determine regional priorities” (SADCC Maseru: Overview, p. 6).

60. Among the more cautious critics is Reginald Green, a longstanding member of the SADCC Liaison Committee (Africa Contemporary Record, 1978–79, pp. A42,44; 1980–81, pp. A32–33). For a more radical critique, see Mwanza, Kamina M. Thandiza, “The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC): The Political Economy of Convenience,” mimeo (University of Zambia, 07 1982), pp. 12–14Google Scholar.

61. Since 1981, two EEC-financed officials have maintained an SADCC support office in Harare. SADCC has appealed to the EEC to provide two of the five members of the Secretarial staff (SADCC, Record of the Council of Ministers, Luanda, 25–26 06 1982, pp. 13–14)Google Scholar. Green notes that SADCC 1 delegates from “outside the region” were the first to propose environmental protection and food security as subjects for SADCC concern (“Southern African Development Coordination,” p. 55).

62. SADCC Blantyre 1981, p. 41; “The EEC and Southern Africa,” West Africa 3433 (30 06 1983), p. 1275Google Scholar.

63. E.g. Mugabe, Robert, ACP-EEC Assembly joint committee, Harare, 1 02 1982 (Zimbabwe Government Press Statement 91/82, pp. 1, 4–5)Google Scholar. In July 1981, the SADCC Summit sent a “fraternal message” of “brotherhood and exhortation” to the summit conference of the seven major industrial countries, then meeting in Ottawa (Record of the SADCC Summit, Harare, 20 07 1981, pp. 3, 51–54)Google Scholar.

64. Bonn has insisted that all bilateral or EEC aid agreements should include a reference to “Land Berlin” (Annex 35 of Lomé II; Financial Times, 25 November 1980, p. 4). Despite East German objections, on 7 October 1982 Maputo and Luanda acquiesced in the Berlin clause.

65. PTA has established a Technical Committee of Experts to advise on “ensuring economic restucturing of the BLS states and reduction of their dependence on South Africa” (PTA Treaty, Annex XII). In March 1982, the Ministerial Council of the Lusaka-based MULPOC prepared contingency plans to help South Africa's neighbors withstand UN economic sanctions against Pretoria (Times of Zambia, 27 March 1982, p. 1).

66. The West has been immensely impressed with the determination of SADCC members to resist politicization of the organization. However, Pretoria's aggressive military actions against member states have made complete SADCC silence impossible. At Blantyre, Britain, the United States, and West Germany (and the World Bank) declined to join in expressing “concern at South African destabilization and sabotage actions affecting regional transport and communications development” (SADCC Blantyre 1981, p. 69; Guardian [London], 24 11 1981, p. 7Google Scholar; Africa Contemporary Record, 1981–82, pp. A107, 111 n51; Record of the Council of Ministers, Blantyre, 18 11 1981, p. 16)Google Scholar. At Maseru, a similar mild statement in response to Pretoria's recent aerial assault on the city secured full Western support after only minor changes were introduced (New African 186 [March 1983], p. 13). On “SADCC: Roadshow without Cast,” p. 3.

67. Record of the Southern African Development Coordination Summit Conference, Lusaka, 1 04 1980, pp. 20, 30Google Scholar. This was a reiteration of an assurance given at Arusha in July 1979. At Lusaka, Kaunda explained that “Some people have tended to think that we are forming this economic group purely to face South Africa. In our view, this regional grouping is being established despite and not merely because of South Africa and her concept of a regional constellation of states” (ibid., p. 15). On the other hand, he later linked PTA and SADCC to “our effort to contain and finally defeat the theory of a ‘Constellation of Southern African States’” (“Opening Address,” PTA signing ceremony, Lusaka, 21 12 1981, p. 12Google Scholar).

68. Burgess, Stephen and Wilson, Michael, “Dependence and Limits to Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa,” mimeo (University of Zambia, 4–6 07 1982), p. 11Google Scholar.

69. “SADCC's basic commitment and raison d'être is to development. … SADCC is not basically formed on unity against South Africa but for development” (SADCC Blantyre 1981, pp. 12, 13).

70. Ibid., p. 31; also Kgarebe, , SADCC 2–Maputo, p. 33Google Scholar.

71. “… We believe that there is room for substantial increases in trade among ourselves. To this end existing payment systems and customs instruments will be studied in order to build up a regional trade system based on bilaterally negotiated annual trade targets and product lists” (SADCC, Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, 1 04 1980, p. 6)Google Scholar.

72. SADCC, Record of the Council of Ministers, Luanda, 25–26 06 1982, p. 17Google Scholar. “Regional trade” is “likely to receive greater attention over time as more and more of SADCC's initial sectoral coordination projects come to fruition” (SADCC Maseru: Overview, p. 6).

73. Adedeji, Adebayo, “Opening Statement,” Lusaka, 22 06 1982, pp. 9–10Google Scholar. In his “End of Year Statement” (30 December 1981, p. 5), he accused PTA's “critics and detractors” of “saying and doing everything to underplay the significance of the signing of the Treaty after many of them had wagered a bet that the negotiations would collapse.” See also Africa Contemporary Record, 1981–82, p. A112 n83.

74. SADCC's assignment of food security to Zimbabwe did not prevent Mugabe from urging PTA to give priority to food production (Times of Zambia, 17 December 1982, p. 1).

75. PTA Treaty, Article 2; SADCC, Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, 1 04 1980, p. 4Google Scholar.

76. Nsekela, , Southern Africa, p. xiiGoogle Scholar; see also SADCC Blantyre 1981, p. 28, and Green, , “Southern African Development Coordination,” p. 57 n4Google Scholar.

77. Nsekela, , Southern Africa, p. xGoogle Scholar.

78. Ironically, there are reports of Zimbabwean businesses migrating to Botswana (Financial Gazette [Harare], 16 07 1982, p. 1Google Scholar).

79. SADCC, Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, 1 04 1980, p. 4Google Scholar. A background paper prepared for SADCC 3 argued that “To be viable, SADCC must be, and be seen to be, based on an equitable building up and sharing of gains” (SADCC Blantyre 1981, p. 11).

80. PTA Treaty, Articles 13, 16, 30, and 31, and Annex XII, Article 4. On avoidance, compensatory, and corrective mechanisms, and their limitations, see Mytelka, Lynn Krieger, Regional Development in a Global Economy: The Multinational Corporation, Technology, and Andean Integration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 10–20Google Scholar.

81. “Towards Integrated Regional Development in Southern Africa,” Development and Peace (Budapest) 2 (Autumn 1981), pp. 79, 83, 87–89Google Scholar.

82. “Dependence and Limits,” p. 14.

83. PTA Treaty, Annex VIII, Article 4. The agenda for the first meeting of the PTA Technical Committee on Industrial Cooperation meeting in Lusaka, 25–29 October 1982, included “arrangements on rationalization of investment laws,” “draft charters of multinational industrial enterprises,” and “mechanisms for the promotion of industrial development” (UN doc. ECA/MULPOC/Lusaka/PTA/CM/1/2, Annex VI, p. 3).

84. See “Economic Commission for Africa: Heart Searching at the Jubilee,” West Africa 3430 (9 05 1983), p. 1105Google Scholar; Record of the SADCC Summit, Harare, 20 07 1981, pp. 17–18Google Scholar.

85. Financial Times, 24 September 1981, p. vii; “Wankie Power Station,” Standard Chartered Review (October 1981), pp. 2–4; Zimbabwe Government, Press Statement 23/82, 13 01 1982Google Scholar.

86. “Zimbabwe Emerges as a Power in the Region,” New African 158 (11 1980), pp. 67–68Google Scholar. The Arusha documents warn of “the spectre of Zimbabwe establishing an industrial hegemony like that which it held in the Central African Federation long before independence … or that which some feared Kenya sought to consolidate in the EAC” (Nsekela, , Southern Africa, P. 14Google Scholar).

87. The Liaison Committee prepared a factual paper on the overlapping SADCC-PTA jurisdictions. This was revised by Zimbabwe for submission to the Gaborone Summit (July 1982), which asked the Secretariat to develop the analysis.

88. It was hoped that nonmember states and institutions would contribute 48% of the authorized capital stock of over $1 billion (Southern African Development Coordination Conference Fund [Blantyre: SADCC, 1981], p. 30)Google Scholar. The PTA clearing house, the first step toward a monetary union, is scheduled to come into operation in September 1983.

89. PTA Treaty, Articles 32–35. One of the pillars of South Africa's Constellation of States is the long-delayed multilateral Southern African development bank, now announced for September 1983. (African Business 52 [12 1982])Google Scholar.

90. Mramba, B. P., “Address on SADCC Industrial Cooperation,” (Maseru, 26 01 1983), p. 5Google Scholar. The project list includes, for example, 19 textile factories in 9 member states and 14 farm implement plants in 8 states (SADCC Maseru: Industry, 1983, 3 vols.Google Scholar).

91. “Though South Africa is saddened at the artificial division of the subcontinent, it welcomes the SADCC efforts to improve their own economic situation and circumstances. … If conditions improve and go well around us, then the same will apply to South Africa itself. … If these states are successful, all the regional states will become more interdependent until a stage is reached where it will be too expensive to remain enemies and not to cooperate. … Nor do we see SADCC as a deliberate move to isolate South Africa” (Shaw, J. A., “The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the South African Response,” International Affairs Bulletin [Johannesburg] 5 [1981], p. 19)Google Scholar. Shaw, South African chargé d'affaires in Blantyre, attended the opening session of SADCC 3 (Financial Times, 20 November 1981, p. 4).

92. Legum, Colin, “South Africa's Power Game,” New African 186 (03 1983), pp. 11–14Google Scholar; Anglin, “The Frontline States”; International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, “South African Aggression,” Briefing Paper on Southern Africa (London) 7 (03 1983)Google Scholar; Geldenhuys, Deon, “Destabilization Controversy in Southern Africa,” Southern African Forum Position Paper (Johannesburg) 5, 18 (1982)Google Scholar; Africa Contemporary Record, 1981–82, pp. A10–13, B774–77; 1980–81, pp. 4–5, 14–20; Tostensen, , Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance, pp. 120–31Google Scholar; “Destabilisation in South Africa,” Economist, 16 July 1983, pp. 19–28.

93. Luanda is reported to have offered its SADCC partners oil at concessionary prices in return for a “full military commitment” to the defense of Angola (Africa Research Bulletin: EFT, 1982, p. 6645).

94. Record of the SADCC Summit, Lusaka, 1 04 1980, p. 33Google Scholar; see also ibid., Harare, 20 July 1981, p. 30.