I thank Jonathan Aronson, Deborah Avant, John Campbell, Gary Cox, Jeff Frieden, Gary Jacobson, Robert Keohane, Samuel Kernell, Stephen Krasner, Mathew McCubbins, John Odell, Paul Papayoanou, Frances Rosenbluth, John Ruggie, Edwin Smith, Steve Weber, and the reviewers of International Organization for their comments.

1. Ruggie, John Gerard, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization 46 (Summer 1992), pp. 561–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2. Many regimes are not multilateral. The definition is from Ruggie, “Multilateralism.”

3. If benefits extended to one country must apply to all, and countries accept that all members are reasonably important for a successful solution (e.g., Greece cannot fall while France survives), then it is harder to rely on specific reciprocity's narrow balancing of benefits. See Keohane, Robert O., “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International Organization 40 (Winter 1986), pp. 1–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4. For example, Kissinger, Henry A., “Domestic Structures and Foreign Policy,” Daedulus 59 (Spring 1966), pp. 503–29Google Scholar.

5. This article explores both a hegemonic power (the United States after 1945) and a non hegemonic power (the future role of Japan). The hegemonic stability thesis suggests why the strong might support collective goods disproportionately, but hypotheses about the fragility and desirability of hegemonic orders differ. See Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

6. Lesser powers also have a domestic political problem when ratifying regime bargains. If political leaders cannot point to specific credible promises by great powers, then it is harder to show concrete benefits to offset complaints by political opponents of multilateral bargains.

7. Countries can also limit the number of participants or introduce specialized checks and balances in a regime. There is, however, a limit on how far this can go without abandoning multilateralism. See Kahler, Miles, “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers,” International Organization 46 (Summer 1992), pp. 681–708CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8. North, Douglas C. and Weingast, Barry R., “Constitution and Commitment: The Evaluation of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-century England,” Journal of Economic History 49 (12 1989), pp. 803–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The Folk Theorem of noncooperative games suggests that cooperation can occur so long as each party can judge the other's good faith ex post and can refuse to cooperate after a defection. Unfortunately, the Folk Theorem is often hard to implement. The game has multiple equilibria; many include frequent defection because it is hard to define defection. See Kreps, David, “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,” in Alt, James E. and Shepsle, Kenneth A., eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 90–143CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9. A good example of such a theory is found in Rosecrance, Richard and Taw, Jennifer, “Japan and the Theory of International Leadership,” World Politics 42 (spring 1990), pp. 184–209CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10. Diplomacy can also tailor multilateral regimes to reinforce the compatibility of everyday politics and foreign policy in the great powers. Lesser powers should accept this tactic (within commonsense boundaries) because it reinforces the commitment of great powers. A good example is that Britain recognized that the world order would suit special U.S. priorities, but London tried to seize the initiative in order to improve its bargaining hand. See Reynolds, David, “Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance, 1939–1945: Towards a New Synthesis,” in Louis, Wm. Roger and Bull, Hedley, eds., The “Special Relationship”: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 17–41Google Scholar; and Mayer, Frederick W., “Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Sidepayments,” International Organization 46 (Autumn 1992), pp. 793–818CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11. The voting system of Westminster democracies (those with British parliamentary and electoral structures) are prone to produce parliamentary majorities for parties that can enact sweeping platforms involving many collective goods. See Lijphart, Arend, Democracies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Taagepeta, Rein and Shugart, Matthew, Seals and Votes: The Effects ami Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; and Cox, Gary, The Efficient Secret (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12. The secrecy of Soviet politics posed a consistent problem for its credibility on such issues as arms control and detente before perestroika. Domestic politics influence transparency, which influences the resolution of prisoners' dilemma games. See Keohane, After Hegemony. I thank Steve Weber for this point.

13. Dichotomization would not work. Electoral systems vary widely in their significant details. The present article uses the cases to illustrate the variables that distinguish electoral systems. Although this article cannot determine the relative importance of domestic and international variables, the first section explains why international variables do not suffice.

14. See the careful review of the literature in Samuels, Richard, The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987)Google Scholar. Another difficulty for testing this framework is that several rival theories offer predictions of equivalent behavior on some dimensions. On testing statist theories, see Cowhey, Peter F., ”‘States’ and ‘Politics’ in American Foreign Economic Policy,” in Odell, John S. and Willett, Thomas D., eds., International Trade Policies-The Gains from Exchange Between Economics and Political Science (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), pp. 225–51Google Scholar.

15. The term is taken from Ruggie, , “Multilateralism,” p. 572Google Scholar.

16. Jones, James M., The Fifteen Weeks (New York: Viking Press, 1955)Google Scholar.

17. Krasner, Stephen, Defending the National Interest (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978)Google Scholar.

18. An analysis of a nondemocratic country would ask how the pursuit of power works outside an electoral system. The impact of the division of power is in principle no different, although discovering the division may be hard. See the discussion of national security policy in Roeder, Philip G., Red Sunset: Origins of the Soviet Constitutional Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, forthcoming), chap. 7Google Scholar.

19. The presidential system is a variation of the model.

20. Hypotheses differ about the respective roles of Congress and the President in defining party reputation. All the approaches suggest that positions matter for electoral success, and parties act on policy agendas. See Kernell, Samuel, “The Primacy of Politics in Economic Policy,” in Kernell, Samuel, ed., Parallel Politics-Economic Policymaking in Japan and the United States (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 325–78Google Scholar. The mix of collective goods and constituency services emphasized by politicians may vary over time. Constituency services have grown in importance since the 1960s, but their rising marginal costs may again favor more reliance on collective goods. See Cox, Gary and Rosenbluth, Frances, “The Structural Determinants of Electoral Cohesiveness: England, Japan, and the United States,” presented to a workshop on the comparison of U.S. and Japanese politics, University of California, Irvine, 21 02 1992Google Scholar.

21. Other models of the politics of credibility overlook this issue. See de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno and Lalman, David, “Domestic Opposition and Foreign War,” American Political Science Review 84 (09 1990), pp. 747–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Morrow, James D., “Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms Control,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (06 1991), pp. 245–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22. Voters are rational free riders who invest too few resources in gathering information about a public good (a better informed vote), but they reason rationally in ways consistent with the limited resources devoted to the task. Attributable benefits (or persuasive denial of blame) are the keys to a politician's success. Presidents like foreign policy especially because they have clear claims to control. Nonetheless, party identification is an important “default” value on issues that voters care about but about which they lack other information. This is especially true in congressional races. Party identification in turn is based on retrospective assessment of performance, and voters will change their assessment of party competence on major issues fairly rapidly. See Popkin, Samuel, The Reasoning Voter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991)Google Scholar.

23. A powerful case for retrospective accountability is made by Aldrich, John H., Sullivan, John L., and Borgida, Eugene, “Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience?',” American Political Science Review 83 (03 1989), pp. 123–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Other important work on opinion overlooks political parties and Congress. See Nincic, Miroslav, “U.S. Soviet Policy and the Electoral Connection,” World Politics 42 (04 1990), pp. 370–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24. U.S. foreign policy officials regale listeners with tales of congressional ignorance. However, the same sort of congressional delegation takes place around issues such as the mechanics of social security administration and tax legislation, where congressional influence is indisputable. On delegation to committee chairpersons who represent the views of the party caucus, see Cox, Gary W. and McCubbins, Mathew D., Parties and Committees in the U.S. House of Representatives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991)Google Scholar.

25. Fiorina, Morris P., “Coalition Governments, Divided Governments, and Electoral Theory,” Governance 4 (07 1991), pp. 236–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

26. After making multilateral commitments, shifts in both the U.S. presidential party and the majority congressional party are required to obtain a major policy reversal. For example, many critical commitments to multilateralism are the products of laws and treaties. Although treaties may become attenuated in practice (as with some regional security treaties), that requires de facto congressional acquiescence.

27. Jacobson, Gary, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

28. See O'Halloran, Sharyn, “Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy: Congress and the Regulation of Foreign Commerce,” Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego, 1990Google Scholar; and Brady, David and Mo, Jongryn, “The U.S. Congress and Trade Policy: An Institutional Approach,” Pacific Focus 5 (Autumn 1990), pp. 5–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29. The Marshall Plan was more credible because its administration was removed from the State Department, put in an office with a temporary life cycle, and led by a corporate executive from Indiana (the head of Studebaker automobiles), whose mission was to deliver a viable program that Congress would not deem harmful to the industrial Midwest.

30. Frieden, Jeffrey A., “Capital Politics: Creditors and the International Political Economy,” Journal of Public Policy, 8 (07–12 1988), p. 274CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31. The Eastern states were critical for winning the nomination, and their leadership backed the Dewey wing. See Barone, Michael, Our Country: The Shaping of America from Roosevelt to Reason (New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 167–81Google Scholar.

32. Barone and Donovan both note that the bipartisan tone benefited Truman but argue that domestic, not foreign, policy was the key to victory. See Barone, , Our Country; and Donovan, Robert J., Conflict and Crisis, the Presidency of Harry S. Truman (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977)Google Scholar.

33. Vandenberg defined the terms by which the Midwestern wing of the Republican party would join the Eastern wing in accepting multilateralism championed by Democrats. Cox and McCubbins show that the party caucus used House committee chairmanships (including that of the Foreign Affairs Committee) to exercise control over committee actions. See Cox and McCubbins, Parties and Committees in the U.S. House of Representatives.

34. Humanitarian appeals for European aid did not move congressional leaders. President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson then linked aid to fighting communism, and the Republicans turned positive. See Yergin, Daniel, Shattered Peace—The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977)Google Scholar; and Ireland, Timothy P., Creating the Entangling Alliance-The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981)Google Scholar.

35. Haggard, Stephen, “The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 91–120Google Scholar, shows how this worked for trade. Multilateralism was not the only internationalist option, but, as Odell notes, an alternative is attractive if it is well known and apparently “predicts” the failure of past policy. See Odell, John S., “From London to Bretton Woods: Sources of Change in Bargaining Strategies and Outcomes,” Journal of Public Policy 8 (07–December 1988), pp. 287–316CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36. Barone argues that the Taft-Hartley Act virtually froze union expansion and limited growth in union power; see Barone, Our Country. Nau notes the conservative overtones to American commitments; see Nau, Henry R., The Myth of America's Decline (New York: Oxford, 1990)Google Scholar.

37. Even Senator Robert Taft voted for aid to Greece and Turkey. See Pollard, Robert, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985)Google Scholar; and Jones, The Fifteen Weeks.

38. Ruggie, “Multilateralism.”

39. Ryan reports that Britain tracked U.S. opinion polls taken in 1944 that showed 71 percent approval in the Midwest for the United Nations. He suggests that anti-United Kingdom feeling among Irish American and German American voters may have bolstered the U.S. position on decolonization. See Ryan, Henry Butter field, The Vision of Anglo-America: The U.S.-U.K. Alliance and the Emerging Cold War, 1943–1946 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 31–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 387Google Scholar.

40. Perkins, Bradford, “Unequal Partners: The Truman Administration and Great Britain,” pp. 57–58Google Scholar, in Louis and Bull, The “Special Relationship.” Ireland shows why bargaining logic favored multilateralism; see Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance.

41. Reynolds notes that 20 to 30 percent of all Americans favored a negotiated peace with Germany in 1942, while the same polls showed no sympathy to Japan; see Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance, 1939–1945.” My thanks to Edwin Smith for this hypothesis.

42. Republicans chose to bargain over the form of multilateralism and its geopolitical priorities. In 1948, thirty of the fifty-one Republican senators were reliable supporters of Truman's policies, a comfortable majority. Republican conservatives favored limiting commitments to Europe (especially resisting placement of U.S. troops in Europe) in order to redeem the United States' “destiny in Asia,” a position popular with conservative Christians; see Reichard, Gary W., “The Domestic Politics of National Security,” in Graebner, Norman, ed., The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945–1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 243–74Google Scholar. Still, Taft did not use the Korean War to urge an anti communist campaign in Asia because he wanted the 1952 nomination. The Dewey wing blocked Taft by turning to Dwight Eisenhower, who was an adamant multilateralist and a “Europe-first” candidate; see Barone, Our Country.

43. Vandenberg cast NATO as an organization stressing “mutual aid and self help” precisely to assure Congress that NATO was not a one-sided bargain. See Ireland, , Creating the Entangling Alliance, p. 89Google Scholar.

44. The logic is similar to that in Mayer, “Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations.”

45. They also allowed Congress to retain coequal power. See O'Halloran, “Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy.”

46. Congressional committees overseeing commodity policies most resembled iron-triangle models. These committees greatly strengthened the cabinet agencies most sympathetic to the commodity producers. See Cox and McCubbins, Parlies and Committees in the U.S. House of Representatives.

47. According to Gardner, Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau told one audience that the Bretton Woods agreement would “drive the usurious money lenders from the temple of international finance.” See Richard N. Gardner, “Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective,” in Louis and Bull, The “Special Relationship”; and Chernow, Ron, The House of Morgan (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990), p. 192Google Scholar.

48. The negotiators weakened the power of the IMF to supervise domestic economic policies in order to please Congress. The majority of Republicans supported the Bretton Woods agreement in Congress. See Gardner, , Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 129–43Google Scholar.

49. Pollard, , Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, pp. 15–17Google Scholar.

50. Truman understood the challenge and maneuvered to reassert his independence. See Destler, I. M., Gelb, Leslie H., and Lake, Anthony, Our Own Worst Enemy-The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984)Google Scholar.

51. Koh, Harold Jongju, The National Security Constitution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 84–99Google Scholar.

52. Avant, Deborah, “The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: The United States in Vietnam and Britain in the Boer War and Malaya,” Ph.D. diss., Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, 1991Google Scholar.

53. Ruggie, “Multilateralism.”

54. Calder, Kent E., “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” World Politics 40 (07 1988), pp. 517–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

55. This model assumes that Japanese political leaders in fact are in charge. Many analysts disagree with that premise and therefore imply different paths toward domestic reforms necessary for international credibility. The classic work on bureaucratic leadership is Johnson, Chalmers, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982)Google Scholar.

56. The Japanese Diet has a lower and an upper house. The lower house holds most of the power. The Liberal Democratic party (LDP) has not lost control of the lower house since 1955 and usually controls the upper chamber, as well. However, currently, it is narrowly in the minority in the upper house.

57. The political leadership does not give the bureaucracy detailed guidelines; often it only signals the outer limits for policy directions and provides a series of detailed expectations about whom policy will reward.

58. The following analysis of Japan draws heavily on Calder, Kent E., Crisis and Compensation–Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), especially pp. 63–70Google Scholar; Frances Rosenbluth, “Japan's Response to the Strong Yen: Party Leadership and the Market for Political Favors,” manuscript, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, December, 1990; Cox and Rosenbluth, “The Structural Determinants of Electoral Cohesiveness”; and Cox, Gary W., “SNTV and d'Hondt are ‘equivalent,’” Electoral Studies 10 (1992), pp. 118–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

59. Van Wolferen notes that foreign policy and defense are among the worst specialties for electoral security or party advancement because they do not generate large flows of campaign moneys; see Wolferen, Karel van, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation (New York: Knopf, 1989)Google Scholar.

60. The opposition can run on issues if it does not seek majority status. The Japan Socialist party (JSP) normally fields only one candidate per constituency. This strategy enhances the chance of one candidate finding a targeted minority in the district to support his or her election. Current officeholders do not encourage a second candidate because there is strong job security with the present strategy. This strategy dooms the JSP to minority status. See Curtis, Gerald, Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971)Google Scholar; and Kernell, “The Primacy of Politics in Economic Policy.”

61. lnoguchi, Takashi, “The Political Economy of Conservative Resurgence Under Recession: Public Policies and Political Support in Japan, 1977–1983,” in Pempel, T. J., ed., Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 189–225Google Scholar.

62. Campbell, John Creighton, “Democracy and Bureaucracy in Japan,” in Ishida, Takeshi and Krauss, Ellis S., eds., Democracy in Japan (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), pp. 113–37Google Scholar.

63. The standard discussion is found in Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle. Many doubt the efficacy of industrial policy. However, a policy driven by narrow demands for protection that also favored investment policy could have yielded virtuous outcomes, given the Japanese industrial structure. Itoh and Kiyono largely agree with Johnson on the role of protection in triggering growth. See Itoh, Motoshige and Kiyono, Kazuhara, “Foreign Trade and Direct Investment,” in Kumiya, Ryutaro, Okuno, Masahiro, and Suzumura, Kotaro, eds., Industrial Policy of Japan (Tokyo: Academic Press, 1988), pp. 155–81Google Scholar.

64. Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State.

65. The dominance of the LDP further slanted the system because it continued massive malapportionment that favored conservative rural voters. This muted shifts in public policy associated with the rising power of urban districts (e.g., reduced protection for farmers).

66. Kohno, Masaru, “Rational Foundations for the Organization of the Liberal Democratic Party,” World Politics 44 (04 1992), pp. 369–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially note 30.

67. Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation.”

68. Japan has cooperated on multilateral nonproliferation and antiterrorism measures.

69. See HeWmann, Donald, Japanese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969)Google Scholar; and Weinstein, Martin E., Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947–1968 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971)Google Scholar.

70. Stockton, J. A. A., “Political Parties and Political Opposition,” in Ishida, and Krauss, , Democracy in Japan, p. 105Google Scholar.

71. The Korean War came as the Occupation ended. The war reinforced popular views in Japan against neutrality and strengthened the military's supporters. The consolidation of conservative groups into a unified LDP (with its cautious policies) in 1955 weakened the military's sympathizers. See Calder, Crisis and Compensation.

72. Evera, Stephen Van, “Why Cooperation Failed in 1914,” World Politics 38 (10 1985), pp. 80–117CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73. Ex ante controls and commitments shape outcomes by putting significant constraints on future choices. Of course, they can be broken, as in the “no new taxes” pledge of the 1988 U.S. presidential campaign, but at a cost.

74. Calder, , Crisis and Compensation, pp. 425–26Google Scholar.

75. The Japanese government's tax revenues are the lowest (as a share of gross domestic product [GDP]) of the industrial world due to business pressure. Hence, moneys for programs are tight. Moreover, big business largely has not accorded top importance to defense projects. High rates of civilian growth even divert the interests of smaller firms who might otherwise become dependent on defense spending. See Bobrow, Davis B. and Hill, Stephen R., “Non-Military Determinants of Military Budgets: The Japanese Case,” International Studies Quarterly 35 (03 1991), pp. 39–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The LDP pledge to limit Japanese defense spending to no more than 1 percent of GDP was another political invention to limit options for defense. See Calder, , Crisis and Compensation, pp. 437–38Google Scholar.

76. Ichiro Ozawa and other senior LDP leaders endorsed the more permissive view of the constitution. See Takagi, Hisao, “LDP Panel Backs Active Role for Troops,” Nikkei Weekly, 29 02 1992, p. 2Google Scholar. Any departure from these rules will lead to Japanese withdrawal from UN peacekeeping forces. See “Outdated Security System is in Need of Overhaul,” The Nikkei Weekly, 27 06 1992, p. 6Google Scholar; and Pollack, Andrew, “Japanese Say They Caiinot Send Troops to Somalia,” New York Times, 19 12 1992, p. Y3Google Scholar.

77. This is the logic of Tanaka, Akihiko, “International Security and Japan's Contribution in the 1990s,” Japan Review of International Affairs 4, Fall/Winter, 1990, pp. 187–208Google Scholar. Asiaweek argues that a Miyazawa doctrine emerged that emphasizes Japanese contributions to leading political and security affairs in Asia for the first time, perhaps using the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as a vehicle. The plan still features a major role for the United States, however. See “The Miyazawa Doctrine,” Asiaweek, 24 July 1992, pp. 21–23. For alternative scenarios, see Inoguchi, Takashi, “Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future,” in Newland, Kathleen, ed., The International Relations of Japan (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 206–23Google Scholar, and Tsuneo Akaha, “Japan's Security Policy after U.S. Hegemony,” in ibid, pp. 147–73. If Japan adopts a more active military profile, it may be tied to the emergence of an Asian bloc that excludes roles for the United States or Europe, hardly a boon for multilateralism. See Johnson, Chalmers, Japan in Search of a ‘Normal’ Role, Policy Paper no. 3 (San Diego, Calif.: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation: 07 1992)Google Scholar.

78. Gourevitch, Peter Alexis, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

79. The political logic is akin to that offered by Milner about U.S. and French firms. See Milner, Helen, “Trading Places: Industries for Free Trade,” World Politics 40 (04 1988), pp. 350–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

80. Encarnation, Dennis J. and Mason, Mark, “Neither MITI nor America: The Political Economy of Capital Liberalization in Japan,” International Organization 44 (Winter 1990), pp. 25–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

81. Noll, Roger and Owen, Bruce, The Political Economy of Deregulation (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute, 1983)Google Scholar.

82. One example of collecting rents from telecommunications and software firms is discussed in Calder, Kent, International Pressure and Domestic Policy Response: Jipanese Informatics Policy in the 1980s, Research Monograph no. 51 (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1989)Google Scholar.

83. The LDP had approved continuation of the Japanese research program. See Mastanduno, Michael, “Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy,” International Security 16 (Summer 1991), pp. 73–113CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

84. Flamm, Kenneth, “Managing New Rules: High-tech Trade Friction and the Semiconductor Industry,” The Brookings Review (Spring 1991), pp. 22 and 29Google Scholar.

85. Cowhey, Peter F. and Aronson, Jonathan David, Managing the World Economy: The Consequences of Corporate Alliances (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), chap. 8Google Scholar.

86. Uniform codes assist newcomers and consumers unless they are explicitly designed to retard them. See Inuoe, Yuko, “Ministries Rapped for Excessive Guidance,” Japan Economic Journal, 2 12 1989, p. 1Google Scholar.

87. See Encarnation and Mason, “Neither MITI nor America”;, and Rosenbluth, Frances, Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989)Google Scholar.

88. Japanese import policy has been liberalized since 1985, despite exclusionary practices by Japanese keiretsu. See Lawrence, Robert, Efficient or Exclusionist? The Import Behavior of Japanese Corporate Groups Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1, 1991, pp. 311–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

89. Could a modification of the multilateral regime strengthen Japanese support? Japan has begun to question the efficacy of the U.S. model for development. It has hinted that its support for multilateral financial institutions may depend on adjusting their strategies to Japanese development strategy and business practices. The United States criticized the Japanese approach as “wasteful.” See “Japan Urges World Bank to Change Course,” Los Angeles Times, 11 December 1991, p. D2; and Moltz, James Clay, “Commonwealth Economics in Perspective: Lessons from the East Asian Model,” Soviet Economy, vol. 7, 1991, pp. 342–63Google Scholar.

90. The Prime Minister has neither the staff nor sufficient time in office to do much more than engage in infighting over policy issues. See Kernell, “The Primacy of Politics in Economic Policy.”

91. This is an example of the logic in Rogowski, Ronald, “Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions,” International Organization 41 (Spring 1987), pp. 203–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

92. Nakagama, Sam, “In Japan, Farm Supports Prop Up More than Farms,” New York Times, 13 08 1990, p. A15Google Scholar. Roughly two hundred LDP Diet members are active supporters of the farm lobby, and about sixty of those seats are from agricultural districts. See Nikkei Weekly, 19 October 1991, p. 2.

93. Reform would initially favor the LDP, but eventually a consolidated opposition might take on the LDP successfully. This was a key reason for passing Kaifu over for a second term as Prime Minister. The Miyazawa cabinet retreated to smaller reforms to put more seats in urban areas and tidy up bits of campaign financing. A coalition of LDP dissenters and the opposition parties in the upper house delayed even that package. See The Economist, 1 February 1992, p. 38; and Itaru Oishi, , “Diet Leaves Reform Proposals Pending,” Nikkei Weekly, 27 06 1992, p. 2Google Scholar.

94. This argument holds even if there are no losses for the incumbent country as a whole from the accommodation. For a review of U.S. restructuring as part of trade diplomacy, see Cowhey and Aronson, Managing the World Economy.