¹ See for instance: Streit, Clarence K., Union Now With Britain (New York: Harper and Bros., 1941)Google Scholar; Catlin, George, The Atlantic Community (Coram, 1959)Google Scholar; Lippmann, Walter, US Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943)Google Scholar.

² See the excellent analysis in Lichtheim, George, The New Europe (New York: Praeger, 1963), Chapters 1–2Google Scholar.

³ See the analysis and the remarks of Beloff, Max in The United States and the Unity of Europe (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1963), pp. 8–9Google Scholar.

⁴ See Deutsch, Karl W., Burrell, Sidney A., Kann, Robert A., Lee, Maurice Jr, Lichterman, Martin, Lindgren, Raymond E., Loewenheim, Francis L., and Van Wagenen, Richard W., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957)Google Scholar, and Haas, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958)Google Scholar.

⁵ We shall assume here that the Atlantic nations are those that are members of either the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

⁶ Aron, Raymond, Paix et Guerre (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1962), p. 388Google Scholar.

⁷ See also Brecher, Michael, “International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia,” World Politics, 01 1963 (Vol. 15, No. 2), pp. 213–235CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ This seems to me true even of those members such as Switzerland and Sweden who are militarily neutral.

⁹ Every rule has its exceptions: there have been incidents between Britain and Iceland over fish, between Britain and Greece over Cyprus. However even those crises have been moderate.

¹⁰ See his article in this issue, p. 627 (italics added).

¹¹ Deutsch, Karl, “Supranational Organizations in the 1960's,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 1963 (Vol. 1, No. 3), p. 212CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹² Haas, Ernst B., op. cit., p. 5Google Scholar. See also his article, “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process,” International Organization, Summer 1961 (Vol. 15, No. 3), pp. 366–392CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ See Valeurs de base de la Communauté Atlantique (Leyden: Sythoff, 1961)Google Scholar. Also, the statement by Christian Herter,

In New England we say “community” when we are thinking about a society in which people live together as good neighbors, with a common recognition of the supremacy of law, and, having the benefits of varied economic and political institutions while united by their common cultural heritage and by their feeling of a common destiny. It is in this sense that I speak of the Atlantic Community. [Quoted in Freedom and Union, 01 1963 (Vol. 18, No. 2), p. 16Google Scholar.]

¹⁴ See his article in this issue, pp. 663–682.

¹⁵ I am following here the analysis by Ladd, John, “The Concept of Community: A Logical Analysis,” in Community, edited by Friedrich, C. J. (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ See the negative conclusion reached by Godechot, J. and Palmer, R. R., “Le problème de l'Atlantique,” Atti del X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche, Florence, 1956, Vol. V, pp. 173 ffGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ See Haas, Ernst, “International Integration …,” p. 367Google Scholar.

¹⁸ See his article in this issue, p. 779–780.

¹⁹ The negotiations in Brussels between the Six and Great Britain (especially over agriculture) had already demonstrated that point.

²⁰ See Haas, Ernst, “International Integration …,” p. 375Google Scholar.

²¹ The role of European assemblies in creating that universe has been important. The NATO Parliamentarians have never been able to play such a role.

²² Among whom I would put not only the “political class” but also the top civil servants, the leaders of the main organized collective interests, and the intelligentsia.

²³ Aron, Raymond, op. cit., p. 733Google Scholar. Aron's critical analysis of the European Communities, which stresses that all the marks of sovereignty remain with the component states, appears on pp. 729–734.

²⁴ The idea that the Council of Ministers, as a Community organ, differs fundamentally from ordinary intergovernmental organs and is morally bound to reach a consensus has been rudely shaken in all these cases.

²⁵ This argument is presented in an unpublished draft by Pierre Uri for the Atlantic Institute.

²⁶ It has been said (by Jean Monnet among others) that the fiasco of the negotiations with Britain was not a failure of the “Community approach,” since that approach had not been used in the matter. It seems to me, however, that this is only partly true, and that what is significant is the fact that on a subject of such importance this approach should have indeed been somewhat soft-pedaled by the parties.

²⁷ Compare the analysis suggested here with Etzioni, Amitai, “A Paradigm for the Study of Political Unification,” World Politics, 10 1962 (Vol. 15, No. 1), pp. 44 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “The Dialectics of Supranational Unification,” American Political Science Review, 12 1962 (Vol. 56, No. 4), pp. 927 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁸ See Delmas, Claude et al. , L'avenir de l'Alliance Atlantique (Paris: Berager-Levrault, 1961)Google Scholar.

²⁹ The United States made use of its predominance when it decided to cancel the Skybolt.

³⁰ McGeorge Bundy, speech in Copenhagen, September 27, 1962, Department of State Bulletin, 10 22, 1962 (Vol. 47, No. 1217), p. 605Google Scholar.

³¹ See this issue, p. 667.

³² See Kraft, Joseph, The Grand Design (New York: Harper and Row, 1962)Google Scholar.

³³ See this issue, pp. 663–682 and 771–786.

³⁴ I am concentrating, as I indicated above, on United States-Western European differences. There are many other subjects of contention between Britain and the Six, and between the Six and EFTA.

³⁵ See Uri, Pierre, Partnership for Progress (New York: Harper and Row, 1963)Google Scholar.

³⁶ See The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy, edited by Elliott, William Yandell (New York: Holt, 1955), pp. 206 ffGoogle Scholar.

³⁷ The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 provides that tariff reductions negotiated by the United States and its European partners will be extended to others through the most-favored-nation clause.

³⁸ See Lichtheim's, George remarks (op. cit., p. 150)Google Scholar about the way in which the list of goods covered by the Trade Expansion Act was drawn. The preliminary GATT discussions at Geneva in May 1963 have been disquieting to many of the underdeveloped countries.

³⁹ See Lichtheim's, George analysis, op. cit., pp. 73 ff.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See de Gaulle's, press conference of 05 15, 1962, in Embassy, French, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 175Google Scholar.

⁴¹ See this issue, p. 721.

⁴² See Acheson, Dean, “The Practice of Partnership,” Foreign Affairs, 01 1963 (Vol. 41, No. 2), pp. 247 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Albert Wohlstetter, “Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the Nth + Country,” idem, April 1961 (Vol. 39, No. 3), pp. 355 ff.

⁴³ George Ball, quoted by Beloff, Max, op. cit., p. 114Google Scholar. See also the quote from Mr. Schaetzel in Mr. Merchant's article, p. 615 below.

⁴⁴ See, for instance, the article by Defense MinisterMessmer, Pierre in Revue de la Defense Nationale, 05 1963Google Scholar (English translation in: Embassy, French, French Affairs, No. 155)Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Critics of de Gaulle's military policy point out that it resembles the “massive retaliation” doctrine abandoned by the United States after writers such as Henry Kissinger and Robert Osgood had shown that it left no middle ground between holocaust and humiliation. There is, however, another possible explanation: the General may well realize the need for conventional forces to make the nuclear deterrent credible, but he may envision a Europe des États in which the deterrent would be composed of France's nuclear forces and Germany's conventional ones.

⁴⁶ The diplomatic game is extremely subtle on both sides: de Gaulle, over the Berlin issue, has been playing on latent European fears and taking a “tough” line as a European (rather than a purely French) statesman, but this stance has served especially to justify the construction of a purely national nuclear force. The United States has been criticizing de Gaulle for his failure to contribute sufficiently to the defense of Europe (i.e., conventional forces, since the United States considers France's nuclear effort as wasteful). The United States has stressed its commitment to this defense, but recent trends in American strategy have been interpreted by Europeans as weakening the deterrent value of America's involvement. (See my article, “De Gaulle, l'Europe et l'alliance,” Esprit, June 1963.)

⁴⁷ See Mr. Merchant's article in this issue, pp. 620–621.

⁴⁸ Even Britain's failure to enter the European Community contributes to the ambiguities: de Gaulle feared that Britain's entry would resolve one of the most fundamental ones by diluting and giving too Atlantic a complexion to the European enterprise. Since France's veto postpones but cannot once and for all preclude a new confrontation, the issue remains unresolved.

⁴⁹ Another symbol of the persistent European divisions can be found in the resolutions of the “Atlantic Convention” of January 1962. The High Council, whose creation was recommended, would not have given any recognition to the European Community as such—i.e., its members would have been the representatives of the separate states (see Herter, Christian A., Toward an Atlantic Community, New York, Harper and Row, 1963)Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ See, for instance, General Norstad's article in this issue, pp. 804–812.

⁵¹ Press conference of May 15, 1962.

⁵² A good indication of this risk is given by Spinelli's, Alfiero article, “Atlantic Pact on European Unity,” Foreign Affairs, 07 1962 (Vol. 40, No. 4), pp. 542 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵³ See, for instance, the remarks of. Alfred Grosser in this issue, pp. 570–572.

⁵⁴ See Liska, George, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 198Google Scholar.