1. For evidence of the increasing importance of export promotion, see Czinkota, Michael R. and Tesar, George, eds., Export Policy: A Global Assessment (New York: Praeger, 1982);Google ScholarHufbauer, Gary C., “Subsidy Issues after the Tokyo Round,” in Cline, William R., ed., Trade Policy in the 1980s (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1983), pp. 327–62Google Scholar; and Hufbauer, Gary C. and Erb, Joanna Shelton, Subsidies in International Trade (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1984).Google Scholar

2. Mikesell, Raymond F. and Farah, Marie G., “U.S. Export Competitiveness in Manufactures in Third-World Markets,” in Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), World Trade Competition: Western Countries and Third-World Markets (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 45–170.Google Scholar The data were drawn from the period 1970–1978. Conditions during the subsequent decade may have varied from this pattern. On the deepening links between trade and finance, see Malmgren, Harald B., “Changing Forms of Competition and World Trade Rules,” in CSIS, World Trade Competition, pp. 425 and 427ff.Google Scholar

3. For literature reviews on international regimes, see Haggard, Stephan and Simmons, Beth, “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 491–517CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Krasner, Stephen, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983),Google Scholar from which the common definition of a regime is drawn: it is a set of “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area” (p. 1).

4. Cowhey, Peter and Long, Edward, “Testing Theories of Regime Change: Hegemonic Decline or Surplus Capacity?” International Organization 37 (Spring 1983), pp. 157–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar On the importance of an “extended period of prosperity, associated with liberal policies,” see Keohane, Robert O., “The World Political Economy and the Crisis of Embedded Liberalism,” in Goldthorpe, John H., ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism: Studies in the Political Economy of Western European Nations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 16.Google Scholar On hegemony, see Krasner, Stephen, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28 (04 1976), pp. 317–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Collaboration and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).Google Scholar On the importance of preexisting institutions, such as GATT, see Aggarwal, Vinod, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).Google Scholar

5. For example, nearly every test of the most widely cited theory of regimes, hegemonic stability theory, has failed to confirm it. For a literature review, see Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” p. 500.

6. Here I draw on Alexander Wendt's critique of methodologically individualist theories, found in “The Agent Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), p. 344.Google Scholar The same point is made by McKeown, Timothy J. in “The Limits of Structural Theories of Commercial Policy,” International Organization 40 (Winter 1986), pp. 43–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar This analytical approach should not be reified: the stages are not always entirely independent; thus, this approach is not theoretically neutral. By ordering the stages of cooperation in this way. for example, it is implicitly assumed that state interests are determined independently of the processes of bargaining and compliance themselves. Among the implications of this weak rationality assumption is the exclusion of some theorizing about the phenomenon of learning, that is, about changes in preferences through feedback from strategic interaction. (Note, however, that the first stage involves the explanation of prestrategic preferences, not interests, which may take the strategic situation into account.) The model also excludes feedback, in the form of rational expectations, from compliance to bargaining. Those interested in learning or rational expectations theory may wish to order the stages of cooperation differently.

7. For outlines of national trade finance systems, see OECD, The Export Credit Financing Systems in OECD Member Countries, 3d ed. (Paris: OECD, 1987)Google Scholar; Rahman, Syed Sajjadur, The Competitiveness of Canada's Officially Supported Export Financing System: Detailed Findings (Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada, 1985)Google Scholar; and Bowen, David, Mills, Dominic, and Knight, Martin, Guide to Export Finance (London: Euromoney Publications, 1986).Google Scholar

8. Export-Import Bank, Report to the U.S. Congress on Export Credit Competition … (mimeograph, 1980–1982).Google Scholar

9. For a fascinating case study of bargaining between exporting nations and the Mexican government on a billion-dollar project, see Wellons, Philip A., “Banks and the Export Credit Wars: Mixed Credits in the Sinestra Financing,” in Rodriguez, Rita M., ed., The Export-Import Bank at Fifty: The International Environment and the Institution's Role (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 167–203.Google Scholar

10. Wellons, Philip A., Passing the Buck: Banks, Government and Third World Debt (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1987), p. 93.Google Scholar This figure understates the importance of trade finance by excluding short-term and private credits, as well as credits for military exports. The importance of trade finance in North–South capital flows is increasing. See Brau, Eduard et al., Export Credits: Developments and Prospects (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Working Paper, 07 1986).Google Scholar

11. Feinberg, Richard, Subsidizing Success: The Export-Import Bank in the U.S. Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 48.Google Scholar The data are drawn from the late 1970s; since the advent of the debt crisis, these ratios may have changed.

12. Economists disagree whether subsidized export credits create or offset distortions in capital or goods markets. For a discussion of these issues, see Eaton, Jonathan, “Credit Policy and International Competition,” in Krugman, Paul R., ed., Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986).Google Scholar

13. See Carr, E. H., The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919–1939 (New York: Harper & Row, 1939), pp. 127–29.Google Scholar

14. Export Credit Guarantee Department, A History of ECGD 1919–1979 (London: ECGD, 1979).Google Scholar

15. Wellons, , Passing the Buck, pp. 58–59.Google Scholar

16. Rodriguez, Rita M., “Exim's Mission and Accomplishments: 1934–84,” in Rodriguez, Export-Import Bank, p. 5.Google Scholar

17. Statement of Marc E. Leland, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, before the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives (mimeograph, 2 November 1981). See also Fleissig, Heywood and Hill, Catherine, The Benefits and Costs of Official Export Credit Programs of Industrialized Countries: An Analysis (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 659, 1984).Google Scholar

18. Unpublished OECD statistics, May 1987.

19. The history recounted here draws on Ray, John, “The OECD ‘Consensus’ on Export Credits,” The World Economy 9 (09 1986), pp. 295–310CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ECGD, A History of ECGD; Moore, John L. Jr, “Export Credit Arrangements,” in Rubin, Seymour and bauer, Gary Clyde Huf, eds., Emerging Standards of International Trade and Investment (Totowa, N.J.: Row man & Alanheld, 1983), pp. 139–74Google Scholar; Pearce, Joan, Subsidized Export Credit (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1980)Google Scholar; Hufbauer and Erb, Subsidies; and Wallen, Axel, “Export Credit Subsidization and the Consensus Arrangement,” Aussenwirtschaft, 09 1984.Google Scholar On the Berne Union, see Ward, Donald A., “The Management of International Trade Risks: The Role of the Berne Union,” The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 11 (October 1986), pp. 246–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20. Moore, , “Export Credit Arrangements,” p. 141.Google Scholar

21. Interview with John E. Ray, International Secretariat of the OECD, July 1987.

22. Moore, “Export Credit Arrangements,” p. 144, who cites Pearce, Subsidized Export Credit. The Berne Union remains active in certain specific areas, such as East–West trade and sectoral agreements on electronic machines and some agricultural products.

23. The quotation is from Pearce, , Subsidized Export Credit, pp. 43–44.Google Scholar See also Moore, , “Export Credit Arrangements,” pp. 144–50.Google Scholar A special working group (Working Party no. 6) was formed to find ways to limit subsidization in the shipbuilding industry. In the late 1960s, the OECD Understanding on Credits for Ships was reached between Europe and Japan. This sectoral agreement, although negotiated without the participation of the United States, which neither imports nor exports ships, served as a prototype for future agreements. On the shipbuilding agreement, see Wallen, , “Export Credit Subsidization,” p. 261.Google Scholar

24. The three European G–5 nations lacked the legal right to negotiate, that right being reserved for the European Commission by Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome (the Common Commercial Policy). The Consensus thus took the form of a series of unilateral declarations. Between 1975 and 1978, the European Commission and the French government fought for competence over the issue. The European Court of Justice eventually found for the commission.

25. Tied-aid credits, also referred to as “mixed” credits, are export credits linked to development aid. The amount of aid in a package is termed the “grant element.” It is calculated by estimating “the amount of capital that would need to be invested on commercial terms to yield the same stream of repayments as the loan in question. The more concessional the loan, the smaller is the corresponding amount of hypothetical capital, and the larger is the difference between them. It is this difference, usually expressed as a percentage of the loan, that is the grant element.” Thus, the lower the grant element, the closer the terms are to market terms. See Pearce, , Subsidized Export Credit, p. 23nGoogle Scholar; and “The Use of Tied-Aid Credits,” OECD Internal Document TD/Consensus/81.13.

26. Hartland-Thunberg, Penelope and Crawford, Morris F., Government Support for Exports: A Second-Best Alternative (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), pp. 67–69Google Scholar; and berg, Fein, Subsidizing Success, p. 63.Google Scholar

27. Messerlin, Patrick A., “Export Credit Mercantilism à la Française,” The World Economy 9 (December 1986), pp. 387–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar At the time, most credits were extended in dollars, which partially counteracted these distortions.

28. The quotation is from Knight, Martin, “In the Fight over Export Credit Financing, Few Hands Are Quite Clean,” Euromoney, 09 1981.Google Scholar For internal governmental concerns, see U.S. Department of Treasury Policy Review Paper, “USG Initiatives to Strengthen International Export Credit Agreements: Review and Recommendations,” March 1979, p. 5.

29. Rodriguez, , “Exim's Mission,” p. 6.Google ScholarSources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Statistics Yearbook, 1987, country tables, line 61; and Ray, John, “The ‘OECD Consensus’ on Export Credits,” The World Economy 9 (09 1986).Google Scholar

30. By 1978, the EC had reasserted its jurisdiction over the issue. The crucial decisions were taken not at the OECD, but in Brussels, where France, Italy, and Belgium were pitted against West Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and, usually, the United Kingdom. Since the Japanese could most likely be persuaded to go along with any transatlantic agreement, efforts of the United States were aimed at influencing the “game within a game” inside the EC. I am grateful to Dan Pearson for suggesting this metaphor.

31. At the recommendation of an OECD commission led by Axel Wallen, the Swedish chairman of the ECG who had been instrumental in avoiding a breakdown of the 1978 negotiations, minimum interest rates were increased in November 1981 and June 1982. Special provisions were enacted to allow low-interest-rate countries, such as Japan and Germany, to charge lower interest rates. The sectoral understanding on commercial aircraft was tightened in September 1981. See Report of the U.S. Department of Treasury, International Export Credit Negotiations (1981–1982) (mimeograph, 16 09 1982), p. 2.Google Scholar But at the time, even Wallen remained pessimistic about further progress. See Wallen, Axel and Duff, John M. Jr, “The Outlook for Official Export Credits,” in Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, ed., The International Framework for Money and Banking in the 1980s (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1981), pp. 475–81.Google Scholar

32. Statement of Lange, John D. Jr, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Treasury Document R-2502 (mimeograph, 16 01 1984), p. 3.Google Scholar

33. The strategy is set forth in U.S. Department of Treasury Policy Review Paper, “USG Initiatives,” pp. 6–8 and Table 3, p. 2. The possibility of using long-term credits as a threat is also mentioned in Wallen and Duff, “Outlook,” pp. 480–81.

34. On the depth of New York capital markets, see Knight, , “Fight over Export Credit”; and Pearce, Subsidized Export Credit, p. 44.Google Scholar

35. U.S. Department of Treasury, International Export Credit Negotiations, p. 10Google Scholar; and interviews with officials of the EC, OECD, and U.S. Department of Treasury, July and August 1987.

36. For a more detailed summary of the provisions of the 1983 agreement, see Hufbauer, and Erb, , Subsidies, pp. 74–75.Google Scholar

37. For a discussion of the aircraft agreement, see Hayward, Keith, International Collaboration in Civil Aerospace (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp. 157–92 passim.Google Scholar

38. The Airbus was the only exception made by West Germany to its policy of nonsubsi-dization. See Knight, “Fight over Export Credit.”

39. Minimum down payments (15 percent) and the maximum portion of the total price to be covered (62.5 percent) were carried over from the Commonline agreement. Quid pro quos, for example those involving grants of landing rights to purchasers, were banned. On the negotiations, see Hayward, , International Collaboration, p. 187.Google Scholar

40. Interviews with EC officials, Brussels, July and August 1987.

41. Interviews with OECD officials, Paris, July 1987.

42. Cheney, David M., “The OECD Export Credits Agreement,” Finance and Development 22 (09 1985), p. 36.Google Scholar

43. By assuming a reference rate of 10 percent, the official OECD calculations overestimated the percentage of aid in a tied-aid credit issued by a nation which, like France, had interest rates higher than 10 percent. See footnote 25.

44. Dan Pearson points out that the administration's request to Congress for a $300 million “war chest” was designed by the Reagan administration to head off congressional pressure for a $1 billion “war chest,” as well as to pressure the French. Only a few months previously, the Eximbank chairperson had testified before Congress againstia war chest. Personal communication, 18 May 1988.

45. Definitive measures of the “strength” of regimes have yet to be developed. Here the following four measures are used: scope, adaptability, coherence, and compliance. For some suggestive measures of institutionalization, from which these four elements are drawn, see Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 13–17 and 22–24Google Scholar; and Haggard, and Simmons, , “Theories of International Regimes,” pp. 496–98.Google Scholar

46. In recent years, even the NICs, which are not members of OECD, have formally or (more often) informally complied with the minimum interest rate provisions. Interviews with U.S. Treasury Department officials, Washington, D.C., April 1987. The OECD Arrangement does not cover agricultural or military exports. These exclusions are consistent with the institutional explanation presented later in this paper, since these credits are administered by the Departments of Agriculture and Defense, respectively.

47. Interviews with Export-Import Bank officials, 1988. See also Export-Import Bank, Report to the U.S. Congress on Export Credit Competition and the Export-Import Bank of the United States for the Period January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1986 (mimeograph, 06 1987), pp. 9, 41, and 49–50.Google Scholar

48. Pearce, , Subsidized Export Credit, pp. 51 and 68Google Scholar; Pearce, Joan, “Developments in the Financing of Industrial Projects since 1982” (mimeograph, 07 1985), p. 11.Google Scholar Indeed, some export credit agencies now feel that “the present system no longer responds adequately to exporters' needs.” See “Consensus Changes,” Euromoney Trade Finance Report, 05 1987, p. 3.Google Scholar

49. Preferences must remain clearly distinguished from interests, which incorporate strategic calculations. Although preferences cannot be observed directly, the initial negotiating positions, internal documents, and interviews often provide evidence about them. In the case of the OECD trade finance negotiations, there is little disagreement among participants and observers about the nature of national preferences.

50. Some have argued that there was a shift in preferences in France and Britain in the mid-1980s. With rising government budget deficits, trade finance reform became a prominent domestic issue in 1984 and 1985. But in neither France nor Britain did this debate fundamentally alter the negotiating preferences of the government. In Britain, the debate did not touch on the desirability of subsidies, which the British government had consistently opposed, but simply on the question of whether subsidies ought to be used to retaliate against foreign subsidies. See Byatt, I. C. R., “Byatt Report on Subsidies to British Export Credits,” The World Economy 7 (06 1984),CrossRefGoogle Scholar and the ensuing exchange in the same journal (September 1984), especially p. 345. The persistence of support for export credits in France is illustrated by the fact that the volume of exports supported by credits remains much higher in France than in all other OECD countries. Only in September 1985 did the French government announce cuts in export credit subsidies, but French support for tied-aid credits remained strong. On French policy, see Messerlin, “Export Credit Mercantilism,” pp. 385–408; and the special issue entitled “Dossier financement export,” Moniteur du commerce international, 22 December 1986.Google Scholar

51. See Goldstein, Judith, “Ideas, Institutions and American Trade Policy,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 179–218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

52. Even the strongest advocates of the power of ideas stress the role of institutions. See Goldstein, Judith, “The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection.” American Political Science Review 80 (03 1986), pp. 161–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

53. Ruggie, John, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in Krasner, International Regimes, pp. 195–232.Google Scholar

54. Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), chap. 12.Google Scholar

55. See Feinberg, , Subsidizing Success, pp. 136–37Google Scholar; Wellons, , Passing the Buck, pp. 23 and 58–63Google Scholar; and Messerlin, , “Export Credit Mercantilism,” pp. 386–87.Google Scholar After considering regional percentages of exports and overall trade balances, Wellons settles on regional trade balances as the best indicator of state interests. Messerlin argues that the export subsidies, in contrast to tariffs, allow the French to increase their penetration of foreign markets while keeping their own borders open for vital imports of capital goods.

56. In the late 1970s, the French and German nuclear industries held nearly equal shares of the world market, with the Germans weakening. Both nations appeared to be outcompeting the United States. See Walker, William and Lönnroth, Mans, Nuclear Power Struggles: Industrial Competition and Proliferation Control (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 34 and 43–44.Google Scholar

57. It is important to keep in mind, however, that these institutions may themselves reflect historical market positions and ideologies.

58. For some earlier efforts in this direction, see Wellons, , Passing the Buck, pp. 25ff., 49–50, and 64,Google Scholar who ultimately rejects the approach; and Spindler, J. Andrew, The Politics of Institutional Credit: Private Finance and Foreign Policy in Germany and Japan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1984).Google Scholar

59. For similar arguments, see Ikenberry, G. John, “The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the Oil Shocks in the 1970s,” International Organization 40 (Winter 1986), pp. 105–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Katzenstein, Peter J., ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ .For example, on the French Commission des Garanties, the dominant players have traditionally been the “spending” agencies (the Direction des Relations Economiques Extér-ieurs and the credit agency BFCE), rather than the “paying” agencies (Tresor and the insurance agency COFACE). See Messerlin, “Export Credit Mercantilism,” pp. 406–7.

61. Wellons, , Passing the Buck, p. 94.Google Scholar Italy, which often allied itself with France in EC debates, has a similar system, but few budget resources. See Ossola, Rinaldo, ed., The Role of Export Credits in Italy's Foreign Trade (Naples: Isveimer Bulletin no. 3, 01 1978).Google Scholar

62. Messerlin, , “Export Credit Mercantilism,” p. 405Google Scholar; and Feinberg, Richard E. and Tucker, Stuart K., “Export Credits in U.S. Trade, Development and Industrial Policy,” in Rodriguez, Export-Import Bank, p. 135.Google Scholar

63. See the interview with John L. Moore Jr., president of Export-Import Bank, in Fry, Richard, “New Policies at Eximbank,” The Banker 129 (08, 1979), p. 75Google Scholar; and U.S. General Accounting Office, To Be Self-Sufficient or Competitive? Eximbank Needs Congressional Funding (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1981).Google Scholar

64. The timing of this shift also calls into question the claim that the American push for market rates stemmed from concerns about subsidized trade with the Eastern bloc. This aspect did not in fact become an issue until the negotiations preceding the 1983 revision of the Arrangement. See Kohler, Daniel F. and Reuter, Peter J., Honor among Nations: Enforcing the “Gentlemen's Agreement” on Export Credits (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Study N-2536-USDP, December 1986).Google Scholar

65. See Ninth Report from the Expenditure Committee, Session 1976–77 (London: HMSO, 1977), cited in Pearce, Subsidized Export Credit, p. 10.

66. Zysman, John, Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of International Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).Google Scholar

67. Keohane, After Hegemony, chap. 5.

68. See Smith, Roger K., “Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41 (Spring 1987), p. 276CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism.

69. Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 100.Google Scholar

70. For an argument that the strong form of hegemonic stability theory is thus misspecified, see Snidal, Duncan, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985), pp. 579–614.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The weak form is set forth in Kindleberger, Charles, The World in Depression (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).Google Scholar

71. U.S. Department of Treasury, International Export Credit Negotiations, p. l; and Lange, , “Congressional Testimony,” 1984.Google Scholar

72. Messerlin, , “Export Credit Mercantilism,” p. 391Google Scholar; and Export-Import Bank, 1986 Report to the U.S. Congress, p. 16.Google Scholar

73. Wallen, , “Export Credit Subsidization,” p. 263.Google Scholar

74. Wagner, Harrison, “The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 77 (06 1983), pp. 330–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

75. For a correlative test, see, for example, Krasner, “State Power.” For a review, see Haggard, and Simmons, , “Theories of International Regimes,” pp. 500–504.Google Scholar For a previous “process-tracing” test of hegemonic stability theory, which I follow closely, see McKeown, Timothy J., “Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th-century Tariff Levels in Europe,” International Organization 37 (Winter 1983), pp. 73–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar McKeown uses process-tracing to uncover a “false-positive” correlation, while in this study it is used to uncover a “false-negative.”

76. For a critique of this assumption, see Snidal, “Limits.” An important exception to the generalization about hegemonic theory testing is Lake, David, “International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887–1934,” World Politics 35 (07 1983), pp. 517–34,CrossRefGoogle Scholar who presents an elegant and powerful defense of monocausal hegemonic stability theory.

77. On the relation between the U.S. world role and domestic financial and monetary policy, see Calleo, David, The Imperious Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).Google Scholar

78. On the OECD regime as a cartel, see Kohler and Reuter, Honor among Nations, p. 17. It is important to remember that the cartel is directed against both LDCs and domestic exporting firms. According to a recent World Bank study, exporting firms and importing nations benefit equally from subsidization. Fleissig, and Hill, , Changing Nature of Export Credit Finance, p. 153.Google Scholar On the economics of the interaction between firms and governments and the way in which international agreements can shift the initiative and the welfare gains from firms to governments, see Carmichael, Calum M., “The Control of Export Credit Subsidies and Its Welfare Consequences,” Journal of International Economics 23 (08 1987), pp. 1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

79. D. K. Osborne contends that members of a cartel face a “prisoner's dilemma.” If certain problems can be resolved, he argues, cartels are not inherently unstable, as has often been argued. “Cartel Problems,” American Economic Review 66 (December 1976), pp. 835–44.Google Scholar For a reconsideration of Osborne's argument, see Green, Edward J. and Porter, Robert H., “Non-cooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information,” Econometrica 52 (01 1984), pp. 87–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

80. Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 101.Google Scholar

81. Interviews with U.S. and OECD officials, 1986–87. See also Wellons, , Passing the Buck, pp. 37–38,Google Scholar and “Bankers and the Export Credit Wars.”

82. Interviews. See also U.S. State Department Telex from Brewster (U.S. Embassy London) to RUEHC/State (Washington, D.C.), 7 February 1978, describing an attempt by the Korean government to use selective information to play the United States and Britain against each other.

83. Kohler, and Reuter, , Honor among Nations, p. 21.Google Scholar

84. , After Hegemony, p. 92.

85. Moore, , “Export Credit Arrangements,” p. 144.Google Scholar

86. For a defense of parsimony, see Lake, David A., “Power and the Third World: Toward a Realist Political Economy of North–South Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 31 (06 1987), pp. 217–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar