¹ On de Gaulle's conception of grandeur, see Hoffmann, Stanley, “De Gaulle's Memoirs: The Hero as History,” World Politics, 10 1960 (Vol. 13, No. 1), pp. 140–155.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Brzezinski, Zbigniew, “After the Test Ban,” The New Republic, 08 31, 1963, pp. 18–21.Google Scholar

³ In his press conference of July 29, 1963 (see de France, Ambassade, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 192, p. 10).Google Scholar

⁴ Especially in his farewell to General Norstad; also in his press conference of July 29, 1963.

⁵ Press conference of 07 29, 1963, pp. 7–8Google Scholar. Also, Furniss, Edgar S., France, Troubled Ally (New York: Harper, 1960), passim.Google Scholar

⁶ In an interview to the Columbia Broadcasting System, in Ambassade de France, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 176, 03 31, 1962.Google Scholar

⁷ On some of these points, see Debré, Michel, Au service de la Nation (Paris: Stock, 1963)Google Scholar, part 4, chapter 2. De Gaulle's, critique of supranationality is best found in his press conference of May 15, 1962 (Ambassade de France, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 175)Google Scholar. I have discussed it in “Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System,” International Organization, Summer 1963 (Vol. 17, No. 3), pp. 521–549Google Scholar. On de Gaulle's concepts of international relations, see the article mentioned in footnote 1, p. 2Google Scholar, above. De Gaulle's, conception is strikingly similar to that of Raymond Aron, defined in Paix et Guerre entre les nations (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1962).Google Scholar

⁸ See in particular his Balance of Terror (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).Google Scholar

⁹ See, for instance, Secretary of State Rusk's speech in Frankfurt on October 27, 1963 (New York Times, 10 28, 1963)Google Scholar and Bowie, Robert R., “Tensions within the Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, 10 1963 (Vol. 42, No. 1), p. 68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ See his press conference of January 14, 1963 (Ambassade de France, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 185, pp. 10–11).Google Scholar

¹¹ Hoag, Malcolm W., “Nuclear Policy and French Intransigence,” Foreign Affairs, 01 1963 (Vol. 41, No. 2), pp. 286–298.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² See Kissinger, Henry A., “NATO's Nuclear Dilemma,” The Reporter, 03 1963 (Vol. 28, No. 7), pp. 22–37.Google Scholar

¹³ Nothing, on the other hand, indicates that de Gaulle has adopted Gallois' extreme argument about the obsolescence of alliances in the nuclear age—an argument effectively criticized by Raymond Aron in his book, Le Grand Débat (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1963).Google Scholar

¹⁴ See, for instance, de Gaulle's suggestions on the Congo in opposition to United States reliance on the UN (press conference of September 5, 1960, in Ambassade de France, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 152, p. 4)Google Scholar; and the contrast he described between the original UN (as he interprets it) and what it has become, in his press conference of April 11, 1961 (text in André, Passeron, De Gaulle parle [Paris: Plon, 1962]), pp. 405–407.Google Scholar

¹⁵ On this fiasco, see the interesting remarks by Faure, Edgar in his introduction to L'Année Politique 1962 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), pp. xiii–xiv.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Whether de Gaulle would have vetoed Britain's entry even without Nassau because of the economic and foreign policy issues discussed above is hard to prove. Maybe the decision would have been the same. But the timing and the manner were certainly determined by Nassau. Without Nassau he might have let the talks drag on and expire over the highly controversial economic issues. Nassau insured that he would faire un éclat—i.e., act in the most spectacular fashion and take the responsibility as well as the initiative of the crash.

¹⁷ I insist upon the word appearing, since Britain was assured to receive United States aid in the construction of the warheads to be fitted on, and of the submarines to be equipped with, the promised Polaris missiles, whereas no such offer, it seems, was made to France.

¹⁸ See McGeorge, Bundy's speech in Copenhagen on September 27, 1962, in Department of State Bulletin, 10 22, 1962 (Vol. 47, No. 1217), p. 605.Google Scholar

¹⁹ There is a parallel with his domestic action in the months that preceded his veto of Britain's entry. The rather questionable procedure he imposed for revising the Constitution of 1958 could not but emphasize the fragility of the very institutions he wanted to consolidate; but any other procedure was likely to be either ineffective or even to lead to a “revenge” of the “parties of yesterday.”

²⁰ See Passeron, André, op. cit., pp. 414 ff., 420 ff., and 427–428, as well as the press conference of July 29, 1963.Google Scholar

²¹ De Gaulle's belief is similar to George Kennan's opinion in 1949; see Beloff, Max, The United States and the Unity of Europe (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1963), pp. 52–53.Google Scholar

²² This point is made by Raymond Aron in an article to be published in Daedalus, Winter 1964.Google Scholar

²³ De Gaulle's recent statement on Vietnam can be interpreted in this light.

²⁴ See Aron's, interview by U.S. News and World Report, 04 22, 1963, pp. 68 ff.Google Scholar

²⁵ “Car l'épée est l'axe du monde et la grandeur ne se divise pas.” (Vers l'armée de métier [Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1934]), p. 230.Google Scholar

²⁶ See, again, de Gaulle's statement on Vietnam.

²⁷ The General's distaste for bargains was much in evidence during the peace talks with the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN): to negotiated compromises he steadily preferred unilateral concessions accompanied by veiled or not-so-veiled promises and threats.

²⁸ See The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).Google Scholar

²⁹ See de Gaulle on Mussolini in Vol. III of his memoirs: Le Salut (Paris: Plon, 1959), pp. 172–173.Google Scholar

³⁰ West Germany certainly has no “habit” of dependence, but it has had the need for it, both because of its division and position, and because any other form of diplomacy would have fanned the flames of anti-German memories and resentments in the West.

³¹ Paul Henri, Spaak, “Hold Fast,” Foreign Affairs, 07 1963 (Vol. 41, No. 4), pp. 611–620.Google Scholar

³² This would not hold in the improbable case of the seizure of power by the extreme right or the extreme left.

³³ It is not impossible that they will shed the General's hostility to supranational institutions. However, in practice, the differences between such institutions and intergovernmental ones tend to decrease as the functions dealt with by the European bodies become more general and affect more the area of high politics. (See my remarks in: Hoffmann, S., Kindleberger, C. P., Wylie, L., Pitts, J. R., Duroselle, J. B., and Goguel, F., In Search of France [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963], pp. 79–80, and in “Discord in Community,” loc. cit.) Moreover, on issues of substance, France's opposition leaders have increasingly indorsed Gaullist positions: they too want a “European Europe” and see in France's nuclear force the embryo of a European one. Their tone is less overtly challenging or suspicious of the United States; their policies hardly less so. To the extent to which they would like to reach, faster than de Gaulle, a much more tightly united Europe whose policies would not be very different from his, should not American enthusiasts for European integration shift their attention from procedures or institutions to substance and policies?Google Scholar