Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dk4vv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T05:39:38.009Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy—CORRIGENDUM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 July 2018

Abstract

Type
Corrigendum
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2018 

In the original publication of this article, a portion of a footnote was improperly incorporated into the main text. On page 552, the final sentence of the second paragraph was meant to be part of footnote 73:

By a different mechanism, there is a parallel here to David Lake's argument for why democracies may be “powerful pacifists,” in the sense of having little interest in territorial acquisition but strong military capability.

Additionally, the opening sentence of the same paragraph should be revised to the following:

With issue competition (γ > 0) and simultaneous arms decisions, if state i’s value for territory increases then j’s equilibrium arms level tends to increase.

References

Fearon, James D. 2018. Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy. International Organization 72 (3):523–59. doi: 10.1017/S0020818318000115.Google Scholar