¹ Three hundred thousand troops were Soviet, with 50,000 Poles, 20,000 Hungarians, 20,000 East Germans, and 10,000 Bulgarians.

² See Birnbaum, Karl, Peace in Europe, East-West Relations 1966–1968 and the Prospects for a European Settlement (London: Oxford University Press, 1970),Google Scholarespecially chapter 3, for an excellent review and analysis of the effects of the Czech crisis on the matrix of East-West European policies. For a shorter discussion see Pierre, Andrew J., “Implications of the Western Response to the Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia,” The Atlantic Community Quarterly 7 (Spring 1969): 59–75.Google Scholar

³ Luchsinger, F., “The Price of Aggression,” Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 25 August 1968, reprinted in Survival 10 (November 1968): 365–67.Google Scholar

⁴ Tucker, Harvey Joel, “Measuring Cohesion in the International Communist Movement, 1957–1970” (Indiana University, 1972), p. 1.Google Scholar

⁵ See Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965);Google ScholarOlson, Mancur and Zeckhauser, Richard, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of Economics and Statistics 48 (August 1966): 266–79;CrossRefGoogle ScholarBurgess, Philip M. and Robinson, James A., “Alliances and the Theory of Collective Action: A Simulation of Coalition Processes,” Midwest Journal of Political Science 13 (May 1969): 194–218CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Russett, Bruce M. and Starr, Harvey, “Alliances and the Price of Primacy,” in Russett, Bruce M., What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 91–126.Google Scholar See also Russett, Bruce M. and Sullivan, John D., “Collective Goods and International Organization,” in The United Nations: Problems and Prospects, ed. Edwin, H. Fedder (St. Louis, Mo.: Center for International Studies of the University of Missouri, 1971), pp. 91–112Google Scholar, for a statement of the wider applicability of collective goods analysis to international relations. The authors also provide an extensive discussion of the conditions under which the collective good will be provided (pp. 96–105).

For critical reviews and analyses of the collective goods approach, see: Loehr, William, “Collective Goods and International Cooperation: Comments,” International Organization 27 (Summer 1973): 421–30;CrossRefGoogle ScholarCowhey, P. F., Hart, J. A., and Schmidt, J. K., “The Theory of Collective Goods and the Future Regime of Ocean Space,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New York City, 14–17 March 1973;Google ScholarBeer, Francis, The Political Economy of Alliances: Benefits, Costs, and Institutions in NATO, Sage Professional Papers in International Studies (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972Google Scholar);Starr, Harvey, “Is There ‘An Economic Theory of Alliances’—An Investigation into the Collective Good Approach to Alliance Behavior” (M. Phil. examination paper, Yale University, 1969).Google Scholar

⁶ While alliances have a number of diverse purposes for their members, in principle security remains the basic function of alliances such as NATO and WTO. More importantly, member nations continue to perceive security-oriented deterrence as vital. Note, for example, West European views on American troop with drawals or other activities that may weaken the American commitment to deterrence in Europe.

⁷ Olson and Zeckhauser, p. 266.

⁸ Ibid., p. 272.

⁹ Olson, pp. 53–56.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 7.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 2. On this point, see also the article by Burgess and Robinson.

¹² Olson, p. 10.

¹³ See the review of Olson's book by Chamberlain, N. W. in the American Economic Review 56 (June 1966): 603.Google Scholar

¹⁴ With certain reservations, deterrence at the alliance level may be seen as having strong collective goods qualities. Collective goods may be defined by two properties: external economy, where benefits are equally available to all members of the group; and nonrivalness, where each individual's consumption does not diminish the supply available to each of the other members.

¹⁵ Olson and Zeckhauser, p. 269. The authors present their arguments partially through the use of simple indifference maps, which use defense spending as an indicator of the valuation of the public good.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 274.

¹⁷ See Van Y Persele De Strihou, Jacques M., “Sharing the Defense Burden Among Western Allies,” Yale Economic Essays 8 (Spring 1968): 261–320Google Scholar; and Pryor, Frederick, Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations (Homewood, III.: Irwin Press, 1969), pp. 96–98.Google ScholarStarr (passim), using several different indicators, demonstrates that if the Olson-Zeckhauser hypothesis regarding GNP and D/GNP is confirmed, the assumption that a collective good is being provided may be accepted.

¹⁸ Russett and Starr, p. 99. In earlier research I also tested the Olson-Zeckhauser hypothesis against universal and regional groupings in order to compare the regional alliances to the international context in which they operated. For a world sample of 117 nations, the Pearson product-moment correlation was a mere .17; for Europe and North America (n=31), the correlation was .35; for Latin America (n=22), r=.12; for Africa (n=36), r=–.04; for the Near East (n=9), r=— .17; for the Far East/Oceania (n=18), r = - .18. None of these correlations were significant at the .05 level except Europe/North America. Thus, the GNP-D/GNP relationship is neither a common one nor one usually found outside the organizational context. However, as noted, if non-NATO European countries are added to the alliance, the model still holds. See Starr, pp. 17, 19–35.

¹⁹ Russett and Starr, p. 115. In her study, Robin Remington provides some indication that Soviet policy toward WTO changed in this respect after the fall of Khrushchev in 1964: “Whereas Khrushchev had treated the alliance as a vehicle for Soviet power and appeared to value it primarily as a stepping stone to more universal forms of Communist organization, the new collective leadership came to use the mechanism of the coalition for consultation and conflict containment.” See Remington, Robin, The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1971), p. 168.Google Scholar

²⁰ See Russett and Starr, p. 101, for a discussion of the methodology employed. Briefly, the Soviet GNP is so much larger than that of the other WTO members that the correlation coefficient will be affected by the outlier. Removing the Soviet Union corrects this distortion while not affecting the presence or absence of a GNP-D/GNP relationship for the rest of WTO.

The data used were provided by the Institute for Strategic Studies (now the International Institute for Strategic Studies) publication, The Military Balance, for the years 1968/69, 1969/70, 1970/71, 1971/72, 1972/73. While not exactly congruent with the data used by Russett and Starr, this is a respected data source, useful for its continuity across time.

²¹ See Russett and Starr, table 4.3, p. 105. I must note, however, that the degree to which a change in GNP affects the change in D/GNP is consistently falling. The betas (which indicate this relationship) for the product-moment correlations computed without the Soviet Union are as follows: .100 for 1967, .099 for 1968, .094 for 1969, .079 for 1970, .075 for 1971.

²² Strategic Survey (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969), p. 2.

²³ Birnbaum, p. 89. Nevertheless, observers agree that detente in Europe was not seriously damaged. For example, on 21–22 June 1970 Warsaw Pact foreign ministers renewed the call for a European security conference.

²⁴ Birnbaum, p. 86.

²⁵ This would explain why East German D/GNP correlates a mere .08 with Soviet D/GNP.

²⁶ The Nixon visit took place on 2–3 August 1969. The Soviet pact was signed 7 July 1970, the Polish one on 9 August 1970.

²⁷ Russett and Starr, p. 115.

²⁸ From table 2 we see that the non-Soviet mean D/GNP for 1968 was 4.2, for 1968 it was 4.3, and for 1970 it was 4.5. Using Russett and Starr's figures (p. 105), we see that the NATO non-US mean D/GNP from 1963–67 was: 1963—4.4, 1964—4.4, 1965—4.2, 1966—4.1, 1967—4.3.

²⁹ Russett and Starr, p. 123.

³⁰ One indicator of this leeway may be seen in the events of the March 1969 Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Budapest. At this meeting the Soviets proposed a set of regulations on combined forces and commands that would have given them direction over the other WTO military forces. The Soviet proposals would have had nations represented in a unified command structure in proportion to the size of their military contributions to WTO, thus assuring Soviet control. However, the opposition of the other members blocked these proposals, thereby scuttling a major objective of the Brezhnev doctrine—WTO force integration under Soviet command and control. The non-Soviet WTO members appear not to have the option of leaving the alliance—indeed, there seems to be little inclination to want to leave—but appear to have the initiative in the size, direction, and use of their military forces (e.g., Rumania's nonparticipation in the 1968 Czech invasion).