1. World Health Organization, International Code of the Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes (Geneva, 1981)Google Scholar; “Joint Agreement, International Nestlé Boycott Committee and Nestlé,” 25 January 1984, signed by Carl Angst, executive vice president of Nestlé, S.A., and William L. Thompson, stated clerk of the United Presbyterian Church, representing the International Nestlé Boycott Committee.

2. Exceptions include Robinson, John, Multinationals and Political Control (New York: St. Martin's, 1983)Google Scholar, and Fisher, Bart and Turner, Jeff, eds., Regulating the Multinational Enterprise: National and International Challenges (New York: Praeger, 1983)Google Scholar. In addition, legal journals have given considerable attention to codes, for example, the special issue of the American Journal of Comparative Law 30 (Autumn 1981)Google Scholar devoted to an examination of codes of conduct.

3. Often called the Infant Formula Code, the code applies to “any food being marketed or otherwise represented as a partial or total replacement for breast-milk, whether or not suitable for that purpose.” I thus refer to it as the WHO/UNICEF code and to the entire debate as the baby food debate rather than the infant formula debate.

4. For other aspects of the baby food controversy, see Fikentscher, Wolfgang, “United Nations Codes of Conduct: New Paths in International Law,” American Journal of Comparative Law 30 (Autumn 1982), pp. 590–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar, on legal implications. Sethi, Prakash, The Righteous and the Powerful: Corporations, Religious Institutions and International Social Activism-The Case of the Infant Formula Controversy and the Nestlé Boycott (Marshfield, Mass.: Pitman, 1985)Google Scholar, examines the issue in relation to the business literature. See also Post, James E., “Assessing the Nestte Boycott: Corporate Accountability and Human Rights,” California Management Review 27 (Winter 1985), pp. 113–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5. Regime theorists have never shown how specific agreements relate to the larger regime. In this case it seems absurd to speak of an “infant feeding regime,” though in the future it may be possible to speak of a “hazardous substances regime” of which the Infant Formula Code is a part. For the time being it is more useful to think of all current code efforts for transnational corporations as specific instrumentalities or agreements within the normative framework of the emerging regime for investment and TNCs.

6. In the late 1960s many countries began to assert increased control over the TNC activities. Nationalization is the most dramatic, but not necessarily the most characteristic, form of hostcountry control, which can also involve policies, legislation, and provisions on such basic issues as monitoring and screening investors, ownership, and divestment, technology transfer, taxation, disclosure, investment guarantees, and dispute settlement. One survey reveals that of 29 less developed countries, 22 adopted regulations on transnational corporations during the period 1967–80; seven had legislation relating the TNCs prior to 1967; and only one has no such regulation. See United Nations, Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), “National Legislation and Regulations Relating to Transnational Corporations” (New York, 1981)Google Scholar.

7. See Feld, Werner J., Multinational Corporations and U.N. Politics: The Quest for Codes of Conduct (New York: Pergamon, 1980), p. 18Google Scholar.

8. International Chamber of Commerce, “Guidelines for International Investment” (Paris, 29 11 1972)Google Scholar; U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “Elements of Global Conduct for Possible Inclusion in Individual Company Statements” (Washington, D.C., 01 1975)Google Scholar.

9. “Guidelines for Advertising Practices in the Promotion of Pesticides Products in Developing Areas of the World,” October 1983, prepared by the Agricultural Chemicals Association Dialogue and accepted by the National Agricultural Association, Washington, D.C.

10. Grosse, Robert, “Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises,” Journal of World Trade Law 16 (09–10 1982), p. 147Google Scholar.

11. FAO, , “Draft International Code on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides” (Rome, 02 1984)Google Scholar.

12. Ruggie, John, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism and the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13. Cf. Keohane, Robert O., “The Demand for International Regimes,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14. Adopted UN codes includes UNCTAD's Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1980 (TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.l); the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, passed in November 1977 by the ILO Governing Body; the WHO/UNICEF Code for the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes; and the FAO/ WHO Code of Ethics for International Trade in Food, adopted by the Codex Alimentarius Commission in 1979.

15. Adelman, Kenneth L., “Biting the Hand That Cures them,” Regulation, 07–08 1982, p. 16Google Scholar.

16. International Organization Monitoring Service, Bulletin 82–02 (11 Jamiaru 1982), p. 6.

17. See, for example, Surjano, D. et al. , “Bacterial Contamination and Dilution of Milk in Infant Feeding Bottles,” Journal of Tropical Pediatrics, 1979Google Scholar.

18. Post, James and Baer, Edward, “Demarketing Infant Formula: Consumer Products in the Developing World,” Journal of Contemporary Business 7 (Autumn 1978), p. 22Google Scholar; Chetley, Andy, The Baby Killer Scandal (London: War on Want, 1979), pp. 94–95Google Scholar.

19. Plank, S. J. and Milanesi, M., “Infant Feeding and Infant Mortality in Rural Chile,” WHO Bulletin no. 48 (1973), p. 48Google ScholarPubMed; Kananneh, H., “The Relationship of Bottle Feeding to Malnutrition and Gastroenteritis in a Pre-Industrial Setting,” Environmental Child Health, 12 1972Google Scholar; Jellife, D. B., “Commerciogenic Malnutrition,” Nutrition Review 30 (1972)Google Scholar.

20. Resolution WHA27.43, Handbook of Resolutions and Decisions of the World Health Assembly and the Executive Board, 4th ed. (Geneva, 1981), 2:58Google Scholar.

21. From case materials prepared by Professor James, E. Post of Boston University, “Nestlé Boycott (A),” Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 1981, p. 9Google Scholar.

22. See INFACT, Monitoring Report: Infant Foods Industry, July–August 1984: “Thirteen Nation Field Data and Analysis of the International Babyfood Industry Marketing Activity with Reference to Industry Obligations under the International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes.” I have also used my field interviews, conducted in Central America December 1981–January 1982.

23. Interview with Baer, Edward, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, New York, 15 04 1982Google Scholar.

24. Post, , “Assessing the Nestlé Boycott,” p. 121Google Scholar.

25. “Lessons from the Anti-Infant Formula Campaign,” Business International, 5 February 1982, p. 8.

26. See Claude, Inis L. Jr., “Collective Legitimation as a Political Function of the United Nations,” in Goodrich, Leland M. and Kay, David A., eds., International Organizations: Politics, Process (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), pp. 209–21Google Scholar.

27. Ernst Haas has defined consensual knowledge as “a body of beliefs about cause-effect and end-means relationships among variables (activities, aspirations, values, demands) that is widely accepted by the relevant actors irrespective of the absolute or final truth of these beliefs.” Quoted in Rothstein, Robert, “Consensual Knowledge and International Collaboration: Some Lessons from the Commodity Negotiations,” International Organization 38 (Autumn 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28. A study by the Sao Paulo School of Medicine in 1979, for example, monitoring babies of low-income families, found that 32% of bottle-fed babies suffered from malnutrition compared to 9% of breast-fed babies; 23% of the bottle-fed babies and none of the breast-fed babies had to be hospitalized. Research in Chile has shown that Chilean babies who were bottle-fed during the first three months of life suffered three times the mortality rate of those who were exclusively breast-fed. Reported in Washington Post, 21 April 1981.

29. Jellife, D. B. and Jellife, E. F. P., Human Milk in the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978)Google Scholar. See also Ambulatory Pediatrics Association, “Statement by the Board of Directors on the WHO Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes,” Pediatrics 68 (09 1981)Google Scholar.

30. “The political implications of the consensual knowledge (especially interpretations of its effect on national interests) and the specific bargaining configuration must interact in a fashion that permits or facilitates diffusion and subsequently agreement on new policies.” Rothstein, “Consensual Knowledge,” p. 755.

31. For a summary of scientific literature distributed by activists, see Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), Breast Is Best (New York, n.p., n.d.)Google Scholar, and Infant Formula Action Coalition, “Policy vs. Practice: The Reality of Formula Promotion” (Minneapolis, 05 1979)Google Scholar. The latter juxtaposes quotations from scientific studies and health professionals with baby food company statements.

32. Plank, and Milanesi, , “Infant Feeding,” pp. 203–10Google Scholar.

33. Other NGO publications and flyers that served to highlight, publicize, and circulate authoritative information on the issue include 1CCR, “What the International Health Agencies Recommend about Baby Formula Promotion: Excerpts and Recommendations” (n.d.); “What Health Personnel Say about Infant Formula Promotion in the Third World” (n.d.); and “Excerpts from Documents: WHO/UNICEF Meeting on Infant and Young Child Feeding, Geneva, Switzerland, October 9–12, 1979,” ICCR Brief, January 1980.

34. Post, , “Assessing the Nestlé Boycott,” p. 121Google Scholar, and Ball, Robert, “Nestlé Revs up Its U.S. Campaign,” Fortune, 13 02 1978, pp. 80–90Google Scholar. In 1978 Nestlé employed more than 140,000 persons in fifty plants and operated in more than fifty nations. Worldwide sales approached $10 billion—47% in Europe, 20% in the United Statess, 20% in the Third World. The company ranked 19th of Fortune's foreign 500.

35. Post, , “Assessing the Nestlé Boycott,” p. 121Google Scholar.

36. By the mid–1970s Nestlé had nearly $2 billion in sales in the United States, and company plans called for a doubling of U.S. sales to $4 billion by 1982 (from over 20% to over 30% of Nestlé worldwide sales), by a combination of internal growth and energetic acquisitions. Post, “Nestlé Boycott,” and Ball, “Nestlé Revs up.”

37. Post, , “Assessing the Nestlé Boycott,” p. 124Google Scholar.

38. “Nestlé Boycott Being Suspended” New York Times, 27 January 1984.

39. Lemaresquier, Thierry, “Beyond Infant Feeding: The Case for Another Relationship between NGOs and the U.N. System,” Development Dialogue (1980), pp. 120–25Google Scholar.

40. Pagan, Rafael D. Jr., president, Nestlé Coordination Center for Nutrition, Inc., “Issue Management: No Set Path,” before the Issues Management Association (Roosevelt Hotel, New York City, 7 11 1983)Google Scholar.

41. Interview with Johnson, Douglas, executive director of the Infant Formula Action Coalition, New York, 5 12 1984Google Scholar.

42. Business International, 17 October 1980.

43. Some in the business community feel that codes of conduct will continue to proliferate and that corporations must get involved in their development. John Kline, for example, argues that “a carefully structured participatory role [in code exercises] could turn challenge into opportunity, benefiting both individual corporations and the broader objective of an open international economic system.” Kline, , “Entrapment or Opportunity: Structuring a Corporate Response to International Codes of Conduct,” Columbia Journal of World Business 15 (Summer 1980), p. 6Google Scholar.

44. U.S. Department of State, telegram from U.S. Mission in Geneva (no. 02652), March 1981, p. 1.

45. Two internal Nestle documents leaked to 1NFACT and later published in the press in mid-1980 outline the tactics used by Nestlé and other infant formula companies to influence the code and discredit the activists. These tactics included lobbying top-level WHO officials (to spearhead this effort, an ex-assistant director general of WHO, Stanislaus Flache, was hired as secretary general of the infant formula industries association, ICIFI) and using “third party rebuttals of the activists’ case.” Nestlé and other infant formula producers funded the Ethics and Public Policy Center at Georgetown University, headed by Ernest W. Lefever, when they discovered that Lefever was sympathetic to their position. They also circulated a Fortune article favorable to Nestlé that accused proboycott groups of being “Marxists marching under the banner of Christ.” See Washington Post, 4 January 1981. Lefever, a member of the Reagan administration transition team, was nominated as deputy assistant secretary of state for human rights. During Senate confirmation hearings it was revealed that Lefever's research center had received $35,000 from Nestlé, which was one of the factors responsible for the rejection of his nomination.

46. U.S. Department of State, telegram from U.S. Mission in Geneva (no. 02652), March 1981.

47. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Memorandum, “WHO Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes-Decision” (09 1980), p. 3Google Scholar.

48. Washington Post, 18 March 1981.

49. To protest the U.S. “no” vote, two senior AID officials resigned. They were Stephen Joseph, a pediatrician and the highest-ranking health professional at the agency, and Eugene Babb, deputy assistant administrator for food and nutrition.

50. DHSS, Memorandum, p. 3.

51. U.S. Department of State, telegram from U.S. Mission in Geneva (no. 12065), September 1980.

52. Post, , “Assessing the Nestlé Boycott,” p. 120Google Scholar.

53. Lemaresquier, , “Beyond Infant Feeding,” p. 120Google Scholar.

54. Interview with Cravero, Kathleen, UNICEF, New York, 10 01 1985Google Scholar.

55. As a result of the negotiations between INBC and Nestlé, UNICEF and WHO were requested to clarify a portion of the code which states that infant formula companies could donate supplies to hospitals for infants who “have to be fed on breastmilk substitutes.” WHO argued that the code was written and adopted by governments, and thus only the governments could further interpret it. Eventually, however, WHO developed a plan, presented by Dr. David Tejada, assistant director general of the organization, whereby WHO and UNICEF agreed to give technical advice to governments who would in turn develop the requested definitions based on that advice. Both Nestlé and the INBC agree to cooperate fully in the implementation of the Tejada Plan. See Minutes of the Joint Press Conference between Nestlé and INBC to announce the termination of the Nestlé Boycott, 4 October 1984 (Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C.).

56. On the role of labor and trade unions in the adoption and implementation of codes at the regional and international level, see Robinson, Multinationals and Political Control.

57. See Minutes of Press Conference, 4 October 1984.

58. INFACT, Monitoring Report: Infant Foods Industry, 07–08 1984Google Scholar.

59. Allain, Annelies, “Toward a Better Code,” IBFAN/IOCU (mimeo, 04 1984)Google Scholar.

60. Reported in “International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes, Update on Implementation,” UNICEF Ideas Forum no. 19 (1984)Google Scholar.

61. Schwartz, Harry, “Perspective on the Third World,” Pharmaceutical Executive, 03 1982, pp. 13–16Google Scholar.

62. Cox, Robert, “The Crisis of World Order and the Problem of International Organization in the 1980s,” International Journal 35 (Spring 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, discusses the role of international organization in the institutionalization of hegemony—the universalization of norms proper to a structure of world power—and also the possibility that international institutions may become vehicles for the articulation of a coherent counterhegemonic set of values.

63. Public Affairs Council, Program for Conference, “Activist Groups at the International Level” (Hilton Hotel, New York City, 21–2204 1982)Google Scholar.

64. New York Times, 19 December 1984.

65. See UNCTC, “Transnational Corporations in the Pharmaceutical Industry in Developing Countries” (New York, 1983), pp. 27–28Google Scholar.

66. Beardshaw, Virginia, Prescription for Change: Health Action International's Guide to Rational Health Projects (The Hague: International Organization of Consumers Unions, 1983), p. 9Google Scholar.

67. UNCTC, “Transnational Corporations in the Pharmaceutical Industry,” p. 1Google Scholar.

68. SCRIP no. 509 (28 07 1980), p. 10Google Scholar.

69. Health Now, 17 May 1984.

70. Heritage Foundation, “The World Health Organization: A Policy Assessment,” draft, Washington, D. C, 11 1984Google Scholar.

71. New York Times, 16 December 1984.

72. Adelman, , “Biting the Hand,” p. 16Google Scholar.