1. Major realist works include:Carr, E. H., The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London and New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964)Google Scholar; Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973)Google Scholar; Aron, Raymond, International Relations: A Theory of Peace and War, trans. Howard, Richard and Fox, Annette Baker (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1973)Google Scholar; Waltz, Kenneth N., Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959)Google Scholar; Waltz, , Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979)Google Scholar; Gilpin, Robert, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Gilpin, , War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This essay does not distinguish between realism and “neorealism,” because on crucial issues—the meaning of international anarchy, its effects on states, and the problem of cooperation—modern realists like Waltz and Gilpin are very much in accord with classical realists like Carr, Aron, and Morgenthau. For an alternative view, see Ashley, Richard, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” in Keohane, Robert O., ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255–300Google Scholar.

2. Richard Rosecrance provided the insight that realism presents an essentially pessimistic view of the human condition: this is noted by Gilpin, Robert, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” in Keohane, , ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 304Google Scholar. This pessimism in realist theory is most clearly evident in Morgenthau, Hans J., Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), especially pp. 187–203Google Scholar.

3. For functionalist international theory, see Mitrany, David, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1966)Google Scholar; see also Haas, Ernst B., Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964)Google Scholar. On neofunctionalism, see Haas, , The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic, and Social Forces, 1950–1957 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958)Google Scholar; Haas, , “Technology, Pluralism, and the New Europe,” in Nye, Joseph S. Jr, ed., International Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), pp. 149–76Google Scholar; and Nye, Joseph S. Jr, “Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functional Model,” in Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A., eds., Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 192–231Google Scholar. On interdependence theory, see Cooper, Richard C., “Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policies in the 1970's,” World Politics 24 (01 1972), pp. 158–81Google Scholar; Morse, Edward S., “The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence, and Externalization,” World Politics 22 (04 1970), pp. 371–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. Jr, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977)Google Scholar.

4. See Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984)Google Scholar; Axelrod, and Keohane, Robert O., “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38 (10 1985), pp. 226–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Keohane, , After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984)Google Scholar; Lipson, Charles, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” World Politics 37 (10 1984), pp. 1–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Stein, Arthur, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” in Krasner, Stephen D., ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 115–40Google Scholar.

5. Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, p. 10Google Scholar; see also Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, p. 95Google Scholar.

6. Waltz, , “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in Keohane, , ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 331Google Scholar.

7. Waltz, , Man, State, and War, pp. 224–38Google Scholar; and Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, pp. 79–128Google Scholar; Hoffmann, Stanley, The State of War: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 27, 54–87, 129Google Scholar; Aron, , Peace and War, pp. 6–10Google Scholar.

8. Aron, , Peace and War, p. 5Google Scholar; Gilpin, , “Political Realism,” p. 304Google Scholar.

9. Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, pp. 115–16Google Scholar; see also Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, p. 512Google Scholar; and Hoffmann, Stanley, “International Organization and the International System,” in Goodrich, Leland M. and Kay, David A., eds., International Organization: Politics and Process (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. 50Google Scholar.

10. Liberal institutionalist theories may be distinguished from three other variants of liberal theory. One of these, trade liberalism, articulated by Richard Cobden and John Bright, finds that international commerce facilitates greater inter-state cooperation: for Cobden, see Wolfers, Arnold and Martin, Laurence W., eds., The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1956), pp. 192–205Google Scholar; with respect to both Cobden and Bright, see also Waltz, , Man, State, and War, pp. 98–99, 103–7Google Scholar. A second variant, democratic structural liberalism, posited by Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson, finds that democracies based on national self-determination are conducive to greater international cooperation. For Wilson, see Wolfers, and Martin, , eds., Anglo-American Tradition, pp. 263–79Google Scholar; for Kant and Wilson, see Waltz, , Man, State, and War, pp. 101–3, 109–11, 117–19Google Scholar; and Doyle, Michael W., “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80 (12 1986), pp. 1151–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Finally, a liberal transactions approach suggests that private international interactions promote international integration: see Deutsch, Karl et al. , Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957)Google Scholar; and Russett, Bruce, Community and Contention (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963)Google Scholar. Citing an unpublished study by Keohane, Nye recently refers to the first two variants as commercial and democratic liberalism, respectively, and suggests that the third might be termed sociological liberalism. See Nye, Joseph S. Jr, “Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” World Politics 40 (01 1988), p. 246CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11. In a way quite different from liberal institutionalist theories, world systems analysis also challenges realism's focus on states. It suggests that they are not ultimate causes of world events but instead are themselves resultants of the development of a single world capitalist economy. See Wallerstein, Immanuel, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System,” in Wallerstein, , The Capitalist World System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 1–37Google Scholar; and Wallerstein, , The Modern World System, vol. 1 (New York: Academic Press, 1974)Google Scholar.

12. See Mitrany, , Working Peace System, pp. 17, 85–87, 133–34Google Scholar; Haas, , Beyond the Nation-State, pp. 32–40Google Scholar; Haas, , Uniting of Europe, pp. 16–31, 113–239, 283–340Google Scholar; Nye, , “Comparing Common Markets,” pp. 195–206Google Scholar; and Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. Jr, “Introduction,” and “Conclusion,” in Keohane, and Nye, , eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. ix-xxix, 371–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13. A substantial body of literature that is not based on liberalism nevertheless shares the latter's skepticism about the unity and rationality of states. It finds that subsystemic forces, such as organizational and bureaucratic politics, small group dynamics, crisis decision-making, and individual psychology, all undermine state coherence and rationality. See Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971)Google Scholar; Janis, Irving J., Groupthink, 2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980)Google Scholar; Holsti, Ole R., Crisis Escalation War (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1970)Google Scholar; Steinbruner, John D., The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974)Google Scholar; Alexander, L. and George, Juliette L., Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964)Google Scholar; and Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in World Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976)Google Scholar.

14. Mitrany, , Working Peace System, pp. 54–55, 63, 69–73, 88, 134–38Google Scholar.

15. See Mitrany, , Working Peace System, pp. 20, 32–38Google Scholar; Haas, , “The New Europe,” pp. 152, 155–56Google Scholar; Keohane, and Nye, , “Introduction,” p. xxvGoogle Scholar, and “Conclusion,” pp. 375–78;Morse, , “Transformation,” pp. 387–89Google Scholar; Cooper, , “Interdependence,” pp. 177, 179Google Scholar; and Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, pp. 33–35, 226–29Google Scholar.

16. Mitrany, , Working Peace System, p. 13Google Scholar; Morse, , “Transformation,” pp. 380–81Google Scholar; Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, pp. 27–29Google Scholar, 228.

17. Mitrany, , Working Peace System, pp. 131–37Google Scholar; Haas, , “The New Europe,” pp. 161–62Google Scholar; Cooper, , “Interdependence,” pp. 161–68Google Scholar, 173–74; Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, pp. 26, 228Google Scholar.

18. See Mitrany, , Working Peace System, pp. 41–42, 95–96, 136–37, 144–45Google Scholar; Haas, , “The New Europe,” pp. 155–58Google Scholar; Morse, , “Transformation,” pp. 383–85Google Scholar; and Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, p. 227Google Scholar.

19. Neofunctionalists suggested that, for West European states, “the argument is no longer over the slice of the pie to go to each; it is increasingly over the means for increasing the overall size of the pastry.” See Haas, , “The New Europe,” p. 158Google Scholar; see also pp. 160–62, 166–67. See also Mitrany, , Working Peace System, pp. 92–93Google Scholar; Morse, , “Transformation,” pp. 383–85Google Scholar; and Cooper, , “Interdependence,” pp. 164–67, 170–72, 179Google Scholar.

20. Mitrany, , Working Peace System, pp. 133–37, 198–211Google Scholar; see also Haas, Beyond the Nation-State.

21. Haas, , “The New Europe,” p. 159Google Scholar.

22. Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, p. 35Google Scholar; see also pp. 36, 232–34, 240–42.

23. See Krasner, Stephen D., Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978)Google Scholar; Russell, Robert W., “Transgovernmental Interaction in the International Monetary System, 1960–1972,” International Organization 27 (Autumn 1973), pp. 431–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Grieco, Joseph M., Between Dependency and Autonomy: India's Experience with the International Computer Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

24. See Katzenstein, Peter J., ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrialized States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978)Google Scholar; Katzenstein, , Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Zysman, John, Political Strategies for Industrial Order: State, Market, and Industry in France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)Google Scholar; Zysman, , Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983)Google Scholar; and Gourevitch, Peter, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 181–217Google Scholar.

25. On the continuing utility of force in the nuclear age, see George, Alexander L. and Smoke, Richard, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974)Google Scholar; Blechman, Barry M. and Kaplan, Stephen S., Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978)Google Scholar; Kaplan, Stephen S., Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981)Google Scholar; and Betts, Richard, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987)Google Scholar.

26. East-West disputes in a specialized international agency are examined in Galenson, Walter, The International Labor Organization: An American View (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981)Google Scholar. North-South struggles within international institutions are discussed in Krasner, Stephen D., Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

27. On the problem of European integration, see Puchala, Donald J., “Domestic Politics and Regional Harmonization in the European Communities,” World Politics 27 (07 1975), pp. 496–520CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Taylor, Paul, The Limits of European Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983)Google Scholar. Trends towards a “new protectionism” supported realist arguments that the erosion of America's hegemonic position would produce a less open international economy. See Gilpin, U.S. Power, and Krasner, Stephen D., “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28 (04 1976), pp. 317–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On trade conflicts during the 1970s, see Jackson, John H., “The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System,” Journal of World Trade Law 12 (03–04 1978), pp. 93–106Google Scholar; Bela, and Balassa, Carol, “Industrial Protection in the Developed Countries,” World Economy 7 (06 1984), pp. 179–86Google Scholar; and Kahler, Miles, “European Protectionism in Theory and Practice,” World Politics 37 (07 1985), pp. 475–502CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On monetary disputes, see Strange, Susan, International Monetary Relations of the Western World, 1959–1971, vol. 2 of Shonfield, Andrew, ed. International Economic Relations of the Western World, 1959–1971 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1976), pp. 320–53Google Scholar; and Cohen, Benjamin J., “Europe's Money, America's Problems,” Foreign Policy, No. 35 (Summer 1979), pp. 31–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On disputes over economic ties with the Soviet Union, see Woolcock, Stephen, Western Policies on East-West Trade, Chatham House Papers No. 15 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1982)Google Scholar; and Jentleson, Bruce W., Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

28. Krasner, Stephen D., “Preface,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes, p. viiiGoogle Scholar.

29. See Lipson, Charles, “Bankers' Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling Sovereign Debts,” World Politics 38 (10 1985), pp. 200–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also see Kahler, Miles, ed., The Politics of International Debt (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

30. See Winham, Gilbert, International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; see also Lipson, Charles, “The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes, pp. 233–72Google Scholar; and Finlayson, Jock A. and Zacher, Mark W., “The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes, pp. 273–314Google Scholar.

31. See Lieber, Robert J., The Oil Decade: Conflict and Cooperation in the West (New York: Praeger, 1983)Google Scholar; Badger, Daniel and Belgrave, Robert, Oil Supply and Price: What Went Right in 1980? (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 05 1982)Google Scholar; and Keohane, , After Hegemony, pp. 217–40Google Scholar.

32. See Smith, Bruce L. R., “A New Technology Gap in Europe?” SA1S Review 6 (Winter–Spring 1986), pp. 219–36Google Scholar; and McDougall, Walter A., “Space-Age Europe: Gaullism, Euro-Gaullism, and the American Dilemma,” Technology and Culture 26 (04 1985), pp. 179–203CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33. Axelrod, , Evolution of Cooperation, p. 3Google Scholar; also see pp. 4, 6.

34. Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation,” p. 226Google Scholar. Stein argues that his theory of international regimes “is rooted in the classic characterization of international politics as relations between sovereign entities dedicated to their own self-preservation, ultimately able to depend only upon themselves, and prepared to resort to force”; see Stein, , “Coordination and Collaboration,” p. 116Google Scholar. Lipson notes that Axelrod's ideas are important because they “obviously bear on a central issue in international relations theory: the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among sovereign, self-interested states, operating without any centralized authority”; see Lipson, , “International Cooperation,” p. 6Google Scholar.

35. Keohane, notes in After Hegemony (p. 9)Google Scholar that “I begin with Realist insights about the role of power and the effects of hegemony” but that “my central arguments draw more on the Institutionalist tradition, arguing that cooperation can under some conditions develop on the basis of complementary interests, and that institutions, broadly defined, affect the patterns of cooperation that emerge.” Keohane also notes (p. 26) that “what distinguishes my argument from structural Realism is my emphasis on the effects of international institutions and practices on state behavior.”

36. Keohane, indicates in After Hegemony (pp. 14, 16)Google Scholar that he does not seek the wholesale rejection of realism. However, on the issue of the prospects for cooperation, like the question of international institutions, he does seek to refute realism's conclusions while employing its assumptions. He notes (p. 29) that “[smarting with similar premises about motivations, I seek to show that Realism's pessimism about welfare-increasing cooperation is exaggerated,” and he proposes (p. 67) “to show, on the basis of their own assumptions, that the characteristic pessimism of Realism does not follow.” Keohane also suggests (p. 84) that rational-choice analysis “helps us criticize, in its own terms, Realism's bleak picture of the inevitability of either hegemony or conflict.” Finally, he asserts (p. 84) that rational-choice theory, “combined with sensitivity to the significance of international institutions,” allows for an awareness of both the strengths and weaknesses of realism, and in so doing “[w]e can strip away some of the aura of verisimilitude that surrounds Realism and reconsider the logical and empirical foundations of its claims to our intellectual allegiance.”

37. On the importance of Prisoner's Dilemma in neoliberal theory, see Axelrod, , Evolution of Cooperation, p. 7Google Scholar; Keohane, , After Hegemony, pp. 66–69Google Scholar; Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation,” p. 231Google Scholar; Lipson, , “International Cooperation,” p. 2Google Scholar; and Stein, , “Coordination and Collaboration,” pp. 120–24Google Scholar.

38. See Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 77Google Scholar; Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation,” pp. 234–38Google Scholar. For a demonstration, see Lipson, “Bankers’ Dilemmas.”

39. Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 97Google Scholar.

40. Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation,” p. 250Google Scholar.

41. Lipson, , “International Cooperation,” p. 6Google Scholar.

42. Stein, , “Coordination and Collaboration,” p. 123Google Scholar.

43. Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 246Google Scholar.

44. Axelrod, , Evolution of Cooperation, pp. 6, 14Google Scholar. Stein acknowledges that he employs an absolute-gains assumption and that the latter “is very much a liberal, not mercantilist, view of self-interest; it suggests that actors focus on their own returns and compare different outcomes with an eye to maximizing their own gains.” See Stein, , “Coordination and Collaboration,” p. 134Google Scholar. It is difficult to see how Stein can employ a “liberal” assumption of state interest and assert that his theory of regimes, as noted earlier in note 34, is based on the “classic [realist?] characterization” of international politics.

45. Lipson, , “International Cooperation,” pp. 2, 5Google Scholar.

46. Axelrod, , Evolution of Cooperation, p. 9Google Scholar.

47. Ibid., p. 22.

48. Lipson, , “International Cooperation,” p. 2Google Scholar.

49. Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 27Google Scholar.

50. On payoffs and utility functions, see Rapoport, Anatol, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 121Google Scholar, and Taylor, Michael, Anarchy and Cooperation (London: Wiley, 1976), pp. 70–74Google Scholar.

51. Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation,” p. 226Google Scholar; see also Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 7Google Scholar; Lipson, , “International Cooperation,” pp. 1–2Google Scholar; Axelrod, , Evolution of Cooperation, pp. 3–4Google Scholar; and Stein, , “Coordination and Collaboration,” p. 116Google Scholar.

52. See Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation,” p. 226Google Scholar; Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 7Google Scholar; and Axelrod, , Evolution of Cooperation, p. 6Google Scholar.

53. Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation,” p. 226Google Scholar. Similarly, Lipson notes that while institutionalized mechanisms (such as governments) that guarantee the enforcement of contracts are available in civil society, “the absence of reliable guarantees is an essential feature of international relations and a major obstacle to concluding treaties, contracts, and agreements.” The resulting problem, according to Lipson, is that “constraints on opportunism are weak.” See Lipson, , “International Cooperation,” p. 4Google Scholar. Also see Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 93Google Scholar, and Stein, , “Coordination and Collaboration,” p. 116Google Scholar.

54. See Waltz, , Man, State, and War, p. 232Google Scholar; and Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, p. 113Google Scholar. Similarly, Carr suggests that war “lurks in the background of international politics just as revolution lurks in the background of domestic politics.” See Carr, , Twenty Years Crisis, p. 109Google Scholar. Finally, Aron observes that international relations “present one original feature which distinguishes them from all other social relations: they take place within the shadow of war.” See Aron, , Peace and War, p. 6Google Scholar.

55. See Gilpin, , “Political Realism,” pp. 304–5Google Scholar.

56. Aron, , Peace and War, p. 7Google Scholar; also see pp. 64–65.

57. Gilpin, , “Political Realism,” p. 305Google Scholar. Similarly, Waltz indicates that “in anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power.” See Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, p. 126Google Scholar; also see pp. 91–92, and Waltz, , “Reflections,” p. 334Google Scholar.

58. Carr, , Twenty-Years Crisis, p. 111Google Scholar, emphasis added.

59. Gilpin, , War and Change, pp. 87–88Google Scholar.

60. Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, p. 126Google Scholar; see also Waltz, , “Reflections,” p. 334Google Scholar.

61. On the tendency of states to compare performance levels, see Young, Oran, “International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions,” World Politics 39 (10 1986), p. 118CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Young suggests that realists assume that states are “status maximizers” and attribute to states the tendency to compare performance levels because each seeks “to attain the highest possible rank in the hierarchy of members of the international community.” The present writer offers a different understanding of realism: while realism acknowledges that some states may be positional in the sense noted by Young, its fundamental insight is that all states are positional and compare performance levels because they fear that others may attain a higher ranking in an issue-area.

62. As Waltz suggests, “When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gains, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not “Will both of us gain?” but “Who will gain more?” If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other.” See Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, p. 105Google Scholar.

63. Stein, , “Coordination and Collaboration,” p. 134Google Scholar.

64. In her review of Axelrod, Joanne Gowa cites the 1979 Waltz passage employed in note 62 and, following Taylor's, terminology in Anarchy and Cooperation (pp. 73–74)Google Scholar, suggests that a state may display “negative altruism.” Furthermore, according to Gowa, a state “may seek to maximize a utility function that depends both on increases in its own payoffs and on increases in the difference between its payoffs and those of another state.” See Gowa, Joanne, “Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations,” International Organization 40 (Winter 1986), p. 178CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This portrays realist thinking in a manner similar to that suggested by Young and cited above in note 61. However, this understanding of state utility cannot be readily based on Waltz, for his core insight, and that of the realist tradition, is not that all states necessarily seek a balance of advantages in their favor (although some may do this) but rather that all fear that relative gains may favor and thus strengthen others. From a realist viewpoint, some states may be negative altruists, but all states will be “defensive positionalists.” Waltz emphasizes that he does not believe that all states necessarily seek to maximize their power: see his statement cited in note 60 and see especially his “Response to My Critics,” p. 334.

65. Waltz, for example, observes that “the impediments to collaboration may not lie in the character and the immediate intention of either party. Instead, the condition of insecurity—at the least, the uncertainty of each about the other's future intentions and actions—works against their cooperation.” See Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, p. 105Google Scholar.

66. Jervis, Robert, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (01 1978), p. 168CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

67. Similar to the concept of a state “sensitivity coefficient” to gaps in jointly produced gains is the concept of a “defense coefficient” in Lewis Richardson's model of arms races. The latter serves as an index of one state's fear of another: the greater the coefficient, the stronger the state's belief that it must match increases in the other's weapons inventory with increases in its own. See Richardson, Lewis F., Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War, eds. Rachevsky, Nicolas and Trucco, Ernesto (Pittsburgh and Chicago: Boxwood Press and Quadrangle Books, 1960), pp. 14–15Google Scholar.

68. Robert Jervis also argues that realist theory posits at least partially interdependent state utility functions. See Jervis, , “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” World Politics 40 (04 1988), pp. 334–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

69. A pluralistic security community, according to Deutsch and his associates, “is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way,” and in which the members retain separate governments; the examples they provide are Canada—United States and Norway—Sweden. See Deutsch, et al. , Political Community, pp. 5–7Google Scholar.

70. Contextual influences on state sensitivities to gaps in gains are explored in Grieco, Joseph M., “Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma Model,” Journal of Politics 50 (08 1988) pp. 600–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

71. In contrast, Keohane finds that that relative gains concerns may impede cooperation only in cases in which states pursue “positional goods” such as “status”; see Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 54Google Scholar. Similarly, Lipson expects that states will be sensitive to relative gains only in security relationships; see Lipson, , “International Cooperation,” pp. 14–16Google Scholar.

72. Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, p. 179Google Scholar.

73. Ibid., p. 180, emphasis added.

74. Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation,” p. 231Google Scholar; see also Stein, , “Coordination and Collaboration,” pp. 123–24Google Scholar.

75. A crucial experiment seeks real world observations confirming one theory's empirical expectations in circumstances most unlikely to have done so unless the theory is very powerful, while simultaneously disconfirming a competitive theory's empirical expectations in circumstances most likely to have provided such confirming observations. On the methodology of crucial experiments, see Stinchcombe, Arthur L., Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1968), pp. 20–28Google Scholar; and Eckstein, Harry, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Greenstein, Fred I. and Polsby, Nelson W., eds., Strategies of Inquiry, vol. 7Google Scholar of the Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 118–20Google Scholar.

76. Such a crucial experiment would demonstrate realism's superiority over neoliberalism. On the other hand, if neoliberal theorists wanted to design a crucial experiment to demonstrate the superiority of their approach, they would focus not on North-North economic relations but rather on North-South relations or, better still, on East-West military interactions.

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78. On the “nesting” of international regimes, see Keohane, , After Hegemony, pp. 90–91Google Scholar; and Aggarwal, Vinod K., Liberal Protection: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

79. I am completing a study of the relative gains problem in the case of the Tokyo Round trade codes. Available studies suggest that the Economic and Monetary Union broke down during 1972–76 as a result of concerns by Britain, France, Ireland, and Italy that they had taken on disproportionate burdens and that West Germany was achieving disproportionate gains: see Tsoukalis, Loukas, The Politics and Economics of European Monetary Integration (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 157Google Scholar. Its successor, the European Monetary System, was designed to ensure greater balance in the gains and losses among partners: see Coffey, Peter, The European Monetary System: Past, Present, and Future (Dordrecht, Neth., and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), pp. 21–26, 126–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In the case of Scandinavian trade cooperation, Norway shifted from opposition during the 1950s and much of the 1960s to support at the end of the latter decade as it became less concerned about its capacity to achieve a satisfactory share of trade gains with Sweden: see Haskel, Barbara, The Scandinavian Option: Opportunities and Opportunity Costs in Postwar Scandinavian Foreign Policies (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), pp. 124–27Google Scholar. Much of the literature on the problem of regional integration among developing countries also emphasizes the importance of relative gains issues. See, for example,Mytelka, Lynn K., “The Salience of Gains in Third-World Integrative Systems,” World Politics 25 (01 1973), pp. 236–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Axline, W. Andrew, “Underdevelopment, Dependence, and Integration: The Politics of Regionalism in the Third World,” International Organization 31 (Winter 1977), pp. 83–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Vaitsos, Constantine V., “Crisis in Regional Economic Cooperation (Integration) Among Developing Countries: A Survey,” World Development 6 (06 1978), pp. 747–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For case studies of the problem of relative gains in developing country regional efforts to cooperate, see Fagan, Richard I., Central American Economic Integration: The Politics of Unequal Benefits (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1970)Google Scholar; Mytelka, Lynn Krieger, Regional Development in a Global Economy: The Multinational Corporation, Technology, and Andean Integration (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 39–61Google Scholar; and Hazlewood, Arthur, “The End of the East African Community,” Journal of Common Market Studies 18 (09 1979), especially pp. 44–48 and 53–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

80. Axelrod, , Evolution of Cooperation, p. 129Google Scholar; also see Keohane, , After Hegemony, pp. 257–59Google Scholar, in which he argues that there are “costs of flexibility” and that states commit themselves to regimes and thereby forgo a measure of flexibility in the future to attain cooperation in the present; and Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation,” p. 234Google Scholar, in which they argue that international regimes promote cooperation because they “link the future with the present.”

81. See Keohane, , After Hegemony, pp. 91–92, 103–6Google Scholar; and Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation,” pp. 239–43Google Scholar.

82. This, however, would certainly not mark the end of the liberal institutional challenge to realism. There are at least two related clusters of modern literature that are firmly rooted in the liberal institutionalist tradition, that attempt no compromise with realism, and that present an understanding of world politics markedly at odds with realist theory. The first cluster argues that international institutions embody and reinforce norms and beliefs that are held in common among states and that facilitate and guide their cooperative endeavors. The key works in this cluster include Ruggie, John Gerard, “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends,” International Organization 29 (Summer 1975), pp. 557–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ruggie, , “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes, pp. 195–231Google Scholar; Kratochwil, Friedrich, “The Force of Prescriptions,” International Organization 38 (Autumn 1984), pp. 685–708CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ruggie, John Gerard and Kratochwil, Friedrich, “International Organization: The State of the Art on an Art of the State,” International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753–76Google Scholar; and Puchala, Donald J. and Hopkins, Raymond F., “International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes, pp. 61–92Google Scholar. The second cluster suggests that international institutions help states develop, accept, and disseminate consensual theoretical and empirical knowledge that can reinforce or introduce international norms leading to cooperation.Haas, presented this argument in Beyond the Nation State, pp. 12–13, 47–48, 79–85Google Scholar; also see Haas, , “Is There a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence and the Construction of International Regimes,” International Organization 29 (Summer 1975), pp. 827–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Haas, , Williams, Mary Pat, and Babai, Don, Scientists and World Order: The Uses of Technical Information in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)Google Scholar; Haas, , “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics 32 (04 1980), pp. 357–405CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Haas, , “Words Can Hurt You; Or, Who Said What to Whom About Regimes,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes, pp. 23–59Google Scholar; and Crawford, Beverly and Lenway, Stefanie, “Decision Modes and International Regime Change: Western Collaboration on East-West Trade,” World Politics 37 (04 1985), pp. 375–402CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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