¹ Deutsch, Karl W., “Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Environment: A Summary Report,” American Political Science Review, 06 1966 (Vol. 60, No. 2), pp. 354–365CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Deutsch, Karl W., Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), pp. 17–28, 68–81Google Scholar; Deutsch, Karl W., “A Comparison of French and German Elites in the European Political Environment,” in Deutsch, Karl W. and others, France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), pp. 218–239, 298–302Google Scholar.

² The sociocausal paradigm of political integration is a verbal model implicitly developed by Deutsch in several of his earlier writings in which social variables are used to causally explain political integration processes. See Deutsch, Karl W., Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday & Company, 1954)Google Scholar; Deutsch, Karl W., Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry Into the Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1953)Google Scholar; Deutsch, Karl W. and others, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1957)Google Scholar; Deutsch, Karl W., The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: Free Press, 1963)Google Scholar; also see the several essays by Deutsch in Jacob, Philip and Toscano, James (ed.). The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964)Google Scholar. A further statement of the sociocausal paradigm is to be found in a doctoral thesis written at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, under the direction of Deutsch by Donald J. Puchala. See Puchala, Donald J., “International Political Community Formation in Western Europe: Progress and Prospects” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1966)Google Scholar. Also see Donald Puchala, J., “European Political Integration: Progress and Prospects,” New Haven, Conn. (Yale University Political Science Research Library), 1966 (mimeographed)Google Scholar; and Alker, Hayward Jr, and Puchala, Donald J., “Trends in Economic Partnership: The North Atlantic Area 1928–1963,” in Singer, J. David (ed.), Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: Free Press, 1968)Google Scholar.

³ Inglehart, Ronald, “Trends and Nontrends in the Western Alliance: A Review,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 03 1968 (Vol. 12, No. 1), pp. 120–128CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Compare with Haas, Ernst B., “Persistent Themes in Atlantic and European Unity,” World Politics, 07 1958 (Vol. 10, No. 4), pp. 614–628CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Haas, Ernst B., “The Challenge of Regionalism,” International Organization, Autumn 1958 (Vol. 12, No. 4), pp. 440–458CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Nye, Joseph also forcefully presents this same argument in his excellent survey of current conceptualizations of integration processes, “Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement,” in International Organization, Autumn 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 4), pp. 855–880CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ The books and articles listed in footnotes 1 and 2 are the principal sources upon which this presentation of the sociocausal paradigm is based.

⁶ See Deutsch, , Political Community at the International Level, pp. 33–45Google Scholar; Deutsch, and others, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 5Google Scholar; Deutsch, Karl W., “Supranational Organizations in the 1960's,” Journal of Common Market Studies (Vol. 1, No. 3), pp. 212–218Google Scholar; and Puchala, , “International Political Community Formation in Western Europe,” pp. 5–7Google Scholar. Compare with Jacob, Philip and Teune, Henry, “The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Basis of Political Community,” in Jacob, and Toscano, (ed.), pp. 35–45Google Scholar.

⁷ Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), pp. 159–161Google Scholar.

⁸ See Deutsch, , Political Community at the International Level, pp. 42–45Google Scholar. Compare with Deutsch, Karl W., “Integration and the Social System: Implications of Functional Analysis,” in Jacob, and Toscano, (ed.), pp. 179–208Google Scholar.

⁹ Deutsch, and others, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, pp. 22–69Google Scholar; and Deutsch, , Nationalism and Social Communication, pp. 60–126Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Deutsch, and others, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, pp. 5–9Google Scholar; and Puchala, , ”International Political Community Formation in Western Europe,” pp. 12–15Google Scholar. Compare with Kaplan, Morton, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957)Google Scholar.

¹¹ See Deutsch, , Nationalism and Social Communication, pp. 60–126Google Scholar; Deutsch, and others, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, pp. 70–78, 117–154Google Scholar; Puchala, , “International Political Community Formation in Western Europe,” pp. 18–39Google Scholar; Deutsch, Karl W., “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” American Political Science Review, 06 1961 (Vol. 55, No. 2), pp. 497–502CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Deutsch, , ”Communication Theory and Political Integration,” in Jacob, and Toscano, (ed.), pp. 46–74Google Scholar; and Deutsch, , Political Community at the International Level, pp. 33–45Google Scholar.

¹² Kaplan, Abraham, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (San Francisco, Calif: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), pp. 88–89Google Scholar.

¹³ See Puchala, , “International Political Community Formation in Western Europe,” pp. 66–129Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Deutsch, in Deutsch and others, France, Germany and the Western Alliance, pp. 218–239Google Scholar; Deutsch, , Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance, pp. 17–18Google Scholar; and Alker and Puchala in Singer (ed.), pp. 287–316.

¹⁵ Deutsch, , Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance, pp. 22–28, 44–67Google Scholar; and Deutsch and others, France, Germany and the Western Alliance.

¹⁶ See Deutsch, , American Political Science Review, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 354–365CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Deutsch, in Deutsch and others, France, Germany and the Western Alliance, pp. 298–302Google Scholar.

¹⁷ For a concise, yet lucid, discussion of elementary symbolic logic see John Kemeny and others, Finite Mathematical Structures (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1959), pp. 1–50, especially pp. 9–11Google Scholar.

¹⁸ A truth table is a mathematical device which allows one to determine the truth or falsity of various logical statements. The statement whose truth or falsity we wish to test heads the far right-hand column of the table, while each separate variable that is used in the statement heads up each remaining column. In order to determine the ultimate truth value of the desired statement one either logically or empirically assigns truth or falsity values to the separate variables used in the total statement. The pattern of values assigned to the separate variables together with the connecting symbols used in the statement then determine the truth value of the total statement. It should be mentioned that different types of symbolic statements require different patterns of variable truth values in determining the truth value of the total statement.

¹⁹ Compare with Haas, , International Organization, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 440–458CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Haas, , World Politics, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 626–628Google Scholar.

²⁰ Compare with Nye, , International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 865–874Google Scholar.

²¹ For a slightly different discussion of output performance see Lindberg, Leon, “Europe as a Political System: Measuring Political Integration” (unpublished draft, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp. 73–81Google Scholar.

²² The Council of Ministers and the Commission of the European Communities which were created by the 1967 merger to replace the separate institutions of each organization are beyond the scope of the present study.

²³ Scheingold, Stuart A., The Rule of Law in European Integration: The Path of the Schuman Plan (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 42–48Google Scholar.

²⁴ Haas, Ernst, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950–1957 (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 32–59Google Scholar; Jensen, Finn B. and Walter, Ingo, The Common Market: Economic Integration in Europe (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1965), pp. 24–43Google Scholar.

²⁵ Lindberg, pp. 73–81.

²⁶ Européen, Parlement, Annuaire: 1964–1965 (Luxembourg: Secrétariat Général, Direction Générale de la Documentation Parlementaire et de l'lnformation, 06 1965), pp. 621–747Google Scholar; Européen, Parlement, Annuaire: 1963–1964 (Luxembourg: Secrétariat Général, Direction Générale de la Documentation Parlementaire et de l'lnformation, 06 1965), Vol. II, pp. 263–388Google Scholar.

²⁷ These categories were suggested to me in several discussions with Professor Leon Lindberg.

²⁸ This weighting system was devised after I held several discussions with Professor Lindberg. There exists no compelling theoretical basis for using the exact weights which were finally chosen. Clearly, more work must be focused upon devising a theoretical framework which can guide a researcher in his attempts to quantitatively analyze patterns of output performance growth.

²⁹ Because the output performance index is simply a weighted sum of a Community's authoritative actions it is generally not possible to attach a precise interpretation to each possible index value. Clearly many different patterns of actions exist which would combine to produce identical index scores. The value of the index for political research lies not in the degree of precision of meaning that can be attached to a given score but rather in the opportunity it affords for making preliminary systematic and quantitative comparisons.

³⁰ The time series methods which I use are based upon discussions in the following statistics texts, Yamane, Taro, Statistics, An Introductory Analysis (2nd ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1967)Google Scholar, and Croxton, Frederick, Cowden, Dudly, and Klein, Sidney, Applied General Statistics (3rd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1967)Google Scholar.

³¹ For a thorough discussion of the elementary differential calculus of functions of a single independent variable and of applications to rate problems see Thomas, George B. Jr, Calculus and Analytic Geometry (3rd ed.; Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1960), pp. 1–154, especially pp. 104–133Google Scholar.

³² See Croxton, Cowden, and Klein, pp. 249–284.

³³ See Thomas, pp. 104–133.

³⁴ The computations upon which this analysis is based were performed on the University of Wisconsin's CDC 3600 computer using programs written by the author and program REGAN 1 of the University of Wisconsin Computing Center Statistical Program System. I wish to thank Keith Billingsley and Richard Trilling for their kind help in familiarizing me with the Wisconsin computing system.

³⁵ Since the four equations have been fitted independently to the output scores of their respective stages, the interior end points of the regression lines will not necessarily join one another. One could construct a more elaborate four-equation model by fitting the regression equations under the constraint that all interior points must be joined.

^a Since two points determine a straight line the correlation statistics for this equation have no real meaning.

³⁶ Since equation II is determined by only two points, there can be no variation about the regression line and consequently the correlation statistics for the equation have no meaning.

^a Since two points determine a straight line the correlation statistics for this equation have no real meaning.

³⁷ Lindberg has suggested that the attempt of the European Community to develop a common agricultural policy provided the opportunity for this great surge in output performance. See Lindberg, Leon, ”Decision Making and Integration in the European Community,” in International Organization, Winter 1965 (Vol. 19, No. 1), pp. 1–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ Before turning to a possible explanation of why the sociocausal paradigm did not describe the empirical reality of political events in Western Europe, I must call attention to the limitations of my own research.

A problem which confronts my work is one of validity. Does my weighting and summation index really describe the variable of output performance? As is often the case in exploratory social research, a scholar has no direct or foolproof check which he can easily use to test the validity of his indicators. Also, relatively little effort has been made by political scientists to devise methods for treating validity problems. What I hope I have done is to state as clearly as possible the reasons underlying the decisions I have made so that the reader may decide for himself whether or not he approves of these procedures.

There exists in my mind the nagging question that perhaps my index does not fully represent output performance. For example, it might be possible that a supranational institution could at a given time period make a series of decisions regarding a particular area. Let us further assume that the actions which were taken in this time period were of such a nature that they effectively allowed the institution to become the dominant political body making binding and allocating decisions for that particular issue area. If this was the situation, the institution would receive a high score on my index for the time period when the crucial decisions were being made that allowed the institution to gain authority in that field. However, in later periods, even though the institution would possess the same or perhaps even greater authority in that field, the institution might have to make fewer actual decisions regarding that area. In other words, once an institution had established its preeminence in an area it might only have to make a few minor decisions for that area as events change slighdy. However, such a course of action would result in a low institutional output performance score on the index. (The findings presented by Lindberg in International Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 1–19, seem to agree with this conclusion.)

If the above pattern actually prevailed, one might predict that my index scores would be expected to level off or decline after a period of years. Since, however, my data indicated that output performance has increased steadily over the period being studied, I would argue that while leveling off of the index scores might have occurred in some issue areas, the European Communities institutions were gaining authority in even more new areas so that the total effect was one of output performance increase. As I have shown, a leveling off of the index of output performance scores might not necessarily mean that an institution's actual output performance was declining. Since the index never did show any leveling off, I feel safe in making the conclusion that supranational institutional output performance in Western Europe has increased from 1953 to 1964.

Another difficult problem is devising a weighting system for my index. I have earlier discussed how I arrived at the final procedures which I used in determining weights for the different types of official actions taken by Community institutions. In my research I did not begin to devise a weighting system for actual decisions made within each of the main action type categories. It is undoubtedly true that certain decisions taken by an institution are of far greater significance than others in expanding the institution's authority in a given area. Clearly this problem of within-category weighting is one which deserves much future attention.

A final problem which bothered me throughout my research was the lack of theoretical criteria presented in the existing scholarly literature which could have served as an aid in designing my research project and in analyzing and interpreting my results. We have very little theory relating to the formation of political systems and what theory we do have is stated in a verbal terminology which gives no clear and precise help for the researcher attempting to quantitatively study an empirical problem.

³⁹ Early, John, “Support for the European Community as a Political System: The Quantitative Aspects” (Unpublished seminar paper, University of Wisconsin, 1967), p. 25Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ See Galtung, Johan, Theory and Methods of Social Research (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 321–323Google Scholar. Also see Kaplan, pp. 121–125.

⁴¹ Miller, Warren E. and Stokes, Donald E., “Constituency Influence in Congress,” in Angus Campbell and others, Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), pp. 351–372Google Scholar. Also see Key, V. O. Jr, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 411–531Google Scholar; and Luttbeg, Norman (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy: Models of Political Linkage (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey Press, 1968)Google Scholar.

⁴² See Cnudde, Charles F. and McCrone, Donald J., “The Linkage between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model,” American Political Science Review, 03 1966 (Vol. 60, No. 1), pp. 66–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Blalock, Hubert, Causal Inferences in Non-Experimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964)Google Scholar; Alker, Hayward Jr, “Causal Inference and Political Analysis,” in Bernd, Joseph (ed.), Mathematical Applications in Political Science II (Dallas, Tex: Southern Methodist University Press, 1966), pp. 7–43Google Scholar; Blalock, Hubert, “Theory Building and Causal Inferences,” in Blalock, Hubert and Blalock, Ann (ed.), Methodology in Social Research (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 155–198Google Scholar; and Boudon, Raymond, “A New Look at Correlation Analysis,” in Blalock, and Blalock, (ed.), pp. 199–235Google Scholar.

⁴³ Miller and Stokes in Campbell and others, pp. 360–371.

⁴⁴ Key, pp. 32–35.

⁴⁵ Inglehart, Ronald, “An End to European Integration?,” American Political Science Review, 03 1967 (Vol. 61, No. 1), pp. 91–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also compare with Nye, , International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 4Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Compare with Etzioni, Amitai, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 44–47Google Scholar; and Bauer, Raymond, Pool, Ithiel de Sola, and Dexter, Lewis, American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade (New York: Atherton Press, 1963)Google Scholar.