Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-p9bg8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T05:51:04.841Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict Among Member-States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2006

David H. Bearce ,
Kristen M. Flanagan  and
Katharine M. Floros
David H. Bearce
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh, [email protected]
Kristen M. Flanagan
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh, [email protected]
Katharine M. Floros
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh, [email protected]
Get access

Abstract

We offer a theory explaining how alliances as international security regimes reduce military conflict between member-states through their internal provision of information concerning national military capabilities. Bargaining models of war have shown that a lack of information about relative military capabilities functions as an important cause of war. We argue that alliances provide such information to internal participants, and greater knowledge within the alliance about member-state military capabilities reduces certain informational problems that could potentially lead to war. This internal information effect, however, is a conditional one. We posit that the information provided within the alliance matters most for dyads at or near power parity: the cases where states are most uncertain about who would prevail if a military conflict did emerge. In power preponderant dyads where the outcome of a potential military conflict is relatively certain, the internal information provided by military alliances becomes less important. Our statistical results provide strong support for these theoretical arguments.Our greatest thanks go to Ashley Leeds, who made available an advance copy of the ATOP 3.0 data set. This article also benefited from presentations at the University of Wisconsin and at ISA-South in Columbia, S.C. Finally, we thank Lisa Martin, two anonymous reviewers, Scott Gehlbach, Chuck Gochman, Zaryab Iqbal, George Krause, Pat McDonald, Jon Pevehouse, Bill Reed, Kevin Sweeney, and Harrison Wagner for their detailed comments and/or suggestions.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 60 , Issue 3 , July 2006 , pp. 595 - 625
Copyright
© 2006 The IO Foundation and Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Altfeld, Michael F. 1984. The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test. Western Political Quarterly 37 (4):523–44.Google Scholar
Anthony, John Duke. 1996. Special Report: The Sixteenth GCC Heads-of-State Summit: Insights and Implications. Middle East Policy 4 (October):159–78.Google Scholar
Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 2001. Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water: A Comment on Green, Kim, and Yoon. International Organization 55 (2):487–95.Google Scholar
Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker. 1998. Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable. American Journal of Political Science 42 (4):1260–88.Google Scholar
Bennett, D. Scott. 1997. Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816–1984. American Journal of Political Science 41 (3):846–78.Google Scholar
Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006. Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses. Political Analysis 14 (1):63–82.Google Scholar
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. The War Trap. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Christensen, Thomas J., and Jack Snyder. 1990. Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity. International Organization 44 (2):137–68.Google Scholar
Clark, David H., and Timothy Nordstrom. 2003. Risky Inference: Unobserved Treatment Effects in Conflict Studies. International Studies Quarterly 47 (3):417–29.Google Scholar
Dann, Uriel. 1989. King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955–1967. New York: Oxford University Press.
Duffield, John S. 1992. International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels. International Organization 46 (4):819–55.Google Scholar
Farber, Henry S., and Joanne Gowa. 1997. Common Interests or Common Polities? Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace. Journal of Politics 59 (2):393–417.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49 (3):379–414.Google Scholar
Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. 1996. Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations. International Organization 50 (1):109–39.Google Scholar
Gartzke, Erik. 1998. Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace. American Journal of Political Science 42 (1):1–27.Google Scholar
Gartzke, Erik, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer. 2001. Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict. International Organization 55 (2):391–438.Google Scholar
Gibler, Douglas M. 2000. Alliances: Why Some Cause War and Others Cause Peace. In What Do We Know About War? edited by John A. Vasquez, 145–64. New York: Rowan and Littlefield.
Gibler, Douglas M., and Meredith Reid Sarkees. 2004. Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data Set, 1816–2000. Journal of Peace Research 41 (2):211–22.Google Scholar
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2002. Expanded Trade and GDP Data. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (5):712–24.Google Scholar
Hadley, Guy. 1971. CENTO, the Forgotten Alliance: A Study of the Central Treaty Organization. Institute for the Study of International Organizations Monograph 1 (4).Google Scholar
Haftendorn, Helga, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander. 1999. Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hellman, Gunther, and Reinhard Wolf. 1993. Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO. Security Studies 3 (1):3–43.Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1983. Security Regimes. In International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner, 173–194. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Kant, Immanuel. [1795] 1932. Perpetual Peace. Los Angeles: U.S. Library Association.
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Keohane, Robert O. 1989. International Institutions and State Power. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sydney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1983. Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. In International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner, 1–21. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Krebs, Ronald R. 1999. Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict. International Organization 53 (2):343–77.Google Scholar
Lai, Brian, and Dan Reiter. 2000. Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816–1992. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (2):203–27.Google Scholar
Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes. American Journal of Political Science 47 (3):427–39.Google Scholar
Leeds, Brett Ashley, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long. 2002. Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815–1944. International Interactions 28 (3):237–60.Google Scholar
Lemke, Douglas. 2002. Regions of War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lemke, Douglas, and William Reed. 2001. War and Rivalry Among Great Powers. American Journal of Political Science 45 (2):457–69.Google Scholar
Lentini, Pete. 2004. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Central Asia. In Regional Security in the Asia Pacific: 9/11 and After, edited by Marika Vicziany, David Wright-Neville, and Pete Lentini, 128–48. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar.
MacDonald, Robert W. 1965. The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Mansfield, Edward D., and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2000. Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict. International Organization 54 (4):775–808.Google Scholar
Mansfield, Edward D., Jon C. Pevehouse, and David H. Bearce. 1999/2000. Preferential Trading Arrangements and Military Disputes. Security Studies 9 (1–2):92–118.Google Scholar
Martin, Lisa L., and Beth Simmons. 1998. Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions. International Organization 52 (4):729–57.Google Scholar
Maoz, Zeev. 2000. Alliances: The Street Gangs of World Politics—Their Origins, Management, and Consequences, 1816–1986. In What Do We Know About War? edited by John A. Vasquez, 145–64. New York: Rowan and Littlefield.
McCalla, Robert B. 1996. NATO's Persistence After the Cold War. International Organization 50 (3):445–75.Google Scholar
McDonald, Patrick J. 2004. Peace Through Trade or Free Trade? Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (4):547–72.Google Scholar
Mearsheimer, John J. 1994/95. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19 (3):5–49.Google Scholar
Morrow, James D. 1989. Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining. American Journal of Political Science 33 (4):941–72.Google Scholar
Morrow, James D. 1991. Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances. American Journal of Political Science 35 (4):904–33.Google Scholar
Nakhleh, Emile A. 1986. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems and Prospects. New York: Praeger.
Olson, Mancur, and Richard Zeckhauser. 1966. An Economic Theory of Alliances. Review of Economics and Statistics 48 (3):266–79.Google Scholar
Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. 1997. The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985. International Studies Quarterly 41 (2):267–94.Google Scholar
Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. 1999a. Is the Liberal Peace Just an Artifact of Cold War Interests? Assessing Recent Critiques. International Interactions 25 (3):213–41.Google Scholar
Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. 1999b. The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992. World Politics 52 (1):1–37.Google Scholar
Oneal, John R., Bruce Russett, and Michael L. Berbaum. 2003. Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992. International Studies Quarterly 47 (3):371–93.Google Scholar
Powell, Robert. 2004. Bargaining and Learning While Fighting. American Journal of Political Science 48 (2):344–61.Google Scholar
Reed, William. 2003a. Information, Power, and War. American Political Science Review 97 (4):633–41.Google Scholar
Reed, William. 2003b. Information and Economic Interdependence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 47 (1):54–71.Google Scholar
Reiter, Dan. 1996. Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances and World Wars. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Reiter, Dan. 2003. Exploring the Bargaining Model of War. Perspectives on Politics 1 (1):27–43.Google Scholar
Russett, Bruce, John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis. 1998. The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950–85. International Organization 52 (3):441–67.Google Scholar
Schroeder, Paul W. 1976. Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management. In Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, edited by Klaus Knorr, 227–62. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Schweller, Randall L. 1994. Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In. International Security 19 (1):72–107.Google Scholar
Seale, Patrick. 1986. The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945–1958. London: Tauris.
Signorino, Curtis S., and Jeffrey M. Ritter. 1999. Tau-b or not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions. International Studies Quarterly 43 (1):115–44.Google Scholar
Simmons, Beth A., and Lisa L. Martin. 2002. International Organizations and Institutions. In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes et al., 192–211. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small. 1968. Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War, 1815–1945. In Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, edited by J. David Singer, 247–86. New York: Free Press.
Smith, Alastair, and Allan C. Stam. 2004. Bargaining and the Nature of War. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (6):783–813.Google Scholar
Wagner, R. Harrison. 2000. Bargaining and War. American Journal of Political Science 44 (3):469–484.Google Scholar
Wallander, Celeste A. 2000. Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War. International Organization 54 (4):705–35.Google Scholar
Walt, Stephen M. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Walt, Stephen M. 1999. Rigor or Rigor Mortis?: Rational Choice and Security Studies. International Security 23 (4):5–48.Google Scholar
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. A Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
Weitsman, Patricia A. 1997. Intimate Enemies. Security Studies 7 (1):156–92.Google Scholar
Weitsman, Patricia A. 2004. Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Werner, Suzanne. 1998. Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 (3):321–43.Google Scholar
Werner, Suzanne. 1999a. The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms. American Journal of Political Science 43 (3):912–34.Google Scholar
Werner, Suzanne. 1999b. Choosing Demands Strategically: The Distribution of Power, the Distribution of Benefits, and the Risk of Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution 43 (6):705–26.Google Scholar
Wittman, Donald. 1979. How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution 23 (4):743–63.Google Scholar