This article has benefited from the comments of other contributors to this issue of IO particularly Peter Haas and Raymond F. Hopkins, and from the suggestions of Steinar Andresen, Peter Cowhey, Peter J. Katzenstein, Stephen D. Krasner, Ronald Lipschutz, Craig Murphy, John S. Odell, and Oran Young.

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2. See, for example, Scarff, James E., “The International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Assessment,” Ecology Law Quarterly, vol. 6, 1977, pp. 389–90.Google Scholar

3. The term “preponderance” is used in this article to avoid the confusion created by simultaneous Gramscian and non-Gramscian uses of the term “hegemony” among international relations scholars. Here, the emphasis is on possessing the far greatest share of relevant material capability. In the case of whaling, no single country or group ever exerted hegemony in the Gramscian sense of winning all others over to its preferred categories for defining and dealing with the problem.

4. Hirasawa, Yutaka, “The Whaling Industry in Japan's Economy,” in Schmidhauser, John R. and Totten, George O. III, eds., The Whaling Issue in US Japan Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 82–114.Google Scholar

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10. This private “direct action” has involved gathering evidence against violators of IWC rules, organizing consumer boycotts, surrounding whaling fleets, interposing groups in small boats between harpooners and whales, and even attempting to sink whaling ships flying non-IWC member state flags. Mandel argues that such methods are sometimes more effective than government enforcement. See Mandel, Robert, “Transnational Resource Conflict: The Politics of Whaling,” International Studies Quarterly 24 (03 1984), pp. 99–127.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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13. This is the observation of Roger Payne, who has served as scientific adviser to Antigua and Barbuda; cited in Stedman, Bruce J., “The International Whaling Commission and Negotiation for a Global Moratorium on Whaling,” in Susskind, Lawrence E., Siskind, Esther, and Breslin, J. William, eds., Nine Case Studies in International Environmental Negotiation (Cambridge: MIT–Harvard Public Disputes Program, 1990), p. 166Google Scholar. While this means that some commissioners end up taking cues from other delegations, it is easy to overestimate the effect of their lack of substantive knowledge on IWC decisions.

14. Birnie, , International Regulation of Whaling, vol. 1, p. 180.Google Scholar

15. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 561.

16. This thinking is reflected, for example, in Waugh's, GeoffreyFisheries Management: Theoretical Developments and Contemporary Applications (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984).Google Scholar

17. A treaty rule may, through long and widespread usage, become binding on nonparties, particularly if the nonparties have themselves followed the rule. For the most authoritative discussion of when this might occur, see the International Court of Justice's judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Reports, 1969, p. 4.Google Scholar

18. In 1955, Norway proposed that the IWC appoint its own inspectors, but the protocol authorizing such action was never ratified because the issue got caught up in disagreements about national shares of Antarctic quotas. See Scarff, , “The International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises,” p. 365.Google Scholar

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20. See M'Gonigle, Michael, “The ‘Economizing’of Ecology: Why Big, Rare Whales Still Die,” Ecology Law Quarterly, vol. 9, 1980, pp. 138–39Google Scholar, in which most of the blame is assigned to the Dutch and Norwegians; Tonnessen, and Johnsen, , The History of Modem Whaling, pp. 610–27Google Scholar, in which most is assigned to the Japanese and Soviets; and Scarff, , “The International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises,” pp. 356–66Google Scholar, in which most is assigned to the Soviets.

21. For a good account of the interfirm agreements, see Tonnessen, and Johnsen, , The History of Modem Whaling, chap. 32.Google Scholar

22. The “unit of effort” is defined as a day's operation of a single catcher boat. Most whaling operations in the 1950s and 1960s consisted of either a landstation or a factory ship supplied with whale carcasses by several high-speed boats equipped with harpoon guns.

23. The public indifference can be gauged in events noted by environmentalist Day, David in The Whale War (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), pp. 5–6Google Scholar. In the 1950s, the Icelandic government requested and received U.S. air force assistance in tracking down and killing schools of orca (“killer”) whales. The U.S. air force was still using the whales as targets for strafing practice in the mid-1960s.

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25. Ibid., p. 489.

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32. This observation is fully consistent with Ellickson's claim that whalers spontaneously develop rules about who has the right to capture a particular whale and that these rules not only maximize the likelihood that a chased whale will be taken but also minimize intership arguments over priority or shares. As Ellickson notes, such rules are likely to encourage aggregate overexploitation. Whalers, like other users of common pool resources, find it extremely difficult to overcome the incentives to overexploit. See Ellickson, Ralph, “A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5 (Spring 1989), pp. 83–97.Google Scholar

33. Each factory ship or landstation was required to report its weekly catch to the Bureau of International Whaling Statistics in Norway. The bureau closed the season when the quota was reached.

34. See Gulland, , “The Management Regime for Living Resources,” p. 225.Google Scholar

35. Tonnessen, and Johnsen, , The History of Modem Whaling, pp. 569–70 and 575–76.Google Scholar

36. For data on the decline in whale oil prices, see ibid., p. 753, Table 69.

37. See McHugh, J. L., “The Role and History of the International Whaling Commission,” in Scheville, William E., ed., The Whale Problem (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 306.Google Scholar

38. The Japanese purchases increased tension between the Soviet and Japanese groups because it could have meant limiting the Soviets to the 20 percent quota that they had managed to gain through difficult negotiations with others in 1962. Again, the Soviets were able to secure concessions. See Taylor, Michael and Ward, Hugh, “Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods,” Political Studies 30 (09 1982), p. 359.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

39. For a discussion of the whale meat and oil markets, see Small, G., The Blue Whale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 39–42Google Scholar. Small notes that during the 1950–63 period, a blue whale used only to produce oil earned its taker an average of $3,675, while a blue whale used to produce both meat and oil earned an average of $11,250.

40. See Andresen, , “Science and Politics in the International Management of Whales,” p. 104.Google Scholar

41. See Holdgate, , “Regulated Development and Conservation of Antarctic Resources,” p. 131;Google Scholar and Gulland, , “The Antarctic Treaty System as a Resource Management Mechanism,” p. 119Google Scholar. As Gulland, notes in “The Management Regime for Living Resources,” pp. 224–25Google Scholar, the proposed approach did not represent the simple imposition of models developed for another species. Some of the early work had emerged from studies of whales; see, for example, Hjort, J., Jahn, G., and Ottestad, P., “The Optimum Catch,” Hvalradets Skrifter, vol. 7, 1933, pp. 92–127.Google Scholar

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43. Scarff, , “The International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises,” p. 366.Google Scholar

44. This classification is discussed in ibid., p. 367; and Birnie, , International Regulation of Whaling, vol. 1, pp. 453 and 461.Google Scholar

45. See Scarff, , “The International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises,” pp. 418–21.Google Scholar

46. Ibid., p. 634. The decision to set a zero quota for South Pacific Bryde's whales in 1976, for example, was highly controversial. Threatened with U.S. sanctions if it filed a formal objection to this decision, the Japanese government sought to keep its whalers active by issuing permits for taking as part of “scientific research,” an early example of a practice that later became more prominent.

47. Resolution 33, Report on the UN Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14, 06 1972, p. 23.Google Scholar

48. See Tonnessen, and Johnsen, , The History of Modem Whaling, p. 554;Google Scholar and Birnie, , International Regulation of Whaling, vol. 2, p. 618.Google Scholar

49. Articles 116–20 and 133–37, Informal Composite Negotiating Text, UNCLOS III, UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/Wp. 10, 15 07 1977.Google Scholar

50. Andresen, , “Science and Politics in the International Management of Whales,” p. 109.Google Scholar

51. See, for example, Smith, Vernon L., “On Models of Commercial Fishing,” Journal of Political Economy 77 (03–04 1969), pp. 181–98;CrossRefGoogle ScholarCheung, S. N. S., “Contractual Arrangements and Resource Allocation in Marine Fisheries,” in Scott, A. D., ed., Economics of Fisheries Management: A Symposium (Vancouver: Institute of Animal Resource Ecology, University of British Columbia, 1970), pp. 97–108Google Scholar; and Clark, Colin W. C., “The Economics of Overexploitation,” Science 181 (08 1973), pp. 630–34.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

52. See Scarff, , “The International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises,” pp. 585–86;Google Scholar and M'Gonigle, , “The ‘Economizing’ of Ecology,” p. 123.Google Scholar

53. The recommendations were made during the Airlie House Workshops, February and April 1975, and are discussed by Scarff, in “The International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises,” pp. 395–97.Google Scholar

54. The importance of computer capacity is noted by Laevastu, Taivo and Larkins, Herbert A. in Marine Fisheries Ecosystem (Farnham, U.K.: Fishing News Books, 1981), p. xiGoogle Scholar. For observations regarding the older and newer models, see Larkin, Peter A., “An Epitaph for the Concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield,” Transactions of the American Fisheries Society, vol. 106, 1977, p. 8;2.0.CO;2>CrossRefGoogle ScholarCushing, D. H., Fisheries Biology: A Study in Population Dynamics, 2d ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981)Google Scholar; Waugh, , Fisheries Management;Google Scholar and Clark, Colin W. C., Bioeconomic Modelling in Fisheries Management (New York: Wiley, 1985).Google Scholar

55. Tonnessen, and Johnsen, , The History of Modem Whaling, p. 619.Google Scholar

56. The belief that the eight species of great whales were endangered was reflected, for example, in the 1971 decision of the U.S. government to include them on the list of animals whose harming or taking was banned under the Endangered Species Act (Public Law 93–205; United States Code, Title 16, Sections 1531–43) and in the 1976 decision of the parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species to list them as “endangered.”

57. See M'Gonigle, “The ‘Economizing’ of Ecology”; and Scott, Peter, “The End of Whaling,” The Siren, no. 26, 12 1984, pp. 2–4.Google Scholar

58. Compare, for example, the remarks of Craig Van Note and those of Kelley, J. B., in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Whaling Policies/ International Whaling Commission: Hearings Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Congress, 1st sess., 1981, pp. 19–23 and 34–35.Google Scholar

59. Remarks of Patricia Forkan, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Review of the 32d International Whaling Commission Meeting: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, 96th Congress, 2d sess., 1980, p. 67.Google Scholar

60. Obara, Hideo, “Whaling: The Conservation Side of Japanese Opinion,” The Siren, no. 35, 12 1987, pp. 13–17.Google Scholar

61. See Tonnessen, and Johnsen, , The History of Modern Whaling, p. 587;Google Scholar and remarks of Kelly, J. B., in U.S. Congress, U.S.Whaling Policies/International Whaling Commission: Hearings, p. 35.Google Scholar

62. For a good introductory discussion of Japanese attitudes toward whaling, see Glass, Kathy and Englund, Kirsten, “Why the Japanese Are So Stubborn About Whaling,” Oceanus 32 (Spring 1989), pp. 45–53.Google Scholar

63. See M'Gonigle, , “The ‘Economizing’ of Ecology,” p. 185Google Scholar. M'Gonigle did note, however, that there was considerable awareness of and political agitation about domestic environmental problems in Japan.

64. Regarding Western ethnocentrism, see Obara, “Whaling.” Regarding Western actions, a Tokyo newspaper warned that “if Japan is to take a strong step [opposing IWC decisions], it will be dealt all-out attacks by various countries, and restrictions on its fish catch within the 200-nauticalmile zones will be strengthened.” See Yomiuri, 30 06 1977, p. 9;Google Scholar quoted in M'Gonigle, , “The ‘Economizing’ of Ecology,” p. 186Google Scholar. At the 1989 IWC meeting, Japan's commissioner complained that the “meat-eating culture” was using IWC to dominate and even destroy the “fish-eating culture.” See the opening statement of Commissioner K. Shima to the 41st IWC meeting, 12 June 1989; quoted in Stedman, , “The International Whaling Commission and Negotiation for a Global Moratorium on Whaling,” pp. 157–58.Google Scholar

65. Japanese promises and threats to other states became a regular theme of environmentalist writings and speeches, some of which appeared to exaggerate. Certain instances, however, have been documented. See, for example, the U.S. delegation's account of the Japanese challenge to the credentials of St. Lucia's delegates, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Review of the 34th International Whaling Commission Meeting: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, 97th Congress, 2d sess., 1982, pp. 11–12 and 40.Google Scholar

66. Mandel, , “Transnational Resource Conflict,” p. 106.Google Scholar

67. Public Law 92–219; United States Code, Title 22, Section 1978Google Scholar, attached to the Fishermen's Protective Act.

68. Public Law 96–61; United States Code, Title 22, Section 1821[e], attached to the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act.Google Scholar

69. Both Remington Kellogg, who served from 1949 to 1968, and McHugh, J. L., who served from 1969 to 1970, were trained cetologists.Google Scholar

70. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, International Moratorium of Ten Years on the Killing of All Species of Whales: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, 92d Congress, 1st sess., 1971, pp. 63–65.Google Scholar

71. Testimony of NOAH Administrator John V. Byrne, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, U.S. Whaling Policy Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Fish and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment, 98th Congress, 1st sess., 1983, pp. 25–26.Google Scholar

72. See Birnie, , International Regulation of Whaling, vol. 1, pp. 195 and 543.Google Scholar

73. See U.S. Congress, U.S. Whaling Policy Oversight: Hearings, p. 11.Google Scholar

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80. Tonnessen, and Johnsen, , The History of Modem Whaling, p. 648.Google Scholar

81. See Andresen, , “Science and Politics in the International Management of Whales,” p. 103;Google Scholar and Scarff, , “The International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises,” p. 355.Google Scholar

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83. For a discussion of the U.S. rationale, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Fisheries Management and Conservation Act: Hearings Before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Congress, 1st sess., 1979, pp. 312–73.Google Scholar

84. Day, The Whale War, p. 97.Google Scholar

85. See ibid., p. 96; and M'Gonigle, , “The ‘Economizing’ of Ecology,” p. 190Google Scholar. Day stops just short of saying that the environmentalists also offered financial support; however, M'Gonigle says that the Seychelles government received some financial assistance from the Threshold Foundation.

86. For an environmentalist view of the pressures on the Panamanian government, see Day, The Whale War, p. 97.Google Scholar

87. Statement by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, in Canadian House of Commons, Debates, 32d Parliament, 1st sess., vol. 10, pp. 11025–27.Google Scholar

88. In “The ‘Economizing’ of Ecology,” p. 188, M'Gonigle regards Canada's concern about EEZ jurisdiction as the primary reason for its withdrawal from the IWC.

89. For a discussion of U.S. sanctions, see Flory, Erin K., “Construing the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments,” Washington Law Review 61 (04 1986), p. 655.Google Scholar

90. For brief notices of the program's progress, see the following reports of Donovan, G. P.: “Thirty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission,” Polar Record 23 (01 1987), pp. 437–41;CrossRefGoogle Scholar“Thirty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission,” Polar Record 24 (01 1988), p. 66;Google Scholar“Fortieth Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission,” Polar Record 26 (10 1989), p. 250;Google Scholar and “Forty-First Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission,” Polar Record 26 (10 1990), pp. 233–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For initial results of the program, see Donovan, G. P., ed., The Comprehensive Assessment of Whale Stocks: The Early Years, special issue no. 11, Reports of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC, 1989).Google Scholar

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92. See, for example, Holt, Sidney, “The Whaling Game,” The Siren, no. 35, 12 1987, pp. 3–6.Google Scholar

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97. The lobbyists employed by Norway included Terry Leitzel, a former director of the National Marine Fisheries Service. See remarks of Craig Van Note, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy with Respect to the International Protection of Whales: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 99th Congress, 1st sess., 1985, p. 35.Google Scholar

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101. The Supreme Court overturned earlier district and appellate court decisions requiring application of the Packwood-Magnuson provision to Japan in July 1986 in American Cetacean Society v. Baldridge. However, the threat of another suit, Greenpeace USA et al. v. Robert Mosbacher et al., probably had some influence on the decision to apply the Packwood-Magnuson provision to Japan in 1988 after the Japanese ignored Scientific Committee criticism and issued scientific permits for whaling. The threat of the suit also helped keep alive the issue of trade sanctions against Norway and Iceland for similar, though less extensive, activity.

102. Holt, Sidney, letter to the editor, The Pilot (UNEP-IUCN newsletter for the Marine Mammal Action Plan), no. 3, 04 1989, p. 13.Google Scholar

103. Before 1977, the Scientific Committee lacked even the right to comment on whether permits should be issued; that right was secured as a compromise between whaler preferences and the U.S. proposal that the Scientific Committee be required to approve all permits. See Scarff, , “The International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises,” p. 634.Google Scholar

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105. See Donovan, , “Forty-Second Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission,” pp. 53–54Google Scholar. Regarding the Icelandic reaction, see “Whaling Could Resume Next Year,” News from Iceland, 08 1990, p. 1.Google Scholar

106. See Klinowska, Margaret, “How Brainy Are Cetaceans?” Oceanus 32 (Spring 1989), pp. 19–20.Google Scholar

107. Haas and Ikenberry suggest that capturing the preponderant power is particularly important when intergovernmental organizations are weak or nonexistent. See the following articles in this issue of IO: Peter M. Haas, “Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone”; and G. John Ikenberry, “A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement.”

108. Other epistemic communities, such as those described by Hopkins and Haas, have suffered from internal disagreements but maintained their influence because they were less sharply challenged by other groups. See the following articles in this issue of IO: Raymond F. Hopkins, “Reform in the International Food Aid Regime: The Role of Consensual Knowledge”; and Haas, “Banning Chlorofluorocarbons.”