¹ Indeed, the “father” of the neofunctionalist school, Ernst Hans, recently argued that integration theories have become obsolete because the assumptions on which they were based are becoming less relevant to the behavior of international organizations. Haas suggested that the behavior of nonstate actors no longer can be explained on the basis of disjointed incrementalism, but rather on a new decision-making rationality he called “fragmented issue linkage.” According to Hans, this condition is unlikely to lead to any permanent structure of institutions in international organizations. Haas, Ernst, “Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration,” International Organization 30, 2 (Spring 1976): 173–212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁵ This “criticism” has been applied also to the Warsaw Pact and other military and security regional organizations, as well as to international business and finance organizations.

⁶ Beer, Francis A., Integration and Disintegration in NATO: Processes of Alliance Cohesion and Prospects for Atlantic Community (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), p. 239.Google Scholar

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⁸ See, for example, statements by government and business leaders from many NATO states in Meeting Report: International Symposium on Nato Standardization and Interoperability, March 8–9, 1978, Los Angeles, CA and Meeting Report: Fourth Annual Executive Seminar on Foreign Military Sales and Arms Control, December 5–6, 1978, Washington, D.C. (Washington: American Defense Preparedness Association, 1978).Google Scholar

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¹⁰ Hessing Cahn, Anne, “The Economics of Arms Transfers,”Google Scholar in Neuman, and Harkavy, , Arms Transfers, pp. 178–80Google Scholar. Cahn argues that the data for the major arms exporters (U.S., USSR, Britain, and France) for 1967–76 do not substantiate these concerns. However, these perceptions remain: they are important determinants of national policy.

¹¹ Kolodziej, , “Arms Transfers,” p. 19.Google Scholar

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¹³ ibid., pp. 145–49.

¹⁴ U.S., Senate, Committee on Armed Services, European Defense Cooperation (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 149.Google Scholar

¹⁵ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1967‐1976 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Vernon, Raymond, “Enterprise and Government in Western Europe,” in Vernon, , ed., Big Business and the State: Changing Relations in Western Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 11–12, 17–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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¹⁹ Gessert, Robert A. et al. , The Impact on the Rationalization of European Defense Industry of Alternative US Approaches to Transatlantic Defense Cooperations: Final Report (Operations Analysis Groups, General Research Corp., 1029-01-79-CR, April 1979), p. 3.Google Scholar

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²³ The Germans mention specifically the 1975 US-UK Memo of Understanding.

²⁴ See “NATO Equipment Standardization—the German View,” International Defense Review 4/1976, p. 563.Google Scholar

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²⁷ Information based on interviews in Washington, D.C., October 1980 and January 1981.

²⁸ ”Part I. Text of the Statement on Conventional Arms Transfer Policy,” Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 202.A, 9/77, p. 1.

²⁹ ibid., p. 2.

³⁰ Based on interviews in Washington, January 1981.

³¹ ”Arms Transfer Restraint and NATO Arms Cooperation—The Unity of Seeming Opposites,” remarks by the Honorable Lucy Wilson Benson, under-secretary of state for security assistance, science and technology, before the EUCOM Conference, 4 April 1979 (unpublished).

³² It is likely that the Soviets had given the bridge to the Egyptians and that the Israelis captured the bridge in the 1967 war, subsequently passing it on to the United States.

³³ Stratton's letter is coded by DoD as 11028, 1-8282/79.

³⁴ ibid.

³⁵ The State Department internal memorandum was appropriately titled, “Bridge Over Troubled Waters.”

³⁶ Cf. Arieff, Irwin B., “Legislative Vetoes Multiplying As Congress Seeks New Limits On Executive Branch Actions,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 38:10 (8 03 1980), pp. 661–64.Google Scholar

³⁷ The letter is dated 19 May 1980; coded by the State Department as 8011014.

³⁸ GAO Report to the Congress—No Easy Choice: NATO Collaboration and the U.S. Arms Export Control Issue, ID-81-18, 19 January 1981 (Washington: Superintendent of Documents, 1981), pp. 68–69.Google Scholar

³⁹ Malone, Daniel K., Roland: A Case for or against NATO Standardization? (The National Defense University Monograph Series no. 80-5, May 1980), pp. 35–41.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ This is consistent with the 1971 Packard Memorandum encouraging licensing between contractors.

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⁴² ibid., pp. 59–60, 74.

⁴³ ibid., p. 5.

⁴⁴ ibid., p. 62.

⁴⁵ ibid., pp. 25–28.

⁴⁶ Kolodziej, , “Arms Transfers,” p. 19.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Malone, , Roland, p. 55.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Roderick, Robert, “ROLAND: Exchange of Expertise,” National Defense, 05–06 1978, p. 579.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Malone, , Roland, p. 80.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ The military services want new weapon systems designed to their specifications in the field as soon as possible. RSI negotiations are time-consuming and inevitably require compromises on technical specifications. Doctrine has been a problem as well. On a summer 1980 joint exercise in Norway, the U.S. Marines ignored procedures that had been carefully negotiated over a long period of time in Brussels. The marines explained that though the procedures worked out were suitable for Norway, they intended to use procedures consistent with their worldwide mission requirements.

⁵¹ Hochmuth, , “Aerospace,” p. 169.Google Scholar

⁵² There are many interpretations of the “family of weapons.” The most common is a scheme that would introduce a variation of a producers' union in the Alliance. In such an arrangement, the Americans might produce the NATO fighter aircraft, the Germans, the NATO battle tank, the French, SAM systems, and so on.