¹ The hypothesis had been raised that regional organizations might play a larger role in the peace and security field in order to reduce some of the burdens on the UN. See Bloomfield, Lincoln P., “Peacekeeping and Peacemaking,” Foreign Affairs, 07 1966 (Vol. 44, No. 4), pp. 671–682 (especially p. 682)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Lefever, Ernest W., Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1965)Google Scholar; United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo, 1960–1964: An Analysis of Political, Executive and Military Control (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1966)Google Scholar; “The Limits of U.N. Intervention in the Third World,” Review of Politics, 01 1968 (Vol. 30, No. 1), pp. 3–18Google Scholar.

³ Such a thesis is consistent with other “conservative” interpretations that stress the desirability for modest UN roles in conflict situations. Conservative interpretations have circulated widely in the wake of the Congo conflict. See especially Hoffmann, Stanley, “In Search of a Thread: The UN in the Congo Labyrinth,” International Organization, Spring 1962 (Vol. 16, No. 2), pp. 331–361CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ For a review of varying UN practices and a plea for more systematic analyses by observers see Young, Oran R., Trends In International Peacekeeping, Research Monograph No. 22 (Princeton N.J:, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1966)Google Scholar.

⁵ The term “intervention” is used to denote involvement in a conflict situation. As such, it is not meant to connote any particular legal judgment.

⁶ This confusion has been noted by several observers, especially by Bishop, Peter V., in “UNOPAX: A New Name (with a definition) for U.N. Peace-keeping Operations,” International Journal (Toronto), Autumn 1963 (Vol. 19, No. 4), pp. 525–531.Google Scholar.

⁷ See, inter alia, Young; Goodrich, Leland M., “The Maintenance of International Peace and Security,” International Organization, Summer 1965 (Vol. 19, No. 3), pp. 429–443Google Scholar; Martin, Paul, “Peace-Keeping And The United Nations—The Broader View,” International Affairs (London), 04 1964 (Vol. 40, No. 2), pp. 191–204Google Scholar. The last source is not internally consistent as later in the article (p. 202) peacekeeping is used in the strict sense of paramilitary operations.

⁸ In general, Lefever fits this category, but his usage is not consistent. At first he refers to ONUC as an instrument for peaceful settlement, then he considers ONUC peacekeeping to be separate from peaceful settlement rather than a subcategory. In Crisis in the Congo see pp. 17 and 44, then compare pp. 69–70; in Uncertain Mandate see p. 22, then compare p. 221. A more consistent conceptualization of peacekeeping as a subcategory of peaceful settlement is found in Rosner, Gabriella E., The United Nations Emergency Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), especially pp. 186, 190Google Scholar, and in general Chapter 8. See also Zacher, Mark W., “The Secretary-General and the United Nations' Function of Peaceful Settlement,” International Organization, Autumn 1966 (Vol. 20, No. 4), pp. 724–749Google Scholar.

⁹ See Bishop, International Journal, Vol. 19, No. 4. See also Wainhouse, David W. and others, International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966)Google Scholar. As used by Wainhouse and others, the concept peace observation is exceedingly fuzzy. See pp. 1–4.

¹⁰ See Miller, especially p. 148; Cox, pp. 8–9; and Bloomfield, , Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 4Google Scholar. The Bloomfield article presents this distinction in embryonic form only and does not maintain the division throughout; the emphasis of the article is clearly on peacekeeping, and the concept of peacemaking is left in limbo.

¹¹ The leading text in international organization notes the relation between peacemaking and peacekeeping. See Claude, Inis L. Jr, Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 288Google Scholar.

¹² Reference can be made at this point to the useful “Synopsis of Major Peacekeeping Operations,” contained in Cox's Appendix A.

¹³ There is no necessary sequence to the three functions; any may be resorted to first by the Organization.

¹⁴ Neustadt, Richard, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1961), especially Chapter 3 and pp. 34, 36, 37Google Scholar.

¹⁵ It is particularly clear that Miller uses pressure to mean different things at different times. See pp. 45 and 60 for pressure as economic influence; cf. p. 163 for another meaning.

¹⁶ The spectrum is thus one representing putative power rather than actualized power. That is to say, the spectrum does not purport to represent the effectiveness of any form of influence; it seeks only to represent the forms available for exertion of potential influence. If it dealt with effectiveness, it would somehow have to comprehend the relation of, say, persuasion in a given context to such factors as the prestige of the actor doing the persuading, the morality of the argument, and the logical consistency of the argument. For a slightly different use of the terms putative and actualized power see Klaus Knorr, “Military Power: Nature, Components, and Functions” (mimeographed, Princeton Center of International Studies).

¹⁷ It is readily admitted that the difference between force and measures short of force is exceedingly difficult to define in theory when one deals in terms of actualized power. What makes the distinction so problematical is that one series of actions in one context can have a different impact if the context is changed. Action X, undertaken by powerful state A against weak state B, may be exceedingly forceful—i.e., cause great destruction on B. The very same action (perhaps economic blockade) by A may have only slight impact on equally powerful state C. Cf. Boulding, Kenneth, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), especially p. 249Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Dunn, F. S., Peaceful Change: A Study of International Procedures (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1937), p. 83Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Schattschneider, E. E., The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), especially pp. 2, 3. “The outcome of all conflict is determined by the scope of its contagion…. The most important strategy of politics is concerned with the scope of conflict.”Google Scholar

²⁰ See also Miller, p. 19. Cf. Claude, Inis L. Jr, The Changing United Nations (New York: Random House, 1967), p. xviiGoogle Scholar:

I offer the blunt assertion that the United Nations has no purposes—and can have none—of its own. It is, above all, a tool, and like other tools, it has possibilities and limitations, but not purposes.

See also p. 53 where the UN is considered an “institutional funnel.” For a qualification of this analysis see p. 46 where the independence of the Secretary-General is acknowledged.

²¹ Gordenker, Leon, The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967)Google Scholar; and Young, Oran R., The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1967), especially Chapter 3 and Part IIGoogle Scholar.

²² Lefever, in using a framework based primarily on the different actors involved in the Congo conflict, is consistently repetitious. This repetition sometimes has little to do with major themes in the book. For example, a description of 1960 Soviet-Congolese relations occurs at three different places (pp. 11, 78, 97) based on the same facts.

²³ See especially Lefever, , Review of Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1, p. 18Google Scholar.

²⁴ See particularly Alker, Hayward R. Jr, “Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly,” American Political Science Review, 09 1964 (Vol. 58, No. 3), pp. 642–657CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and the literature cited therein, especially in footnote I.

²⁵ See Holsti, Kalevi J., International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 206Google Scholar.

²⁶ For an analysis based only on persuasive forms see Kay, David A., “Instruments of Influence in the United Nations Political Process,” in Kay, David (ed.), The United Nations Political System (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), pp. 92–108Google Scholar. For an analysis of intra-UN politics as primarily persuasive with intermittent use of pressure see Keohane, Robert Owen, “Political Influence in the General Assembly,” International Conciliation, 03 1966Google Scholar (No. 557). Cf. an earlier analysis that emphasizes pressure more: Riggs, Robert E., Politics in the United Nations: A Study of United States Influence in the General Assembly, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. 41 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958)Google Scholar. See also O'Brien, Conor Cruise, To Katanga and Back (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962) for an analysis of Assembly voting in the context of manipulation of economic means of influence, especially pp. 16–39Google Scholar.

²⁷ O'Brien, p. 50.

²⁸ See Tandon, Yashpal, “UNEF, the Secretary-General, and International Diplomacy in the Third Arab-Israeli War,” International Organization, Spring 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 2), p. 531CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Hammarskjōld apparently threatened to withdraw the Force if Nasser did not agree to base the termination of hoststate consent on the condition that the Force be allowed to complete its “tasks” in “good faith.”.

²⁸ Gordenker, p. 239. Hammarskjöld hinted in the Security Council he would resign if prevented from applying the Charter against the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion.

³⁰ See Cordier, Andrew W., “The Role of the Secretary-General,” in Swift, Richard N. (ed.), Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1960–1961 (New York: Oceana Publications, 1960), p. 10Google Scholar.

³¹ It is important to note that Azcárate misunderstands the origins of the Paris conference (pp. 174–176) which exemplifies one of the major deficiencies of individual memoirs as a source material. Because of the limited information and perspective of the principal secretary UNCCP in Azcáte's work appears to be dominated in this case by the United States and its Secretary of State. In fact, the motivation for holding the conference came from James Barco, a member of the United States delegation to UNCCP, who in his capacity as a UN official first stimulated UNCCP into action and then did the necessary lobbying in Washington. It is a general criticism of Azcáte's memoirs that he was not careful in checking with others regarding either the accuracy of basic facts or alternative interpretations of those facts. See further this author's forthcoming study, United Nations Peacemaking: The Conciliation Commission for Palestine and Other Subsidiary Organs.

³² Claude, , Swords Into Plowshares, p. 209Google Scholar. The same argument is made in Cox, p. 8; Leland Goodrich and Anne Simons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1955), p. 316Google Scholar; Stephen Goodspeed, The Nature and Function of International Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 217Google Scholar.

³³ On this point see Bloomfield, Lincoln P., “International Forces Today and Tomorrow,” in Bloomfield, Lincoln P. and others, International Military Forces: The Question of Peacekeeping in an Armed and Disarming World (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), p. 79Google Scholar.

³⁴ Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, “The U.N. Experience in Gaza,” Foreign Affairs, 07 1957 (Vol. 35, No. 4), pp. 600–619; and Rosner, pp. 76–92, 110–115CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁵ See in particular Perkins, Whitney T., “Sanctions for Political Change—The Indonesian Case,” International Organization, Winter 1958 (Vol. 12, No. 1), p. 42CrossRefGoogle Scholar, where he writes that in trying to resolve conflicts the UN may be

subjected to the most severe attacks, but these may serve roughly to measure the usefulness of the UN in making politically possible a renunciation [of state policy] which might otherwise cost much more bloodshed and travail.

³⁶ See Rosner, pp. 198–199, for the argument that the UN has to find a middle position between trying too little as well as too much.

³⁷ See Miller, p. 209. See also Young, Trends in International Peacekeeping, for a discussion of the fact that in the Rhodesian conflict the UN resorted initially to economic sanctions without reference to Chapter VII and threats to the peace.

³⁸ See Hoffmann, , International Organization, Vol. 16, No. 2Google Scholar, for an interpretation of UN roles that fits this image. See also Claude, , The Changing United Nations, pp. 121ffGoogle Scholar.; and Claude, Inis L. Jr, “United Nations Use of Military Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 06 1963 (Vol. 7, No. 2), pp. 117–129Google Scholar.

³⁹ Hammarskjöld, Dag, “The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact,” in Kay, (ed.), The United Nations Political System, p. 158Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ See Claude, , “The Containment and Resolution of Disputes,” in Wilcox, Francis O. and Haviland, H. Field Jr, (ed.) The United States and the United Nations (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), pp. 122–123. Claude is critical of United States attempts to “use” the UN for its own goals. This thesis is quoted approvingly by Cox (pp. 47–48)Google Scholar.

⁴¹ The liberals argue that what endangered the Organization was not the ONUC intervention against moderately significant opposition from the Communists and radical Africans but the American decision to press the legal issues of the financing of ONUC. To the activists the Article 19 crisis should have been avoided on the basis that in a fragmented political system those who will the ends must also will the means.

The activists also raise the question whether UN absolute neutrality in the form of no action in the Nigerian-Biafran conflict did not lower both the prestige and future usefulness of the Organization while permitting large-scale violence of an international nature (since British arms went to the Nigerians and French weapons to Biafrans, with other foreign parties participating in addition).

⁴² For an excellent critique of the UN's use of legal jargon in the Congo conflict to disguise its interventionary policies see Gagnon, Mona Harrington, “Peace Forces and the Veto: The Relevance of Consent,” International Organization, Autumn 1967 (Vol. 21, No. 4), pp. 812–836CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴³ See in particular Bloomfield in Bloomfield and others, pp. 28–30, where the editor lists three types of conflicts: basically internal (Cyprus), externally abetted, and externally created or controlled.

⁴⁴ On this point see especially Falk's, Richard essay in Stanger, Roland (ed.), Essays On Intervention (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964)Google Scholar. It also can be argued that at times the policy of nonintervention into a conflict can constitute de facto intervention–thus linking a purportedly noninvolved state to a conflict and creating yet one more international nexus. Given knowledge of the conflict and the capacity to intervene, an actor's policy of nonintervention constitutes de facto intervention in support of the stronger party. Thus, UN nonintervention in the Nigerian-Biafran conflict can be said to constitute intervention in favor of the clearly superior Nigerian central government.

⁴⁵ The claim that the type of conflict affects significantly the UN operation undertaken is also made by Tandon, Yashpal, “The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes,” International Relations (London), 04 1964 (Vol. 1, No. 3), pp. 555–587Google Scholar. But cf. the framework for analysis given below, and cf. this author's study, United Nations Peacemaking. The roles and structures of the interventionary process are analyzed without regard to the type of conflict treated. Also note that local conflicts are not the only type of conflict where the UN may find itself involved in controversy concerning the type of order to be established: Reference has already been made to UNEF's position in 1967.

⁴⁸ See Bloomfield in Bloomfield and others, p. 70. For a brief but incisive critique of problems entailed in relying upon legal norms as precise guidelines to UN action see Calvocoressi, Peter, World Order And New States: Problems Of Keeping The Peace (New York: Frederick A. Praeger [for the Institute for Strategic Studies], 1962), pp. 70–72Google Scholar. Regarding legal rules of operation concerning UNEF and ONUC see Burns, Arthur Lee and Heathcote, Nina, Peace-Keeping By U.N. Forces: From Suez to the Congo (New York: Frederick A. Praeger [for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University], 1963)Google Scholar, Chapters 2 and 9. In addition to Miller's World Order And Local Disorder on Cyprus see her latest publication, Cyprus: The Law and Politics of Civil Strife, Occasional Papers In International Affairs, No. 19 (Cambridge, Mass: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 06 1968)Google Scholar. In general see Bowett, D. W. and others, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964)Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ There are several ways to analyze outcomes. An ad hoc manner is to try to answer a nonintegrated series of questions constructed especially for one study that may be listed explicitly (i.e., Miller, p. 8) or left implicit (i.e., Lefever). A second way is to construct an integrated series of questions to be used for all interventionary studies of a particular nature: To what extent did UN intervention contribute to life preserving, state preserving, state building, nation building, system building, and UN building? A third way is to analyze UN intervention only in systemic terms by measuring outcomes according to the transformation from a nation-state system to one characterized by supranational institutions and actors: see Zacher, , International Organization, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 736ffGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁸ Cox's study presents (pp. vii, 4) a vaguely stated, overlapping series of roles: prevent fighting, maintain cease-fires, provide order, enforce. Stanley Hoffmann, in “Erewhon or Lilliput?—A Critical View of the Problem,” in Bloomfield and others, notes two roles: interposition or policing (pp. 187ff). In that same book Bloomfield notes these different roles: guard, observation and patrol, enforcement of cease-fires and truces, internal orderkeeping and policing, combat (see pp. 1–10) . Calvocoressi, in his book, discusses: roles without force to obtain information, roles to “hold a ring or police a border,” and roles of “active intervention” (pp. 88–89).

⁴⁹ For the symbolic roles played by UNEF see Tandon, , International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 542Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ On the minute difference between investigation and observation consult Miller, p. 184.

⁵¹ Rosner, p. 98. For the specific means whereby that movement was prevented see pp. 100–101. To compare UNTSO and the related Mixed Armistice Commissions with UNEF see Brook, David, Preface To Peace: The United Nations and the Arab-Israel Armistice System (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1964)Google Scholar; and Burns, E. L. M., Between Arab and Israeli (New York: I. Obolensky, 1963)Google Scholar, inter alia.

⁵² See especially Boyd, James M., “Cyprus: Episode in Peacekeeping,” International Organization, Winter 1966 (Vol. 20, No. 1) , p. 13CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf. Miller (p. 129) concerning UNFICYP's different roles at different times: “observation, patrol, and attempts to break up small clashes,” which corresponds to the terms of the present framework—observe, supervise, police. For an example of usage of the term “policing” in direct comparison to the following category of enforcement see Bloomfield in Bloomfield and others, pp. 74–75.

⁵³ De facto enforcement in the Congo was undertaken through guise of a Council resolution calling for apprehension of mercenaries in Katanga, but one UN official argues that members of the Council realized they were voting for the use of force to end secession. See O'Brien, p. 98. This resolution was implemented through guise of right of movement for ONUC combined with the right to use force in self-defense.

⁵⁴ Rosner, pp. 76–92. Again the UN exercised the right of movement backed by coercion (tear gas and gunfire). Rosner notes (p. 104) that when UNEF exercised “combat initiative” it ceased to play the role of policing. This differentiation corresponds to the present framework.

⁵⁵ See in particular Claude, , Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962); and Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, Chapter 12Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Quoted in Miller, p. 137.

⁵⁷ For a review of attitudes concerning this general comparison see Cox; for a review of problems related to use of ad hoc forces see Miller (especially p. 127) and Bloomfield in Bloomfield and others (pp. 64–69); for factors involved in creating a permanent force see Bloomfield, and others; Bowett, and others; and Frye, William R., A United Nations Peace Force (New York: Oceana Publications, 1957)Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ For example, one can study the cohesion and integrity of the command structure, as Lefever does extremely well (pp. 32–40, 168, 173–197) with regard to ONUC. On the basis of the trying conditions in the Congo the general hypothesis could be put forward that despite multinational contingents and occasional misunderstandings of orders the command structure of UN peacekeeping operations is not likely to be jeopardized seriously. Or one can study a particular relationship within the command structure, such as the relationship between the Secretary-General and advisory bodies: see Michalak, Stanley J. Jr, “Peacekeeping and the United Nations: The Problem of Responsibility,” International Studies Quarterly, 12 1967 (Vol. 2, No. 4), pp. 301–319Google Scholar. In general see Cox, pp. 121–128, inter alia.

⁵⁸ Cox provides a concise review of this issue, pp. 112–120. See also Stoessinger, John and associates, Financing the United Nations System (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1964)Google Scholar. On the one hand, Lefever in Crisis in the Congo (p. 71) suggests that the financing arrangement has little operational impact on UN peacekeeping since payments can be deferred as long as the United States extends credit. On the other hand, peacekeeping experience in Cyprus suggests that problems in financing may relate to limited duration of the mandate and to uncertainty as to what roles can be wisely undertaken.

⁶⁰ Tandon argues that the terms of consent for UNEF should have been made clear (International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 552)Google Scholar. See also Gagnon.

⁶¹ Bloomfield in Bloomfield and others, p. 98. For a discussion of legal norms and their operational significance see the literature cited above in footnote 46.

⁶² Neither political science nor international law provides precise meanings for the traditional terms good offices, mediation, and conciliation. The degree of intervention entailed under each term is unclear. Usage tends to associate good offices with lesser degrees of intervention. The difference between mediation and conciliation seems to be based on the number of interveners–one versus a multiplicity. Thus, conciliation is taken to mean group mediation, with mediation conceived as peacemaking that entails intervention beyond use of good offices. For purposes of continuity roles one to three below can be considered aspects of good offices and roles four to eight as mediation or conciliation depending upon the size of the UN agent. See further Jackson, Elmore, “Techniques of Mediation and Conciliation,” International Social Science Bulletin, 1953 (Vol. V, No. 2)Google Scholar.

⁶³ Cf. Young, The Intermediaries, for a conception of UN intervention in the peacemaking sphere mat is less broad–i.e., the peacemaker does not ever try to play the role of balancer in the negotiations (pp. 43–45). Much of the literature cited by Young and many of his points (pp. 51–61) proved heuristic for the framework adopted in this article.

⁶⁴ This role is mirrored in many statements pertaining to peacemaking, such as the following:

The major cause [for lack of progress in peacemaking] may well be the failure thus far to harness the influence and authority of the major powers in support of reasonable accommodations of conflicting interests.

Goodrich, Leland M., International Organization, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 442–443Google Scholar. It is increasingly clear that this mobilization of influence, to be effective, would have to extend beyond the “major powers,” as both Cox (p. 31) and Young, (The Intermediaries, pp. 350–366) noteGoogle Scholar. Some opposition by a “major power” would not necessarily prevent the successful mobilization of influence as Lefever's Uncertain Mandate shows. Thus, it is important to observe differing degrees of “major power” opposition to UN action, perhaps as Bloomfield does (Bloomfield and others, pp. 40–45) through the categories: agreement, some disagreement, violent disagreement.

⁶⁵ For more data in support of the hypotheses offered here see this author's study, United Nations Peacemaking.

⁶⁶ For the effect of mandates on peacemaking, in addition to Lefever, and Miller, , see Hoffmann, , International Organization, Vol. 16, No. 2Google Scholar; Lall, Arthur, Modern International Negotiation: Principles and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 84–89Google Scholar; and Tandon, Yashpal, “Consensus and Authority Behind United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” International Organization, Spring 1967 (Vol. 21, No. 2), pp. 79–101Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ Young, , The Intermediaries, p. 344Google Scholar; cf. Miller, p. 207; and Tandon, , International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 580Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ On the effect of composition on peacemaking see: Jackson, Elmore, Meeting of Minds: A Way to Peace Through Mediation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952)Google Scholar; Korbel, Josef, Danger in Kashmir(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 118, 154Google Scholar; Miller, p. 90; Gordenker, Leon, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947–1950 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), especially pp. 257, 262–266Google Scholar; Taylor, Alastair, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1960)Google Scholar, passim; Young, , The Intermediaries; and Zacher, , International Organization, Vol. 20, No. 4, especially pp. 725–728Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ See Taylor, pp. 410–411, 421; Hankey, Lord, Diplomacy By Conference: Studies in Public Affairs, 1920–1946 (London: E. Benn, 1946)Google Scholar; Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea, pp. 256–259Google Scholar; Matthews, Robert O., “The Suez Canal Dispute: A Case Study in Peaceful Settlement,” International Organization, Winter 1967 (Vol. 21, No. 1), pp. 79–101Google Scholar; Claude, , Swords Into Plowshares, p. 218Google Scholar; Azcárate, p. 114; Jackson, , Meeting of Minds, and International Social Science Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 2Google Scholar; Chase, Stuart, Roads To Agreement (London: Phoenix House, 1952), pp. 235–240Google Scholar; and Young, The Intermediaries.

⁷⁰ See Jackson, , Meeting of Minds, and International Social Science Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 2Google Scholar; Bloomfield, , Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 4Google Scholar; Tandon, , International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 2Google Scholar; Hurewitz, J. C., “The UN and Disimperialism in the Middle East,” International Organization, Summer 1965 (Vol. 19, No. 3), p. 755Google Scholar; Brook, p. 30 et passim.

⁷¹ See Jacobson, Harold Karan, “ONUC's Civilian Operations: State-Preserving and State-Building,” World Politics, 10 1964 (Vol. 17, No. 1 ), pp. 75–107Google Scholar; and van der Veur, Paul W., “The United Nations in West Irian: A Critique,” International Organization, Winter 1964 (Vol. 18, No. 1), pp. 53–73Google Scholar.