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11. Keohane, , in After Hegemony, notes that a formal international regime was never established in oil (p. 140)Google Scholar, but later refers to the postwar oil regime (p. 190). Lipson, Charles, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 32Google Scholar, includes in his object of analysis both patterns of behavior and normative structures; the concept of regime is not central to his analysis, and is used primarily as a summary of state behaviors. This is true also of Wood, Robert E., From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986)Google Scholar. For a defense of this usage, see Donnelly, Jack, “International Human Rights Regimes,” International Organization 40 (Summer 1986), pp. 599–642CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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13. This approach to regimes is closest to that of Young, Oran, Resource Regimes: Natural Resources and Social Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982)Google Scholar; p. 20; Compliance and Public Authority (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1979)Google Scholar; “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” World Politics 32 (04 1980), pp. 331–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and “Anarchy and Social Choice: Reflections on the International Polity,” World Politics 30 (01 1978), pp. 241–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Aggarwal, Vinod, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), chap. 2Google Scholar.

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20. Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, p. 55Google Scholar. Neo-functionalists drew inspiration from organization theorists, including Thompson, James D., Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967)Google Scholar. Keohane, Robert, in After Hegemony, draws on neoclassical theorie of organization, such as Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981)Google Scholar, and Williamson, Oliver, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975)Google Scholar. See also Scott, W. Richard, Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), chap. 5Google Scholar.

21. Krasner, Stephen, “The Tokyo Round: Pluralistic Interests and Prospects for Stability in the Global Trading System,” International Studies Quarterly 23 (12 1979), pp. 491–531CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22. Stephen Krasner makes this point in Structural Conflict.

23. Young, Oran, Compliance and Public Authority, p. 55Google Scholar.

24. On the NIEO debate over modes of resource allocation, see Donges, Juergen, “The Third World Demand for a New International Economic Order,” Kyklos 30 (no. 2, 1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Doyle, Michael, “Stalemate in the North-South Debate: Strategies and the New International Economic Order,” World Politics 35 (04 1983), pp. 426–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For discussions of the NIEO in a regime context, see Hart, Jeffrey, The New International Economic Order: Conflict and Cooperation in North-South Economic Relations, 1974–77 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rothstein, Robert, “Regime Creation by a Coalition of the Weak: Lessons from the NIEO and the Integrated Program for Commodities,” International Studies Quarterly 28 (Summer 1984) pp. 307–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Krasner, Structural Conflict.

25. Structural models have been given game-theoretic treatment byLake, David, “Beneath the Commerce of Nations: A Theory of International Economic Structures,” International Studies Quarterly 28 (06 1984), pp. 143–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Duncan Snidal, “Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory.”

26. Keohane, After Hegemony, chap. 7, explores the implications of introducing Simon's notion of bounded rationality. Axelrod, Robert argues that his own theory is not dependent on rational utility maximization in The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p. 18Google Scholar.

27. Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 74Google Scholar.

28. Haas, Ernst, “Words Can Hurt You: Or Who Said What to Whom About Regimes” in Krasner, , International Regimes, p. 57Google Scholar.

29. The social theorist most interested in the relationship between knowledge and power is Michel Foucault. See particularly Gordon, Colin, ed., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings by Michel Foucault, 1972–1977 (New York: Pantheon, 1980)Google Scholar.

30. In his book, World In Depression (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973)Google Scholar, Charles Kindleberger links the “stability” of the world economy to unilateral leadership by a dominant power; no formal international commitments or institutional machinery would be required. Gilpin's, RobertU.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and his War and Change in International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981)Google Scholar make little reference to the role of international rules. Krasner's, Stephen “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28 (04 1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, tests the correlation between the distribution of economic power, the trade preferences of states, and the openness of the international trading system. David Lake, “Beneath the Commerce of Nations,” also makes no reference to the intervening role of international regimes. Rather, position within carefully specified international economic structures directly conditions trade policy preferences.

31. Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, pp. 50–51Google Scholar.

32. A number of tests have been devised for the theory of hegemonic stability in recent years. Reviewing the trade, money, and oil regimes between 1967 and 1977, Keohane concluded that we lack compelling causal arguments linking hegemonic decline and regime change, particularly for trade; Keohane, , “Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977,” in Holsti, Ole, ed., Change in the International System (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980)Google Scholar; Keohane, After Hegemony, chap. 9. Krasner's “Structure of International Trade” found that hegemonic theory predicted trading patterns in some periods (1820–79, 1880–1900, 1945–60), but not in others (1900–13, 1919–39, 1960 to present). McKeown, Timothy argues that Britain did not actively encourage free trade in the 19th century, “Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th-century Tariff Levels in Europe,” International Organization 37 (Winter 1983), pp. 73–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Arthur Stein argues that hegemons cannot enforce free trade, but can pay the price of asymmetric openness under certain domestic political conditions, “The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order,” International Organization 38 (Spring 1984), pp. 355–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar. More positive assessments of the theory's utility can be found in Avery, William P. and Rapkin, David P., eds., America in a Changing World Political Economy (New York: Longman, 1982)Google Scholar, though most of the pieces address the question of U.S. policy, as opposed to regime outcomes.

Several efforts have been made to confront hegemonic stability theory with alternative explanations. Gowa, Joanne resorts to domestic factors and international market conditions in “Hegemons, IOs and Markets: The Case of the Substitution Account,” International Organization 38 (Autumn 1984), pp. 661–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Crawford, Beverly and Lenway, Stephanie supplement a structural model with a cognitive approach, “Decision Modes and International Regime Change: Western Collaboration on East-West Trade,” World Politics 37 (04 1985), pp. 375–402CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In Standing Guard, Lipson couples a hegemonic decline argument with an analysis of the changing capabilities of “weak” states. In one of the few efforts to test the theory against a contending approach, Peter Cowhey and Edward Long find that theories of surplus capacity are superior to the theory of hegemonic stability for predicting the timing of protection in automobile trade; see Cowhey, and Long, , “Testing Theories of Regime Change: Hegemonic Decline or Surplus Capacity?” International Organization 37 (Spring 1983), pp. 157–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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38. On the problem of “benign” coercion, see Taylor, Michael, Community, Anarchy, Liberty (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 10–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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