I would like to thank Doug Blum, Selig Harrison, Ted Hopf, Robert Jervis, Zalmay Khalilizad, Stephen Krasner, Bruce R. Kuniholm, Deborah Welch Larson, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, W. Howard Wriggins, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for financial support.

1. As President Reagan stated in a speech advocating support for the contras: “If we cannot defend ourselves [in Central America]… then we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere.… [O]ur credibility will collapse and our alliances will crumble.… If Central America were to fall, what would the consequences be for our position in Asia and Europe and for alliances such as NATO?… Which ally, which friend would trust us then?” See New York Times,28 April 1983, p. A12.

2. For example, General Bernard Rogers, former supreme allied commander in Europe, has stated that “if the U.S. withdraws 100,000 troops from Europe, this won't make the Europeans do more.… [it] is going to send the kind of message that will lead [the European NATO members] to start to accommodate to the East.” Quoted in Ulsamer, Edgar, “The Potential Checkmate in Europe,” Air Force Magazine 69 (11 1986), pp. 55–56Google Scholar.

3. See, for example,Layne, Christopher, “Atlanticism Without NATO,” Foreign Policy 67 (Summer 1987)Google Scholar; Ravenal, Earl, “Europe Without America: The Erosion of NATO,” Foreign Affairs 63 (Summer 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kristol, Irving, “What's Wrong with NATO?” New York Times Magazine, 25 09 1983Google Scholar; and Calleo, David P., Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books, 1987)Google Scholar.

4. For a description and assessment of these two positions, see Lake, Anthony, “Wrestling with Third World Radical Regimes: Theory and Practice,” in Sewell, John W., ed., U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1985–86 (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1985)Google Scholar.

5. See Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979)Google Scholar, chap. 6. Other prominent versions of the balance-of-power theory are found in Morgenthau, Hans and Thompson, Kenneth W., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1985)Google Scholar; and Kaplan, Morton A., System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957)Google Scholar. A recent formal treatment is Wagner, Harrison, “The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power,” World Politics 38 (07 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6. The best guide to this debate is Keohane, Robert O., ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986)Google Scholar. Other critiques of “structural realism” include:Wendt, Alexander, “The Agent-Structure Problem,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Spegele, Roger C., “Deconstructing Methodological Falsificationism in International Relations,” American Political Science Review 74 (03 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (but note Waltz's, reply to Spegele in American Political Science Review 74 [09 1980], p. 793)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7. An exception to this assertion is Posen, Barry R., The Sources of Military Doctrine: Britain, France, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984)Google Scholar, which compares balance of power theory, organization theory, and technological explanations of military doctrine. In his own critique of structural theory, John Ruggie does address its empirical limitations, but he focuses primarily on its failure to account for systems transformation rather than on predictive failures withinthe context of the existing state system. See his “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics. Richard Rosecrance has also challenged Waltz's analysis on empirical grounds, arguing that Waltz understates the level of economic interdependence. See his “International Theory Revisited,” International Organization 35 (Fall 1981)Google Scholar, plus Waltz's, reply and Rosecrance's, rejoinder in International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), pp. 679–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8. The importance of alliances in international politics is widely acknowledged. According to Julian Friedman, “alliances are the central feature of international political life.” See his “Alliance in International Politics,” in Friedman, , Bladen, Christopher, and Rosen, Steven, eds., Alliance in International Politics (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1970)Google Scholar. In George Modelski's view, alliance is “one of a dozen or so key terms of international relations.” See his “The Study of Alliances: A Review,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 7 (12 1963), p. 773Google Scholar. Ole Holsti describes alliances as “a universal component of relations between political units,” and Hans Morgenthau states that “alliances are a necessary function of the balance-of-power operating in a multiple state system.” See Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and Sullivan, John D., Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances (New York: Wiley, 1973) p. 2Google Scholar, and Morgenthau, Hans J., “Alliances in Theory and Practice,” in Wolfers, Arnold, ed., Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), p. 185Google Scholar.

9. See Walt, Stephen M., The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987)Google Scholar, and “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9 (Spring 1985)Google Scholar.

10. Portions of this section are based on Walt, Origins of Alliances, chaps. 2 and 8.

11. See Thompson, W. Scott, “Toward a Communist International System,” Orbis 20 (Winter 1977)Google Scholar; Krauthammer, Charles, “Isolationism: Left and Right,” New Republic, 4 03 1985Google Scholar; and Gray, Colin S., Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1986), pp. 38–40Google Scholar. None of these authors provide persuasive evidence to support their claims.

12. Empires are easier to amass because each successful conquest will encourage others to “leap on the bandwagon,” thereby increasing the dominant power's capabilities while reducing resistance. Empires will also be fragile, however, because minor setbacks may trigger a wave of defections.

13. Quoted in Brown, Seyom, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 217Google Scholar. For additional evidence on U.S. perceptions, see: Larson, Deborah Welch, “The Bandwagon Metaphor and American Foreign Policy,” paper presented at the International Studies Association convention, 25–29 03 1986Google Scholar; Walt, Origins of Alliances, chaps. 1 and 2; Morgan, Patrick, “Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence,” in Jervis, Robert, Lebow, Richard Ned, and Stein, Janice Gross, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985)Google Scholar; and Gaddis, John Lewis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981)Google Scholar. The Soviet belief in bandwagoning can be seen in the claim that positive shifts in the “correlation of forces” will make additional international gains easier rather than harder, and in the corresponding belief that the growth of Soviet power forced the United States to accept detente in the 1970s. See Zimmermann, William, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 159–64Google Scholar; Garthoff, Raymond J., Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 36–53Google Scholar; and Blacker, Coit D., “The Kremlin and Detente,” in George, Alexander L., ed., Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention (Boulder: Westview, 1983)Google Scholar.

14. In Waltz's, words: “Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and safer, provided, of course, that the coalition they form achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking.” See his Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 126–27Google Scholar.

15. See Rothstein, Robert L., Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 11Google Scholar.

16. In World War I, the alliance of Great Britain, France, and Russia controlled 27.9% of world industrial production, while Germany and Austria together controlled only 19.2%. With Russia out of the war but with the United States joining Britain and France, the percentage opposing the Dual Alliance reached 51.7%, an advantage of more than 2 to 1. In World War II, the defense expenditures of the United States, Britain, and Russia exceeded those of Germany by roughly 4.5 to 1. Even allowing for German control of Europe and the war against Japan, the Grand Alliance possessed an enormous advantage in capabilities. Thus, the coalitions that waged the two most important wars of this century cannot be explained by focusing solely on the distribution of capabilities. For these and other statistics on relative power in the two world wars, see Kennedy, Paul M., “The First World War and the International Power System,” International Security 9 (Summer 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Kennedy, , The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 309–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17. The explanation, of course, is that the Allies were united by the common awareness that although Germany was ultimately less powerful, its aggressive actions made it more dangerous.

18. In 1950, the United States produced approximately 40% of gross world product; the Soviet Union managed only 13.5%. U.S. naval and air power were far superior, and the United States had a clear advantage in deliverable atomic weaponry.

19. The United States and its allies lead the Soviet Union and its allies by more than 3 to 1 in GNP and nearly 2 to 1 in population. The two coalitions are roughly equal in number of men under arms, and the Western alliance spends roughly 15% more each year on defense. Although the U.S. share has declined, the overall disparity has changed little since 1950. Indeed, the most significant shift—China's realignment with the West—has added even more to the current imbalance of power. For the evidence upon which this assessment is based, see Walt, Origins of Alliances, Appendix 2.

20. As Organski, A. F. K. puts it, “If we look at the whole sweep of international history for the past 150 years, we find that balances of power are the exception, not the rule.” See his World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1968), p. 293Google Scholar.

21. Balance-of-threat theory can also be conceived in systemic terms, because its predictions are based on the distribution of threats rather than the absolute “threat potential” of a single state. Thus, if two states are equally powerful but one seems more aggressive, the latter would be more threatening and more likely to provoke others to align in response. Measuring the “balance of threats” would be difficult, but so is measuring the balance of power.

22. An obvious example is the breakdown of the Soviet-American ddtente after its heyday in the early 1970s, amid mutual accusations that the other side had sought to exploit the relationship.

23. See Heikal, Mohamed, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), pp. 82–90Google Scholar. And in the early years of the cold war, the French executive director of the World Bank remarked that “the Communists are rendering [Europe] a great service. Because we have a ‘Communist danger,’ the Americans are making a tremendous effort to help us. We must keep up this indispensable Communist scare.” Quoted in Isaacson, Walter and Thomas, Evan, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 426Google Scholar.

24. Thus, the widespread belief that Great Britain was still a superpower was corrected rather quickly after World War II, and the sluggish response to the danger posed by Nazi Germany vanished once events dispelled any confusion about Hitler's ultimate aims.

25. Basic accounts of the Iranian crisis may be found in:Kuniholm, Bruce R., The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ramazani, R. K., “The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish People's Republic,” in Hammond, Thomas T., ed., The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 454–62Google Scholar; Ramazani, R. K., Iran's Foreign Policy: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1975)Google Scholar; Lenczowski, George, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918–1948 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949)Google Scholar, chap. 11; Paterson, Thomas A., Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973)Google Scholar; Pfau, Richard, “Containment in Iran: The Shift to an Active Policy,” Diplomatic History 1, no. 4 (1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rossow, Robert, “The Battle for Azerbaijan,” Middle East Journal 10 (Winter 1956)Google Scholar; and Snyder, Glenn and Diesing, Paul, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, System Structure, and Decisionmaking in International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976)Google Scholar.

26. Qavam visited Moscow in March 1946 and rejected Stalin's one-sided offer to withdraw from someof the occupied areas “pending examination of the situation.” See U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1946 (hereafter FRUS), volume 7, p. 337Google Scholar, note 36; Kuniholm, , Origins of the Cold War, pp. 313–15Google Scholar; and Ramazani, , Iran's Foreign Policy, pp. 135–36Google Scholar.

27. The oil agreement was seen as an ominous development at the time, but was probably not a very significant concession. Qavam linked it to a complete Soviet withdrawal, arguing that Iranian law required ratification by the Majlis (parliament) and that the Majlis could not be elected so long as Russian troops remained on Iranian soil. Given the anti-Soviet disposition of the Majlis, it was not unreasonable for him to expect them to reject the agreement (which they later did). Moreover, there was no guarantee that oil would ever be found in northern Iran (in fact, little has been discovered to this day). Finally, the U.S. ambassador later told Soviet officials that the deal was more generous to Iran than the oil arrangements between Iran and Great Britain.

28. Qavam tried unsuccessfully to negotiate with the Azerbaijani and Kurdish republics in June, and he invited three members of the Tudeh Party to join the cabinet in August. This was probably just a tactical concession, as Qavam also formed his own “Democratic Party of Iran” at this time in order to oppose the Tudeh in the upcoming elections.

29. According to the U.S. ambassador, Qavam began contemplating a “sharp change in policy” in September because “he realized that [the] policy of conciliation towards Azerbaijan had not yielded favorable results.” See FRUS 1946, vol. 7, p. 518.

30. In 1943, the Shah told American officials that he would “like to see American interest in Iran continue and grow,” and he also stated that an American guarantee “would be most helpful in counteracting the ever-growing Soviet threat.” See Ramazani, , Iran's Foreign Policy, pp. 57–58Google Scholar, 254. In November and December of 1945, Iranian officials in the United States inquired further about American intentions, and warned that “the confidence of small countries” would be eroded if the United States did not help Iran. See Kuniholm, , Origins of the Cold War, pp. 279, 284–85Google Scholar.

31. Murray, Ambassador also noted that “we cannot provide Iran with an insurance policy against all dangers.” See FRUS 1946, vol. 7, pp. 374–75Google Scholar; and Kuniholm, , Origins of the Cold War, p. 327Google Scholar. The Iranians were troubled by America's rapid demobilization after the war, and by the fact that the United States and Great Britain had withdrawn their troops from Iran while Soviet forces remained.

32. According to Bruce R. Kuniholm, “Qavam and the Shah asked [Ambassador] George Allen repeatedly what either U.S. or U.N. assistance meant in concrete terms. On 13 August, on 24 August, in early September, and on 29 September, Allen received pointed inquiries. But his cautious advice, together with Henry Wallace's speech of 12 September, were taken by the Iranians as evidence that Iran could expect little in the way of concrete assistance from the United States.” See his Origins of the Cold War, p. 384 (emphasis added). At the beginning of October,Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson told the U.S. ambassador that “responsibility for maintaining Iran's independence and integrity rests primarily with the government of Iran.” See FRUS 1946, vol. 7, p. 527Google Scholar. See also Pfau, , “Containment in Iran,” pp. 362–63Google Scholar.

33. See FRUS 1946, vol. 7, pp. 519–20.

34. A number of accounts conclude that Allen's behind-the-scenes activities were crucial in persuading Qavam and the Shah to resist Soviet and Tudeh pressure in October. Allen pressed Qavam to take action against the Tudeh on 11 October, and repeated his warnings to the Shah three days later. According to the Shah's version of this episode, Qavam was reportedly fearful of the Soviet reaction but the Shah ordered him to oust the Tudeh from his cabinet and restore the government's authority. See Pfau, , “Containment in Iran,” pp. 365–68Google Scholar; Paterson, , Soviet-American Confrontation, pp. 177–83Google Scholar; and Kuniholm, , Origins of the Cold War, especially pp. 388–91Google Scholar.

35. Having ordered Qavam to oust the Tudeh on 17 October, the Shah made yet another request for American support the following day. The United States finally announced on 28 October that it would sell Iran several million dollars of military equipment, and Ambassador Allen told an Iranian newspaper that he thought sending troops into Azerbaijan was a “perfectly normal and proper decision.” Encouraged by an off-the-record statement by Acheson in November and by Allen's continued cooperation, Qavam and the Shah proceeded with their plans to restore authority in Azerbaijan. See Kuniholm, , Origins of the Cold War, pp. 393–94Google Scholar.

36. Qavam had begun “contemplating a sharp change of policy” in late September, convinced that his policy of accommodating the Tudeh had not worked. The limited nature of U.S. support is revealed by Allen's, request on 30 September that he “would welcome instructions which would justify [a] more favorable response to Qavam and also to [the] Shah.…” RUS 1946, vol. 7, pp. 519–20Google Scholar.

37. As Allen told Secretary of State Byrnes, James F.: “We must keep in mind [that Qavam's] appeals to the U.S. for help have been answered by advice to depend on United Nations for security. Our advice has been best we could give, but Qavam's problems are immediate.…” FRUS 1946, vol. 7, p. 542Google Scholar. Significantly, Allen made this observation after Qavam had taken the decisive step of ousting the Tudeh from the Cabinet.

38. Quoted in Kuniholm, , Origins of the Cold War, p. 389Google Scholar, note 18 (emphasis added).

39. Discussing his plans to oust the rebel government in Azerbaijan, , Qavam, told Allen, on 23 November that “he realized troops could probably not be sent to aid Iran but he felt Iran must bring to [the U.N. Security] Council's attention a situation which threatened world peace.… He hoped members of Council would at least show their approval of [the] Iranian Government's efforts to maintain its sovereignty.” FRUS 1946, vol. 7, p. 548Google Scholar.

40. In April 1947,Henderson, Loy, director of Near East and African affairs, told a group of Iranian representatives that “[i]t is desirable that Iran should keep the best possible relations with the Soviet Union… [economic or military] grants can be given only to those countries under direct threat and danger.” FRUS 1947, vol. 5, p. 905Google Scholar. Similarly, Allen, told the Shah, that “occasions arise when small states are called upon to defend their essential rights regardless of assurances… defending their essential interests even in the absence of airtight guarantees of help.” FRUS 1947, vol. 5, p. 922Google Scholar.

41. This theme is elaborated in Ramazani, R. K., The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500–1941: A Developing Nation in World Affairs (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1966), pp. 277–300Google Scholar.

42. Ramazani argues that Iran's desire for American assistance was primarily political; the Shah sought economic ties with the United States to deepen the U.S. political commitment to Iran. See his Iran's Foreign Policy, pp. 163–64.

43. According to George McGhee, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, the Shah told President Truman in 1949 that Iran had “always fought Russia with her bare hands,” and that he would do so with or without American help. This suggests that American credibility had little to do with Iran's interest in balancing against the Soviet Union. See his Envoy to the Middle World (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), p. 69Google Scholar and passim. See also Rubin, Barry, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 36–41, 49–51Google Scholar.

44. Although he had little sympathy for the Soviet Union, Mossadegh balanced Anglo-American pressure by seeking support from the Tudeh Party prior to his ouster. For accounts of this episode, see: Barnet, Richard J., Intervention and Revolution (New York: New American Library, 1968), pp. 226–29Google Scholar; Roosevelt, Kermit, Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979)Google Scholar; Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, chap. 3; and Ramazani, , Iran's Foreign Policy, pp. 247–50Google Scholar.

45. The Baghdad pact was a treaty network linking Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and Great Britain, with the United States as an observer. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was opposed to Iran's membership (believing it would jeopardize the Shah's internal position) but the Shah staged a diplomatic fait accompli by announcing his desire to join. See Chubin, Shahram and Zabih, Sepehr, The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 90–92Google Scholar; and Rubin, , Paved with Good Intentions, p. 97Google Scholar. Iran's motives were revealed by Zahidi, Premier Fazlollah, who stated in 1954 that “we have witnessed how aggressors have wantonly occupied neutral countries in defiance of international law… Therefore, it is certain… that a government can preserve itself only if it has the power of resistance against an aggressor.” New York Times, 28 07 1954Google Scholar.

46. The Soviets offered Iran a 50-year non-aggression treaty and substantial foreign aid if Iran would formally adopt a neutral position. Although the Shah was concerned by the U.S. refusal to sign a formal treaty (the 1959 accord was an executive agreement), he declined the Soviet offer. Indeed, these negotiations may well have been a ploy to attract greater American support. See Ramazani, R. K., The United States and Iran: The Patterns of Influence (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 38–39Google Scholar; Iran's Foreign Policy, pp. 280–85, 295–99; Rubin, , Paved with Good Intentions, pp. 101–2Google Scholar; and Rubinstein, Alvin Z., Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iran: The Dynamics of Influence (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 68–69Google Scholar.

47. For example, U.S. aid enabled the Shah to balance Iran's persistent budgetary deficits throughout the 1960s. See Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, chap. 4.

48. See Chubin, and Zabih, , Foreign Relations of Iran, p. 77Google Scholar and passim, and Zabih, Sepehr, “Iran's International Posture: De Facto Non-Alignment Within a Pro-Western Alliance,” Middle East Journal (Summer 1970), p. 313Google Scholar.

49. For discussions of the motives behind Iran's détente with the Soviet Union, see: Ramazani, R. K., “Emerging Patterns of Regional Relations in Iranian Foreign Policy,” Orbis 18 (Winter 1975), pp. 1047–48Google Scholar; Ramazani, , Iran's Foreign Policy, pp. 312–28Google Scholar; Rubinstein, , USSR and Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, pp. 69–70Google Scholar; and Rubin, , Paved with Good Intentions, pp. 108, 118–19Google Scholar.

50. After the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, the Shah reportedly remarked, “Now we know that the United States will not come to aid us if we are attacked.” It should be noted that the Shah's interpretation of the war was faulty: Pakistan was the main aggressor in the 1965 war.

51. See Chubin, and Zabih, , Foreign Relations of Iran, pp. 77–78Google Scholar.

52. See Chubin, and Zabih, , Foreign Relations of Iran, chap. 3, especially pp. 143–52Google Scholar, 156–62; Cottrell, Alvin J., “Iran, the Arabs, and the Persian Gulf,” Orbis 17 (Fall 1973), pp. 980–81Google Scholar. On Iran's relations with Israel, see Bialer, Uri, “The Iranian Connection in Israel's Foreign Policy, 1948–1951,” Middle East Journal 39 (Spring 1985)Google Scholar; Safran, Nadav, Israel: Embattled Ally (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 378–80Google Scholar; and Halliday, Fred J., Iran: Dictatorship and Development (New York: Penguin, 1979), pp. 278–80Google Scholar.

53. See Ramazani, , Iran's Foreign Policy, pp. 339–44Google Scholar; Rubin, , Paved with Good Intentions, pp. 118–21Google Scholar.

54. On the Nixon Doctrine and its impact on Iran, see Litwak, Robert F., Detente and the Nixon Doctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 139–43Google Scholar and passim.

55. Iranian arms imports averaged $146.5 million per year for the period 1965–70. By contrast, arms imports for the period 1971–77 were almost eight times greater, averaging $1.15 billion per year. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978)Google Scholar; and Pryor, Leslie, “Arms and the Shah,” Foreign Policy 31 (Summer 1978)Google Scholar.

56. On these events, see Ramazani, R. K., “Iran's Search for Regional Cooperation,” Middle East Journal 30 (Spring 1976)Google Scholar; Ramazani, , “Emerging Regional Relations,” pp. 1051–54Google Scholar, 1060–62; Halliday, , Iran, pp. 270–77Google Scholar; and Szulc, Tad, The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years (New York: Viking, 1978), pp. 582–87Google Scholar.

57. On Khomeini's ideology, and especially his view of the United States and Soviet Union as two “Satans,” see Ramazani, R. K., Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 21–22Google Scholar.

58. The fact that ideological factors have been especially important to the revolutionary regime is hardly surprising, and does not by itself refute balance-of-threat theory. As the ideological fervor of the revolution gradually withers, the proximity of the Soviet Union should encourage Iran to restore at least amicable relations with the United States.

59. See Sick, Gary, “Iran's Quest for Superpower Status,” Foreign Affairs 65 (Spring 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Just as balance-of-threat theory would predict, Iran has responded to the recent U.S. naval buildup in the Persian Gulf by expanding its diplomatic contacts and economic ties with the Soviet Union.

60. The Islamic Republic has obtained military equipment from China, North Korea, Israel, and the United States.

61. Although this might appear to be an example of bandwagoning, it was in fact an effort to balance against the Soviet Union by obtaining British or American support. As the danger from Germany receded, the traditional threat from Russia dominated Turkish calculations. See Vali, Ferenc, Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), pp. 31–33Google Scholar; Kuniholm, , Origins of the Cold War, pp. 21Google Scholar, 51–55, 68–72, and passim.

62. See Kuniholm, , Origins of the Cold War, p. 287Google Scholar.

63. At the Potsdam Conference in July, the United States and Britain agreed that a revision of the Montreux Convention was in order, because it “failed to meet present-day conditions.” See Rubinstein, , Soviet Policy, p. 10Google Scholar; Kuniholm, , Origins of the Cold War, pp. 260–70Google Scholar.

64. Truman made his decision in response to a Soviet note proposing joint Soviet-Turkish control of the Turkish Straits, which would have permitted Soviet military bases in the area. The Turks insisted they would “resist by force Soviet efforts to secure bases in Turkish territory even if Turkey had to fight alone.” It should be noted that Turkish resolve was doubted by some U.S. officials. See FRUS 1946, vol. 7, p. 841Google Scholar.

65. See Harris, George S., Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–1971 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972), pp. 17–29Google Scholar.

66. According to Vali, , “it was the Soviet threat, more menacing in its modern Stalinist form than the Tsarist pressures experienced in the past, that compelled Ankara to seek close political and military ties with the West.” See his Bridge Across the Bosporus, p. 35Google Scholar.

67. Turkey's initial request for NATO membership was rejected by Britain and France on the grounds that Turkey was not a European country. Turkey's strong anti-Soviet position and its active participation in the Korean War overcame this resistance. See Kuniholm, Bruce R., “Turkey and NATO: Past, Present, and Future,” Orbis 27 (Summer 1983)Google Scholar; Rubinstein, , Soviet Policy, p. 12Google Scholar; Harris, , Troubled Alliance, pp. 35–44Google Scholar; and Vali, , Bridge Across the Bosporus, pp. 36–37, 116–18Google Scholar.

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69. In particular, the military government that seized power in 1960 assured Turkey's allies that it would maintain Turkey's existing commitments. On these events, see Vali, , Bridge Across the Bosporus, pp. 126–28Google Scholar; and Harris, , Troubled Alliance, pp. 63–65Google Scholar.

70. See Vali, , Bridge Across the Bosporus, p. 129Google Scholar; and Rubinstein, , Soviet Policy, p. 132Google Scholar.

71. For the text of Johnson's, letter, see Middle East Journal 20 (Summer 1966), pp. 386–93Google Scholar. See also Harris, , Troubled Alliance, chap. 5, especially pp. 112–15Google Scholar; Vali, , Bridge Across the Bosporus, pp. 130–31Google Scholar; and Campany, Richard C., Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period (New York: Praeger, 1986), pp. 32–33Google Scholar.

72. See Rubinstein, , Soviet Policy, pp. 26–27Google Scholar, 29–31; and Vali, , Bridge Across the Bosporus, pp. 176–81Google Scholar.

73. See Mango, Andrew, “Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally,” The Washington Papers, no. 28 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975), p. 36Google Scholar; Kuniholm, , “Turkey and NATO,” p. 425Google Scholar.

74. On these events, see: Campany, Turkey and the U.S., chap. 4; Boll, Michael, “Turkey's New National Security Concept: What It Means for NATO,” Orbis 23 (Fall 1979)Google Scholar; and House Foreign Affairs Committee, Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1981)Google Scholar.

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79. See Arkin, William M. and Fieldhouse, Richard W., Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1984), pp. 232–33Google Scholar. For summaries of Turkey's role in NATO and the Turks’ continued interest in close ties with the West, see Kuniholm, , “Turkey and NATO,” pp. 436–45Google Scholar; and House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Problems and Prospects: Implications for U.S. Interests (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980) pp. 14–28, 49Google Scholar.

80. Non-alignment was the brainchild of Prime Minister Jawarharlal Nehru, the dominant figure in Indian foreign policymaking and a leading spokesman for the Non-Aligned Movement. An excellent guide to his thinking is Nehru, J., India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961)Google Scholar. See also Brecher's, Michael very flattering Nehru: A Political Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1959)Google Scholar, especially chap. 19; and Zinkin, Taya, “Indian Foreign Policy: An Interpretation of Attitudes,” World Politics 7 (01 1955)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On India's policy towards the other states in South Asia, see Rose, Leo, “India and Its Neighbors: Regional Foreign and Security Policies,” in Ziring, Lawrence, ed., The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, Its Neighbors, and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger, 1982)Google Scholar.

81. The most significant problem was the fate of Kashmir, a predominantly Moslem province that India occupied after independence, triggering a brief war between the two newly independent states. Its importance was heightened because: 1) Kashmir was strategically valuable to both sides; 2) each side's claims reflected competing formulas for legitimacy (e.g., India is a secular state, Pakistan is formally Moslem); and 3) both sides believed that the other had acted illegally in pressing its claims. For various accounts of the dispute, see: Brecher, Michael, The Struggle for Kashmir (London: Oxford University Press, 1952)Google Scholar; Brines, Russell, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict (London: Pall Mall, 1968), chaps. 4 and 5Google Scholar; and Birdwood, Lord, Two Nations and Kashmir (London: Hale, 1956)Google Scholar.

82. See Barnds, William J., India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 32–33Google Scholar. This rivalry was exacerbated by disputes over water rights, financial compensation, and border demarcation.

83. According to Nehru, the principles of “panch sheel” were: 1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2) mutual non-aggression; 3) mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful coexistence. See Nehru, , India's Foreign Policy, p. 99Google Scholar.

84. On Indian attitudes towards China, see Dutt, Vidya Prakah, “India and China: Betrayal, Humiliation, Reappraisal,” in Halpern, A. M., ed., Policies Towards China: Views from Six Continents (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 202–9Google Scholar; Nehru, , India's Foreign Policy, pp. 303–12Google Scholar; Brecher, , Nehru, pp. 588–92Google Scholar; and Zinkin, , “Indian Foreign Policy,” pp. 201–5Google Scholar.

85. For accounts of Nehru's largely unsuccessful visit to the United States in 1949, see Brecher, , Nehru, pp. 419–20Google Scholar; and McGhee, , Envoy to the Middle World, pp. 46–52Google Scholar.

86. India supported the U.N. Resolution condemning North Korea's aggression in 1950, but viewed the Chinese intervention later in the year as justified. See Barnds, , India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, p. 61Google Scholar; Choudhury, G. W., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Great Powers (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 15, 74–77Google Scholar; Burke, S. M., Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), pp. 127–29Google Scholar.

87. On Soviet relations with India after independence, see: Donaldson, Robert H., Soviet Policy Towards India: Ideology and Strategy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), chap. 3, especially pp. 70–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Choudhury, , India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, pp. 7–11Google Scholar, 15–16.

88. On this point, see Onkar Marwah, “National Security and Military Policy in India,” in Ziring, ed., The Subcontinent in World Politics; and Kavic, Lome J., India's Quest for Security, 1947–65 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 40–41Google Scholar.

89. See Barnds, , India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, p. 118Google Scholar.

90. There were hints of Sino-Indian rivalry at the 1955 Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement at Bandung. Nehru viewed himself as the leader of the movement, but was upstaged at the meeting by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. See Kahin, George McTurnan, The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 14–16, 23–30Google Scholar; and Sidky, Mohammed Habib, “Chinese World Strategy and South Asia: The China Factor in Indo-Pakistani Relations,” Asian Survey 16 (10 1976), pp. 966–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

91. For accounts of the Sino-Indian border dispute, see Kavic, India's Quest for Security, chap. 10; Lebow, Richard Ned, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 184–92, 216–22Google Scholar; Pringsheim, Klaus H., “China, India, and Their Himalayan Border (1961–63),” Asian Survey 3 (10 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Barnds, , India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, pp. 141–55Google Scholar.

92. See Barnds, , India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, p. 152Google Scholar.

93. See Graham, Ian, “The Indo-Soviet MIG Deal and Its International Repercussions,” Asian Survey 4 (05 1964), p. 823CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Signs of the growing Sino-Soviet split were the fact that China had not yet received these advanced systems and the Soviet decision to adopt a neutral position in the border dispute between democratic India and communist China.

94. On the Kennedy administration's efforts to improve U.S. relations in the Third World, see: Gaddis, , Strategies of Containment, pp. 223–25Google Scholar; and Brown, , The Faces of Power, pp. 198–204Google Scholar.

95. Border clashes between India and China had grown increasingly serious as relations deteriorated. Convinced that China would not attack in force, Nehru had ordered the Indian Army to outflank the Chinese troops in the Aksai Chin (the main disputed area). Despite repeated Chinese warnings, India continued its provocations until the Chinese decided to take direct action to halt them. See Maxwell, Neville, India's China War (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1972)Google Scholar; and Whiting, Allen S., The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975)Google Scholar.

96. India received $92 million worth of arms from the United States between 1962 and 1965, and $130 million from the Soviet Union between 1962 and May 1964. See Singh, S. Nihal, “Why India Goes to Moscow for Arms,” Asian Survey 24 (07 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Chari, P. R., “Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation: A Review,” Asian Survey 19 (03 1979), pp. 236–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Significantly, the Indians begged the United States to intervene during the fighting, but China's abrupt withdrawal rendered the request irrelevant. See Kavic, , India's Quest for Security, p. 282Google Scholar.

97. See Chari, , “Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation,” pp. 232–35Google Scholar; Kavic, India's Quest for Security, chap. 11. Significantly, India has sought to avoid excessive dependence by diversifying suppliers and by negotiating agreements for coproduction and technology transfer. On this point, see Thomas, Raju G. C., Indian Security Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 246–64Google Scholar.

98. The phrase was coined by President Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan. Pakistan was emboldened by Chinese support, and also felt that India's military buildup (made possible by Soviet and American aid) would reduce their long-term prospects for regaining Kashmir. Accordingly, they sought a resolution of this issue sooner rather than later.

99. For an account of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, see Brines, lndo-Pakistani Conflict, chaps. 12–14.

100. See Hill, John E., “Military Aid and Political Influence: A Case Study of an Arms Embargo,” Pacific Community 6 (04 1975)Google Scholar.

101. Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin invited Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India and President Ayub of Pakistan to meet in the Soviet city of Tashkent in January 1966. Through Kosygin's active mediation, an agreement was reached for the restoration of the status quo ante. Both sides also pledged that they would base their future relations on the U.N. Charter. Each side made compromises: the Indians withdrew from more territory and the Pakistanis agreed to leave the Kashmir issue out of the agreement. See Brines, Indo-Pakistani Conflict, chap. 16.

102. This quotation is from Article 9 of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, reprinted in Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 188–91. For a discussion of the treaty and its significance, see Kapur, Ashok, “The Indo-Soviet Treaty and the Emerging Asian Balance,” Asian Survey 12 (06 1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

103. The desire to demonstrate U.S. credibility (especially to China) is apparent in Kissinger's extremely defensive account of the crisis. See Kissinger, Henry A., White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), chap. 21, especially pp. 853, 886, 895, 913–15, and 918Google Scholar. For persuasive critiques of U.S. policy, see Hollen, Christopher Van, “The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia,” Asian Survey 20 (04 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, chap. 8.

104. The flow of refugees from East Pakistan created a serious burden for India, and the creation of Bangladesh reduced the potential threat from a Pakistani-U.S.-Chinese alliance. Soviet support was useful for deterring any attempt by China to come to Pakistan's aid during the crisis.

105. The Simla Accord was negotiated at a meeting between Gandhi and Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto in June and July of 1972. It provided for repatriation of prisoners of war, and both sides pledged to settle differences through negotiation, not to interfere in each other's internal affairs, to refrain from the use of force, and to respect the 17 December 1971 cease-fire line. They also committed themselves to additional meetings in the future. For the text and an analysis, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 19–26 August 1972, pp. 25432–33.

106. This trend should not be exaggerated. The Soviet share of Indian foreign trade remained fairly constant throughout the 1970s (approximately 12%) although it had dropped to 8.4% by 1982. See International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1980, 1983)Google Scholar. The Soviet share of Indian military imports fluctuated, growing from 79% in the period 1965–1974 to 82% in the period 1976–1980, and then declining to 72% in the period 1979–1983. See ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (various years). The Indians continued to insist in coproduction arrangements for advanced technology, and they avoided exclusive reliance on Moscow by purchasing the Anglo-French Jaguar and the French Mirage 2000 advanced combat aircraft, as well as a number of other systems. See Chari, “Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation”; and Wood, Glynn L. and Vaagenes, Daniel, “Indian Defense Policy: A New Phase?” Asian Survey 24 (07 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

107. India continued to reject Soviet proposals for a collective security system in Asia, and it has consistently sought to reduce both superpowers’ presence in the Indian Ocean.

108. On the Sino-Indian détente, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 23 07 1976, pp. 27846Google Scholar; and Horn, Robert C., Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and Influence (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 123–24, 158–59Google Scholar.

109. Evidence of a fragile but distinct improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations takes several forms, including: 1) Pakistan's willingness to take vigorous measures following the hijacking of India Air Lines jets in 1982 and 1984; 2) General Zia's visit to India in November 1982; 3) the December 1985 agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities; and 4) the establishment of an organization for South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC), which began in 1981. On these events, see: Banerjee, Jyotirmoy, “Hot and Cold Diplomacy in Indo-Pakistani Relations,” Asian Survey 23 (03 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, March 1986, p. 34240; the symposium entitled “South Asian Regional Cooperation: Four Views and a Comparative Perspective,” Asian Survey 25 (04 1985)Google Scholar; and Thomas, , Indian Security Policy, pp. 30–44, 295–97Google Scholar.

110. Nehru recognized that great power rivalries would enhance India's security at an early stage. As he wrote in 1931: “No country will tolerate the idea of another acquiring the commanding position [in India] which England enjoyed for so long. If any power was covetous enough to make the attempt, all the others would combine to trounce the intruder. This mutual rivalry would itself be the surest guarantee against an attack on India.” Quoted in Marwah, Onkar, “National Security and Military Policy in India,” p. 73Google Scholar.

111. See Thomas, , Indian Security Policy, pp. 16–17Google Scholar.

112. Convinced that the West was taking Pakistan for granted, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan agreed to visit Moscow in 1950, to counter Nehru's planned visit to the United States. This gesture convinced the United States to pay more attention to Pakistan, and Liaquat canceled the trip to Moscow and accepted an invitation to Washington. The Pakistani Ambassador to the United States called this “a masterpiece of strategy… we were taken much for granted [in Washington] as good boys… we were treated as a country that did not seriously matter… [but] overnight Pakistan began to receive the serious notice and consideration of the U.S. government.” Quoted in Choudhury, , India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, p. 12Google Scholar.

113. On the origins of the Pakistani alliance with the United States, see Harrison, Selig S., “India, Pakistan, and the United States: Case History of a Mistake,” The New Republic, 10 08 1959Google Scholar; Choudhury, , India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, pp. 80–81Google Scholar; and Burke, S. M., Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 126–35 and chap. 8Google Scholar.

114. According to Khan, Mohammed Ayub, former commander-in-chief of the Pakistani army and president of Pakistan: “The crux of the problem from the very beginning was the Indian attitude of hostility between us; we had to look for allies to secure our position.” See his Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 154Google Scholar. See also Choudhury, , India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, p. 86Google Scholar and passim; and Lerski, George J., “The Pakistan-American Alliance: A Reevaluation of the Past Decade,” Asian Survey 8 (05 1968), pp. 405–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The Pakistani government also faced serious internal challenges from disaffected ethnic groups, especially a rebel movement among the Pushtuns that received intermittent support from Afghanistan. See Hasan, Khurshid, “Pakistan-Afghan Relations,” Asian Survey 2 (07 1962), especially pp. 14–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Barnds, , India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, pp. 77–79Google Scholar. U.S. military aid also helped Pakistan's ruling elite maintain its dominant position over various rival ethnic groups; alignment with the United States thus helped them balance both external and internal threats. See Harrison, Selig H., The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979) pp. 274–75Google Scholar.

115. See U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Aid to International Organizations (Washington, D.C.: GPOGoogle Scholar, various years).

116. China issued a $64 million interest-free loan in 1964, the first in a burgeoning series of economic and technical agreements. See Vertzberger, Ya'acov, “The Political Economy of Sino-Pakistani Relations: Trade and Aid 1963–1982,” Asian Survey 23 (05 1983), p. 645 and passimCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

117. On the origins of the Sino-Pakistani relationship, see: Syed, Anwar H., China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974)Google Scholar, especially chap. 4; Vertzberger, Ya'acov, “The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistani Relations 1960–1980,” The Washington Papers, no. 95 (New York: Praeger, 1983) pp 15–24Google Scholar; Sayeed, Khalid B., “Pakistan and China: The Scope and Limits of Convergent Policies,” in Halpern, , Policies Towards China, pp. 236–48Google Scholar; Armstrong, J. D., Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 157–66Google Scholar; and Mehrotra, O. N., “Sino-Pak Relations: A Review,” China Report 7, nos. 5–6 (1976)Google Scholar.

118. As Ayub, put it: “If we could not establish normal relations with all our three big neighbors, the best thing was to have an understanding with two of them… it was on this basis that I set out to normalize our relations with the PRC and the Soviet Union.” See his Friends Not Masters, p. 118Google Scholar and passim. For a summary of “bilateralism,” see Burke, , Pakistan's Foreign Policy, pp. 359–60Google Scholar.

119. See Barnds, , India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, pp. 212–16Google Scholar; Choudhury, G. W., “Pakistan and the Communist World,” Pacific Community 6 (10 1974), p. 114Google Scholar and passim; and especially Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, chap. 15.

120. Quoted in Choudhury, , India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, p. 142Google Scholar.

121. See Choudhury, , India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, pp. 210–14Google Scholar; Jackson, , South Asian Crisis, pp. 94–96Google Scholar; and Vertzberger, Enduring Entente, chap. 4.

122. See Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, “The Foreign Policy of ‘New’ Pakistan,” Orbis 20 (Fall 1976), especially pp. 736–43Google Scholar.

123. See Vertzberger, , Enduring Entente, pp. 59–62Google Scholar; and “Political Economy of Sino-Pakistani Relations,” pp. 647–49; Tahir-Kheli, , “Foreign Policy of New Pakistan,” pp. 734–36Google Scholar; Barnds, William J., “China's Relations with Pakistan,” China Quarterly 63 (09 1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mehrotra, , “Sino-Pak Relations,” pp. 68Google Scholar, 70–71.

124. See Weinbaum, M. G. and Sen, Gautam, “Pakistan Enters the Middle East,” Orbis 22 (Fall 1978), pp. 601–3Google Scholar.

125. See Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 54–62, 72–76Google Scholar; and Thornton, Thomas B., “Between the Stools? U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan During the Carter Administration,” Asian Survey 22 (10 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

126. The administration established a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) for use in the area and increased its military access arrangements in the region. See McNaugher, Thomas L., Arms and Oil: U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 13–17Google Scholar and passim.

127. Quoted in Rubinstein, Alvin Z., “Soviet Policy Towards South and Southwest Asia: Strategic and Political Aspects,” in Rubinstein, Alvin Z., ed., The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 88Google Scholar. On Pakistan's options and actions during this period, see Wriggins, W. Howard, “Pakistan's Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan,” Pacific Affairs 57 (Summer 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

128. See Wirsing, Robert G. and Roherty, James M., “The United States and Pakistan,” International Affairs 58 (Autumn 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tahir-Kheli, , U.S. and Pakistan, pp. 97–104Google Scholar.

129. See Ali, Mehrunnisa, “Soviet-Pakistani Ties Since the Afghanistan Crisis,” Asian Survey 23 (09 1983), pp. 1027–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

130. See Wirsing and Doherty, “U.S. and Pakistan”; and Mustafa, Zubeida, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations: The Latest Phase,” The World Today 36 (12 1980)Google Scholar.

131. See Wriggins, W. Howard, “The Balancing Process in Pakistan's Foreign Policy,” in Ziring, Lawrence et al. , eds., Pakistan: The Long View (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977)Google Scholar.

132. The most obvious example is concern for each other's nuclear capability (for example, Pakistan's nuclear program was primarily a response to the Indian detonation of 1974), but this concern is also reflected in their continuing sensitivity to each other's arms acquisitions. Thus, India opposes Pakistan's efforts to obtain advanced early-warning aircraft, and its recent decision to purchase MIG-29 fighters from the Soviet Union was a response to Pakistan's acquisition of F-16 aircraft in the early 1980s.

133. Obviously, the Iranian revolution ended Iran's close relationship with the United States, but this was primarily because of domestic political events and ideological differences. Moreover, the Islamic Republic of Iran is probably more suspicious of the Soviet Union than the Shah was.

134. It is worth noting that the invasion of Afghanistan reversed these trends, because it revived suspicions about possible Soviet aggression.

135. This suggests that the superpowers face a fundamental tradeoff when choosing and supporting alliance partners. The stronger or more important an ally, the more influence it can wield within the alliance. Although powerful allies are of greater value, they are also more difficult to control and will demand more in exchange for their allegiance. This dilemma is compounded because establishing the alliance commits the superpower's prestige and strengthens the client's resources. Thus, the patron's control declines further, because the client has less need of support and the patron has an interest in preserving its investment. Thus, the gradual erosion of Soviet and American influence is not evidence of band wagoning; it is an inevitable by-product of the balancing process.

136. In a revealing statement, the Shah of Iran told a group of U.S. officials during World War II that he viewed the United States as an especially valuable ally because it “was completely disinterested, having no contiguous frontiers and no selfish ends to serve in Iran.” Quoted in Ramazani, , Iran's Foreign Policy, p. 254 (emphasis added)Google Scholar.

137. Balance-of-threat theory also helps explain why alliances larger than a “minimum winning coalition” may form, contrary to William Riker's “size principle.” Because states balance against threats rather than power, they may welcome additional members into an alliance if they are viewed as necessary to deter or defeat an especially dangerous rival. Furthermore, if statesmen believe (incorrectly) that bandwagoning is the dominant tendency, they may welcome additional members to reinforce their image as the dominant coalition (and thus preserve the overall alliance). This principle is another reason why weak states promote the concept of bandwagoning; by magnifying their own importance, it helps persuade alliance leaders to support them even if their marginal value is small. On the notion of the “size principle,” see Riker, William, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962)Google Scholar.

138. See David, Steven, “The Superpowers and Regime Realignment in the Third World,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 3–6 09 1987Google Scholar.

139. To mention a few examples: 1) India acquired the MIG-21 to counter Pakistan's purchase of the American F-86; 2) India began a major military buildup after its defeat by China in 1962, which encouraged the Sino-Pakistani military aid relationship; 3) Pakistan's nuclear program was a clear response to India's successful effort to acquire a nuclear capability; and 4) the Pakistani decision to acquire the F-16 encouraged India's successful effort to obtain the Mirage 2000 and MIG-29 from the Soviet Union in 1986. For a general discussion, see Wirsing, Robert, “The Arms Race in South Asia: Implications for the U.S.,” Asian Survey 25 (03 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

140. One could argue that this development has relatively little to do with ideology per se, and is merely a predictable result of any revolutionary situation. Having suffered at the hands of the old regime, a revolutionary government is likely to be extremely suspicious of the old regime's principal supporters. Moreover, the allies of the old regime make a convenient scapegoat for any difficulties or failures experienced by the revolutionary state.

141. On the limited impact of ideology, see Walt, Origins of Alliances, chap. 6; Feinberg, Richard, The Intemperate Zone: The Third World Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Norton, 1983)Google Scholar; and Feinberg, Richard and Oye, Kenneth A., “After the Fall: U.S. Policy Toward Radical Regimes,” World Policy Journal 1 (Fall 1983)Google Scholar.

142. On the European great power system, see Dehio, Ludwig, The Precarious Balance (New York: Vintage, 1965)Google Scholar and Hinsley, F. H., Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963)Google Scholar. On balancing behavior in the Middle East, see Walt, Origins of Alliances, chap. 5.

143. The obvious exceptions are Cuba and Nicaragua, which have balanced against the United States by aligning with each other and the Soviet Union.

144. See Kinzer, Stephen, “For Nicaragua, Soviet Frugality Starts to Pinch,” New York Times, 20 08 1987, pp. Al, A12Google Scholar; and Brinkley, Joel, “U.S. Says Kremlin Proposed to Cut Aid to Nicaragua,” New York Times, 4 02 1988, pp. Al, A12Google Scholar.

145. On this point, see Krasner, Stephen D., Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978)Google Scholar. Histories of U.S. intervention include: Blasier, Cole, The Hovering Giant: The U.S. and Revolutionary Change in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976)Google Scholar; and Lafeber, Walter, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: Norton, 1982)Google Scholar.

146. The most obvious examples are Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua under the Somozas.

147. In addition to Cuba and Nicaragua, it is worth noting the Arbenz regime in Guatemala sought to balance the American effort to overthrow it by purchasing weapons from the Soviet bloc.

148. As Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit remarked in 1978: “Certainly a country always needs armaments and armies to insure her security. But I believe… that establishing an atmosphere of mutual confidence in our relations with the neighboring countries is at least as protective as and sometimes more protective, than armaments.” See Ecevit, , “Turkey's Security Policies,” p. 205Google Scholar.

149. See the references cited in note 3.

150. For a more extensive analysis of this issue, see Walt, Stephen M., “Two Cheers for Containment: U.S. Grand Strategy in the Post-Reagan Era,” Cato Journal 8 (forthcoming, Summer 1988)Google Scholar.