¹ The best known exponent of small state theory is David, Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (London: Oxford University Press, 1967)Google Scholar. Also see Rapoport, J., et al. , Small States and Territories: Status and Problems (New York: UNITAR Studies, 1971)Google Scholar; Sveics, V. V., Small Nation Survival: Political Defense in Unequal Conflicts (Jericho, N.Y.: Exposition Press, 1970)Google Scholar; Small States in International Relations, August, Schou and Arne Olav, Brundtland, eds. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971)Google Scholar; Robert, Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).Google Scholar

² Vigorously criticizing small state theory from an area specialist's perspective is Ralph, Pettman, Small Power Politics and International Relations in Southeast Asia (Sydney: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976)Google Scholar. Rummel, R. J. has argued that size variables have low correlations with foreign conflict behavior in his “The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behavior,” in Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, Singer, J. D., ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1968)Google Scholar. Critical of definitional ambiguities in Vital's and Rothstein's works is Robert, Keohane, “Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” International Organization 23 (1969): 291–310.Google Scholar

³ A welcome exception is Nancy, Viviani, “Problems of the Small Donor: The Australian Experience,” in Co-Operation and Development in the Asia/Pacific Region, Castle, L. V. and Holmes, F., eds. (Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, 1976). However, Viviani sides with the skeptics and in any event is more concerned with Australia than with small donors as a group.Google Scholar

⁴ Elmer, Plischke, Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Choices (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976) finds that small states tend to have a larger number of multilateral than bilateral treaties, while large states display the opposite pattern.Google Scholar

⁵ East, Maurice A., “Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models,” World Politics 25 (07 1973): 556–576, presents quantitative data that support his proposition on p. 576 that “there are profound and significant differences in the behavior patterns of large and small states.”CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ Sawyer, J., “Dimensions of Nations: Size, Wealth, and Politics,” American Journal of Sociology 73 (09 1967): 145–172.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷ Hermann, Charles F., “Comparing the Foreign Policy Events of Nations,” in International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy, Kegley, Charles W. Jr., et al. , eds. (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1975).Google Scholar

⁸ East, op. cit., p. 557.

⁹ Rothstein, op. cit., p. 79.

¹⁰ Vital, op. cit.; Barston, Ronald P., “The External Relations of Small States,” in Schou and Brundtland, op. cit.; and Loren P. Gresham, Small Nation Foreign Policy: Linkages and the New Zealand Case (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1973). Plischke, op. cit., established cutting points at 100,000, 300,000, 1 million, 5 million, 25 million, 50 million, 75 million, 100 million, and 200 million for a more complex categorization, but no other scholars have followed his lead.Google Scholar

¹¹ The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) originated in the late 1950s at the insistence by the United States that other rich states shoulder their share of the burden of aid to the developing ex-colonies and other poor countries. It was constituted in its present form in 1961. See Willard, Thorp, The Reality of Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 248–252Google Scholar. Switzerland, Finland, Australia, and New Zealand joined during the subsequent decade and Portugal resigned. In 1976 the DAC members gave 70.6 percent of all Official Development Assistance (ODA); OPEC states gave 26.7 percent; and the centrally planned economies gave 2.8 percent. See Williams, Maurice J., Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee: 1977 Review (Paris: OECD, 1977), p. 63.Google Scholar

¹² Burgess, P. M., “Nation-typing for Foreign Policy Analysis: A Partitioning Procedure for Constructing Typologies,” in Methodological Concerns in International Studies, Fedder, E. H., ed. (St. Louis: University of Missouri Center for International Studies, 1970), pp. 3–66.Google Scholar

¹³ Salmore, S. A., Foreign Policy and National Attributes: A Multivariate A nalysis (unpublished h.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1972); Hermann, op. cit.; and East, op. cit.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Paraphrased from the convenient listing by East, op. cit., p. 557.

¹⁵ This observation finds support from Plischke, op. cit., p. 63 and Chadwick, Alger and Steven, Brams, “Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations,” World Politics 19 (07 1967): 646–663.Google Scholar

¹⁶ These figures were extracted from George, Cunningham, The Management of Aid Agencies: Donor Structures and Procedures for the Administration of Aid to Developing Countries (London: Croom Helm, 1974) and various official pamphlets and publications issued by donor aid agencies.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 130.

¹⁸ Figures from Williams, op. cit., Statistical Annex.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 71. The weighted and unweighted averages differ because the influence of large donor aid volume is taken into account in the former and not in the latter. I've chosen to present only unweighted averages in the tables for simplicity's sake and because weighting would not necessarily alter the patterns of contrast between the two groups, particularly since the two most persistent deviants, Italy and Finland, swing the least weight in their respective groups.

²¹ The One Percent Aid target was first put forward by the World Council of Churches during the 1950s. The UN General Assembly endorsed it in 1960 and UNCTAD in 1964 and again in 1968. DAC endorsed it in 1964. See Pearson, Lester B., et al. , Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 144.Google Scholar

²² The.7 percent target was put forward by UNCTAD in 1968 and was strongly endorsed by the Pearson Commission, op. cit. (pp. 147–151). The DAC has not formally adopted it but 14 of the 17 members have accepted it in principle.

²³ Figures from Williams, op. cit., Statistical Annex.

²⁴ On the concept and calculation of grant element see John, White, The Politics of Foreign Aid (London: The Bodley Head, 1974), pp. 158–159.Google Scholar

²⁵ Figures from Williams, op. cit., Statistical Annex.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Pearson, , op. cit., pp. 172–176 and 191–193.Google Scholar

²⁸ Bhagwati, J., “The Tying of Aid” in Foreign Aid: Selected Readings, Jagdish, Bhagwati and Eckaus, Richard S., eds. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970).Google Scholar

²⁹ Figures from Williams, op. cit., Statistical Annex.

³⁰ Wittkopf, Eugene R., Western Bilateral Aid Allocations: A Comparative Study of Recipient State Attributes and Aid Received (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972).Google Scholar

³¹ McKinley, R. D. and Little, R., “A Foreign Policy Model of U.S. Bilateral Aid Allocations,” World Politics 30 (10 1977): 58–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³² Williams, op. cit., pp. 72–83.

³³ Cited in Viviani, op. cit., p. 207, n. 10.

³⁴ Viviani, op. cit., p. 207. Viviani's judgment is interesting insofar as she appears skeptical of small state theory in other respects, especially as applied to Australia.

³⁵ See, for instance, USAID's report to Congress Implementation of “New Directions” in Development Assistance (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975)Google Scholar and Overseas Development: The Changing Emphasis in British Aid Policies: More Help for the Poorest (Cmnd. 6270, London: HMSO, 1975). On Scandinavian countries' aid policies see Cunningham, op. cit.Google Scholar

³⁶ I am grateful to Professor Robert O. Keohane for his suggestions on the construction of this index. A preliminary method of construction employing grant element of ODA to LLDCs and weighting all the measures equally yielded a questionably high ranking for Italy and suspiciously low rankings for Canada and France. Nevertheless the relative magnitudes of small and large donor averages and the rank correlations of aid performance with size and wealth measures were similar for both methods of index construction. This suggests that ODA as a percentage of GNP is probably the best indicator of aid performance if only a single indicator must be selected.

³⁷ Turney, B. L. and Robb, G. P., Statistical Methods for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Intext, 1977). None of the correlations reached statistical significance at the.05 level which is.490 for seventeen cases.Google Scholar

³⁸ Rummel, R. J., The Dimensions of Nations (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), pp. 212–231.Google Scholar