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Regimes, power, and international aviation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
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Measured against institutionalism and modified structural realism, realism provides the most coherent explanation of the international arrangements pertaining to the issue-area of civil aviation. Although institutionalized international organizations govern technical and safety issues, no single regime has emerged to govern the important commercial matters that bear on states' relative gains and losses. Instead, since World War I states have entered into a multiplicity of denounceable bilateral agreements that in turn reflect the balance of bargaining power between them. States that have attempted to reorganize the system have been driven by their own interests and capabilities, with the stronger aviation powers professing a preference for liberalism.
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I thank my colleagues, T. V. Paul and Mark Brawley in political science and Jagdish Handa in economics, and the journal's three anonymous reviewers for their sharp but most constructive criticisms on an earlier version of the paper, as well as the journal's editor who, with his comprehensive and penetrating comments, has been my toughest critic. I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its generous financial assistance for research on this and other subjects over the years.
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