¹ Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

² Palmer, Michael, “The Negotiations on Political Union,” Planning, 10 1, 1962 (Vol. 28, No. 465), p. 298Google Scholar.

³ Haas, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic, and Social Forces, 1950–1957 (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 11–16Google Scholar.

⁴ Monnet, Jean, “Ferment of Change,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 1962 (Vol. 1, No. 3), p. 206CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Thus it is necessary to skip over all previous attempts to further political integration (such as the European Defense Community [EDC]-European Political Community [EPC] project in the early 1950's) and to focus on the new approach proposed for the first time in 1960.

⁶ See “Report of the Fouchet Study Committee to the Heads of State or Government, May, 1961,” in European Parliament Political Committee (ed.), Towards Political Union (selected documents related to the Fouchet negotiations) (Luxembourg, 01 1964), p. 8Google Scholar.

⁷ “Communiqué of the Heads of State or Government of the Six, Bonn, July 18, 1961,” in ibid., p. 10.

⁸ “First Fouchet Plan,” submitted to the Fouchet Committee on October 19, 1961, in ibid., p. 12.

⁹ Recommendation 72 of the December 15, 1961, ministerial meeting in Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU), General Affairs Committee, A Retrospective View of the Political Year in Europe, 1961 (Paris, 03 1962), p. 21Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Text proposed by the delegations of Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, January 18, 1962, in Towards Political Union, pp. 25–34.

¹¹ WEU Document A/WEU/GA/PAE/(64) CR I (Paris, October I, 1964), pp. 7–8.

¹² German plan of November 10, 1964, published as Document No. 288, in Europe, November 16, 1964; and Italian plan of November 28, 1964, published as Document No. 293, in Europe, December 18, 1964. (Europe is a daily report on European Community affairs, published in Luxembourg by a private agency, Agence Internationale d'Information pour la Presse.)

¹³ See Le Monde, March 27–April 1, 1965.

¹⁴ See de Gaulle's press conference, February 21, 1966, in The New York Times, February 22, 1966; and Europe, February 2 and 3, 1966.

¹⁵ The following analysis of the Fouchet negotiations is based largely on 110 interviews conducted during the winter of 1964–1965 with various members of the foreign ministries in the governments of the Six, of some of the parliaments, and of the EEC staff, as well as on primary written sources and documents.

¹⁶ All of the relevant documents which have been published are in Towards Political Union.

¹⁷ Spaak, Paul-Henri, “Contre L'Europe des Patries,” Realités, 05 1962Google Scholar; see also The Times (London), 05 16, 1962Google Scholar; the Guardian (Manchester), 07 18, 1962Google Scholar; and The Christian Science Monitor, July 27, 1962.

¹⁸ Italian compromise proposals in Towards Political Union, p. 43. See also Lewis, Flora, The Washington Post, 04 10, 1962Google Scholar; and Gruson, Sydney, The New York Times, 04 10, 1962Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Italian compromise proposals in Towards Political Union, p. 43; see also Europe, February 17, 1962, and April 13, 1962.

²⁰ The Washington Post, April 5, 1962; see also Lewis, Flora in The Washington Post, 04 10, 1962Google Scholar.

²¹ See Europe, May 11, 1962 (editorial comment section) for indications of some French flexibility on this question.

²² See, for example, the reports by Gruson, Sydney in The New York Times, 02 19, 1961Google Scholar, and in The Times (London), 02 13, 1961Google Scholar.

²³ In a sense the Fouchet negotiations could be viewed as the confrontation between the two extreme national positions, the French and the Dutch. Insofar as their policies were at opposite ends of the spectrum a study of diese two positions might establish die outer limits of the debate and the range of dissensus about foreign and defense policy. In addition, a close study of the national factors influencing French and Dutch policies—both in their differences and in their subtle similarities—would prove useful in suggesting the kinds of motivations which determine national policies in all six countries.

²⁴ Camps, Miriam, What Kind of Europe?: The Community Since de Gaulle's Veto (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 102Google Scholar.

²⁵ See The Times (London), 05 24, 1962Google Scholar; The Washington Post, May 27, 1962; and other press reports from die spring and summer of 1962.

₂₆ Communiqué of de Gaulle and Erhard, November 22, 1963, in Assembly of WEU, General Affairs Committee, A Retrospective View of the Political Year in Europe, 1963 (Paris, 1964), pp. 114–116Google Scholar; see also Camps, p. 110.

²⁷ Italy came to the April 17, 1962, meeting prepared to accept, given certain safeguards, a treaty embodying the Fouchet approach, according to an article, “Political Unity in Western Europe,” in Current Notes on International Affairs, 05 1962 (Vol. 33, No. 5), p. 31Google Scholar.

²⁸ Statement by Foreign Minister Eugène Schaus, April 27, 1962, in Assembly of WEU, General Affairs Committee, A Retrospective View of the Political Year in Europe, 1962 (Paris, 1963), pp. 32–34Google Scholar.

²⁹ Spaak, Paul-Henri, interview in Le Soir, 04 20, 1962Google Scholar, in ibid., p. 32.

³⁰ Spaak, Paul-Henri, “L'Europe Politique: Paul Henri Spaak S'Explique,” interview published in Opera Mttndi Europe, Supplement No. 147, 05 9, 1962, p. 4Google Scholar.

³¹ Spaak's point on April 17 was that unless the French agreed to introduce some elements of supra nationality into the Faucet Plan (via the revision clause), there was no reason to proceed without the British. (Spaak, , Le Soir, 04 20, 1962Google Scholar, in A Retrospective View, 1962, p. 31.)

³² Luns, Joseph, “Pas d'Europe Politique sans l'Angleterre,” interview in Entreprise, 02 15, 1964 (No. 440), p. 11Google Scholar.

³³ See “Opmerkingen over plannen-de Gaulle” (“Observations on de Gaulle's Plans”), summary of the government policy of the Netherlands prepared by Diepenhorst, J., 06 1962Google Scholar.

³⁴ See Heath, Edward, speech to Common Market Ministers, October 10, 1961, in A Retrospective View, 1961, p. 55Google Scholar; also The Christian Science Monitor, October 31, 1961.

³⁵ The Times (London), 04 18, 1962Google Scholar; The New York Times, April 18, 1962.

³⁶ President Kennedy's press conference, May 17, 1962, in A Retrospective View, 1962, p. 42; Marder, Murray, in The Washington Post, 06 19, 1962Google Scholar, remarked that the United States was attempting to “tread a narrow path” between encouraging European evolution in a direction compatible widi United States interests and not interfering in internal European affairs.

³⁷ The New York Times, May 29, 1962, June 8, 1962, and June 19, 1962; The Christian Science Monitor, September 4, 1962; see also Undersecretary of State George Ball's February 6, 1962, speech, “Toward Atlantic Partnership,” reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, March 5, 1962 (Vol. 46, No. 1184), pp. 364–370.

³⁸ “Europe or Atlantis?,” The Economist, 07 14, 1962 (Vol. 204, No. 6203), p. 125Google Scholar.

³⁹ Sulzberger, C. L., The New York Times, 06 20, 1962Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ John F. Kennedy's speech of May 17, 1962, reprinted in U.S. News and World Report, May 28, 1962 (Vol. 52, No. 22), p. 64; see also Marder, Murray, The Washington Post, 05 20, 1962Google Scholar, and June 19, 1962; The New York Times, June 19, 1962; and The Economist, 07 14, 1962 (Vol. 204, No. 6203), p. 124Google Scholar.

⁴¹ There were some press reports that one of the main purposes of Secretary of State Dean Rusk's June 1962 trip to Bonn was to keep Adenauer from “succumbing” to the Gaullist vision of Europe's future—particularly since it was by no means yet clear what Britain's position in Europe would be. (Marder, Murray, The Washington Post, 05 27, 1962.)Google Scholar

⁴² The importance of this factor may be seen by contrast to the denouement of the 1965 EEC crisis: In that case, where the stakes were high enough and the basic agreement among the Five firm enough to produce a consistently united front among them, de Gaulle's attempt to deal widi each country bilaterally failed and he was forced to yield on the crucial points.

⁴³ See Camps, Miriam, Britain and the European Community, 1955–1963 (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 329Google Scholar; and Camps, Miriam, “The Six and Political Union,” The World Today, 11 1964 (Vol. 20, No. 7), p. 474Google Scholar. This was also made quite clear to this author in interviews with Dutch delegates to the Fouchet Committee who had been present at these meetings.

⁴⁴ Significantly, in an interview two days after terminating the negotiations Spaak made a statement stressing that the larger countries must recognize and act in accordance with the principle of “equality between states”; he added pointedly, “What would be dangerous and unacceptable would be for certain larger nations to imagine that once agreement was reached between them, problems would be automatically resolved.” (Spaak, , Le Soir, 04 20, 1962Google Scholar, in A Retrospective View, 1962, p. 31.)

⁴⁵ The validity of these conjectures depends upon the assumption that the basic attitudes and policies of the Six will not completely change in direction (although they may change in degree) and that some inferences about their future policies may be drawn from their behavior in the past.

⁴⁶ In fact, it appears unlikely that even a non-Gaullist successor would substantially alter die general direction of die General's foreign policy (whedier or not he would be able to maintain the force de frappe). In the April 1966 debate in the French National Assembly over de Gaulle's withdrawal from the NATO military structure his decision was overwhelmingly upheld. It appears that de Gaulle's position has been “strengthened rather dian weakened” by his defiance of NATO and that the majority of parliamentarians believed dieir constituents to have approved of diis move. See the editorials of Servan-Schreiber, J. J. in L'Express, 09 26–October 2, 1966Google Scholar, and October 3–9, 1966; The Washington Post, July 11, 1966, and September 27, 1966; and Tanner, Henry in The New York Times, 04 22, 1966Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Hoffmann, Stanley, “European Process at Atlantic Crosspurposes,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 02 1965 (Vol. 3, No. 2), p. 100Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste, “General de Gaulle's Europe and Jean Monnet's Europe,” The World Today, 01 1966 (Vol. 22, No. 1), p. 12Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ The fact that the German question remains the key to the future of Europe and that it is the primary consideration in the minds of many Europeans was confirmed again in the NATO crisis of 1966. Significantly, the French decision to withdraw from the integrated NATO military command has not caused much concern in Europe about whether France will follow a neutralist or “third force” policy. Rather it has focused attention on, and raised fears about, the possible effects of this move upon German nationalism and West German desires for “more lasting security guarantees,” perhaps through German-controlled nuclear weapons. Particularly in Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries the fear that West Germany might demand its own nuclear armaments or “at least a part ownership of some nuclear hardware” seems to be the primary motivation for the strong insistence on upholding the principle of an integrated defense structure. (Frankel, Max, The New York Times, 03 31, 1966, p. 2Google Scholar; and The New York Times, March 13, 1966, p. 16.) Concern about the future development of West Germany was also aroused by the crisis within Germany toward the end of 1966.

⁵⁰ The West Germans have made it plain that whether or not there will be a European political union, German reunification is one issue which cannot be settled by Europeans alone and that any negotiations must include the United States. (See Le Monde, May 4, 6, and 15, 1965; also Europe, February 10, 1966.)

⁵¹ The New York Times, March 19, 1966, p. 10; and Europe, March 11, 1966.

⁵² In mid-March 1966 Prime Minister Harold Wilson stated,

We [the Labour Party] reject any idea of supranational control over Britain's foreign and defense policy. We are in Europe, but our power and influence are not, and must never be, confined to Europe.

(Quoted in Europe, March 19, 1966; see also Wilson's statement quoted in Europe, May 20, 1966.) In the light of British behavior since World War II and of current indicators it appears unlikely that a Conservative government would be more partial toward the idea of a supranational political community.

⁵³ In some respects the Franco-German treaty is a special case and cannot serve as a precise model for the Six. Both the French and the Germans were particularly reluctant to admit that the Fouchet negotiations had had no positive result. In addition the treaty was partly a confirmation of the personal solidarity between de Gaulle and Adenauer-as one writer has called it, “a kind of human infrastructure which is independent of political circumstances.” (Grosser, Alfred, “General de Gaulle and the Foreign Policy of the Fifth Republic,” International Affairs [London], 04 1963 [Vol. 39, No. 2], p. 209.)Google Scholar However, since Adenauer's successor has inherited the task of implementing the treaty, the personal tie is no longer a factor. Moreover, the Franco-German model resembles that of the Six insofar as the interests of the two countries and their policies on many specific issues are different. Furthermore, the stated objectives of the treaty are similar to those envisioned in the Fouchet Plan. Thus, the two cases are enough alike to warrant some inferences about a political union of the Six on the basis of the results of the Franco-German “political union.”

⁵⁴ Le Monde, March 31, 1965, p. 3.

⁵⁵ Camps, , What Kind of Europe?, p. 10Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Europe, March 9, 1966.

⁵⁷ For example, see Destler, Irving, “European Political Union: The Negotiations That Failed,” Public and International Affairs, Spring 1965 (Vol. 3, No. 1), p. 127Google Scholar; for Hallstein's reservations, see, for example, Hallstein, Walter, “The European Communities as the Foundation of the Political Union of Europe,” speech before the Europa-Union, Bad Godesberg, 10 22, 1962, p. 15Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Europe, February 2, 1966.

⁵⁹ Camps, , What Kind of Europe?, p. 116Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ The idea of bridging the gap between a minimal starting point and an eventual community by means of a three-year “trial period” was first suggested by Spaak in his address to the General Affairs Committee of the WEU Assembly on September 9, 1964. By “giving up, for the time being, the idea of making a final treaty,” Spaak proposed, the Six would have a less ambitious but more realizable working basis. (WEU Document A/WEU/GA/PAE/[64] CR 1, p. 8.) Spaak, among others, has long felt that there was no necessary contradiction between an intergovernmental approach and an eventual supranational end. Already in 1961 he had stated, “My ideal goes beyond ‘Europe des Patties,’… [but] I believe that a confederal Europe will lead to a federal Europe.” (Spaak, , quoted in Le Monde, 03 5–6, 1961.)Google Scholar

⁶¹ By substituting the notion of a trial period for that of a revision clause the Six might also be able to avoid a renewal of the troublesome dispute over the revision clause.

⁶² Beijen, J. W., “United Europe: Federal or Supernational,” Internationale Spectator, 04 8, 1965 (19th Year, No. 7), p. 470Google Scholar.

⁶³ Hallstein, Walter, “The Unity of the Drive for Europe” (speech at the opening session of the Seventh Conference of European Local Authorities), Rome, 10 15, 1964, p. 15Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Action Committee for the United States of Europe, Joint Declaration, Berlin, May 8–9, 1965.

⁶⁵ Lindberg, Leon N., ‘Decision-Making and Integration in the European Community,” International Organization, Winter 1965 (Vol. 19, No. 1), p. 78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁶ These were some of the conditions established by one author who has studied in detail the EECv negotiations for a common agricultural policy. (See ibid., pp. 56–80.)

⁶⁷ Camps, , What Kind of Europe?, p. 116Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ Kitzinger, U. W., The Politics and Economics of European Integration (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 231Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ Spaak, WEU Document A/WEU/GA/PAE/(64) CR 1.

⁷⁰ See Brugmans, Henri, L'ldée Européenne, 1916–1966 (2d ed.; Bruges: de Tempel, 1966), p. 316Google Scholar.

⁷¹ Kissinger, Henry, The Troubled Partnership (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 244Google Scholar.