¹ Alker, Hayward R. Jr, “Supranationalism in the United Nations,” Peace Research Society (International) Papers, 1965 (Vol. 3), Chicago Conference, pp. 197–212Google Scholar.

² Keohane, Robert, “Who Cares about the General Assembly?” International Organization, winter 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 1), pp. 141–149CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ Alker, , Peace Research Society (International) Papers, Vol. 3, p. 200Google Scholar.

⁴ Keohane, , International Organization, Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 141CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ These 101 countries include those countries that were both members of the United Nations throughout 1962 and independent throughout 1962. Indonesia was excluded because it was not a continuous member from 1962–1966. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic were also excluded because they have no bilateral diplomatic representatives. The base year for most of the data included in this study is 1963.

⁶ Russett, Bruce M., International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 59–79Google Scholar. In defining the actual subset of roll calls comprising “supranational” issues included in our study we attempted to use the same roll calls which Russett found loaded together as a supranational factor (ibid., pp. 64–65) although in some instances incomplete information forced us to make arbitrary categorizations. Our final subset of votes contains 26 roll calls, compared with Russett's 24. All of the subjects included in Russett's supranational factor are included in our subset.

⁷ For an elaboration of the computation techniques used in computing the voting-support index see Brams, Steven J. and O'Leary, Michael K., “An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies,” American Political Science Review, 06 1970 (Vol. 64, No. 2), pp. 465—466CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ Keohane, , International Organization, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 143–145Google Scholar; and Alger, Chadwick F. and Brams, Steven J., “Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations,” World Politics, 07 1967 (Vol. 19, No. 4), p. 651CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ The regression equation which serves as a basis for the predicted-size index is: actual (average) UN delegation size = 10.41 + .032 (diplomats sent abroad).

In other words, the average UN delegation consists of slightly more than ten people, plus about three more people for every 100 diplomats which the nation has stationed in foreign capitals. The predictedsize index is the “residual” for each nation, that is, the difference between its actual UN delegation size and its delegation size as predicted by the regression equation.

¹⁰ For example, Afghanistan's actual (average) UN mission size is 7.6 delegates and its predicted-size index (deviation of actual from predicted delegation size) is -5.5. Thus,

¹¹ In 1963 contributions for the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund, which have since been combined into the United Nations Development Program, were made separately. Combined totals for the two programs are used in the derivation of the three financial indices.

¹² Drawn from John Clark, F., “United Nations Economic Aid Programs and Supranationalism” (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University, 05 1969Google Scholar).

¹³ This is the conclusion of James E. Price who has computed regression models for a number of international organizations’ assessment scales in “The ‘Tax’ Burden of International Organizations,” Public Finance, 12 1967 (Vol. 22, No. 3), pp. 496–519Google Scholar.

¹⁴ The thirteen minimum-assessment countries with 1963 GDPs greater than $400 million are: Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Libya, Madagascar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, and Tanzania.

¹⁵ The five minimum-assessment countries which made no contributions in 1963 are: Central African Republic, Mongolia, Paraguay, Somalia, and Yemen. The eighteen minimum-assessment countries which made contributions in 1963 and which had 1963 GDPs below $400 million are: Albania, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Gabon, Guinea, Haiti, Iceland, Jordan, Laos, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta. Of these, there are five with above-median contributions: Chad, Dahomey, Jordan, Laos, Liberia.

¹⁶ Countries were classified as less developed if they signed the “Joint Declaration of 77 Developing Countries” at the conclusion of the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)—the so-called “Group of 77.” Sixty-six of the 101 countries included in our study have been classified as less developed using this definition.

¹⁷ Data on economic assistance received is drawn from Clark. Only monies flowing to and from the 66 less developed countries were included in the calculation of the contribution-assistance index.

¹⁸ Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union.

¹⁹ For an elaboration of the transaction-flow model used seeBrams, Steven J., “Transaction Flows in the International System,” American Political Science Review, 12 1966 (Vol. 60, No. 4), pp. 880–898CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Brams, Steven J., “Trade in the North Atlantic Area: An Approach to the Analysis of Transformations in a System,” Peace Research Society (International) Papers, 1966 (Vol. 6), Vienna Conference, pp. 143–164Google Scholar. For an application of the transaction-flow model to the analysis of foreign aid see Eugene R. Wittkopf, “The Distribution of Foreign Aid in Comparative Perspective” (dissertation in progress). Bilateral economic aid data for 1963 for the twelve Development Assistance Committee members, reported as disbursements, was drawn fromGeographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Less Developed Countries 1960–1964 (Paris: OECD, 1966Google Scholar). Data for the five Soviet-bloc countries was drawn from The External Financing of Economic Development (New York: United Nations, 1969), pp. 44–45Google Scholar. This data includes aggregate commitmentsof bilateral economic assistance from five Soviet-bloc countries plus the People's Republic of China (Communist China). For purposes of this portion of the analysis, therefore, contributions to the UNDP by these countries were also aggregated, and a single aid-allocation index was computed for the Soviet bloc. The value (-.85) was then assigned to each of the Soviet-bloc UN members with monies included in both the aggregate Soviet-bloc bilateral aid commitments and aggregate contributions to the UNDP.

²⁰ For each set of analysis we shall confine our attention principally to the rotated factor matrices which are somewhat more easily interpreted. We have no theoretical reason for focusing attention on either the unrotated or rotated factor matrix. In addition to easier interpretation, however, the orthogonal nature of the factors in the rotated matrix have the added advantage that variation in the factor scores of countries on one factor which might be explained by reference to another variable, such as per capita income, is completely independent of the variation that variable might explain in the scores of countries on a second factor. It is for this reason that we use factor scores computed on the basis of the rotated matrices in the correlation analyses presented later. However, following what appears to be conventional practice, we use the unrotated factor scores in the plots, also presented later. For an excellent introduction to factor analysis see Rummel, R. J., “Understanding Factor Analysis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 12 1967 (Vol. 11, No. 4), pp. 444–480CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹ Several studies by Chadwick F. Alger focus more direcdy on the notion of socialization and participation. See “United Nations Participation as a Learning Experience,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Fall 1963 (Vol. 27, No. 3), pp. 411–426CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Personal Contact in Intergovernmental Organizations,” inKelman, Herbert C., ed., International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), pp. 523–547Google Scholar; and “Interaction in a Committee of the United Nations General Assembly,” in Singer, J. David, ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, Vol. 6 of International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 51–84Google Scholar.

²² Factor scores were computed on the basis of the unrotated factor matrix.

²³ In all three of the figures each dot refers to one or more countries, but in no case is a single country referenced by more than one dot. Space precludes identification of all 101 countries included in the study.

²⁴ For an exploration of the possible consequences of partitioning nations into analytical subsets, with reference in particular to the less developed/developed dichotomy, see Alker, Hayward R. Jr, “The Long Road to International Relations Theory: Problems of Statistical Nonadditivity,” World Politics, 07 1966 (Vol. 18, No. 4), pp. 628–639CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Rosenau, James N., “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Farrell, R. Barry, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, III: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27–92Google Scholar, has argued that a necessary step in facilitating the comparative study of foreign policy is to classify nation-states into analytical categories according to their size, level of development, and type of political system. For some empirical evidence which supports the utility of the Rosenau typology see O'Leary, Michael K. and Wittkopf, Eugene R., “Measuring the Concentration and Diffusion of Foreign Policy Acts” (Paper prepared for the convention of the International Studies Association, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 04 2–4, 1970)Google Scholar.

²⁵ See the appendix for information on data sources and codings used in assigning national characteristics.

²⁶ For an analysis of the relationship between bilateral foreign aid distributions and attributes of recipient nations see Wittkopf.