Research for this article was supported by the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. I benefited from the incisive comments of Harry Eckstein, Jeff Frieden, Russ Dalton, Manuel Garcia y Griego, Joshua Goldstein, Bernie Grofman, Rober t R. Kaufman, James Kurth, Patrick Morgan, Michael Shafer, Dorie Solinger, Christian Werner, an anonymous reviewer, and the editor of International Organization.

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20. If only the economic component is taken into account, state A is presumably more powerful than state B if A commands a greater share of global trade and credit than B and is less dependent than B on the global economy (as measured by the size of its external sector relative to gross national product). See Krasner, Stephen D., “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28 (04 1976), pp.317–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an analysis of Brazil's and Argentina's structural power see Mares, David, “Middle Powers Under Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement,” International Studies Quarterly 32 (12 1988), pp. 453–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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25. In that sense, this study comes close to Grieco's analysis of informatics in India and its emphasis on institutional interests, state autonomy, and state-private sector competition; to Haggard's comprehensive comparison of the politics of growth among NICs; and to Kitschelt's explanation of state intervention in nuclear industries in industrialized countries. See Grieco, Joseph M., Between Dependency and Autonomy-India's Experience with the International Computer Industry (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984)Google Scholar; Haggard, Stephan, Pathways from the Periphery-The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 1990); and Kitschelt, “Structures and Sequences of Nuclear Energy Policy-making”Google Scholar.

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50. On CNEA's control over the nuclear program and the inability of other agencies, including the Foreign Ministry, to influence nuclear policy, see La Prensa, 22 March 1984, p. 7.

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52. State autonomy does not preclude a high convergence of interests among state and private interests. It is a highly contingent or historically specific phenomenon rather than an absolute condition and can vary across countries and periods. See Onis, Ziya, “The Logic of the Developmental State,” Comparative Politics 24 (10 1991), pp. 109–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On state autonomy in Brazil, see Schmitter, Philippe C., Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequences, and Perspectives (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1973); and Alfred Stepan, “State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America,” in Evans, , Rueschemeyer, , and Skocpol, , Bringing the State Back In, pp.317–46Google Scholar.

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57. On the hegemonic position of the Ministry of Finance within the bureaucracy between 1967 and 1974, with the ascendancy of Delfim Neto as Finance Minister, see Kaufman, “Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule in Latin America.” On the powerful Ministry of Planning and its responsibility to plan Brazil's economic affairs synoptically, see Barzelay, The Politicized Market Economy. On the constraining role of central economic agencies over sectoral programs during that period, see Abranches, Sergio, “The Divided Leviathan: State and Economic Policy Formation in Authoritarian Brazil,” Ph.D. diss.; Cornell University, 1978Google Scholar; and Schneider, Ben Ross III, “Politics Within the State: Elite Bureaucrats and Industrial Policy in Authoritarian Brazil,” Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1987. On the centralization of economic policymaking in Brazil between the late 1960s and the mid-1970s, see Schmitter, Military Rule in Latin America; Barros, The Brazilian Military; and Evans, Dependent DevelopmentGoogle Scholar.

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62. These contradictions are evident from statements, open letters, and annual reports by the agroexporter association Sociedad Rural, the Unióon Industrial Argentina, and the Argentina Chamber of Commerce. See Smith, , Authoritarianism and the Crisis of the Argentine Political Economy, pp. 84–90Google Scholar.

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68. See Stepan, The State and Society; and Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy.

69. . On the external sources of erosion of consensus see Stepan, “State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America”; Barzelay, The Politicized Market Economy; and Evans, Dependent Development.

70. “Primeiro Documento dos Empresáarios” (First Document of the Industrialists), Forum da Cazeta Mercantil, July 1978.

71. These deductions are based on attempted challenges to CNEA along those lines. See Poneman, Daniel, Nuclear Power in the Developing World (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982)Google Scholar.

72. This scenario falls within cell IV in Figure 2.

73. See Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.”

74. On foreign investors' primary concern with the political and administrative stability and the predictability of the host country, see Encarnation and Wells, “Sovereignty En Garde.”

75. See Bennett, Douglas C. and Sharpe, Kenneth E., Transnational Corporations Versus the State: The Political Economy of the Mexican Auto Industry (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Gereffi, Gary, The Pharmaceutical Industry and Dependency in the Third World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

76. Stepan argues that a stronger, cohesive state elite—capable of providing a predictable environment for foreign capital—enjoys a better bargaining position. See Stepan, “State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America.”

77. Grieco, Between Dependency and Autonomy.

78. Declarations by KWU officials at the time confirm that they regarded the 30-percent share of supplies by private Brazilian firms and the technological control of joint ventures by German firms as squarely within the domestic win-set; see Nucleonics Week, 31 October 1985, p. 6.

79. On the position of Brazilian negotiators, see declarations in Manchete, 4 April, 1976; Journal do Brasil (7 November 1976); O Estado de Sāao Paulo (19 March 1977); Federal Senate of Brazil, Relatāorio, vol. 6, book 5, p. 302; and O Clobo, 20 June 1975.

80. Negotiators can also be misinformed about levels of bureaucratic autonomy or segmentation. See Encarnation and Wells, “Sovereignty En Garde.”

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87. On how a more coherent development strategy can moderate the negotiating leverage of an autonomous agency, see Encarnation and Wells, “Sovereignty En Garde.”

88. See Grieco, Between Dependency and Autonomy; and Encarnation, Dislodging Multinationals.

89. New York Times, 18 May 1982.

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