¹ This paper has been developed from parts of a Ph.D. thesis entitled “;Economic Sanctions in the International Enforcement Process”; presented to the University of London in 11, 1970.Google Scholar Research for the thesis was greatly assisted by a Canada Council Doctoral Fellowship. Responsibility for the paper and its shortcomings rests solely with the writer, but acknowledgment for generous and valuable advice is due particularly to Dr. John Burton, Reader in International Relations, University College, London.

² These and other cases of economic sanctions have been investigated by the writer in Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, [Oxford paperback 268] 1971).Google Scholar General studies of international sanctions have also been made by Hoffman, F., “The Function of Economic Sanctions: a comparative analysis,” Journal of Peace Research, 1967, (Vol. 2) pp. 140–159;CrossRefGoogle ScholarMacDonald, R. St. J., “Economic Sanctions in the International System,” Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 1969, (Vol. 7) pp. 61–91;Google ScholarRita, F. and Taubenfeld, H. J., “The ‘Economic Weapon’: the League and the United Nations,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1964, (No. 58) pp. 183–205.Google ScholarInternational Sanctions: a report by a group of members for the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Oxford University Press for RIIA, 1938)Google Scholar though dated, is still of interest. On Rhodesia, see Doxey, Margaret, “The Rhodesian Sanctions Experiment,” Year Book of World Affairs, 1971, (Vol. 25) pp. 142–162;Google ScholarGaltung, J., “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions With Examples from the case of Rhodesia,” World Politics, 04 1967, (Vol. 19, No. 3) pp. 378–416;CrossRefGoogle ScholarSutcliffe, R. B., “The Political Economy of Rhodesian Sanctions,” Journal of Common-wealth Political Studies, 07 1969, (Vol. 7, No. 2) pp. 113–125;CrossRefGoogle ScholarZacklin, R., Challenge of Rhodesia, International Conciliation, 11 1969, (No. 575) pp. 5–72.Google Scholar On South Africa, see Dale, R., “South Africa and the International Community,” World Politics, 01 1966, (Vol. 18, No. 2) pp. 297–313;CrossRefGoogle ScholarMudge, G. A., “Domestic Policies and UN Activities: the Cases of Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa,” International Organization, Winter 1967, (Vol. 21, No. 1) pp. 55–78;CrossRefGoogle ScholarSegal, R. (ed.), Sanctions against South Africa (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964);Google ScholarSpence, J. E., Republic Under Pressure (London: Oxford University Press for RIIA [Chatham House Essays No. 9], 1965).Google Scholar

³ In a wider social context, however, while still conformity-defending instrumentalities, sanctions may be either positive or negative. R. Arens and H. D. Lasswell note that: “In the civilizations with which we are best acquainted, … the task of defending the integrity of collective norms is positive as well as negative. Hence value indulgences are deliberately employed as strategies to in-duce future conformity and to reward past fidelity”. (“Towards a General Theory of Sanctions,” Iowa Law Review, 1963-1964, (Vol. 49) p. 234.)Google Scholar The general and serious neglect of positive sanctions is discussed by Baldwin, D. A. in “The Power ' of Positive Sanctions,” World Politics, 10 1971, (Vol. 24, No. 1) pp. 19–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Cf. the carefully argued position of Macdonald who submits that “the traditional analytical approach to domestic law is of doubtful use when transferred to the international context. … International law and its sanctions are too frequently assessed in terms of their conformity with domestic law analogues instead of the principle of feasibility and effectiveness” (“Economic Sanctions in the International System,” loc. cit., p. 68).

⁵ Burton, J. W., Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge: University Press, 1968), p. 227.Google Scholar

⁶ Ibid., p. 43.

⁷ Non-legitimized regimes can use law to stifle and crush opposition and protest; criticism of their methods and personnel can bring harsh penalties in the form of deprivation of material and personal values. Enforcement based on fear is characteristic of a police state.

⁸ See Easton, D., A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (New York: J. Wiley, 1965, Ch. 6)Google Scholar for a discussion of the sources of legitimacy which, in his terminology, provide diffused support for a system. Weber, who identified the concept of legitimacy, characterized it as traditional, rational/legal and charismatic. See Parsons, T. (ed.), Weber, Max: The Theory of Economic and Social Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 328.Google Scholar

⁹ See Katz, D. and Kahn, R. L., The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley, 1966), p. 456.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Kelman, H. C., “Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: a social-psychological analysis of political legitimacy” in Rosenau, J. N. (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 287n.Google Scholar

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Easton makes this point well in commenting: “In practice we can expect that a member may and normally will hold conflicting attitudes at one and the same time about different components of the community, regime, or authorities. Some norms of a regime, for example, he may favor strongly, such as those of political tolerance, majority rule and minority rights. Others he may oppose strongly” (op. cit., pp. 168–9).

¹³ Of course, for other groups in the same system, sanctions may be primarily indicators.

¹⁴ See Harsanyi, J. C., “Rational Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories,” World Politics, 07 1969 (Vol. 21, No. 4) pp. 513–538.CrossRefGoogle Scholar A rational-choice model appears more rather than less appropriate at the international level where decision-making involves a considered choice of policy from among available options. Force of habit, which may produce unthinking observance of norms by individuals is unlikely to be relevant to important foreign policy decisions.

¹⁵ There is today a growing reluctance to rely on unsubstantiated assumptions about the effectiveness of negative sanctions. For instance, the report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice noted “no discernible correlation between the availability of the death penalty and the homicide rate.” The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, (Washington, D.C., 1967) p. 636.Google Scholar

¹⁶ R. Arens and H. D. Lasswell, loc. cit., p. 235.

¹⁷ See Gurr, T. R., The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Casual Model (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Princeton University Research Monograph No. 28, 1967), pp. 10–11.Google Scholar

¹⁸ The relative invulnerability of giant corporations to sanctions was illustrated in the 1961 antitrust conspiracy cases in the United States when General Electric and Westinghouse were convicted of illegal price-fixing practices and fines totalling nearly $2 million were imposed. See Geis, G., “White Collar Crime: the Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust cases of 1961” in Bersani, C. A. (ed.), Crime and Delinquency (New York: the Macmillan Co., 1970), pp. 170–185 and particularly p. 173 where Geis comments that for “General Electric, a half-million dollar loss was no more unsettling than a $3 parking fine would be to a man with an income of $175,000 a year.”Google Scholar

¹⁹ Macdonald discusses this problem in “Economic Sanctions in the International System”, loc. cit. pp. 75–77.

²⁰ Gurr, T. R., Why Men Rebel, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970) pp. 259–260.Google Scholar

²¹ Edmead, F., Analysis and Prediction in International Mediation (New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), PS No. 2, 1971), p. 11.Google Scholar See too J. Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions …” loc. cit., p. 407, p. 409, p. 411. Galtung is particularly concerned to point out some of the unexpected reactions to sanctions which may be generated within the target.

²² UN Document A/217 (III) December 10, 1948.

²³ Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UN Document A/1514, (XV) December 14, 1960; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UN Document A/1904 (XVIII) November 20, 1963. See Claude, Inis Jr. “Collective Legitimization as a political function of the United Nations”, International Organization, Summer 1966 (Vol. 20, No. 3), pp. 367–379.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁴ Falk, R. A., “The Legitimacy of Legislative Intervention by the United Nations” in Stanger, R. J. (ed.), Essays on Intervention (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964) p. 31.Google Scholar

²⁶ Space does not permit consideration of the rather different case of Portugal which has so far withstood the accelerating trend to decolonization in Africa. A series of resolutions has been passed by UN organs calling for sanctions which might induce the Portugese government to grant self-determination to the people of Angola, Mozambique and Portugese Guinea. Assembly resolutions have recommended diplomatic and economic sanctions; the Security Council has merely recommended a ban on the sale or shipment of arms and equipment which could be used for the suppression of indigenous people in these territories. (See Security Council Resolutions 180, July 31 1963 and 218, October 23 1965.) To date, it would seem that the activities of guerrilla forces have caused the Portugese authorities more concern than censure by UN organs. Portugal's non-implementation of sanctions against Rhodesia has also angered many UN members and led to calls for sanctions.

²⁶ Security Council Resolution S/4300, April 1, 1960.

²⁷ General Assembly Resolution 1761 (XVII) Octobur 6, 1962.

²⁸ Security Council Resolutions 181, August 7, 1963; 182, December 4, 1963; 282, July 23, 1970.

²⁹ UN. Document S/6210, March 2, 1965.

³⁰ See ICJ Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, 1966, p. 6.Google Scholar

³¹ General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI), October 27, 1966.

³² Security Council Resolution 276, January 30 1970. This view was upheld by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion given at the request of the Security Council on 21 June 1971. See ICJ: Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders. Legal Consequences for States of the continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970). The Court declared itself to be of the opinion that “ … the contmued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately … ” (p. 58).

³³ Security Council Resolutions 232, December 16, 1966; 253, May 29, 1968; 277, March 18, 1970. The Beira blockade was authorized by Security Council Resolution 221, April 9, 1966. Voluntary sanctions were recommended by the Security Council immediately after UDI in Resolution 217, Octomber 20, 1965.

³⁴ Statement by the Prime Minister (Harold Wilson) in the British House of Commons, October 1, 1965 (House of Commons Debates, Vol. 718, coll. 633).

³⁵ See The Hungarian Situation and the Rule of Law (The Hague: International Commission of Jurists, 1957).Google Scholar

³⁶ South Africa left UNESCO voluntarily in 1955; she was forced to withdraw from the ILO and FAO in 1964 and was excluded from the work of the ECA by resolution of ECOSOC in 1963. See Sohn, L., “Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal from an International Organization”, Harvard Law Review, 1964 (Vol. 88), pp. 1381–1425.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁷ Although the government of South Africa could not be said to represent non-white opinion, it would appear to be generally representative of white opinion, and to this extent legitimized by elite support. On questions of apartheid, the continued administration of South West Africa and opposition to external pressure, there is no substantial difference between the National (government) Party and the United (opposition) Party. The Progressive Party, which supports a qualified franchise for all races, has a single Member of Parliament.

³⁸ Cf. the reaction of the Greek regime to the condemnation of the Council of Europe following the submission of the Report of the European Commission on Human Rights, 18 October 1969, to the Committee of Ministers of the Council. The Report contained a well documented account of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which had been suspended since the military coup in Greece in 1967. Anticipating suspension from membership of the Council, the Greek government withdrew in December, 1969. Since then there has been little evidence of a restoration of these freedoms; like South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961, the exodus from the Council of Europe was presented as a victory for the consumption of the Greek public, with the government playing the role of champion of the national honor. See, for instance, report in the Sunday Telegraph (London) 14 12, 1969;Google ScholarFawcett, J. E. S., “Greece and the International Community”, The World Today, (Vol. 26:6, 1970) pp. 225–8.Google Scholar

³⁹ UN Publication ST/PSCA/SERV.A/7, 1969 Repressive Legislation of the Republic of South Africa gives a good account of the disabilities under which non-whites suffer in the Republic. Austin, R. H. summarized post-UDI legislation in Rhodesia in The Character and Legislation of the Rhodesian Front since UDI (London, Africa Bureau Pamphlet) 1968.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ It is unlikely that UN norms can be violated without detection provided the norms themselves are clear, but problems of detection arise at the national level when enforcement of sanctions regulations conies into question. See infra, sec. 3b.

⁴¹ As Rosalyn Higgins puts it: “What constitutes an Article 39 situation is a product of what one intends to do about it.” “International Law, Rhodesia and the UN.” The World Today, 03, 1967 (Vol. 23, No. 3) p. 102.Google Scholar

⁴² Foreign Policy for Canadians. The United Nations. (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1970) p. 19.Google Scholar The review notes that “the Canadian Government's response …. tends to parallel that of other Western governments… Even the Scandinavian countries, whose stance tends to emphasize moral condemnation, continue to trade on a substantial scale with South Africa.” (Ibid.)

⁴³ See Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in London: Final Communique, Cmnd 3115 (London, 1966) pp. 3–4.Google Scholar The Rhodesian government may have hoped for an early defeat of the Labor government in the United Kingdom which had a slim majority in the House of Commons. They may also have thought that close ties between British and Rhodesian families would restrain the British government from severe action; if so, they underestimated the pressure which the Commonwealth would exert on British policy.

⁴⁴ Ch. 6 of the writer's Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement deals specifically with these problems. See too the reports of the Collective Measures Committee: General Assembly Official Records, (VI) Supplement No. 13, UN Document A/1891; ibid. (VII) Supplement No. 17, UN Document A/2215; ibid. (XI) Annexes, Agenda item 19, U.N. document A/2713/S3283 pp. 1–4. The Recommendations of the Committee were never implemented.

⁴⁵ An analysis for the Carnegie Foundation of collective measures against South Africa included a cost analysis of hypothetical blockade operation. Based on US experience in the Cuban quarantine of 1962, an estimate was made that a force of 50 warships and 300 aircraft would be required, at a monthly cost of approximately $27.6 million. See Leiss, Amelia C. (ed.), Apartheid and UN Collective Measures: an Analysis (New York: The Endowment, 1965), p. 165Google Scholaret seq. The financial difficulties which resulted from the Congo operation and which are still not resolved would suggest that military intervention by the UN is very unlikely.

⁴⁶ The four reports of the Committee can be found in UN Documents S/8954, December 30, 1968; S/9252, June 12, 1969; S/9844, June 15, 1970; S/10299, June 16, 1971. Very few governments have reported suspected cases of sanctions breaking to the Committee and the follow-up on the Committee's requests for information is painfully slow and often incomplete. In its most recent report, the Committee itself is revealed to be at loggerheads and unable to agree on recommendations.

⁴⁷ For an account of difficulties encountered by the League in applying sanctions to Italy in 1935–36 see Highley, A. E., The First Sanctions Experiment: a study of League procedures, (Geneva: Geneva Research Centre, 1938)Google Scholar (Geneva Studies 9/4). The decision taken by the United States government at the end of 1971 to lift sanctions on purchases of chrome ore from Rhodesia must be viewed as a very serious beach of the UN sanctions front and suggests a progressive abandonment of sanctions by Western countries. See the New York Times, October 12, 1971.

⁴⁸ F. Edmead, op. cit., p. 29.

⁴⁹ It is unnecessary and impossible to give detailed treatment here to the performance and condition of the Rhodesian economy under sanctions. Statistics have been provided by the UN Secretariat on a regular basis: most recently in UN Document S/10299, Add. 2, July 13, 1971. In addition to the articles listed in n.2 supra, analysis of the economic effects of sanctions on Rhodesia can be found in T.R.C. Curtin and D. Murray, Economic Sanctions and Rhodesia: an examination of the probable effects of sanctions in national and personal incomes in Rhodesia and of the effectiveness of sanctions on Rhodesian policy, (London, Institute of Economic Affairs, Research Monographs no. 12, 1967); Curtin, T.R.C., “Rhodesian Economic Development under Sanctions and the ‘long haul’,” African Affairs, 04, 1968 (Vol. 67;267) pp. 100–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar and “Total Sanctions and Economic Development in Rhodesia” Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 07, 1969 (Vol. 7:2) pp. 126–31;Google ScholarMcKinnell, R. T., “Sanctions and the Rhodesian Economy”, journal of Modern African Studies, 1969, (Vol. 7, No. 4) pp. 559–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁰ See, for instance, “Zambia Under Strain,” Africa Digest, 10, 1971, (Vol. 18, No. 5), p. 13 et seq.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See, for instance, Lapping, B., “Oil Sanctions against South Africa,” in Segal, R. (ed.) Sanctions against South Africa (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964), pp. 135–152.Google Scholar

⁵² Developments in South Africa's policy of ensuring adequate energy supplies for her growing industrial needs are discussed in the context of her relations with other States in the sub-continent, both white- and black-ruled, by Molteno, R., “South Africa's Forward Policy in Africa,” Round Table, 07, 1971 (No. 243) pp. 320–345.Google Scholar

⁵³ Edmead suggests that a policy will only be abandoned when all expectations of success have vanished (op. cit. pp. 12–14). The proposals for a settlement of the Rhodesian case worked out between the British government and the Smith regime in late 1971 represented an attempt at compromise by providing for eventual African majority rule and preserving the authority of the present regime in an independent Rhodesia which would receive substantial economic aid from Britain. (See Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement, Cmnd 4835, H.M.S.O., London, 11 26, 1971).Google Scholar These proposals have not received official UN support nor, at the time of writing, do they appear to be acceptable to the African population of Rhodesia.

⁵⁴ See Walters, F. P., A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press for RIIA; 1960 (one vol. edition)) p. 624Google Scholar; Manning, C.A.W., “The Failure of the League of Nations,” Agenda 1942 (Vol. 1, No. 1) pp. 59–72.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See MacDonald, R. St. J., “The OAS in Action,” University of Toronto Law Journal 1963-1964 (Vol. 15) pp. 359–429.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See too, Slater, J., “The Limits of Legitimization in International Organizations: the OAS and the Dominican Crisis,” International Organization, Winter 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 1) pp. 48–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁶ “Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist Countries,” translated from Pravda September 27, 1968. Text in Invasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia and the UN (N.Y.: International Review Service 1968 (Vol. 14, No. 100)), Appendix VI, p. 100, p. 101.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Schelling, T. C., Arms and Influence (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966) pp. 70–78.Google Scholar