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36. Ibid.

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50. Ibid., pp. 18–19.

51. Ibid., p. 110.

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56. Ibid., p. 116.

57. See Orbell, Dawes, and van de Kragt, “The Limits of Multilateral Promising.”

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62. Orbell, Dawes, and van de Kragt, “The Limits of Multilateral Promising.”

63. This does not mean that cooperation does not occur in this region. It just means that there are no significant differences in cooperation across groups that promise (short of universal promising) and groups that do not.

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65. Ibid.

66. The contemporary literature on institutions is voluminous and growing rapidly. For an overview of one kind of “new institutionalism,” see March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P., “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (09 1984), pp. 734–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an overview of recent work in international relations, see Keohane, Robert O., “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” International Studies Quarterly 32 (12 1988), pp. 379–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a survey from a rational choice perspective, see Shepsle, Kenneth A., “Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1 (04 1989), pp. 131–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Finally, for an overview of sociological approaches, see Powell, Walter W. and DiMaggio, Paul J., eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991)Google Scholar. My use of the term “institutional” does not exactly replicate the usage of any single approach. Yet it draws heavily on John Ruggie for his emphasis on ideas and norms, on Stephen Krasner for his notions of path-dependence, and on Robert Keohane for his arguments about the ways in which institutions shape incentives.

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70. See Mirowski, Philip, “The Philosophical Bases of Institutionalist Economics,” Journal of Economic Issues 21 (09 1987), pp. 1001–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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75. Ruggie has made this point numerous times. See Ruggie, John Gerard, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), pp. 379–415CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ruggie, “Multilateralism.”

76. Institutional approaches need not be methodologically holist, however. They may be committed to the view that individuals are the ultimate units of society and still treat complex social structures and institutions as describing important emergent effects. In this sense, the ontological argument may be misleading in that it is easy to glide from the ontological position that individuals are the ultimate units to the theoretical position that all causation has an individual locus. I am indebted to discussions with Ronald Jepperson for this point; see his article entitled “Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism,” in Powell, and DiMaggio, , The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, pp. 143–63Google Scholar.

77. In “International Institutions,” p. 384, Keohane stresses that institutions constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles.

78. For this viewpoint, see Giddens, Anthony, Central Problems in Social Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 49–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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80. Ruggie, John Gerard, “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends,” International Organization 29 (Summer 1975), p. 567CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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