¹ Throughout these three decades the PCI continued to have significant behind-the-scenes influence on some areas of national policy; for evidence, see Cazzola, Franco, “Consenso e opposizione nel parlamento italiano: il ruolo del PCI dalla I alla IV legislature,” Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politico Vol. 2 (1972): 71–96Google Scholar, and Palma, Giuseppe Di, Surviving Without Governing: The Italian Parties in Parliament (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)Google Scholar. For a useful account of current Italian party politics, see Tarrow, Sidney, “The Italian Party System Between Crisis and Transition,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 21 (05 1977): 193–224CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and for an insightful summary of Communist party strategy over the last decade, see Hellman, Stephen, “The Longest Campaign: Communist Party Strategy and the Elections of 1976,” in Penniman, Howard R., ed., Italy at the Polls: The Parliamentary Elections of 1976 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977)Google Scholar.

² See Sani, Giacomo, “Mass Level Response to Party Strategy: The Italian Electorate and the Communist Party,” in Blackmer, Donald and Tarrow, Sidney, eds., Communism in Italy and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975)Google Scholar, and Sani, “The Italian Electorate in the Mid-Seventies: Beyond Tradition?” in Penniman, Italy at the Polls.

³ On Italy's economic woes, see Lubitz, Raymond, “The Italian Economic Crises of the 1970's,” unpublished manuscript prepared for delivery to the Joint Country Groups Panel at the American Political Science Association meeting, Washington, D.C., 09 1–4, 1977Google Scholar.

⁴ For useful introductions to postwar Italian foreign policy, see Kogan, Norman, The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1963)Google Scholar, Willis, F. Roy, Italy Chooses Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971)Google Scholar, and Vannicelli, Primo, Italy, NATO, and the European Community: The Interplay of Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics, Harvard Studies in International Affairs, No. 31 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center for International Affairs. 1974)Google Scholar.

⁵ On the distinction between position and valence issues, see Butler, David and Stokes, Donald, Political Change in Britain (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 189Google Scholar. For an account of the role of foreign policy in the 1976 Italian elections, see Robert D. Putnam, “Italian Foreign Policy: The Emergent Consensus,” in Penniman, Italy at the Polls, on which the present paper draws heavily.

⁶ Segre, Sergio, “The ‘Communist Question’ in Italy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54 (07 1976): 699CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁸ Haas, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 113–61Google Scholar.

⁹ On the evolution of the PCI's attitude to Western European integration, see Blackmer, Donald L. M., “The International Strategy of the Italian Communist Party,” in Blackmer, Donald L. M. and Kriegel, Annie, The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France, Harvard Studies in International Affairs, No. 33 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1974), pp. 19–25Google Scholar; Blackmer, , Unity in Diversity: Italian Communism and the Communist World (Cambridge Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1968), pp. 263–329Google Scholar; Willis, , Italy Chooses Europe, pp. 287–99Google Scholar; and Mclnnes, Neil, “The Communist Parties of Western Europe and the EEC,” The World Today, Vol. 20 (02 1974): 80–88Google Scholar.

¹⁰ l'Unità (Rome), 06 20, 1976Google Scholar.

¹¹ On the evolution of the PCI's international policy, see Blackmer, Donald L. M., “Continuity and Change in Postwar Italian Communism,” in Blackmer, and Tarrow, , Communism in Italy and France, pp. 21–68Google Scholar; and Willis, , Italy Chooses Europe, pp. 287–99Google Scholar.

¹² Spinelli, Altiero, “Le Prospettive della Politica Estera Ilaliana,” Lo Spettalore Internazionale, Vol. 2 (01–02, 1967): 25Google Scholar.

¹³ Spinelli, , “Le Prospettive,” pp. 18–19Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Berlinguer, Enrico, La Politico Internationale dei Comunisti Italiani: 1975–1976, Tatò, Antonio, ed., (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1976)Google Scholar. This is a useful collection of Berlinguer's speeches on internationl affairs during this pivotal year.

¹⁵ L'Italia nella Politico Internationale: 1973–1974 (Milan: Communità, 1974), p. 464Google Scholar. This is a volume in the very useful annual series edited by the lstituto Affari Internazionali of Rome.

¹⁶ L'Italia nella Politico Internationale: 1974–1975, p. 390

¹⁷ Corriere della Sera (Milan), 06 15, 1976Google Scholar. That this statement was controversial, and perhaps even unexpected, within the party organization is suggested by the fact that these paragraphs alone were omitted from the version of this interview that was published the following day by the party paper l'Unità. However, the interview was subsequently reprinted intact in Berlinguer, La Politico Internazionale, pp. 159–60.

¹⁸ Time (New York), 06 24, 1975Google ScholarPubMed, as reprinted in Berlinguer, La Politico Internationale, p. 70.

¹⁹ “La lotta per la pace, per una nuova politica estera dell'Italia, e per l'unita del movimento operaio internazionale,” l'Unità, November 7, 1965, as cited in Bonanni, Massimo, “I partiti italiani e la politica estera: PCI,” Lo Spettatore Internazionale, Vol. 1 (01–02, 1966): 74Google Scholar.

²⁰ For useful introductions to the postwar Italian economy, including its international dimensions, see Hildebrand, George H., Growth and Structure in the Economy of Modern Italy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Podbielski, Gisele, Italy: Development and Crisis in the Post-War Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974)Google Scholar; and Lubitz, “Italian Economic Crises.”

²¹ Hildebrand, , Growth and Structure, p. 79Google Scholar.

²² On Italy and the aftermath of the oil crisis, see Lieber, Robert J., Oil and the Middle East War: Europe in the Energy Crisis, Harvard Studies in International Affairs, No. 35 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1976)Google Scholar and the annual volumes of L'Italia nella Politico Internationale, from which the data in the text are taken.

²³ These conclusions are based on a linear regression analysis of export shares 1948–1976. Trends in the years 1973–1975 are distorted by the effects of the world recession, for in this period Italy's trade with its industrial partners slackened, as it had in previous recessions. Data for 1976 show the impact of renewed growth in the West. In recent years Italy's trade with Eastern Europe has grown slightly faster than that of most of its EEC partners. But over the decade ending in 1976, Eastern Europe's share of Italian exports “grew” from 5.1 percent to 5.4 percent, with a low of 4.2 percent in 1972 and a high of 6.2 percent in 1975.

²⁴ Firm evidence on the prevalence of MNCs in the Italian economy is hard to obtain. By one estimate 60 of the 194 largest Italian enterprises in 1971 were foreign-owned, accounting for 26 percent of total sales, while according to another source, 37 of the 100 largest enterprises in 1974 were foreign-controlled. Direct foreign investment is said to account for roughly one fifth of total industrial investment. See Luciani, Giacomo, II PCI e il Capitalismo Occidentale (Milan: Longanesi, 1977), p. 55Google Scholar, and LaPalombara, Joseph and Blank, Stephen, Multinational Corporations and National Elites: A Study in Tensions (New York: The Conference Board, 1976)Google Scholar.

²⁵ On Italy's transnational linkages, see Kaiser, Karl, “Le relazioni transnazionali,” in Il Caso Italiano, Cavazza, Fabio Luca and Graubard, Stephen R., eds., (Milan: Garzanti, 1974), Vol. 2, pp. 401–19Google Scholar. On Italy's expenditures on research and development, see Nau, Henry R., “Collective Responses to R & D Problems in Western Europe: 1955–1958 and 1968–1973,” International Organization Vol. 29 (Summer 1975): 640CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A detailed, quantitative analysis of Italy's interdependence with the West would need to go well beyond the evidence presented here, but more subtle measurements would lead very likely to the same conclusions. For useful discussions of economic interdependence and international politics, see Cooper, Richard N., “Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies,” World Politics Vol. 24 (01 1972): 159–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977)Google Scholar; and Hirschman, Albert O., National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945)Google Scholar.

²⁶ Cardia, Umberto, in Politico ed Economia (08 1976)Google Scholar, as cited in Luciani, Giacomo, Il PCI e il Capitalismo Occidentale, p. 112Google Scholar.

²⁷ Levi, Arrigo, “Gli ultimi dei primi e i primi degli ultimi,” in Il Caso Italiano, Vol. 2, p. 426Google Scholar.

²⁸ It is relevant in this context to note the 1975 agreement among the major Western nations to limit competition in the extension of commercial credit to Eastern Europe.

²⁹ Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, pp. 10–11Google Scholar (emphasis in original).

³⁰ Cooper, , “Economic Interdependence,” pp. 164–65Google Scholar. See also Cooper, Richard N., The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968)Google Scholar.

³¹ Peggio, Eugenio, “Relazione introduttiva,” in Crisi economica e condizionamenti internazionali dell'Italia, Quaderni de Politico ed Economia, new series, No. 1 (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1976), pp. 24–25Google Scholar.

³² “Intervista con Giorgio Amendola,” Appendix to Luciani, , Il PCI e il Capitalismo Occidental, p. 176Google Scholar.

³³ Palombara, La and Blank, , Multinational Corporations and National Elites, pp. 104–10Google Scholar, quote at p. 110.

³⁴ Corriere della Sera (Milan), 07 2, 1976, p. 2Google Scholar.

³⁵ Inglehart, Ronald, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977)Google Scholar, Chapter 12.

³⁶ Data from unpublished Eurobarometer surveys in 1975 and 1976, conducted for the Commission of the European Communities, under the direction of Jacques-Rene Rabier. I am grateful to Dr. Rabier and to Professor Ronald Inglehart for making these data available for my analysis, for which I am naturally responsible.

³⁷ In the 1976 Eurobarometer survey, for example, 81 percent of Communist voters favored a common European economic and monetary policy, as compared to 94 percent of non-Communists; 85 percent of the Communists, as compared to 92 percent of the non-Communists, favored direct elections to the European Parliament; and 76 percent of the Communists, as contrasted with 90 percent of the non-Communists, would accept European legislation concerning foreign relations. See also Figure 4.

³⁸ Evidence from a variety of surveys in the early 1970s suggests the existence of a small minority of PCI voters—perhaps ten percent of the PCI's 1970 electorate—who continue to adhere strongly to the party's earlier opposition to Western European integration. It is worth noting that this group was much outnumbered (and diluted) by the voters newly attracted to the PCI in 1975–76. These new recruits, more than a quarter of the party's 1976 electorate, must have been heavily pro-European, given the patterns of opinion shown in earlier surveys.

³⁹ La Stampa (Turin), 06 13, 1976Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Most of these data come from a uniquely valuable archive of foreign survey data systematically compiled by the United States Information Agency since 1956. Since soundings were somewhat unevenly spaced across these twenty years, I have calculated long-term averages and trends in terms of regression analysis. Since the percentage of “don't know” responses varies significantly from survey to survey, the most revealing summary measure consists of the net number of responses favorable (or unfavorable) to the United States, as a percentage of the total sample. Time series data from another indicator of “general opinion of America” follow roughly the same pattern over these two decades, and in fact show an even greater net margin favorable to the United States. See Merritt, Richard L. and Puchala, Donald J., eds., Western European Perspectives on International Affairs (New York: Praeger, 1968)Google Scholar; Free, Lloyd A. and Sereno, Renzo, Italy: Dependent Ally or Independent Partner? (Princeton, N.J.: Institute for International Social Research, 1957)Google Scholar; Free, Lloyd A., How Others See Us (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath, 1976)Google Scholar; and Richman, Alvin, “Trends and Structure of Foreign Attitudes Toward the United States and the USSR,” paper prepared for the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, 09, 1973Google Scholar. I am very grateful to Russell Dalton and Leo Crespi of the United States Information Agency for their assistance and counsel in connection with these data and, in particular, for making available data from the 1976 surveys. I am also grateful to Lloyd Free for graciously making available data independently gathered in 1974.

⁴¹ Unpublished data from a national survey directed by Samuel H. Barnes in 1968 (hereafter cited as “Barnes 1968 Survey”), from a comparable 1972 survey directed by Barnes and Giacomo Sani (hereafter cited as “Bames-Sani 1972 Survey”), and from the 1970 Inglehart-Rabier survey cited in footnote 36. I am grateful to Professors Barnes, Sani, Inglehart, and Rabier for making these data avilable for my analysis, for which I am solely responsible.

⁴² Free, and Sereno, , Italy, p. 45Google Scholar.

⁴³ Free, , How Others See Us, pp. 25, 30, 34, 72–73, 84–88Google Scholar. Note that the Italians' 1974 rankings of their national power and influence a decade earlier were well above the median for these eight countries, so that the very low ranking for present and future were not due simply to a national penchant for self-deprecation.

⁴⁴ These generalizations are based on detailed analysis of the social and political correlates of sympathy for the United States and the Soviet Union, based on the Barnes 1968 Survey and the Barnes-Sani 1972 Survey. For this analysis, as well as much of the other statistical work for this chapter, I am deeply indebted to Ms. Celinda Lake.

⁴⁵ Note that in Gramscian terms this pattern of attitudes derives from, and illustrates, the hegemonic role of the United States in Italian political culture.

⁴⁶ Data illustrating this point can be drawn from the 1970 survey cited in Table 2. At least “some” confidence in the Americans is expressed by 73 percent of the respondents, whereas only 28 percent express a similar level of trust in the Russians. On the other hand, only 58 percent of the same respondents rate “fighting Communism” as a top priority, whereas 44 percent give top priority to “ending capitalism.”

⁴⁷ This generalization is based on data from Barnes' 1968 survey of Italian voters and a matched survey of local Communist, Socialist, and Christian Democrat leaders. Both leaders and voters were asked to rate the Russians and the Americans on a 100-point scale from full approval to full disapproval. For further methodological details on these surveys, see Barnes, Samuel H., Representation in Italy: Institutionalized Tradition and Electoral Choice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977)Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Fabris, Giampaolo, Il Comportamento Politico degli Italiani (Milan: Franco Angeli Editori, 1977), pp. 97, 135Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Blackmer, , “Continuity and Change,” p. 23Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Podbielski, , Italy, p. 64Google Scholar.

⁵¹ For a fuller report on these findings by one of my colleagues on this project, see Leonardi, Robert, “Depolarization and the Italian Left,” prepared for delivery at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 09 1–4, 1977Google Scholar.

⁵² Allum, P. A., “Italy: Republic Without Government?” The World Today, Vol. 30 (11 1974): 456Google Scholar.

⁵³ Transcribed from a televised press conference, June 1976.

⁵⁴ “Given the great importance that the PCI places on domestic politics and its role in Italian society and political life, … the PCI's international politics, their decisions and modifications, are for the most part the function of what the PCI represents and wants to represent in Italy. Foreign policy decisions are made above all to this end.” Galli, Giorgio, “The PCI's Foreign Policy,” in La Politico Estera delta Repubblica Italiana (Milan: Communità, 1967), Vol. 3, p. 951Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Berlinguer, , La Politico Internazionale, p. 20Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Paese Sera (Rome), 06 8, 1976Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ Hoffman, Stanley, “Pranzo a tre sulla politica estera italiana,” in Il Caso Italiano, Vol. 2, p. 391Google Scholar. See also Vannicelli, Italy, NATO, and the European Community.

⁵⁸ Hassner, Pierre, “The Political Evolution of Italy and the International Context: A Personal View,” prepared for a joint meeting of the Istituto Affari Internazionali and Chatham House, Manziani, 20–22 11, 1975Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Kogan, , Politics, p. 50Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ Willis, , Italy Chooses Europe, p. 303Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Kogan, , Politics, pp. 141–42Google Scholar.

⁶² Kogan, , Politics, p. 135Google Scholar.

⁶³ Pasquino, Gianfranco, “Pesi internazionali e contrappesi nationali,” in Il Caso Italiano. Vol. 1, p. 171Google Scholar. Note that for many non-Communists (and for some thoughtful Communists, as well) Italy's membership in the European Community is seen as a kind of multilateral, multinational guarantee against radical shifts in Italy's internal political order. Many Italian politicians have privately expressed the view that “the European Community makes cheating virtually impossible.”

⁶⁴ Vanicelli, , Italy, NATO, and the European Community, p. 35Google Scholar. Cf. Haas, , Uniting of Europe, p. 419Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ McInnes, , “Communist Parties,” p. 88Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ Blackmer, , “International Strategy,” p. 25Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ Consider the response of Giorgio Amendola to a question about the possibility of achieving more progressive Community policies: “In my opinion it is possible. We cannot evaluate [this possibility] using the yardstick of communist voters; even in Italy, where we are not so few, we don't think we can act by ourselves alone.…In this Europe so fragmented one cannot imagine European political directions that are not the expressions of grand coalitions, of encounters between political families.” “lntervista con Giorgio Amendola,” p. 177.

⁶⁸ Berlinguer, , Politica Internazionale, p. 24Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ Berlinguer, , Politica Internazionale, pp. 194–99Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ Berlinguer, , Politica Internazionale, p. xviGoogle Scholar.

⁷¹ La Repubblica (Rome), 06 8, 1976Google Scholar.

⁷² La Stampa (Turin), 06 13, 1976Google Scholar.

⁷³ Berlinguer, , Politica Internazionale, p. 20Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ See Kogan, , Politics, p. 136Google Scholar, and Willis, , Italy Chooses Europe, pp. 18–27Google Scholar.

⁷⁵ See Free, and Sereno, , Italy, p. 79Google Scholar; Kogan, , Politics, pp. 24–28Google Scholar; and Merritt, and Puchala, , Western European Perspectives, pp. 201, 220–22, 328–31, and 338–51Google Scholar. On the attitudes of Italy's governing parties to the Atlantic Alliance, see Silvestri, Stefano, “Il Dibattito sulla NATO in Italia,” Lo Spettatore Internationale, Vol. 3 (01–02, 1968): 121–41Google Scholar; Willis, , Italy Chooses Europe, pp. 252–85Google Scholar; and Kogan, Politics, passim.

⁷⁶ See The Military Balance: 1976–1977 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976)Google Scholar and earlier volumes in that series.

⁷⁷ Free, , How Others See Us, pp. 75–88Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ Pierre Hassner, “Political Evolution in Italy.”

⁷⁹ Kogan, Norman, Italy and the Allies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 4CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁰ Berlinguer, , La Politico Internazionale, p. 20Google Scholar.

⁸¹ See, for example, the statements of Segre, Sergio in La Stampa (Turin), 05 31, 1976Google Scholar, of Jacoviello, Alberto in La Repubblica (Rome), 06 2, 1976Google Scholar, and of Spinelli, Altiero in La Stampa (Turin), 06 13, 1976Google Scholar.

⁸² l'Unità (Rome), 06 6, 1976Google Scholar.

⁸³ In interpreting the timing of the PCI's reconciliation with NATO, note that several important obstacles faded between 1973 and 1975, especially American involvement in Vietnam and, within the Mediterranean, the right-wing dictatorships in Greece and Portugal. Given its passionate anti-Fascism, the PCI would have found it difficult to come to terms with a NATO, two of whose members were ruled by fascist regimes. See Berlinguer's comments on the passing of Mediterranean Fascism at the XIV Party Congress, in Berlinguer, , La Politico Internazionale, p. 22Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ La Repubblica (Rome), 06 8, 1976Google Scholar.

⁸⁵ For abundant illustrations of the persistently anti-American tenor of PCI publications, see Are, Giuseppe, “Italy's Communists: Foreign and Defence Politics,” Survival, Vol. 18 (09/10 1976): 210–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A survey of PCI members in the autumn of 1977 reported that 27 percent preferred that “Italy remain tied to America and the Atlantic Pact,” 13 percent favored “ties of friendship and collaboration with Russia,” and 52 percent favored Italian neutrality. See L'Espresso (Rome), 10 30, 1977, p. 44Google Scholar.

⁸⁶ See the successive annual autumn addresses of the Italian Foreign Minister to the United Nations General Assembly between 1972 and 1976.

⁸⁷ See L'Italia nella Politico Internazionale: 1975–1976, pp. 509–10.

⁸⁸ Luciani, , Il PCI e il Capilalismo Occidentate, pp. 105–12Google Scholar.

⁸⁹ Quoted in Panorama (Milan), 12 21, 1976, p. 77Google ScholarPubMed. For an economist's argument that the Italian economy should be increasingly directed toward Third World markets, see Forte, Francesco, “The Italian Economy as an Intermediate Economy,” Lo Spettatore Internazionale, Vol. 11 (1976): 135–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁹¹ Urban, George, “A Conversation with Lucio Lombardo Radice: ‘Communism with an Italian Face’,” Encounter (London), Vol. 48, No. 5 (05 1977)Google Scholar; 10, 13.

⁹² It is ironic and perhaps significant that the PCI's persistent opposition to European defense unification increases Europe's de facto dependence on NATO and the United States, yet another example of the unresolved inconsistencies in the party's position on defense issues.

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⁹⁴ Data from an October 1976 Eurobarometer survey, conducted for the European Communities and graciously made available to me by Professor Inglehart, suggest that the July 1976 USIA survey may have exaggerated somewhat the long-term impact of the events of the spring and summer. The 1976 slump in solidarity with the United States, though of unprecedented severity, was not without historical parallels. During the birth pangs of the Center-Left in the late 1950s, while the United States was actively opposing this shift in the axis of Italian domestic politics, Italian sympathy for the United States showed a significant decline, relative to the attitudes of other Europeans. Data in Figure 5, for example, show that Italians' sense of solidarity with the United States fell from nine points above the European average in 1957 to twenty points below the European average in 1961. Italian solidarity with the United States returned to European levels between 1961 and 1963, not coincidentally the period in which American objections to the Center-Left were lifted. Other measures of sympathy for the US show the same pattern of decline 1957–1961 and resurgence 1962–1963.